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Abstract 
This thesis features two case studies exploring the George W. Bush Administration’s 
(2001 – 2009) efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, following military 
occupation in Iraq, and through ‘democracy support’ or ‘democracy assistance’ in 
Lebanon. While reviewing well rehearsed arguments that emphasise the 
inappropriateness of the methods employed to promote Western liberal democracy in 
Middle East countries and the difficulties in the way of democracy being fostered by 
foreign powers, it focuses on two factors that also contributed to derailing the U.S.’s 
plans to introduce ‘Western style’ liberal democracy to Iraq and Lebanon.  
The first is the adverse impact upon the U.S.’s efforts to foster democracy in Iraq 
caused by bureaucratic in-fighting and conflicting U.S. agency agendas. The argument 
is that the internecine struggles between competing U.S. agencies, not only in the build-
up to the invasion of Iraq, but also during the post-war occupation of that country, 
helped to undermine the Bush Administration’s policy there. In Lebanon the study 
shows that, notwithstanding the non-military approach the Bush Administration pursued 
there, its efforts again still fell short of the grand rhetoric which accompanied the shift 
in U.S. foreign policy toward democracy promotion in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 
2003 Iraq war. 
The second factor put forward in this study as also significant in the failure of the Bush 
enterprise is the widespread suspicion of U.S. motives across Iraq, Lebanon and the 
wider Arab world. The thesis argues that such suspicions are reflective of the broader 
issues of credibility and trust which have bedevilled U.S. democracy promotion. The 
analysis to follow will show how Bush’s democracy campaign was compromised by a 
prevalent anti-American sentiment borne out of the deep and pervasive suspicions of 
U.S. motives.  
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Note on Transliteration 
Arabic words have been transliterated in accordance with the standard practice in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies. The spelling of Arabic names and places 
has been based on the most prevalent practice used in books. As far as those 
interviewed are concerned, the translation of their names is based on how the 
individuals concerned spell it themselves.  
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Chronology of key events in Iraq 2001 – 2009 
Date Event  
11/09/2001 Suicide Attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon.  
2002  January: President George W. Bush identifies Iraq as part of an ‘axis of 
evil’; 
June: Bush Administration finalise war plans against Iraq; 
October: US Congress passes resolution authorising use of military 
force against Iraq.  
20/01/2003 National Security Presidential Directive 24, creating Head of the Office 
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). 
19/03/2003 In an address to the American people, President George W. Bush 
announces that coalition forces began striking Iraqi military targets to 
neutralize Saddam Hussein’s army - Start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
09/04/2003 The Liberation of Iraq. U.S. forces advance into central Baghdad. 
Saddam Hussein’s grip on the city is broken and his statue is toppled. 
There is widespread looting in Baghdad and elsewhere.   
21/04/2003 General Jay Garner arrives in Baghdad as the appointed Head of ORHA 
to rule Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion.   
01/05/2003 President George W. Bush announces major combat operations in Iraq 
have ended.  
11/05/2003 Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III succeeds Jay Garner as chief U.S. 
civilian administrator in Iraq heading the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA).  
16/05/2003 Bremer issues CPA Order No.1, disbanding the Baa’th party (De-
Baathification).  
22/05/2003 United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1483, lifting 13 
sanctions regime on Iraq and granting the U.S.-led coalition authority to 
govern Iraq.  
23/05/2003 Bremer issues CPA Order No.2 which dissolves the Iraqi Armed Forces, 
the ministries of Defence and Information, and other security institutions 
that supported Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
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13/07/2003 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) created.  
08/09/2003 Bremer op-ed appears in Washington Post.  
15/11/2003 The United States and the IGC agree to speed up transition to 
sovereignty by June 30, 2004. Agreement to terminate CPA and launch 
Iraqi Interim Government.  
08/03/2004 IGC approves an interim constitution, called the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL), which lays out a roadmap for parliamentary 
elections and a constitutional referendum.   
30/04/2004 Prisoner abuse scandal breaks in the U.S. media (CBS News) and 
evidence of prison abuse inside the US-run Abu Ghraib prison is widely 
condemned.  
28/05/2004 IGC names Iyad Allawi, a secular Shia, who leads the Iraqi National 
Accord faction, Prime Minister of the incoming interim government.  
02/06/2004 IGC dissolves itself.  
08/06/2004 Resolution 1546 is adopted by the U.N. Security Council. The resolution 
declares the end of the occupation of Iraq and endorses a fully sovereign 
and independent interim government that will serve from June 30, 2004, 
until elections in January 2005. 
28/06/2004 The United States hands over power to the Iraqi Interim Government 
headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and President Sheikh Ghazi al-
Yawar. Ambassador Paul Bremer leaves the country.  
15/11/2004 US-led forces retake the Sunni rebel stronghold of Fallujah, killing 
approximately 2,000, and capturing 1,200 people including a number of 
non-Iraqis.  
30/11/2004 The Association of Muslim Scholars, a Sunni political group in Iraq, 
announces a boycott of upcoming parliamentary elections. 
27/12/2004 The Iraqi Islamic party, the largest Sunni Muslim party, withdraws from 
the election. 
30/01/2005 Elections for the Transitional National Assembly, along with elections 
for the Kurdish Regional Parliament and Iraq’s 18 Governorate 
Councils.  
07/04/2005 Iraq’s new president, Jalal Talabani, elected on April 6, 2005, names the 
Shia leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime Minister. 
28/04/2005 Members of the newly elected Iraqi parliament sanction the first elected 
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government since the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
01/08/2005 Deadline for drafting permanent constitution.  
15/10/2005 Millions of Iraqis vote in a referendum on Iraq’s new constitution. 
15/12/2005 Iraqis vote for their first, full-term government.  
21/01/2006 It is announced that the Shiite-led United Iraqi Alliance has emerged as 
the winner of more seats than any other group. 
22/04/2006 United Iraqi Alliance names Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister.  
03/05/2006 Iraq’s parliament meets for its first full legislative session since it was 
elected in December 2005. 
08/06/2006 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq is killed in a U.S.-led 
air strike near Baquba.  
08/07/2006 Five U.S. soldiers are charged with the rape and murder of a young Iraqi 
woman and the murder of three members of her family in 
Mahmoudiyah. The incident marks the latest in string of alleged 
incidents of abuse by U.S. soldiers.  
08/11/2006 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld steps down and President Bush 
nominates Dr. Robert M. Gates to be Secretary of Defense. 
06/12/2006 The Iraq Study Group (ISG) calls for, and recommends a change of 
course in U.S. policy, saying conditions in Iraq are “grave and 
deteriorating”.  
10/02/2007 General David H. Petraeus assumes command of U.S. forces in Iraq. 
U.S. sends 28,000 extra troops to Iraq to implement new security plan.  
13/01/2008 A new law reverses elements of the 2003 “de-Baathification” policy and 
allows some to return to government.  
23/04/2008 General Petraeus’s former No. 2 in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno is 
named the new commanding General in Iraq.   
20/01/2009 Barack Obama assumes office of the President of the United States of 
America.  
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Chronology of key events in Lebanon 2001 – 2009 
Date  Event  
06/05/2002  As a follow-up to his 2002 State of Union address, and in a speech 
entitled “Beyond the Axis of Evil”, President George W. Bush 
expanded the “forces of evil” bearing down on the world to include 
Syria.  
12/04/2003 US Congress promulgated the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act 
03/05/2003  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented Syrian President, 
Bashar al-Sad with a long list of U.S. demands aimed at loosening 
Syria’s grip on Lebanon.  
02/09/2009 Promulgation of UNSC 1559 which supported free and fair 
presidential elections in Lebanon and called upon remaining foreign 
forces to withdraw from the country.  
14/02/2005 Former Lebanese premier, Rafik Hariri is killed by a car bomb in 
Beirut. The attack sparks anti-Syrian rallies and the resignation of 
Prime Minister Omar Karami’s cabinet. Calls for Syria to withdraw its 
troops intensify until its forces leave in April. Assassinations of anti-
Syrian figures become a feature of political life. 
29/04/2005 Withdrawal of Syrian Forces from Lebanon  
29/05/2005 First Parliamentary elections in Lebanon in thirty years without a 
Syrian military or intelligence presence.  
June 2005 Anti-Syrian alliance led by Saad Hariri wins control of parliament at 
elections. Hariri ally Fouad Siniora becomes prime minister. 
July – August 
2006 
Israel attacks after Hezbollah kidnaps two Israeli soldiers. Civilian 
casualties are high and the damage to civilian infrastructure wide-
ranging in 34-day war. UN peacekeeping force deploys along the 
southern border, followed by Lebanese army troops for first time in 
decades. 
May 2007 UN Security Council votes to set up a tribunal to try suspects in the 
assassination of ex-premier Hariri. 
May 2008 Parliament elects army chief Michel Suleiman as president, ending six-
month-long political deadlock. Gen Suleiman re-reappoints Fouad 
Siniora as prime minister of national unity government.  
October 2008 Lebanon establishes diplomatic relations with Syria for first time since 
both countries gained independence in 1940s.  
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March – April 
2009 
International court to try suspected killers of former Prime Minister 
Hariri opens in Hague.  
07/06/2009 The pro-Western March 14 alliance wins parliamentary elections and 
Saad Hariri forms unity government.  
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1 Map of Lebanon 
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Map of Iraq 
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Source: U.S. Department of State (accessed via 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm) on 17/01/2015 
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Internet source: accessed via: 
http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational%20Portfolios/
Organizations%20and%20Functions%20Guidebook/DoD_Organization_March_2012.p
df. 
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Source: Feith, D.J. (2008) War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the 
War on Terrorism (New York: Harper Collins: p.531, Appendix 1) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
______________________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
______________________________________________________________________ 
This chapter will present the introduction to the study. It will focus on the following: 
 Definitions of key terminology and their interpretation by the George W. Bush 
administration; 
 The hypotheses of the study; 
 The research questions; 
 The basis for choosing Iraq and Lebanon as country case studies; 
 A review of the literature; 
 The structure of the subsequent chapters; and  
 The methodology adopted to examine the aims and objectives of the study.  
DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMINOLOGY AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 
BY THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
The key terms requiring definitions are ‘Western style liberal democracy’, ‘democracy 
promotion’ and ‘democracy support’. These terms occupy a central position within this 
study. A basic understanding of these terms and their relevance to George W. Bush’s 
democratization campaign in Iraq and Lebanon is therefore integral to this study.  
Let us start with a definition of the term ‘Western style liberal democracy’. Deriving 
from the classical Greek ‘rule by the people’ the term democracy is now synonymous 
with ‘Western – style liberal democracy’ in which leaders are elected by citizens to act 
on their behalf (Luckham et al 2003). This simplified and concise connotation of the 
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term however does not command consensus amongst democratic theorists who argue 
that the concept of democracy has a number of different meanings and in essence, 
remains a fundamentally contested concept. Democratic theorists such as Robert Dahl 
and James Hyland have indeed found it difficult to construct a definitive meaning of the 
term. In attempting to state what democracy actually is, Dahl lamented that “a term that 
means anything means nothing. And so it is has become with ‘democracy’, which 
nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague 
endorsement of a popular idea” (Dahl 1989:2). This perspective is endorsed by Hyland 
who makes the point that “Everyone purports to be in favour of democracy, but there is 
little agreement over what democracy is” (Hyland 1995: 36). 
As a result of the widespread disagreement and diversity of views amongst democratic 
theorists about what the concept of democracy means and how it is best expressed as an 
ideal, this study inclines towards the most widely accepted definition of democracy 
advanced by Dahl which highlights no fewer than seven institutional components.  
According to Dahl, ‘modern democracy’ is a type of regime in which: 
1. Control over government decisions is constitutionally vested 
in elected officials; 
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections; 
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote; 
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective office; 
5. Citizens have the right to express themselves on political matters broadly 
defined, including criticism of officials; 
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information 
[which] are protected by law; and  
7. Citizens have a right to form relatively independent associations and 
organizations including political parties and interest groups (Dahl 
1982:11).  
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Following on from the definition of ‘Western style liberal democracy’, and turning next 
to the term ‘democracy promotion’, we find that a definition of this term is also not 
uniformly agreed. Nancy Bermeo defines ‘democracy promotion’ as the ‘ideational 
project of framing democracy as the best form of government’ (Bermeo 2009: 243). 
Whilst the idea of democracy, as a general formula for governance, has universal appeal 
and theoretical legitimacy, the definition of the term ‘democracy promotion’ adopted in 
this study is that which is advanced by Peter Burnell. Burnell defines the term as a ‘wide 
range of largely non-coercive attempts to spread democracy abroad’ (Burnell 2011: 1-
2). At the heart of this definition is a kind of political intervention in the domestic 
affairs of countries that seeks to affect the distribution of power there (Dauderstadt & 
Lerch 2005 – cited in Burnell 2011: 2) mainly by patient and non-violent involvement, 
although some (e.g. Palmer 2003 – cited in Burnell 2011: 2) argue that in certain 
situations, more forceful action might be needed. 
The final term ‘democracy support’ was coined following the unwelcome association of 
‘democracy promotion’ with regime change through the use of force. According to the 
academics Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki, instead of practicing ‘democracy promotion’, 
‘democracy support’ took over as a generic term to describe the activities of the U.S. 
and other Western democracy promotion actors (Bridoux & Kurki 2014: 58 – 59). This 
form of support is closely tied with the already long -existing strategy of achieving 
democratic change through ‘democracy assistance’ from the ground up (Lennon 2009). 
The term ‘democracy assistance’ has been described as the ensemble of techniques and 
instruments that are activated to implement democracy support programmes (Bridoux & 
Kurki 2014: 59). It includes programming, sourcing of partners, technical support of 
target governments and NGOs – training, financial and material support, follow up, and 
assessment of programmes’ effectiveness (Bridoux & Kurki 2014: 59). Bridoux and 
30 | P a g e  
 
Kurki make the point that, the U.S. Administration develops democracy assistance 
programmes around four pillars: civil society, elections and political processes, 
governance, and rule of law. U.S. governmental democracy support actors then rely on a 
sophisticated procurement system to choose organizations they will work with – both 
U.S.-based NGOs and the target country’s NGOs (Bridoux & Kurki 2014: 59). These 
NGOs are in charge of deploying an array of techniques to achieve the aims specified in 
the programmes that are implemented. Achievements are constantly monitored 
according to specific assessment methods to ensure that the programmes financed by 
the U.S. government progresses according to plan (Bridoux & Kurki 2014: 59).  
Having now settled on working definitions of the terms ‘Western style liberal 
democracy’, ‘democracy promotion’ and ‘democracy support’,  it is important to clarify 
how these concepts were interpreted by the Bush administration and subsequently 
utilised in its foreign policymaking.  
For a start, by engaging in democracy promotion in Iraq and Lebanon, the Bush 
Administration aimed to promote ‘Western style liberal democracy’. When the 
Administration spoke about ‘democracy promotion’ or ‘democracy support’ it had a 
very clear idea of the shape and form it wanted ‘democracy’ to take. The version of 
democracy which U.S. implementers aimed to introduce in Iraq, Lebanon and the wider 
Arab world looked a lot like the American liberal democratic system and the values that 
underpin it. There seemed to have been little debate amongst Bush and his team over 
exactly what counts as a ‘democracy’ other than to assume that it resembles ‘Western 
style liberal democracy’ or specifically, U.S. – style democracy. The U.S. strategy of 
democracy promotion in Iraq, Lebanon and the wider Arab World is therefore more 
accurately viewed as a direct attempt to export the political [and economic] institutions 
that comprise the American liberal democratic system. Indeed, the rhetoric which 
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surrounded Bush’s effort to spread democracy in Iraq, Lebanon and the Arab World 
implied that the political system is applicable in a standardized (Western) form, that it 
can succeed in the Middle East region, it can remedy the region’s democratic deficit, 
and that it can bring peace within Arab societies and between nations, rather than sow 
disorder. There was also very little need to spell out the main features of the preferred 
political system. Bush’s Vice President Dick Cheney (2001 – 2009) reflected this sense 
in interview with Stephen F. Hayes, a senior writer for the Weekly Standard, when he 
stated that:  
I am a big democracy advocate. And I say that for a couple of 
reasons. Because on the one hand I think we have an obligation, 
we Americans, if we go in and take down a government to do the 
best we can to stand up a new one in its place that meets the 
standards and principles that we believe in.......Political reform 
is part of that.......(Hayes 2007: 474). 
In his memoir, In My Time, Cheney reiterated his view with regard to Iraq: 
If the United States took military action and removed Saddam 
from power, we had an obligation to ensure that what followed 
reflected our values and belief in freedom and democracy. It 
may well have been easier simply to hand pick another Iraqi 
strongman and install him in one of Saddam’s palaces, but that 
would have been inconsistent with American values and, in my 
view, immoral (Cheney 2011: 387 – 388).  
Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.S. Presidential Envoy, 
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III (2003 – 2004), oversaw the production of 
Iraq’s interim constitution - referred to as the Transitional Administrative 
Law (TAL) - which defined a Western-style parliamentary democracy. 
Yudith Yaphe states that the TAL document described Iraq’s government as 
“republican, federal, democratic, and pluralist” (Yaphe 2010: 240 – 260). 
Bremer himself described the TAL document as follows:  
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The Transitional Administrative Law, written and approved by 
the Iraqi Governing Council........lays out the path Iraqis will 
follow to sovereignty, elections and democracy” (cited in Allawi 
2007: 219).  
According to Bremer, the TAL document which was written in 2003 by 
Iraqis but with “guidance” from Bush Administration advisers   resonated 
with protections for individual rights and civil liberties, as detailed in 
Western constitutions. Regarding the task of preparing the TAL document, 
Bremer stated that: 
To meet President Bush’s vision for the New Iraq, the interim 
constitution would have to establish guarantees of fundamental 
individual rights, address the contentious issue of federalism, 
and establish checks and balances to protect against a slide 
back into tyranny. Of course, Iraq’s democracy would not be 
like America’s. The Iraqis would have to decide their own 
structure. But these basic principles would be essential, we 
judged, for long-term stability in a country riven by sectarian 
tensions [Bremer 2006: 213]. 
Ali Allawi, who served as minister of trade and later minister of defence in 
the Cabinet of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and who was also a 
member of the Transitional National Assembly and Minister of Finance in 
the Transitional National Government of Iraq, states that the text of the draft 
TAL enshrined principles that were supposed to guide the transitional 
process, and even the constitutional framework, of Iraq. He argues that the 
TAL’s preamble was worded in stirring terms, reminiscent of permanent 
constitutions – and utterly alien in construction and phraseology from the 
Arabic language and the Iraqi experience. “The people of Iraq, striving to 
reclaim their freedom .....” the TAL began. It talked about pluralism, gender 
rights, separation of powers and civilian control over the armed forces – 
none of which according to Allawi were even remotely familiar terms in 
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Iraq. Allawi states that the TAL embodied western, specifically American 
notions, and was carefully supervised by the CPA. He states that each 
significant point had been pre-cleared with the NSC in Washington and 
neither the CPA nor its drafters envisaged it as anything less than the basic 
model for Iraq’s permanent constitution (Allawi 2007: 222).  
Furthermore, the Bush administration used the antithetical concepts of “democracy” and 
“freedom” interchangeably. Notwithstanding the intellectual efforts which highlight the 
tensions that exist between “freedom” and “democracy”, and the fundamental 
differences between the two concepts, the distinction that these efforts drew, seemed 
lost on the Bush administration. In their statements, Bush and his senior officials 
espoused the notion that where there is democracy, citizens of a country enjoy 
fundamental freedoms and are free to exercise their inalienable rights. Indeed, the 
perspective, it would seem, was why spell it out? Isn’t ‘democracy’ synonymous with 
‘freedom’? If you want ‘freedom’ and the fall of the old regime, isn’t it obvious that 
‘democracy’ is what you seek? If these questions seem rhetorical, it is because at all 
material times, Bush and key members of his cabinet sought to make a connection 
between democratic values and the fundamental values of freedom and human 
goodness.  
In his memoir, Decision Points, Bush stated that one of the aims of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ 
was to advance liberty and hope – the so-called ‘forward strategy for freedom’ agenda. 
Reiterating the point he made during his Second Inaugural Address when he stated that 
“America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one”, Bush added:  
 
Critics charged that the freedom agenda was a way for America 
to impose our values on others. But freedom is not an American 
value; it is a universal value. Freedom cannot be imposed; it 
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must be chosen. And when people are given the choice, they 
choose freedom (Bush 2010:396).  
The fullest elaboration of Bush’s ‘twin ideology’ came in the form of the National 
Security Strategy (NSS), a document that the White House issues annually at the behest 
of Congress. In the wake of 9/11, Bush set out to clarify the values his government 
stood for in the world. In the second section of the 2002 National Security Strategy of 
the United States, which outlined the aim to ‘Champion Aspirations for Human 
Dignity’, Bush spelt out the key objectives of his democratization agenda as follows: 
We will: 
 Speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of 
human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to 
advance freedom; 
 Use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle 
non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are 
rewarded for the steps they take; 
 Make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes 
in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other 
democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to 
move toward a better future; and  
 Take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and 
defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.  
 
We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it 
(NSS 2002: 4). 
 
Bush’s Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice (2005 – 2009), re-affirmed the former 
president’s ‘twin ideology’ when in her confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, she listed the priorities of the Administration’s diplomacy as 
follows:  
 
.......we will unite the community of democracies in building an 
international system that is based on shared values and the rule 
of law.......we will spread freedom and democracy throughout 
the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set for 
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America in the world and is the great mission of American 
diplomacy today2. 
 
In a speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. on 
February 17, 2005, the former Under Secretary for Defense Policy in the Bush 
Administration, Douglas J. Feith (2001 - 2005), also remarked that: 
  
A key element of the president’s strategy is the interest that the 
United States has in seeing freedom and democracy gain ground 
in the world3.  
 
In addition, in his interview with the Weekly Standard’s Stephen F. Hayes, Dick Cheney 
echoed Rice and Feith’s remarks when he stated that:  
 
...........What the president’s recommending is supporting the 
proposition that we can have a bigger impact on that part of the 
globe [the Arab world] by supporting freedom and democracy 
(Hayes 2007:474).  
 
Bush followed this rhetoric in the 2006 NSS document when he explicitly declared the 
spread of ‘democracy and freedom’ as a defining objective of his administration’s 
foreign policy. The NSS 2006 stated that:  
 
To protect our Nation and honour our values, the United States 
seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an 
international effort to end tyranny and promote effective 
democracy (NSS 2006:3). 
 
Thus, we see that the key tenet of Bush’s democratization agenda was that ‘democracy’ 
and ‘political freedom’ are for all practical purposes synonymous with each other. 
                                                          
2 Opening statement by Dr. Condoleezza Rice’s before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on 18th January 2005 – internet source: accessed via http://www.age-of-the-
sage.org/sharansky/rice_confirmation - accessed on 16/11/2012;  
3 Accessed via http://www.cfr.org – on 16/11/2012 
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Whilst Bush and his officials were somewhat vague and imprecise in their interpretation 
of Dahl’s widely accepted definition, it could be reasonably inferred that their intention 
was to uphold the core tenets of this definition. If a difference in perception between 
Bush and Dahl’s conceptualisation of ‘democracy’ exists, it is explained primarily by 
the fact that ‘democracy’ remains a fundamentally and famously contested concept - the 
philosopher W.B. Gallie described democracy as one of the “essentially contested 
concepts” for it is “the appraisive political concept par excellence” (Gallie 1956:184). 
For this reason, and given that the definition of ‘democracy’ is continuously amended to 
suit its particular user’s need, this study does not aim to define ‘democracy’ 
conclusively, but operationally. Through this process, we can critically analyse what 
Bush and his officials talked about, and aimed to promote and install in Iraq, Lebanon 
and the wider Middle East region.  
 
Some help towards understanding Bush’s operational definition of ‘democracy’ is 
offered by the U.S. based Freedom House organization which was founded by Eleanor 
Roosevelt and other notable Americans in 1941 to be a voice for ‘democracy’ and 
‘freedom’ in the world. In its mission statement, Freedom House underscores the point 
that: 
 Freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in 
which the governments are accountable to their own people; the 
rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, 
and belief, as well as respect for their rights of minorities and 
woman, are guaranteed4.  
 
Also, in its publicised statement on the 2003 Iraq War, Freedom House echoed its 
mission statement, and urged a commitment to free elections, multiple political parties, 
freedom of association, independent trade unions, women’s equality and rights, an 
                                                          
4 Accessed via http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2 on 16/11/2012;  
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independent judiciary, separation of religion from the state, an independent press, and 
religious tolerance in Iraq and throughout the Middle East region5.Taken together, these 
statements clearly indicate that ‘freedom’ is generally viewed as a basic determinant of 
‘democracy’, and that to qualify as a democracy a given political system has to 
guarantee  essential ‘freedoms’.  It would seem therefore, that there is certainly a degree 
of overlap or better described, an interdependent relationship between the two terms 
with ‘democracy’ acting as an umbrella concept which embodies the core principle of 
‘freedom’. It could be argued that this interdependent relationship is what Bush and his 
officials (who included Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy 
and Global Affairs (2001 - 2009) and currently (2015) a member of the Board of 
Trustees of Freedom House) embraced and emphasised within their global 
democratization agenda. From this analysis, it could be argued further that what was 
purposefully being advocated by Bush, was the appropriateness of the application of 
Dahl’s definition as within the language of his Administration’s democratization 
agenda, “I am a democratic state” translated to “I am legitimate, I am fair, and I can 
guarantee fundamental freedoms”.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
This study advances two hypotheses. There are relevant considerations in respect of 
each hypothesis which help to clearly mark out the parameters and scope of this study. 
The hypotheses and the relevant considerations in respect of each are as follows:  
The First Hypothesis 
It is the aim of this study to first show that the democracy infrastructure utilized by the 
Bush administration, and the personnel it called upon to advance its democratization 
                                                          
5 Accessed via: www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-statement-iraq-war -  on 
16/11/2012;  
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strategy, - which comprised for the most part, various branches of the U.S. government 
- experienced difficulty in achieving strategic cooperation or convergence on 
approaches to democratisation ‘on the ground’ in Iraq and also within the corridors of 
power in the United States.  
Illustrating this, this study will present evidence of communication failures and lapses in 
teamwork among the myriad agencies of the U.S. government. It will draw attention in 
particular to the bureaucratic infighting between the U.S. State Department, which is the 
constitutionally nominated overseer of U.S. foreign policy, and Defense Department 
whose job it was to advise Bush on the U.S.’s defence policy. The State Department 
officers were tasked to ensure that efforts undertaken by other groups did not serve to 
undermine U.S. foreign policy. This coordination function was extremely difficult to 
execute in Iraq because there were other important actors in Iraq and in Washington 
with responsibility for various implementation efforts. The evidence presented in this 
study shows that the lines of authority and coordination responsibility were often 
unclear, and particularly blurred in the dealings between State and Defense officials.  
 
The relevant considerations relating to the first hypothesis are: 
 
(1)  It is not the aim of this study to analyse U.S. democratisation efforts in Iraq and 
Lebanon in terms of the political outcomes in these countries. Indeed, this study 
appreciates that the U.S. cannot be the primary determinant of the status of 
democratic currents in Iraq and Lebanon. What is certain is that the most basic, 
consistent lesson coming out of the experience of democracy promotion in other 
regions is that external actors, even very determined ones, rarely have a decisive 
impact on the political direction of other societies. The political history and 
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circumstances of Iraq and Lebanon are unique and distinctive, and the evolution 
of pluralistic political systems within these societies will inevitably follow its 
own path. This point was endorsed by George W. Bush in his NSS 2006, when 
he declared that “We have a responsibility to promote human freedom. Yet 
freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. The form that freedom and 
democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to 
its people” (Bush, NSS 2006:5). Consequently, this study accepts that it would 
be naive to trace the ebb and flow of democracy’s advancement in Iraq and 
Lebanon through the successes and failures of the U.S.’s ‘democratisation 
project’.  
 
(2) This study does not argue that it was the primary intention of the U.S.’s grand 
democracy strategy to disconnect rhetoric on democracy promotion from 
practise or that the Bush administration was not genuinely committed to 
democracy promotion in Iraq and Lebanon as a general proposition. Rather, the 
perspective taken by this study is that the U.S.’s declared policy failed to match 
policy deeds because of the unintended consequence of a series of decisions or 
miscalculations made by key U.S. policy makers.  
 
(3)  The failure by U.S. agencies to achieve strategic cooperation or convergence on 
approaches to Bush’s democracy campaign is not being emphasised as the sole 
explanation for the U.S.’s failure to match rhetoric with policy deeds in Iraq and 
Lebanon.     
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The Second Hypothesis 
The second hypothesis argues that deep and pervasive suspicions of U.S. motives 
amongst many Iraqis and Lebanese, and also the anti-American sentiment that is shared 
by these people with the rest of the Arab world, further undermined the Bush 
administration’s efforts to promote democratic change in Iraq and Lebanon in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war.  
The relevant considerations relating to the second hypothesis are: 
(1)  The suspicion of U.S. motives amongst Iraqis and Lebanese cannot be 
attributed solely to the disconnection between U.S. rhetoric and practise vis-a-
vis democracy promotion. The negative image of the U.S. permeating Iraqi and 
Lebanese societies is the product of history of U.S. foreign policy towards both 
countries and across the Arab world. 
(2) Whilst it is argued that the glaring gap between talk and action has caused Iraqis 
and Lebanese to question the depth of the U.S.’s normative commitment to the 
democratic cause, this study does not argue that Iraqis and Lebanese do not 
support democratic ideals or the foreign policies that seek to advance them.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study seeks answers to the following research questions:  
 To what extent did the various branches of the U.S. government tasked with 
democracy promotion experience difficulty in achieving strategic cooperation or 
convergence in the build – up to the 2003 Iraq war, and on approaches to 
democratisation ‘on the ground’ in Iraq?  
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 Based on the scholarly literature consulted, how do Iraqis and Lebanese perceive 
U.S. efforts to promote democracy in their respective countries and what impact, 
if any, did such perceptions have on U.S. democratisation efforts? 
ORIGINALITY OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is entering a scholarly conversation that is already in progress. Its novelty 
rests on its ability to furnish the current dialogues and debates with a body of work that 
is representative of the Iraqi and Lebanese case studies. The primary sources relied upon 
and the feedback obtained from interviews conducted form an important and original 
aspect of this.  
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ AND LEBANON 
Why Iraq and Lebanon? 
The choice of Iraq and Lebanon can be justified on two fronts. The first justification can 
be drawn from a U.S. policy perspective whilst the second justification is linked to the 
two countries’ political, intellectual and sociological make-up which is deemed relevant 
for understanding their capacities and political desires to accommodate the introduction 
and internalisation of democratic norms.  
Turning first to the U.S. policy perspective, we find that in the wake of 9/11, Iraq and 
Lebanon acted as centrepieces in the George W. Bush’s democratization agenda in the 
Middle East. Thereafter, both countries featured prominently in the U.S.’s rhetorical 
commitment to democratize the Arab world.  
Iraq featured first on Bush’s freedom agenda as U.S. efforts to democratize the Middle 
East became more pronounced after 9/11 with sustained attention directed towards 
achieving ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in that country.  
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The apparent lack of democracy in Iraq was touted as one of the main justifications for 
the invasion of that country by the US-led coalition in 2003. Bush stated that one of the 
reasons for starting the war in Iraq was to bring democracy to that country:  
[We] are committed to a strategic goal of a free Iraq that is 
democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain 
itself6. 
However, and contrary to Bush’s stated aim to democratize Iraq in the 
aftermath of 9/11, key members of his administration held differing views. 
Douglas Feith explained that in his view, the reason to go to war with Iraq 
was self-defence. In his memoir, Feith stated:  
I do not doubt that President Bush meant what he said when he 
spoke high-mindedly of his policies and the unselfish, 
humanitarian benefits he hoped to achieve. But to my knowledge 
– and contrary to what his critics have charged – he never 
argued, in public or private, that the United States should go to 
war in order to spread democracy. While he was willing to 
conclude that the United States might have to go to war in self-
defence, I never heard him say that we should do so simply or 
primarily to help a foreign pro-democracy movement oust a 
dictator (Feith 2008: 234).  
Feith added: 
I did not think that a U.S. president could properly decide to go 
to war just to spread democracy, in the absence of a threat 
requiring self-defense. I did not see democracy promotion as 
trumping every other national security consideration (Feith 
2008: 235).  
Whilst endorsing Feith’s view to a certain extent, Condoleezza Rice stated 
in her memoir, No Higher Honour - which is based on her years in 
                                                          
6 President Bush meets with Senior U.S. Defense Officials on Iraq, December 13, 2006. 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2006/12/20061213-5html] cited in CRS Report for 
Congress, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, December 26, 2007, 
Congressional Research Service.  
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Washington - that Bush’s plan was always to pursue a democratization 
effort on the ground in Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion of that country. 
Rice stated:  
Moreover, we did not go to Iraq to bring democracy any more 
than Roosevelt went to war against Hitler to democratize 
Germany, though that became American policy once the Nazis 
were defeated. We went to war because we saw a threat to our 
national security and that of our allies. But if we did have to 
overthrow Saddam, the United States had to have a view of what 
would come next. When the NSC had that discussion, some 
members, including Don [Donald Rumsfeld] argued that we had 
no such obligation. If a strongman emerged, so be it. But the 
President believed that the use of U.S. military power had to be 
followed by an affirmation of the United States’ principles. If 
war occurred, we would try to build a democratic Iraq. And 
democracy in the Arab heartland would in turn help 
democratize the Middle East and address the freedom gap that 
was the source of hopelessness and terrorism (Rice 2011: 187).  
In his memoir, Known and Unknown, Bush’s Defense Secretary, Donald 
Rumsfeld (2001 – 2006) expressed his view on Bush’s plans to democratize 
Iraq:   
I had another issue with the President’s remarks. “The 
transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is 
worth every effort”, Bush had said. “Our coalition will stay 
until our work is done”. That was not the way I had understood 
our plan. A nation that had suffered under decades of dictatorial 
rule was unlikely to quickly reorganize itself into a stable, 
modern, democratic state. Deep sectarian and ethnic divisions, 
concealed by a culture of repression and forced submission to 
Saddam, lurked just below the surface of Iraqi society.....I hoped 
Iraq would turn toward some form of representative 
government, but I thought we needed to be clear-eyed about 
democracy’s prospects in the country... (Rumsfeld 2011: 498).  
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Rumsfeld added: 
I wondered as well how we would define democracy if that 
became our goal. If Iraq never created an American – style 
system of government, would that mean that our mission had 
been a failure or that the troops would have to stay indefinitely? 
Emphasis on Iraqi democracy invited critics of the war to find 
the innumerable instances in which Iraq would inevitably fall 
short ....Bringing democracy to Iraq had not been among the 
primary rationales (Rumsfeld 2011: 499).  
Notwithstanding Feith, Rice and Rumsfeld’s comments, - which suggest that democracy 
promotion was not an overriding objective or prime factor in shaping Iraq policy within 
the Bush administration post-911 - Bush publicly vowed to bring democracy to Iraq and 
the wider Middle East and he told an audience of foreign policy and defence experts in 
London’s historic Banqueting House, Whitehall Palace, in the keynote speech of his 
state visit to Britain on 19th November 2003 that:  
We will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, by 
finishing the work of democracy we have begun7 .  
Achieving democracy in Iraq, it was said, would also significantly act as an impetus and 
unarguably provide a powerful model for democratic change in the Arab world. As 
Larry Diamond argued shortly before serving as a senior adviser to the CPA in 
Baghdad:  
In its most extravagant expressions, the democratic 
transformation of Iraq is envisioned as a geopolitical 
earthquake that will shake Middle Eastern autocracies to their 
foundations and finally extend the global wave of 
democratization to the last major region to hold out against it 
(Diamond 2003).  
                                                          
7 Internet source: accessed via http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/11/19/raw-data - on 
17/12/2013;  
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Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (2001 – 
2003) in the Bush Administration also argued:  
A democratic Iraq would be a powerful refutation of the 
patronising view that Arabs are incapable of democracy8.  
Furthermore, Paul Wolfowitz, Bush’s Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001 – 2005) spoke 
to Bill Keller, a New York Times reporter in September 2002 and stated: 
I don’t think it’s unreasonable to think that Iraq, properly 
managed – and it’s going to take a lot of attention, and the 
stakes are enormous ....it really could turn out to be, I hesitate to 
say it, the first Arab democracy ...I think the more we are 
committed to influencing the outcome, the more chance there 
could be that it would be something quite significant for Iraq. 
And I think if it’s significant for Iraq, it’s going to cast a very 
large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, but across the whole 
Arab world, I think  (cited in Allawi 2007:77).  
Bush echoed Diamond, Perle and Wolfowitz’s arguments in numerous 
public speeches as he sought to advance the case for his Administration’s 
democratization agenda in Iraq. During his speech to the World Affairs 
Council of Philadelphia in 2005 he stated that: 
The advance of freedom in the Middle East requires freedom in 
Iraq. By helping Iraqis build a lasting democracy, we will 
spread the hope of liberty across a troubled region, and we’ll 
gain new allies in the cause of freedom............9. 
                                                          
8 Comments by Richard Perle cited in James Fallows, “The Fifty-First State?” in The Atlantic, 
November 1, 2002 – accessed via http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/1 - on 
29/08/2013; 
9 Bush, G.W., ‘The Struggle for Democracy in Iraq: Speech to the World Affairs Council of 
Philadelphia’, 12/12/2005 – accessed via 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/12.12.05.html, - on 29/08/2013;  
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Earlier, in his remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner on 26th 
February 2003, Bush had trumpeted his democratic crusade and advanced the case for 
the invasion of Iraq by declaring that: 
 The world has an interest in the spread of democratic values. A 
new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring 
example of freedom for other nations in the region10.  
Furthermore, in his speech on 6th November 2003 at the 20th Anniversary of the 
National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, Bush declared that: 
 Iraqi democracy will succeed ....... and that success will send 
forth the news from Damascus to Tehran that freedom can be 
the future of every nation11.  
As the audience at the National Endowment for Democracy answered Bush’s rallying 
cry for democracy promotion in the Arab world with hearty applause, the former 
president went on to purposefully declare that:  
The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East 
will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution12.  
To this end, and in view of the dramatic events in the region dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’, 
former U.S. policy makers in the Bush administration, and neoconservatives, have 
argued that the inspiration for the popular demonstrations emanated from the attempts 
by the U.S. to promote freedom and democracy in Iraq. Dick Cheney suggested that the 
“Arab Spring” was one of the “ripple effects” of America’s toppling of Saddam Hussein 
in Iraq (Norton 2012: 16), and Bush’s speechwriter Peter Wehner claimed “vindication 
                                                          
10 Internet source: accessed via http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy  - on 
29/08/2013;  
11 Internet source: accessed via http://www.ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president  - on 
29/12/12;  
12 Ibid;  
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for Bush’s freedom agenda”. Robert Kagan, a neoconservative and Senior Fellow at 
U.S. think tank The Brookings Institution, also jumped on the bandwagon of vindication 
when he stated that: 
 ....there were repeated free elections in Iraq and that 
undoubtedly had some effect on how neighbouring people view 
their government.  
Kagan added:  
I think Egyptians said: ‘If the Iraqis can have elections, why 
can’t we have elections?13 
Whilst these claims are refuted by most commentators who argue that the inspiration for 
the rebellions appeared locally, and was purely indigenous (Norton 2012: 16), it is clear 
that Iraq was the main focus of attention of Bush’s democratic mission in the Arab 
world. 
After the events of 9/11, Lebanon also acquired symbolic significance in the attempts 
by the Bush Administration to promote democracy in the Middle East region. With the 
scope and influence of Syria and Iran in Lebanon, and also concerns about terrorist 
groups operating in that country, the Bush administration sought to promote its Middle 
East democratization policy in Lebanon in 2005.  
Bush supported politicians, including former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, 
who were demanding independence from Syrian military occupation. The Syrian 
presence in Lebanon was seen by the U.S. as a destabilizing factor and a hindrance to 
                                                          
13 Interview cited by journalist Jordan Michael Smith in article entitled “Neocons’ new lie” 
posted on Salon website on Wednesday, April 25, 2012 – accessed via 
www.salon.com/2012/04/25 on 29/12/12; 
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Lebanese sovereignty and political reform, whilst the Iranian regime was considered a 
serious threat to the stability of the entire Middle East.  
The assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005 intensified the U.S.’s campaign 
against the Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon. The Bush Administration reacted 
strongly to Hariri’s assassination and held Syria responsible. Bush criticized the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon and demanded the withdrawal of Syrian forces from that country. 
The U.S. government also stated its commitment to pursue justice with regard to the 
assassination of Hariri and actively supported UN Security Council Resolution 1664 
which called for the establishment of a tribunal to try the perpetrators of this crime. This 
international pressure was able to use the mass mobilisation inside Lebanon culminating 
in a demonstration in Beirut in which thousands of Lebanese took to the streets to 
demand the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. In his interview with the 
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) on 18th April 2005, President Bush stated 
that he was not surprised when he saw pictures of the demonstrations in Lebanon with 
people calling for freedom and democracy in Lebanon because everybody wants to be 
free and that the Lebanese people in particular were tired of living under a government 
which, in essence, was a foreign occupation14.  
Syria did withdraw its remaining forces from Lebanon on 29th April 2005, with many 
commentators arguing that its withdrawal was opportunistically presented abroad by the 
Bush Administration as a manifestation of the U.S.’s global democratic revolution. The 
Bush Administration took credit for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon 
claiming that the events that were taking place in Lebanon were the direct result of the 
                                                          
14 George W. Bush interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation on 18th April 2005 in 
the Map Room at the White House – accessed via 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73663 on 13/12/2014;  
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U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Paul Salem of Carnegie Endowment Middle East Center in 
Beirut made the salient point then that: 
 For the Bush Administration, the independence and success of 
Lebanon is now seen as an important feather in the cap of 
President George W. Bush’s freedom and democratization 
vision for the Middle East (Salem 2005:3).  
Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of the Beirut Spring, Lebanon was repeatedly 
touted by the Bush administration as being at the heart of the Administration’s Middle 
East democracy promotion strategy. On 8th March 2005, Bush stated that: 
 Lebanon could serve as democratic bellwether for the Middle 
East and that if Lebanon is successful [as a democratic 
experiment], it is going to ring the door of every Arab regime15.  
Bush also argued that the ‘Beirut Spring’ signalled the cracking of the region’s 
autocratic edifice and the end of Arab rulers’ ability to smother popular discontent or 
co-opt dissenters into submission (Wittes 2008: 83). He said: 
And any who doubt the appeal of freedom in the Middle East 
can look to Lebanon, where the Lebanese people are demanding 
a free and independent nation16.  
Earlier, at a news press conference on 28th February 28 2005, Paula J. Dobriansky stated 
as follows:  
In Lebanon, we see growing momentum for a ‘cedar revolution’ 
that is unifying the citizens of that nation to the cause of true 
democracy and freedom from foreign influence. Hopeful signs 
                                                          
15 George W. Bush, speech to the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 
Washington, March 8, 2005 (Accessed via: 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html  - on 12/12/12); 
16 Ibid;  
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span the globe, and there should be no doubt that the years 
ahead will be great ones for the cause of freedom17.  
The U.S. also welcomed the formation of a new Lebanese government, and in keeping 
with its concept of a global democratic revolution, the Bush Administration pledged its 
support for parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Speaking in London on Tuesday,1st 
March 2005, the day after the toppling of the Syrian – backed government in Lebanon 
by what the media called “people power”, Condoleezza Rice, offered support to 
Lebanon for free and fair elections. Rice stated that: 
 .......events in Lebanon are moving in a very important 
direction. The Lebanese people are starting to express their 
aspirations for democracy ......This is something that we support 
very much18.  
Later, and after a meeting with then Lebanese Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora on 22 July 
2005, Rice said: 
 I think that you cannot find a partner more supportive of 
Lebanon than the United States19.    
President Bush also made a personal pledge to the Lebanese people. In his 
aforementioned interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, he 
delivered this message to the Lebanese people: 
[The] United States believes in freedom, and we appreciate 
courage. We appreciate the courage of those who are willing to 
stand up and say, “We want to be free. We want to be a 
                                                          
17 Morley, Jefferson (3 March 2005) “The Branding of Lebanon’s Revolution”, The Washington 
Post – accessed via http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1 - on 19/12/2013;  
18 As reported at CNN.International.com and headlined ‘U.S. hails Lebanese democracy move – 
Government resigns amid anti-Syria protests’ (posted on Tuesday, March 1, 2005); 
19 BBC Monitoring Middle East, Text of live news conference by U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in Beirut, Lebanese LBC 
TV, July 22, 2005;  
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democracy. We want to help establish a Government that 
responds to the people”. And you will have our help20. 
Thus, like Iraq, Lebanon was viewed by the Bush administration as a country that could 
serve as a great example of what is achievable from a democratic perspective in the 
Arab world. The Administration hoped that democracy will take hold in these two 
countries and create a powerful model for the spread of democratic values in the Middle 
East region.  
Considering the second justification for choosing Iraq and Lebanon to study, we find 
that Iraq (prior to the current conflict and constitutional battle in this country) and 
Lebanon exhibit unique political characteristics. Both countries now share a significant 
common political feature in that they both possess competitive multiparty systems. 
Indeed, being competitive elective democracies, both Iraq and Lebanon are a rarity in 
the Middle East.  
Lebanon in particular has been hailed and proclaimed as arguably the most democratic 
state in the Arab world. It boasts an institutional legacy as well as democratic habits 
formed in successive generations from the 1920s onwards. Not only is Lebanon the first 
Republic to be instituted in the Arab World and the second in the Middle East (Turkey 
was first), but it also continued to abide by its constitution longer than any country in 
the region (Harik 1980: 27). Iliya Harik points out that electoral politics have persisted 
in Lebanon since 1922 and corrective measures to achieve a greater degree of 
representativeness by means of structural changes have taken place over the years 
(Harik 1980: 27) most notably under the auspices of the Ta’if Agreement and its revised 
consociational formula. Indeed, Lebanon enjoys a well-established tradition of 
                                                          
20 George W. Bush interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation on 18th April 2005 in 
the Map Room at the White House – accessed via 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73663 on 13/12/2014; 
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democratic suffrage and the civil war (1975 – 1989) was the only period after 
independence during which the country did not hold elections.  
Julia Choucair -Vizoso, a Project Associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project 
at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Editor-in-chief of the online 
journal, SADA, supports Lebanon’s democratic status pointing to the fact that since 
becoming independent in 1943, Lebanon has had regular elections, numerous political 
parties, and relatively free and lively news media under parliamentary rule (Choucair 
2006).  
Even Larry Diamond in his article entitled “Why are there no Arab democracies?” 
maintains that among the sixteen independent Arab states of the Middle East and coastal 
North Africa, Lebanon is the only one to have ever been a democracy (Diamond 2010). 
Further, it is also the view of some that in Lebanon, one can count on an overwhelming 
majority with a deep-rooted commitment to freedom and existing democratic 
institutions that merely need to be released from their bondage and allowed to function 
properly21. Paul Salem states that: 
 Lebanon has had the institutions and political culture of 
statehood and cooperative, electoral-based government for 
many decades......” and that “Although Lebanon faces many 
changes, it has not embarked on some brand new political 
adventure or experiment, but rather a process of reinforcing 
existing institutions and behaviour patterns (Salem 2005: 4).  
Regarding Iraq, this country is also considered by some to possess the appropriate 
human and economic resources to enable it to embrace democracy. Given that Iraq has 
enormous economic potential – with oil reserves second only to Saudi Arabia, its 
                                                          
21 See Article titled “Winning the War on Terror: The Case for a Free Democratic Lebanon” 
posted on the website of The National Alliance of Lebanese Americans on December 01, 2003 
at 11:05. 
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economic importance is clearly global (Dodge 2005:8) - and because Iraqi people have 
been among the most educated in the Arab world in the past, some writers are of the 
view that this country has the potential to readily assimilate liberal democracy. Eric 
Davis is a strong proponent of this view. In citing the popular wisdom in the well-
known Arabic saying which states that “The Egyptians write, the Lebanese publish, and 
the Iraqis read”, Davis argues that: 
 Iraq has the resources to create one of the most vibrant 
democracies in the Arab world – one that can become the envy 
of countries around the globe (Davis 2005b: 18).  
According to Davis,  
Iraq has the capability to become one of the most advanced 
countries of the Middle East” as it “has a large and highly 
educated middle class, a tradition of a flourishing civil society, 
an agricultural sector whose potential is greatly underutilized, 
one of the world’s great civilizational heritages, and a rich base 
of oil wealth  (Davis 2005a: 244).  
Bush himself expounded on this theme when he stated that:  
The nation of Iraq – with its proud heritage, abundant resources 
and skilled and educated people – is fully capable of moving 
toward democracy and living in freedom22.  
Furthermore, there are others who argue that democratic practices, and the values that 
support them, are not alien to Iraqi society and traditions. Adeed and Karen Dawisha are 
notable proponents of this view and they extol the virtues of the Iraqi parliament (the 
so-called Constituent Assembly) during the monarchical era (1921 – 1958). According 
to the Dawishas, 
                                                          
22 Internet source: accessed via http://www-aei.org/article/foreign-and-defensepolicy - on 
17/09/2013;  
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.........debates in parliament were often vigorous and legislators 
were usually allowed to argue and vote against the government 
without fear of retribution..........Parliament often managed to 
influence policy (Dawisha & Dawisha 2003).  
Eric Davis supports this view and he states that “Democracy is not new to Iraq” and that 
“In fact, quite the opposite is true” (Davis 2005b: 3). Other commentators go further in 
saying that even under authoritarian rule, Iraqis demonstrated a commitment to cultural 
and political pluralism. Fatima Moshen argues that: 
 Even under Baathist Party rule, there were a number of 
newspapers and magazines calling for democracy and freedom 
of expression in the 1960s (Moshen 1994:8).  
Additionally, Moataz Fattah’s statistical analysis of the first large scale survey of 
literate Muslims (22 Muslim countries were surveyed) conducted in 2002 concluded 
that: 
 There is nothing in the current data that shows Iraqis to be 
exceptionally anti-democratic (Fattah 2004:3). 
Based on the above evidence, it is argued that the wide range of historical, cultural and 
social characteristics of Iraq and Lebanon did play an important part in the U.S.’s 
assessment of the applicability of democratic traditions to these countries.  
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There are significant discoveries, key concepts, arguments, and theories that scholars 
have put forward in respect of each of the hypotheses advanced in this study. The 
discussion under this section will critically review this literature, show how prevailing 
ideas fit into my research, and demonstrate how my research agrees or differs from 
them.  
The relevant literature examined comprises scholarly books, journal articles, newspaper 
articles and a range of media constructs which together provide an ample collection of 
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resources. An examination of these resources offers diverse viewpoints and opinions, as 
well as scholarly analysis.  
This review of the relevant literature is organized thematically and my sources are 
arranged in terms of the topics they cover within my research.  
Theme I: U.S. Interagency competition and conflict 
The bureaucratic battles between the U.S. State and Defense departments are the subject 
of voluminous journalistic stories and academic analysis. Those battles are an important 
part of the first hypothesis of this study. 
Stephen Glain’s book, State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America’s Empire (Glain 
2011) traces the U.S. State Department’s decline as the lead U.S. government agency 
responsible for developing and implementing U.S. foreign policy. Told largely through 
tales of bureaucratic infighting between the U.S. State and Defense departments, Glain 
chronicles the rise of post-war national security and argues that U.S. foreign policy is 
increasingly made and carried out by the Pentagon. According to Glain, this does not 
bode well for the United States. The George W. Bush administration is particularly 
singled out by Glain as having forced the air out of the U.S. State Department. Glain 
argues that the early days of the U.S.’s occupation of Iraq were orchestrated not by 
skilled Arabists from the State Department, but by the Pentagon23.  
Glain’s work places the findings of this thesis into a wider context. His critique of the 
Pentagon’s active role in the formulation and application of U.S. foreign policy, whilst 
                                                          
23 See reviews of Stephen Glain’s State vs. Defense by Karen De Young, Washington Post 
Senior National Security Correspondent (accessed via 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/ on 15/03/2014) and by Mark Mayor, author of 
“A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq” (accessed via 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405311 on 15/03/2014); 
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warranting urgent consideration, must be balanced against wider considerations and 
other historical perspectives. His argument that the State Department, USAID and 
nominated civilians are equipped to foster nation-building and international 
development better than the Pentagon attracts controversy for many reasons. Critics of 
Glain’s book argue first and foremost that the variable effects of politics and personality 
make any simple “militaristic” pattern hard to detect. For this reason, they argue that the 
Defense Department is not necessarily more ‘hawkish’ than the State Department. They 
point to the fact that the Defense Department was influential under U.S. Presidents 
Lyndon Johnson (1963 – 1969) and George W. Bush whilst the State Department was 
dominant under other U.S. Presidents, including supposed ‘hawks’ like Ronald Reagan 
(1981 – 1989) and Dwight Eisenhower (1953 – 1961). Under Reagan’s regime, 
Secretary of State, George Shultz (1982 – 1989) is singled out as being more 
enthusiastic than his Defense counterpart Caspar W. Weinberger (1981 – 1987) about 
injecting U.S. ground forces into Third World crises. However, it is worth noting that 
Eisenhower and Reagan, along with their predecessors, Jimmy Carter (1977 – 1981) 
and Bill Clinton (1993 – 2001) never engaged in a sustained war abroad.  
 
Other counterarguments to Glain’s work point to the fact that American military 
governors were remarkably successful in rehabilitating Germany and Japan after World 
War II and that also, following the annexation of the Philippines in 1899, the U.S. Army 
governed the Islands with a degree of administrative competence and integrity that 
earned it renown among the populace. Critics charge further that during World War II, 
Franklin Roosevelt tasked the military with administering occupied Axis territories after 
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the State Department’s mismanagement of the North African occupation revealed 
appalling deficiencies24.  
 
The thesis differs from Glain’s work and the prevailing counterarguments in respect of 
it in that it does not enter the debate as a battering ram at the Pentagon’s gates. In the 
final analysis of its findings, the thesis argues that interagency cooperation can help 
address transnational global security challenges and create a broader culture of 
collaboration between respective agencies, where energy once spent fighting turf battles 
can instead be devoted to getting things done. This argument finds support in the 
remarks made by Andrew J. Shapiro, the former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs (2009 – 2013) at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC on 8th August 2012. In his remarks Shapiro stated that 
whilst it may not be the most attention-grabbing topic, the need to improve interagency 
– and in particular, State-Defense collaboration, is of vital importance to U.S. national 
security. Earlier, a CSIS report dated July 2012 on stabilization and reconstruction, 
noted that “almost all experts cite the need for improved interagency coordination”25.  
Shapiro’s comments, and the CSIS’s above mentioned report, advocate the urgent need 
for U.S. interagency collaboration. The thesis resonates with this discussion as it 
hypothesizes that the lack of interagency cooperation was an important factor 
                                                          
24 See reviews of Stephen Glain’s State vs. Defense by Karen De Young, Washington Post 
Senior National Security Correspondent (accessed via 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/ on 15/03/2014) and by Mark Mayor, author of 
“A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq” (accessed via 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405311 on 15/03/2014);  
25 A report of the CSIS Program on the Case for Conflict and Stabilization Operations Today, 
July 12, 2012) – internet source: http://csis.org – accessed on 15/01/2013; 
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responsible for derailing the Bush administration’s plans to introduce ‘Western style’ 
liberal democracy to Iraq.   
Theme II: The problem of U.S. credibility 
Marina Ottaway’s article, “Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of 
U.S. Credibility”, highlights a problem of fundamental importance – the lack of 
credibility that the United States has in the Arab world when it presents itself as a pro-
democratic actor in the aftermath of 9/11. The basis for this lack of credibility is 
discussed extensively in this study at Chapter Five aptly titled, ‘The Problem of U.S. 
Credibility’.  
In his foreword note to Ottaway’s article, Thomas Carothers argues that, while the U.S. 
may feel that its credentials as a pro-democratic actor are unquestionable, the stubborn 
fact remains that Middle Easterners, have a different opinion26. Carothers adds that if 
left unaddressed, this credibility gap will undermine even the most-well intentioned 
efforts by the United States to promote positive political change in the Middle East 
(Ottaway 2003: 3). Ottaway makes the point that, the Arab press consistently questions 
the U.S.’s rhetorical championing of Middle East democracy. She argues that the deep 
suspicions of U.S. motives harboured by Arabs led many to perceive Bush’s freedom 
agenda as amounting to hypocrisy (Ottaway 2003: 3-5).  
Larry Diamond shares Ottaway’s view and he argues in his book entitled The Spirit of 
Democracy: The Struggle to build Free Societies Throughout the World, that Americans 
are seen as hypocrites – favouring democracy and the rule of law throughout the world 
                                                          
26 This opinion is quite nuanced and complex as there used to be more admiration in the Arab 
world for the U.S. democratic model, and this has gradually been eroded as a result of the 
factors discussed in Chapter five amongst others.  
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so long as it does not constrain how the United States acts in the world (Diamond 
2008:331).  
Also, in their book, “Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think”, 
John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed introduce evidence reflecting the Arab press’s 
disenchantment with U.S. democracy policy in the region. Quoting media pundits such 
as the Lebanese journalist; Michael Young and citing a journalistic piece from the 
Syrian newspaper, Izz-al-Din al-Darwish amongst others, Esposito and Mogahed argue 
that many in the Arab world do not believe that the U.S. is committed to democratic 
change in the region (Esposito & Mogahed 2007: 33-34, 59).  
The relevant literature also reveals that Arab commentators who challenge the collective 
wisdom regarding the perceived ‘ill-intentions’ of America in particular, and the 
inappropriateness of its proposed reforms for democratic change in the region, are 
definitely in the minority. Sami E. Baroudi, a Lebanese academic and professor of 
political science at the Lebanese American University, argues in his article “Arab 
Intellectuals and the Bush Administration’s Campaign for Democracy” that those who 
support the U.S. intention to promote democratic change in the Arab world “.....remain 
like voices in the wilderness with little influence over the opinions of the majority of 
intellectuals and the larger public who are fiercely anti-American” (Baroudi 2007: 
415).  
The views of Ottaway, Diamond, Esposito, Mogahed and Baroudi are consistent with 
my hypothesis claim but differ in that they relate to the perspectives of Arabs generally. 
My research is country-oriented and specific and it focuses mainly on the Iraqi and 
Lebanese perspectives. It investigates the deep suspicions that many Iraqis and 
Lebanese harbour but appreciates that this pervasive suspicion is also shared by Arabs 
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generally. The feedback obtained from select primary sources will form an important 
and original segment of this aspect of my study.  
In addition, David M. DeBartolo’s article entitled “Perceptions of U.S. Democracy 
Promotion: Part One: Middle Eastern Views” which relies heavily upon public opinion 
data and which significantly includes polling data obtained from Iraqis and Lebanese 
people, adduces evidence to show that Middle Easterners are unhappy with American 
democracy promotion efforts because they believe the U.S. does not genuinely and 
consistently support democratic reform (DeBartolo 2008: 1). The evidence advanced by 
DeBartolo’s work supports my hypothesis further substantiating it through the 
production of polling data reflective of Iraqi and Lebanese perspectives on U.S. 
democracy promotion.  
PLAN OR ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: 
Chapter Two traces the evolution of the U.S.’s commitment to democracy promotion 
in Iraq and Lebanon by examining first, U.S. foreign policy towards both countries pre-
9/11 and thereafter, in the immediate aftermath of this watershed event. The discussion 
within this context will provide the first glimpse of the turf wars which characterised 
U.S. interagency relationships as the Bush administration struggled and wrestled 
analytically to shape and formulate a unified pre- and post-9/11 Iraq policy.  
Chapter Three focuses on U.S. efforts aimed at promoting Western style ‘liberal 
democracy’ in Iraq post-9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. This discussion examines the 
resources and policy initiatives directed towards supporting democracy, good 
governance and election programs in Iraq. It will aim to show how the plethora of U.S. 
agencies tasked with ‘democracy promotion’ in Iraq pursued differing and often 
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contradictory agendas in their formulation of the ‘democratisation project’ with 
predictably perplexing and perverse results.  
Chapter Four focuses on U.S. democracy promotion in Lebanon. It examines the shift 
in U.S. foreign policy towards Lebanon which took place against the background of that 
country’s so-called Cedar Revolution in 2005. Within its discussion of the role played 
by the Bush Administration in promoting democracy in this country, this chapter 
contrasts the operating environment of Lebanon with that of the unique set of 
circumstances within which the U.S. operated in Iraq in its capacity as an occupying 
force. It concludes that U.S. democracy promotion overall, in spite of its more peaceful 
expressions in Lebanon, was unable to match its strong rhetoric with policy 
implementation on the ground.  
Chapter Five examines the apparent contrast between U.S. efforts aimed at promoting 
democracy in Iraq and Lebanon, and Iraqi and Lebanese perspectives on the role of the 
U.S. as a promoter of democratic reform in their respective countries. This chapter 
examines the main factors responsible for the suspicions on the part of Arabs generally 
of U.S. motives to spread democracy across the Middle East region. Thereafter, it 
argues that the Bush administration’s democracy promotion efforts were compromised 
by the pervasive suspicions amongst Iraqis and Lebanese of U.S. motives aimed at 
spreading democracy in their respective countries. By drawing upon a historical account 
which demonstrates the deep suspicions of U.S. motives which many Iraqis and 
Lebanese harbour in common with large sections of the Arab world, the discussion in 
this chapter investigates the extent to which the pervasive suspicions about U.S. efforts 
to advance liberal democracy caused Iraqi and Lebanese commentators to articulate 
vociferous criticisms of U.S. initiatives aimed at promoting democratic reform in their 
respective countries.  
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Chapter Six is the conclusion to this study. It will summarise the thesis findings and 
place the number of important contributions which are synoptic of the Iraq and 
Lebanese case studies into a wider context. In doing so, the conclusion to this study will 
aim to raise a variety of questions which require further research.  
METHODOLOGY 
This section of the study includes a description of the means through which the 
hypotheses of the thesis are pursued. It sets out the methods, procedures and tasks 
utilized to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions posed above.  
In order to prove the hypotheses and answer the research questions, I applied a 
qualitative analysis method that makes use of country case studies, in this case, Iraq and 
Lebanon.  
Methods of data collection 
The qualitative analysis consists of elite based interviews and a critical analysis of 
published primary and secondary sources. The interview research was conducted in the 
UK, Lebanon and the United States throughout 2013 to 2014.  
Rationale for elite interviews 
The elite interview data was not considered in isolation as the goal of collecting such 
data was to corroborate the information that I had previously collected from other 
sources. The data served to provide substance and meaning to my analysis of published 
primary and secondary material. By helping me to make sense of what had been gleaned 
from prior analyses, the elite interview data also assisted in the process relating to the 
validation of my arguments.  
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Target population, sample size and ethics  
The target population for the study is represented by various spectrums of elite opinion 
in Iraq, Lebanon, UK and the US. 
In deciding who to interview, I identified commentators with knowledge of the Bush 
administration’s Mid-East ‘democracy policy’ in Iraq and Lebanon. The commentators 
selected fall into three broad groups:  
(1) Newspaper columnists and editors of distinguished Iraqi, Lebanese and Arabic 
newspapers including those affiliated with pan-Arab newspapers in circulation 
in the UK; 
(2) Academics and intellectuals based in Iraq, Lebanon, UK and the US; 
(3) Key personnel of U.S. agencies tasked with democracy promotion in Iraq and 
Lebanon.  
A total number of seven elites were interviewed. The number of elites interviewed 
was influenced and determined by the difficulties experienced in accessing 
participants. Most of the elite professional participants targeted were often very 
busy, and could not fit research into small amounts of time in between their 
meetings and other professional commitments. Despite this constraint, and bearing 
in mind that this project was not supported by sufficient financial resources, the 
sample size was an appropriately sized research sample27.  
The interviews were conducted via telephone, email and face-to-face meetings and 
the language used throughout was English. No ethical issues or challenges arose 
                                                          
27 Some academics argue that a sample of one is enough to suit some types of qualitative 
research in some circumstances (Back 2012; Becker 2012; Brannen 2012; Denzin 2012 and 
Passerini 2012).  
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during the conductance of these interviews. The participants did not set their own 
agendas and those who were nominated by my supervisors participated voluntarily 
and did not undermine the process of valid consent. There were also no agreed 
limits of confidentiality and anonymity.  
Question design 
The questions utilised during the course of the interviews were designed to prove the 
hypotheses and answer the core research questions posed above. The questions were 
designed with the elites’ specialist and general knowledge in mind. Two sets of specific 
questions were thus designed – one set for U.S. policymakers and expert commentators 
and the other set for the Arab subjects/elites. General questions were also designed for 
both groups of elite commentators.  
The overall aim of the question design was to enable me to conduct a research interview 
that proceeds like a normal conversation but one with a specific purpose and structure. 
Different dimensions introduced in the interview subjects’ responses were pursued. The 
decisive issue here was my ability to sense the immediate scope of an answer and the 
horizon of possible sub-issues that it can potentially unravel. 
Testing the hypotheses and answering the research questions 
I applied the following methods and procedures to test the hypotheses and answer the 
research questions.    
I assessed the claims of democracy promotion by the U.S. in Iraq and Lebanon by 
examining the official statements and actions of senior U.S. officials of the Bush 
administration and those not officially part of but close to the administration.  
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The post-9/11 speeches of George W. Bush and members of his administration in 
particular were cited as important primary sources relevant to U.S. rhetoric on 
democracy promotion in Iraq and Lebanon.  
Further claims of the Bush administration’s commitment to the promotion of democracy 
generally were provided by the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of 
America documents of 2002 and 2006. Both sets of documents were consulted as 
together these documents formed the intellectual framework for the Bush 
administration’s forward strategy for freedom agenda in Iraq and the wider Middle East 
region. Together, these documents represent the most sweeping shift in U.S. foreign 
policy since the beginning of the Cold War.  
Furthermore, I consulted relevant publications of U.S. think tanks associated with the 
neoconservative group that influenced U.S. foreign policy during the Bush era such as 
the Project for New American Century (PNAC), the American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI), Heritage Foundation, and Center for Strategic and International Studies. In 
addition, the publications of other institutions such Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Council on Foreign Relations, RAND Corporation and Brookings 
Institution, which are not definitively classed neoconservative, - although their fora and 
organs were occasionally used by individuals who share a neoconservative perspective - 
were also consulted.  
For a comprehensive account of the invasion and occupation of Iraq by an Iraqi insider, 
I consulted Ali A. Allawi’s The Occupation of Iraq – Winning The War, Losing The 
Peace (2007). Allawi is the former minister of trade and the first post-war civilian 
minister of defence in the Cabinet of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). He also served 
as a member of the Transitional National Assembly and as minister of finance in the 
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Transitional National Government under Dr. Ibrahim al-Jaffari. Allawi’s insider account 
is an exposition of Iraqi society and politics in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq 
war. 
Additionally, I accessed relevant primary sources such as biographies, memoirs and 
books written by key figures of the Bush administration and interview transcripts 
relating to such figures. These types of sources provided important ‘insider’ information 
relating to Bush’s ‘forward strategy for freedom’ agenda. They also revealed some 
pertinent information about the personalities of key policy-makers and the prevalent 
mode of thinking amongst them which formed the basis for the interagency turf wars 
and bureaucratic infighting.  
Examples of firsthand accounts consulted include amongst others: the presidential 
memoir of George W. Bush Decision Points (2010); a study of Dick Cheney, Cheney: 
The Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President (2007); 
a personal and political memoir of Dick Cheney aptly titled Dick Cheney: In my time - 
(2011); the memoir of Donald Rumsfeld, former Defense Secretary, Known and 
Unknown: A Memoir  (2011); the recollections of former Under Secretary of State of 
Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the 
Dawn of the War on Terrorism (2008); and those of  the former head of the Coalition 
Provincial Authority (CPA) in Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq – 
The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (2006).   
The above mentioned sources are particularly relevant in view of the fact that some of 
the most useful primary documents in the form of government public records are 
usually inaccessible because they fall under various closure regulations. These 
regulations restrict the use of analysis of documents covering recent events such as 
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those addressed in this study. In the United States, the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) generally release records after a 30 – year closure period.  
Most notably, access to the George W. Bush Presidential Records is governed by the 
U.S. Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978 which provides amongst other provisions 
that a former President’s records are not subject to public access requests until five (5) 
years after the end of a presidential administration28. For the administration of George 
W. Bush that date of accessibility was 20th January 2014. The records of the former 
Vice-President, Dick Cheney, which are housed at the NARA in Washington DC, are 
also subject to the same FOIA provisions as Bush’s presidential records. Both sets of 
official records became accessible and subject to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests as effective from 20th January 2014.  
Despite being currently accessible, the George W. Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum processes FOIA requests for Bush’s records in the order in which they are 
received based on a queue structure determined by the amount and type of records 
requested. Requesters are advised that the FOIA process can take time, given the laws 
and regulations; the volume and complexity of presidential records generally; and also 
the process of making materials available29. In the first week it was open to FOIA 
requests, the George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum received more than 200 
requests from journalists, scholars and activists30. It is also noteworthy that documents 
processed in response to a request may be closed in whole or part in compliance with 
                                                          
28 It is noted that materials that are restricted under the U.S. Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 
1978 will remain closed for twelve (12) years after the President has left office.  
29 George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum - accessed via 
http://www.georgebushlibrary.smu.edu/en/research - on 17/09/2014;  
30 Ibid;  
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applicable PRA restrictions and FOIA exemptions. Furthermore, most of the material 
that is ‘explosive’ enough to be really interesting, for example to reporters and 
researchers, is classified or the story is already in the public domain. Indeed, Bush and 
key members of his cabinet have written memoirs explaining the reasoning behind the 
decisions they took whilst in office in relation to specific policy issues.  
Thus, until the briefing notes summarizing high-level meetings between Bush and his 
principal advisers becomes available, one can only speculate about the Administration’s 
motives to install democracy in Iraq, Lebanon and the wider Middle East region on the 
basis of other accessible material. Moreover, until this and other relevant information 
surfaces, and considering also, that it may literally take years to piece together an 
accurate and complete assessment of Bush’s foreign policy towards the region, the 
biographical and other contemporary studies used will help to provide important 
‘insider’ information. Indeed, the information accessed did shed light on some of the 
key influences on U.S. foreign policy during the Bush years.  
Notwithstanding the value of the above biographic sources, there are notable 
weaknesses associated with these types of sources. In his book titled “Political 
Memoirs”, Gamble argues that the weakness of these types of sources is that they focus 
only on the ‘inside story’, and often, they have less to say on the ‘outside story’ and the 
wider context in which government operates. According to Gamble, it is almost 
impossible to trace the evolution of policy-making through the use of biographies alone 
(Gamble 2002: 150). Burnham et al also make the salient point that biographies may 
lack neutrality thus making it necessary for the researcher to consider the extent of bias 
towards the issue at hand (Burham et al 2004).  
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Bearing in mind the above scholarly advice, the biographies accessed in this study are 
those of senior officials which explain their predominant mode of thinking during the 
period spent in office. More importantly, these biographies were not treated as ‘stand-
alone’ sources as they were considered in conjunction with other relevant material in the 
form of important investigative journalism such as Seymour Hersh’s book Chain of 
Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (2004) and Bob Woodward’s books, 
Bush At War (2003); Plan of Attack (2004); and Bush At War, Part III: State of Denial 
(2006). Woodward’s three books which are based on unprecedented access to all the 
senior Washington players take us inside the White House and corridors of power to 
explore the thoughts of Bush, key cabinet members, the White House staff, and officials 
who served at various levels of the Defense and State Departments and the CIA.  
To analyse the role of the plethora of U.S. agencies on the ground in Iraq and Lebanon, 
I examined unofficial documents and writings (such as journalistic and scholarly 
publications) and also the official reports, factsheets and news bulletins produced by 
organizations tasked with ‘democracy promotion’ such as USAID, National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) amongst others. 
These resources were supplemented with elite interviewing.  
Bearing in mind that one of the subsidiary aims of this study is to examine the gulf 
between the Bush administration’s rhetoric and practise on democracy promotion in 
Iraq and Lebanon, I utilised a checklist comprising of the essential elements constituting 
a liberal democratic political system to evaluate the extent to which rhetoric which 
placed human rights and democratic governance at the forefront of Bush’s freedom 
agenda was channelled into meaningful policies in Iraq and Lebanon. The checklist 
comprised of the following elements in the liberal democratic canon: free and fair 
70 | P a g e  
 
elections; free and investigative media; respect for human rights and the presence of 
civil society (that is, a plurality of social organisations).  
In order to gauge the perceptions of Iraqis and Lebanese commentators on the U.S.’s 
democratization project, I focused on the contributions of a select number of 
commentators, who, in my view, provided the most articulate commentary on U.S. 
efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and Lebanon. The secondary sources referenced 
were drawn from the opinion pieces and editorials of web-based archives of Iraqi and 
Lebanese newspapers which commented on the U.S.’s project to promote democracy in 
Iraq and Lebanon in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. 
Flowing from this exercise, I identified notable U.S. initiatives that focused on effecting 
democratic change in Iraq and Lebanon during the George W. Bush era. I used these 
initiatives as case studies, and I examined Iraqis and Lebanese reactions towards the 
specific proposals embodied in these programs to promote democracy and good 
governance in their respective countries. Iraqis and Lebanese reactions towards the 
Bush Administration’s democratic agenda as articulated in its Middle East Partnership 
Initiatives were examined with reference to the opinion pieces and editorials of web-
based archives of Iraqi and Lebanese newspapers (drawn exclusively from the 
secondary sources consulted). The most notable of these initiatives are the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) which was launched in 2002 and its successor, the Greater 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (GMEI) launched in 200431.  
The above exercises were also supplemented by elite interviewing 
                                                          
31 The Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative (GMEI) was launched in partnership with the 
G-8 and it is a product of a flurry of transatlantic meetings held in June 2004 – the G – 8 
meeting, the brief U.S. /E.U. summit, and the NATO summit. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
______________________________________________________________________ 
THE BACKGROUND TO U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 
______________________________________________________________________ 
PRE- 9/11 PERIOD 
Before 9/11, the promotion of democratic reform in the Arab world was not something 
around which heated debates erupted nor was it a topic of discussion that found its way 
very frequently into U.S. presidential remarks or speeches.  
With the onset of the Cold War, access to the oil resources of the Middle East was, from 
the U.S.’s point of view, a crucial strategic interest in the struggle with the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East post-World War II aimed at 
fending off Russian domination of the region’s petroleum resources. At the heart of this 
policy was the objective to contain Soviet expansionism in the region.  
The containment of Soviet expansionism became an end in itself and the U.S. defined 
the means of achieving this interest as vital, leading it to cooperate closely with 
authoritarian regimes such as that of Shah of Iran and the Al – Saud dynasty in Saudi 
Arabia. Diplomatic historians and political scientists have written extensively on 
Washington’s support for autocratic regimes during the Cold War. Philip H. Gordon 
makes the point that for decades prior to 9/11, the United States basically had a deal 
with repressive governments throughout the Arab world: they could run their countries 
more or less however they wanted, as long as they were willing to sell oil at reasonable 
prices to the West, act as strategic allies of the United States and not threaten the Middle 
East regional order (Gordon 2003: 156). The pattern itself was crystal clear: when the 
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incumbent was pro-American (and anti-communist), the United States was pro-
incumbent. 
Blocking Soviet penetration and gaining access to Iran and the Arab world’s oil 
resources during the post-World War II period was tied in with another broad U.S. 
objective which was supporting and protecting Israel. Extending support to Israel was 
deemed politically significant as it was apprehended that any reluctance to do so would 
alienate an important political force, the American Zionist constituency, whose electoral 
and lobbying power was clearly influential. The pressure of American pro-Israel public 
opinion and ideas propagated by the pro-Israel lobby on Congress and the White House 
compelled the U.S. to extend its long protective arm over Israel.  
In short, in the late 1940s and early 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. pursued three broad 
objectives in the Middle East: access to oil, containment of the Soviet Union and 
security for Israel. These three interests remained relatively constant from 1948 through 
to 1989, when the USSR collapsed and the Cold War ended.  
In the 1970s, and at the regional level, the U.S. embraced the ‘dual containment policy’ 
in the Gulf region in order to isolate ‘rogue states’ and to create a suitable framework 
for proceeding toward a complete peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
through a series of limited agreements. Throughout this period the U.S. continued to 
reject democratization on the basis that it was incompatible with Arab-Islamic culture. 
Based on these prevailing ideas, the U.S. opted to cooperate with authoritarian, 
traditional regimes.  
In the 1980s, military and strategic cooperation became increasingly important to 
protect access to petroleum supplies and provide staging areas for U.S. military 
operations in Asia and Africa. Michele Durocher Dunne who served in the Department 
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of State for seventeen years as a Middle East specialist (1986 - 2003), with assignments 
in the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, states that 
during the ‘80s, the United States also focused increasingly on the need for economic 
growth as a crucial component of maintaining stability in Arab countries (Dunne 2004: 
3).  
The promotion of political reform in the Middle East region began to creep into U.S. 
foreign policy in a modest way in the early 1990s. For many scholars, the 1990s were 
the period when post-Cold War democracy promotion began to take shape (Mitchell 
2008 and Mitchell 2011:311). 
However, notwithstanding the growing rhetoric of democracy promotion, the U.S. still 
prioritized security interests in the region ahead of representative government. During 
this decade, concerns that democratic openings would pave the way for Islamists to 
impose their own ‘illiberal’ rule and to pursue anti-American policies led the United 
States to avoid pushing for such openings (Hawthorne 2003:24). The mild response of 
the George H.W. Bush’s administration to the Algerian military’s undemocratic 
intervention in seminal multi-party elections in which a conservative religious 
movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS) was poised to 
command a large legislative majority in Algeria in 1991, was a case in point. The 
former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III (1989 – 1992) described the view 
then of the George H.W. Bush administration as follows: 
Generally speaking, when you support democracy, you take 
what democracy gives you ....if it gives you a radical Islamic 
fundamentalist; you’re supposed to live with it. We didn’t live 
with it in Algeria because we felt that the radical 
fundamentalists views were so adverse to what we believe in and 
what we support, and to what we understood the national 
interests of the United States to be (Baker 1994). 
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From the study of the trajectory of U.S. Middle East foreign policy from George H.W. 
Bush to Clinton, it appears that Clinton continued with the policy of his predecessor. 
According to Amaney A. Jamal, officials in the Clinton administration admitted that if 
the Arab world’s Islamists did not have an international agenda, the United States 
would not resist their coming to power (Jamal 2012: 242). Jamal states that the 
theological or potentially non-democratic character of the Islamists is not the driving 
force behind U.S. rejection of them but their anti-American views. She argues that the 
United States is far more likely to tolerate conservative, non-democratic rulers, like the 
monarchy in Saudi Arabia and the Taliban in Afghanistan (before they became more 
internationalized through al-Qaeda), than a democratic state that is not friendly toward 
the United States. Fawaz Gerges endorsed Jamal’s argument with reference to the 
Clinton administration. He stated that “The Clinton administration would not oppose 
Islamists if they.....kept their focus on domestic issues” (Gerges 1999: 102). Jamal 
reports that one official affiliated with Clinton’s administration even stated frankly that: 
“We are prepared to live with Islamic regimes as long as they do not endanger or be 
hostile to our vital interests” (Jamal 2012: 242). An address on 18th May 1993 by 
Martin Indyk, a senior State Department official in the Clinton administration who also 
served as ambassador to Israel, referred to Islamists as “troublemakers” who can 
potentially create chaos in the Arab world (cited in Jamal 2012:86). Clinton echoed 
these sentiments in his 1994 speech before the Jordanian parliament. In his speech, 
Clinton spelled out the U.S. perspective on politics in the Arab world as follows: there 
were forces of tyranny (the Islamists) and forces of freedom (the United States) allied to 
authoritarian regimes (cited in Jamal 2012: 86).  
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The former Secretary of State during Clinton’s second term, Madeleine Albright (1997 
– 2001), further explained the rationale behind the U.S.’s reluctance to promote 
democratization because of the perceived threat of Islamists by claiming that:  
We have been afraid to push hard for democracy, especially in 
Arab countries. We worry, perhaps with reason, that if radical 
Islamists obtain power through an election, there would be no 
more elections.........and instability might be created (cited in 
Yetiv 2006:400).   
Jamal concludes that under Clinton, U.S. policy toward Islamists became crystallized 
and that government officials worried about the implications of Islamists because of 
their foreign policy agendas (Jamal 2012: 242).   
Whilst fearing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. officials also assumed during 
the 1990s that pursuing political reform and democratization in the Arab states would 
disrupt efforts at Arab – Israeli peacemaking which was a major focus of U.S. 
diplomacy (Dunne 2004:4). On a practical level, senior U.S. government officials 
consistently resisted raising internal political issues with Arab leaders, even when U.S. 
ambassadors in the field recommended that they do so. Dunne states that senior officials 
deleted the issue from the meeting agendas because they did not want to irritate Arab 
leaders, possibly damaging the prospects of getting their cooperation on the specific 
issues of the day related to the peace process (Dunne 2004:4). He adds that, the general 
attitude in the U.S. State Department and the White House during this period was that if 
there were to be political reform in the region, it should be gradual and driven entirely 
by internal forces, primarily by the middle classes and elements of civil society that 
were expected to arise as a result of economic reform (Dunne 2004:4).  According to 
Dunne, U.S. officials also believed that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
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prevented Arab peoples and regimes from focusing on domestic reform (Dunne 
2004:4).  
______________________________________________________________________ 
A brief history of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and Lebanon pre-9/11 and the 2003 
Iraq war 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    Iraq 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq oscillated between conflict 
and cooperation for over five decades.  
The United States had no formal diplomatic or consular relations with Iraq after the 
Iraqi government severed ties with the U.S. in 1967 following Egypt’s Gamal Abdul 
Nasser’s claim that the U.S. collaborated with Israel during the Arab-Israeli War. 
Relations were resumed in the 1970s after the State Department noted Saddam 
Hussein’s declaration in July 1973 that he would welcome better relations with the U.S. 
Saddam’s move was viewed by the U.S. as an indication that Iraq was prepared to chart 
a more independent course in foreign relations (Kiely 2009: 47).  
The year 1979 represented a major watershed in U.S.-Iraq relations. The Iranian 
revolution of the same year displaced U.S. strategy in the region in one fell swoop by 
undermining traditional pro-Western regimes in the Arab world. Prior to the 1979 
revolution, Iran served as one of the ‘twin pillars’ of the U.S.’s regional security system 
alongside Saudi Arabia. The fall of the Shah of Iran transformed the most powerful state 
in the region from America’s ally into its enemy. In the same year, Saddam Hussein had 
formally assumed the presidency of Iraq after forcing Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr into 
retirement on 16 July 1979. With Saddam’s ascent to power, the U.S. sought to pursue 
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its objective to re-establish a stable hegemonic position across the region by curtailing 
the spread of Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini’s growing influence. The U.S. viewed Iran 
as a primary threat to regional stability because of Khomeini’s explicit aim of exporting 
its revolutionary theocratic doctrine to neighbouring countries32. Khomeini had a firm 
belief in popular movements and was seeking to institutionalize the struggle at the level 
of the masses. The Shi’a Islamic revolutionary ideology enunciated by Khomeini 
attacked Western imperialism and its perceived aim of eradicating Islam. The U.S.’s 
relationship with Iraq thus featured prominently at the heart of its effort to undermine 
the revolutionary influence of Ayatollah Khomeini. Ali A. Allawi, the former minister 
of trade and minister of defence in the Cabinet of the Iraqi Governing Council states 
that: 
Throughout the 1970s, U.S. policy towards Iraq was 
increasingly determined by a new strategic variable: the 
emergence of the Shah’s Iran as a key ally in the area. 
Whenever the USA was seen to be interfering in Iraq’s affairs, it 
was to enhance the relative power of Iran in the struggle for 
supremacy in the Gulf. Iraq was relegated to the second drawer 
of U.S. concerns in the area. All this changed with the collapse 
of the Shah’s rule and the establishment of the virulently anti-
American Islamic Republic of Iran. The threat to the Gulf states 
was too real to ignore, and the hitherto neglected Ba’ath of 
Iraq, especially after the ascendancy of Saddam Hussein to 
unchallenged power in 1979, became a crucial instrument in 
blocking, and possibly reversing, the march of revolutionary 
Islam (Allawi 2007: 3).  
In the 1980s, starting with Ronald Reagan’s Administration, U.S. relations with Saddam 
Hussein grew stronger resulting in the formation of a kind of tacit alliance between the 
two countries. The fact that the U.S. was at loggerheads with Iran appeared to be 
favourable to Saddam as he saw an opportunity to replace Iran as the dominant Persian 
                                                          
32 Iran’s sponsorship of militant Islamist organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah emerged 
as a prime concern of the United States.  
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Gulf state and undermine Khomeini’s influence. The hostilities between Iraq and Iran 
are historic and deeply rooted in concerns over internal security and territorial 
boundaries. The respective ideologies and ambitions of Saddam and Khomeini at the 
time to gain and maintain control over regional politics also played a part in the 
hostilities that continued in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. Following the 
Iranian revolution, Saddam began to interpret the build-up in hostilities in Iraq’s 
Kurdish controlled areas as not only resulting from the political aspirations of some 
Kurdish leaders to undermine and destabilize his regime, but as a calculated and 
premeditated effort by Iran to stir and sustain revolutionary activities in these areas. The 
demands by the Da’wa Party and its Shi’a leader, Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr - a personal 
friend and protégé of Ayatollah Khomeini - for the overthrow of the Ba’ath party and its 
replacement by an Islamic revolutionary government led Saddam to believe that 
Khomeini deliberately wanted to foment revolutionary activities in the Kurdish 
controlled areas of Iraq. By waging war on Iran, Saddam aimed to stifle the Shi’a 
insurgency which had been influenced by the Iranian revolution and assert Iraq’s claim 
to regional power. On 22nd September 1980, Saddam launched a pre-emptive attack 
against Iran via air and land to achieve this objective.  
The Reagan administration’s policy toward Iraq in the 1980s was thus one in which the 
mutual interests of the two nations was considered. In pursuance of this policy of 
mutual interests, the U.S. provided important support for Iraq during its eight year war 
with Iran. At that time, a defeat or even weakening of Iran’s military prowess 
represented a mutual goal for both the U.S. and Iraq. Iraq wanted to be the sole regional 
power while the U.S. wanted to prevent a hostile Iran from posing any military threats 
to oil-rich countries in the area. Allawi argues that: 
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The war that Iraq fought with Iran (1980 – 88) was as much to 
do with protecting and advancing the interests of the west as 
with local and regional considerations. The USA viewed 
Saddam’s Iraq as the single most valuable, albeit indirect, 
bulwark against the spread of revolutionary Islam into the Gulf 
region (Allawi 2007: 3).  
Close cooperation between the U.S. and Iraq continued throughout the 1980s. In early 
1982, the United States provided civilian and military aid to Iraq to support Saddam 
Hussein in his war against Iran. In a sworn court declaration regarding the “Iran-Gate” 
affair, Howard Teicher, who served as a staff member to the United States National 
Security Council under the Reagan administration between the years 1982 – 1987, 
testified as follows: 
 
In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States 
could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President 
Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was 
necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with 
Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a 
National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in 
June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I 
co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff 
Kemp. The NSDD, including even its indentifying number, is 
classified (Teicher 1995).  
 
As indicated by Freudenheim et al, the Reagan administration also took Iraq off the U.S. 
State Department’s list of terrorist states, apparently without Congressional approval 
(Freudenheim et al 1982). There were nonetheless policymakers within the U.S. 
administration who raised concerns during the 1980s about the U.S.’s close cooperation 
with Saddam’s regime, but their caveats were rejected. The main policy thrust was to 
stop Iran from exporting the Islamic revolution and to block Soviet expansion into the 
Gulf area. Noel Koch, the former Principal Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defence for 
International Security Affairs (1981 – 1985) in the Reagan Administration and Deputy 
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U.S. Undersecretary of Defence (Wounded Warrior Care and Transition Policy) in the 
Barack Obama administration (2009 – 2010), made the point that:  
 
no one had any doubts about his [Saddam’s] continued 
involvement with terrorism.....The real reason [for taking Iraq 
off the terrorism list] was to help them [Iraqis] succeed in the 
war against Iran (cited in Halabi 2009:84).  
 
William Colby, a former director of the CIA, stated in 1986 that: 
 
 It is in the interest of the United States, the Western world and 
even the Soviet Union that Iraq successfully withstands the 
Iranian assault.....The United States [had] better make direct 
efforts to strengthen Iraq against Iran (cited in Halabi 2009:84).   
 
This pattern of engagement and tacit support for Iraq continued through to the early 
years of the George H.W. Bush administration. In October 1989, George H.W. Bush 
signed National Security Directive 26, which was to ‘propose economic and political 
incentives for Iraq to moderate its behaviour and to increase our influence with Iraq’ 
(cited in Jentleson 1994:15). Only when Iraq invaded Kuwait did the U.S.-Iraq 
relationship break down. The U.S. withdrew its military, economic and diplomatic 
support for Iraq in its war with Iran following Saddam’s annexation of Kuwait. Allawi 
states that “the direct challenge to vital U.S. and western interests, and the enormous 
effects this would have if it were not reversed galvanised the U.S. into action”. 
According to Allawi, the objective became “the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
and then a strategy to ‘contain’ Iraq. The latter was designed to disarm, isolate and 
weaken the regime, remove it as a threat to regional security, and keep it politically off 
balance” (Allawi 2007: 3).  
 
Prior to the invasion however, the U.S. reportedly gave mixed signals to the presence of 
Iraqi forces on the border with Kuwait. Excerpts from a purported transcript of a 
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conversation which took place between then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie 
and Saddam Hussein on 25th July 1990, appeared in The New York Times International 
on Sunday, 23rd September 1990. The details of this conversation showed the U.S.’s 
indecisiveness on the bilateral border disputes raised by Iraq with respect to Kuwait.  
According to the foregoing transcript, Ambassador Glaspie reportedly told Saddam 
Hussein that:  
The instruction we had during this period was that we should 
express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not 
associated with America. Secretary of State James A. Baker III 
has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this 
instruction33.   
Regarding the Glaspie interview and other "signals" emanating from the Washington 
government in July of 1990, a senior United States diplomat in the Middle East is 
reported to have said, presumably in the autumn of 1990 or the winter of 1990/1991 
that: 
 We virtually gave him [Saddam Hussein] the green light [to 
attack Kuwait]. If I had been sitting where he was sitting and 
getting the signals he was getting from Washington and 
elsewhere at the time, I would probably also have gambled on 
the invasion of Kuwait (cited in Watson 1991). 
However, it is also reported that Ambassador Glaspie denounced the Iraqi transcript of 
her interview with Saddam as having been "maliciously" edited by the Iraqis "to the 
point of inaccuracy" (Ogden 1991 and Watson et al 1991:22). Appearing before the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, and the Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on 
                                                          
33 Confrontation in the Gulf; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. envoy, The 
New York Times International, Sunday, 23rd September 1990 – accessed via 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-Gulf/ - on 15/01/2014;  
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20th and 21st March 1991, Glaspie explained that the published transcript included only 
one part of her sentence to Saddam Hussein which stated that the United States had no 
opinion on his quarrel with Kuwait. According to Glaspie, the other part of her sentence 
made it clear that the United States insists that Saddam settles his disputes with Kuwait 
non-violently to which Saddam assured her that he would do so (Watson et al 1991:22). 
On 2nd August 1990, four days after Glaspie’s meeting with Saddam Hussein, Iraqi 
troops invaded and occupied Kuwait. Days after Glaspie delivered her message to 
Saddam Hussein, the former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, John Kelly, explained to a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
in Washington on 31 July 1990, that:  
Historically, the United States has taken no position on the 
border disputes in the area, nor on matters pertaining to 
integral OPEC deliberations, but the United States has taken a 
strong position in support of the sovereignty of all States in the 
area (cited in Wilz 1996).  
In their justification for attacking Iraq and causing large scale devastation to that 
country’s infrastructure and industry, members of the George H.W. Bush administration 
cited preventing Iraq from posing any threats to its neighbours. Initially, the George 
H.W. Bush Administration highlighted violations of sovereignty and human rights 
notably Saddam’s gassing of Kurds in Iraq in 1988; Iraq’s illegal occupation and 
plunder of Kuwait; and babies being removed from incubators by Iraqi soldiers during 
the invasion of Kuwait. However, doubts appeared about what Washington’s real 
concern was when Bush stated that the aggressive stance towards Iraq was about 
“access to energy resources” and “our way of life” (cited in Aruri 2002: 24). Further 
comments from Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, triggered more doubts about 
the U.S.’s real intentions and served to underline U.S. motives, when he accused Iraq of 
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threatening a recession in the United States. According to Baker, the real conflict was 
over “jobs” and that:  
 
This [conflict with Iraq] is not about increases in the price of a 
gallon of gas.......It is rather about a dictator who..........could 
strangle the global economic order, determining by fiat whether 
we all enter a recession or even the darkness of depression 
(cited in Marshall 1990:A14 and Neuman 1990).  
 
The Clinton administration which came to power following the Persian Gulf War opted 
to pursue a policy of ‘dual containment’ of Iraq alongside Iran, replacing the previous 
strategy of ‘balancing’ one against the other with their mutual isolation (Gause 
1994:56). Clinton’s policy towards Iraq was no less devastating than that which was 
pursued by his predecessor as it continued the bombing raids begun by the George H.W. 
Bush administration and also stringent and devastating sets of sanctions. Following in 
the footsteps of Bush senior, Clinton used human rights violations to justify the U.S.’s 
continued hostility towards Saddam’s Iraq. Whilst his administration hastened to cite 
the attacks launched by Iraq against the Kurds, statements made by members of the 
Clinton administration also revealed that the issue had global and regional dimensions 
beyond the Kurds. Clinton’s Defense Secretary William Perry (1994 – 1997) admitted 
that:  
 
The issue is not simply the Iraqi attack on the [Kurds in] Irbil 
[on 31st August 1996], it is the clear and present danger 
Saddam Hussein poses to [Iraq’s] neighbours, to the security 
and stability of the region and to the flow of oil in the world 
(cited in Aruri 2002:287).  
 
Clinton himself made it clear that vital U.S. interests lay with Iraq’s immediate 
neighbours, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia rather than to the Kurds in the north. He said: 
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“We acted in southern Iraq, where our interests are the most vital......”34. This point was 
reinforced following comments by Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright 
when she was asked on national television on 12th May 1996 by the journalist, Lesley 
Stahl what she thought about the fact that 500,000 Iraqi children have died as a result of 
the sanctions. Albright responded that this was a “very hard choice,” and but then 
added, “but we think the price is worth it” (Albright 1996).  
Overall, Clinton’s foreign policy towards Iraq was widely criticised by influential 
national security intellectuals and former policy-makers resident at or involved with 
conservative think-tanks in Washington. Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers point out those 
broad criticisms of Clinton’s Iraq policy judged that policy as a failure (Ritchie and 
Rogers 2007:44). For instance, in January 1998, Bush’s Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz (2001 – 2005) joined other neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, 
Chairman of Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (2001 – 2003), Undersecretary 
of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky (2001 – 2009), Special 
Assistant to Bush and Deputy National Security Adviser for Global Democracy 
Strategy, Elliot Abrams (2005 – 2009) and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and 
the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad (2007 – 2009) amongst others, in signing a public 
letter published by William Kristol in his “Project for the New American Century” 
(PNAC) addressed to Bill Clinton, arguing that containment of Saddam had failed. 
Allawi interestingly points out that; a number of the signatories of the letter to Clinton 
found top-level jobs in the George W. Bush administration whilst other prominent 
individuals associated with the former alternative Iraq policy were nominated to senior 
                                                          
34 Bill Clinton, President’s Weekly Radio Address, Federal News Service, 14th September 1996 
– cited in Arnove, A. (2003) Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War 
(London: Pluto Press).   
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positions throughout the new administration (Allawi 2007: 79)35. In a prescient note, the 
letter, which was described by Colin Dueck, Professor of Government and International 
Politics at George Mason University, as “an explicit vision of American primacy” 
(Dueck 2012:60), stated that,  
Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy [towards 
Iraq]......is dangerously inadequate....In the long term, [the only 
acceptable strategy] means removing Saddam Hussein and his 
regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of 
American foreign policy.......American policy cannot continue to 
be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the U.N. 
Security Council36.   
A month later, in February 1998, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, co-founders of 
PNAC, challenged the administration’s prognosis on Iraq. They argued that 
containment of Saddam was an illusion (cited in Ritchie and Rogers 2007: 44). Later, in 
September 1998, John Bolton, later Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security for George W. Bush, condemned Clinton’s Iraq policy as “worse 
than incompetent”, declaring containment unsustainable (cited in Ritchie and Rogers 
2007:44). In December 1998, Bolton argued further in the Weekly Standard – a leading 
conservative political journal edited by William Kristol – that “seven years of 
                                                          
35 Elliot Abrams, a signatory to the PNAC statement, joined the National Security Council and 
in 2002 became Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs. John Bolton, a board 
member of PNAC, became the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security Affairs. Paula Dobriansky, another PNAC supporter, became Undersecretary of State 
for Global Affairs, responsible for spreading democracy. Zalmay Khalizad, a former RAND 
Cooperation senior analyst, who went on to become ambassador to Iraq, joined the National 
Safety Council (NSC) as its Director for the Gulf and Southwest Asia and Other Regional 
Issues. Richard Perle became the head of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board. Peter Rodman, 
another PNAC signatory, became the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs. Donald Rumsfeld became the Secretary of Defense (cited in Allawi 2007: 467).  
36 ‘Letter to President Clinton on Iraq’ published by the Project for the New American Century, 
26th January 1998.  Available from: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm 
(accessed on 17/07/2013).  
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incompetence” had left the administration “precious few options to reverse the 
downward drift of our Iraq policy”. Bolton described Clinton’s foreign policy as 
“inattentive” and “feckless” (cited in Ritchie and Rogers 2007: 44).  
Furthermore, Section 3 of the Iraq Liberation Act passed in January 1999 stated that: 
It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to 
remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in 
Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government 
to replace that regime (cited in Allawi 2007:62)37.  
The administration of George W. Bush which took up office in January 2001 did not 
change U.S. policy towards Iraq and it continued in the same vein and fashion as the 
Clinton administration. The attacks of 9/11 however prompted a change in U.S. foreign 
policy towards Iraq and turned it on its head. Allawi argues that: 
 
It took the attacks of 11 September, 2001 on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon to create the breach in the policy 
ramparts into which marched the proponents of the ‘Alternative 
Discourse’. It was only then that Middle Eastern policy, in 
particular the policy towards Iraq, began to undergo a 
fundamental and far-reaching revision (Allawi 2007:4). 
 
The possibility that Iraq harboured WMD was the main basis upon which an aggressive 
U.S. policy towards it could be based. From this flowed other ‘legitimate’ U.S. 
strategies such as the idea of implanting the ideals of Western style liberal democracy 
which it was hoped would serve as a strong antidote to Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
 
                                                          
37 The U.S. House of Representatives approved the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38 
(Republicans voted 202 to 9 and Democrats voted 157 to 29 in favour of the bill). It passed the 
Senate without a single dissenting vote. Clinton signed the legislation into law making regime 
change in Iraq an official policy of the United States.  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
Lebanon 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Following Lebanese President Camille Chamoun’s announcement of Lebanon’s 
participation in the Eisenhower doctrine38 in 1957, Lebanon gained importance as a key 
ally in President Eisenhower’s administration’s Baghdad Pact39. Thereafter, U.S. 
marines entered the country in 1958 to restore order following the outbreak of 
Lebanon’s first post-independence civil war. The American military intervention of 
1958 foreclosed a second term of office for Chamoun and it led to the election of Army 
Commander General Fuad Shehab as president. No military response followed the 
outbreak of the 1975 civil war, although the U.S. maintained its political involvement in 
the country via the activities of special envoys, particularly around the second Israeli 
invasion in 1982. Washington’s involvement in Lebanon, which then aimed at 
negotiating peace between that country and Israeli in 1983, was influenced by the 
historical precedent of 1958. Ronald Reagan chose as his emissary to Lebanon one of 
America’s premier career diplomats and a notable Lebanese – American in the person 
of Philip C. Habib.  
                                                          
38 The term Eisenhower Doctrine refers to a speech by President Dwight David Eisenhower on 5 
January 1957, within a "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East". 
Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a Middle Eastern country could request American economic 
assistance or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from 
another state. Available from: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-
doctrine  (accessed on 15/12/2012).  
39 The Baghdad Pact was a defensive organization for promoting shared political, military and 
economic goals founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. Similar to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the main 
purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to prevent communist incursions and foster peace in the 
Middle East. It was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq 
pulled out of the Pact. 
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Habib’s task was:  
to defuse the tensions and to create an atmosphere.......for 
resolving the crisis by peaceful means and forestalling a 
confrontation40. 
The Lebanon of 1982 was, however, far different from that of 1958. The journalist, 
John Kelly succinctly describes the Lebanese political landscape in 1982 as follows:  
with an active Israeli invasion of Lebanon underway, a besieged 
set of Palestinian fighters, a Syrian expeditionary force on the 
ground, and dozens of separate armed Lebanese factions 
already embroiled in lethal contests and active warfare for the 
previous seven years, Lebanon was a perilous land for well-
meaning strangers (Kelly 2006).  
Devastating suicide attacks were carried out against the U.S. Embassies in 
Beirut (on April 18, 1983 and September 20, 1984 respectively) and on the 
garrison of U.S. soldiers (on October 23, 1984) resulting in a total of 310 
deaths (Faath 2006: 146). In addition to the suicide attacks, various 
kidnappings of American professors at the American University of Beirut 
and U.S. journalists were carried out by anti-U.S. forces. Consequently, the 
U.S. administration imposed a travel ban for U.S. citizens wanting to visit 
Lebanon. The ban was lifted in 1997 but security measures were still 
maintained because of strong evidence of a virulent anti-American 
sentiment amongst the Lebanese population. A complete withdrawal of U.S. 
                                                          
40 Passage of statement read by the Department of State Acting Spokesman in former US 
President Ronald Reagan’s administration on May 29, 1981; 
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troops from Lebanon took place on 26th February, 1984 but it took until 
1997 before USAID resumed its work in the country (Faath 2006:146). 
Needless to say, the Cold War dimension of the 1982-1984 intervention was very 
different from Eisenhower's 1958 deployment of the Marines to Lebanon. Kelly points 
out that whilst the 1958 justifications were placed very much in the context of an East-
West contest - militant Arab nationalist movements assisted by the Soviets versus pro-
Western forces for stability backed by the United States - the 1982 to 1984 justifications 
were more linked to regional acts and actors: the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Syrians, 
and the Lebanese factions (Kelly 2006).  
In the late 1980s, the U.S.’s foreign policy toward Lebanon became inextricably linked 
to Syrian influence and authority over that country. In 1988, a constitutional crisis 
engulfed Lebanon with two rival governments formed at the end of Amin Gemayel’s 
presidency. Before the expiry of his presidential term, Amin Gemayel appointed an 
interim military cabinet headed by General Michel Aoun, the commander of the 
Lebanese Army to rule the country until elections could be held. Syrian forces, which 
then controlled large swathes of Lebanese territory, instigated a political impasse by 
rejecting Aoun’s government and establishing a rival regime in Syrian-controlled West 
Beirut. Despite the constitutional legality of Aoun’s government, the U.S. openly 
discredited Aoun’s declaration of a war of liberation against Syrian forces. In an effort 
to resolve the crisis on terms acceptable to Syria, the U.S. promoted a mediation effort 
by the Arab League. The former Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger even 
told a congressional hearing that the Lebanese crisis might worsen if Syrian forces 
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withdrew from Lebanon41. The mediation process yielded the Ta’if Accord which 
former White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater hailed in a speech in 1989 headlined 
‘State Department Welcomes Arab Plan for Lebanon’ as ‘the first step toward 
restoration of a sovereign, unified, and independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces’ 
(cited in Gambill 2001).  
General Aoun’s refusal to relinquish power following the elections of Rene Mouawad 
as President of the second republic of Lebanon on 5th November 1989, and his 
successor, Elias Hrawi (following Mouawad’s assassination on 22nd November 1989), 
prompted George H.W. Bush’s administration to launch a diplomatic campaign to 
isolate Aoun. The U.S.’s condemnation of Aoun resulted in a December 27th UN 
Security Council Statement calling for the implementation of the Ta’if agreement and 
expressing “deep concern” over Aoun’s rejection of it. Subsequent international 
pressure weakened Aoun’s position and this paved the way for a Syrian invasion of 
Lebanon in October 1990.  
Although U.S. – Syrian relations were not cordial during this period, the U.S. used the 
Ta’if Agreement to improve diplomatic relations between the two countries. Syria’s 
regional importance was recognised by the U.S. as it sought to address Israeli security 
concerns vis-a-vis Hezbollah and Iran. This marked the start of the processes that would 
see the U.S. grant Syria custodianship of Lebanon in 1990 and Syria’s subsequent 
alliance with the U.S. against Iraq following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The 
timing of Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics is significant as it was a time when 
the U.S. and its allies were rewarding allies who had helped and collaborated with them 
                                                          
41Boustany, Nora “An Old War Claims New Victims; Shellings Galvanise Christians of East 
Beirut Against  Syrians”, The Washington Post, 12 April 1989 – accessed via 
http://www.washingtonpost.com – on 15/02/2014;  
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to regain and restore Kuwait’s sovereignty from the shackles of Saddam’s grip. At the 
time, the U.S. relied on partner countries to assist in stabilizing other potential 
disturbances in the region.  
Whether the U.S. ever had any intention to follow through on the Ta’if Agreement and 
enforce Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is difficult to ascertain. What is notable 
however is that whilst the official U.S. position supported the full implementation of 
Ta’if, U.S. officials appeared to be paying lip service to the restoration of Lebanese 
sovereignty by bolstering Damascus’s perceptions that Syrian control over Lebanon was 
not being contested by the United States. Indeed, the administrations of George H. W. 
Bush and the Bill Clinton both found it politically expedient for one reason or another to 
tacitly support Syrian authority over Lebanon. The George H.W. Bush administration’s 
interest in regional stability and its inability to be equally present on all Middle Eastern 
fronts explains its reasons for turning a blind eye to Syrian custodianship over the 
implementation of peace and the Ta’if Accord in Lebanon in 1990. Whilst George H.W. 
Bush and his team expected Syria to comply with the provisions of the Ta’if Accord and 
remain committed, at least in principle, to its full implementation, the administration 
undertook no further initiatives to pressure Syria on this matter. Washington expressed 
little concern when Syria reinterpreted the clause in the Ta’if Agreement calling for the 
redeployment of its troops stationed in Lebanon in advance of parliamentary elections. 
It also failed to condemn the 1992 elections which were held against serious objections 
from the Christian political forces and resulted in a major boycott of the process and the 
subsequent marginalization of these forces from the Lebanese political scene.  
The U.S.’s failure to condemn the brashness and cynicism with which Syria attempted 
to influence Lebanon’s democratic foundations and principles became a modest political 
liability in the months leading up to the 1992 presidential election. This period 
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witnessed a concerted lobbying campaign by the Council of Lebanese American 
Organizations (CLAO) and the Clinton-Gore campaign, not surprisingly, took aim at the 
Bush administration’s policy in a bid to secure the votes of an estimated 2 million 
Americans of Lebanese descent. In his presidential statement on Lebanon on 18th 
September 1992, Bill Clinton told a gathering of Lebanese Americans that, “The Bush 
administration appears willing to sacrifice the prospects for an independent Lebanon in 
order to curry favour with Syria’s dictator” (cited in Gambill 2001). He added, 
“Obviously, the withdrawal of Syrian troops is essential to Lebanon regaining its 
independence” (cited in Gambill 2001).  
The U.S.’s apparent indifference towards Syria’s Ta’if implementation failures however 
spilled over to Bill Clinton’s administration despite the former president’s 
condemnation of his predecessor’s Middle East policy vis-a-vis Lebanon. Clinton’s 
eloquent defence of Lebanon’s sovereignty during his 1992 presidential election 
campaign, proved to be, as Gary C. Gambill, General Editor of The Middle East Forum, 
a Philadelphia-based think tank, describes it, “a fleeting mirage of American electoral 
politics” (Gambill 2001). Whilst it is argued that, the Clinton administration never 
openly disavowed U.S. commitments to the “spirit” of the Ta’if Accord (and to the 
Lebanese deputies who signed it), just like the Bush administration that preceded it, 
Clinton’s team consistently declined to criticize Syrian control over Lebanon (Gambill 
2001). According to Gambill, “the palpable wave of anticipation that swept through 
Lebanon after Clinton’s election was very short-lived” (Gambill 2001). Gambill 
attributes the disconnection between Clinton’s rhetoric and policy implementation to the 
former president’s Mid-East strategy towards Lebanon which he states “stemmed from a 
desire to coax the Syrians into making the necessary concessions for peace with Israel” 
(cited in Gambill 2001).  
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Within this context, the Clinton administration notably declined to acknowledge that 
Syria’s adamant refusal to undertake a limited redeployment of its forces to the Beqaa 
Valley was in violation of the Ta’if Agreement. A June 1997 Congressional hearing on 
U.S. policy toward Lebanon by the House Committee on International Relations led to 
an exchange between the chairman of the committee, Republican Benjamin A. Gilman 
and Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs David Welch that fuelled speculation 
surrounding the Clinton administration’s consistent refusal to publicly acknowledge 
Syrian violations of the Ta’if Agreement. Asked by Representative Gilman whether 
Syria has redeployed to the Beqaa Valley pursuant to its agreement within the Accord, 
Welch deftly avoided the issue of whether Syria was in violation of the Ta’if Accord by 
stating only that the “redeployment from Lebanon to Syria” has not been completed 
(cited in Gambill 2001).  
Furthermore, the Clinton administration was very responsive to Syrian concerns over 
General Aoun’s opposition towards Damascus’s involvement in Lebanese politics. This 
was most evident in the days leading up to the June 1997 congressional hearing 
mentioned above. Aoun had been invited by Representative Gilman to testify before the 
committee and was listed on the committee’s schedule just days before the hearing, but 
failed to appear. In an interview with Gary Gambill on 18th April 2000, Lester Munson, 
Communications Director for the Committee on International Relations, remarked that 
“the State Department chose not to provide him [Aoun] with the necessary visa to come 
to the United States” and “at no time was his invitation to testify withdrawn” (cited in 
Gambill 2001). This appears to have been the first time that a U.S. administration has 
ever deliberately obstructed the appearance of someone invited to testify before 
Congress. According to Gambill, this was a strong indication of how responsive the 
Clinton White House was to Syrian sensitivities at the time (Gambill 2001). A report 
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prepared by the Lebanese Study Group in May 2000 at the Middle East Forum strongly 
criticized the Clinton administration for soft-pedalling on “Syria’s record on terrorism 
and its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction”. The report bemoaned the fact that 
the U.S. possesses enormous leverage over Syria that it does not seem willing to use. It 
advocated that the Executive Branch openly call on Damascus to end its occupation of 
Lebanon, suggesting in reference to the Turkish-Syrian interaction over PKK (Kurdish 
Workers Party) presence in Syria that “a credible threat to use force does not fall on 
deaf ears in Damascus and may well yield swift results (Pipes and Abdelnour 2000).  
Bill Clinton’s successor George W. Bush Jnr. also appeared to follow the policies of his 
predecessors by appeasing Syrian interests in Lebanon as he initially sought to achieve a 
Syrian-Israeli peace treaty at all costs, and contain Iraq’s perceived drive to produce 
weapons of mass destruction. Asked by U.S. Representative Engel during a 
congressional committee hearing on 7th March 2001 if the U.S. was taking steps to 
facilitate a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Bush’s then Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell, remarked vaguely that Syrian withdrawal would be beneficial to the region 
“eventually at some point”, but it “isn’t going to happen tomorrow” (cited in Gambill 
2001). Powell also bizarrely presented Syria’s late president Hafiz al-Assad as a 
champion of peace as he sought to enlist Syria as a partner equally concerned about 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The Syrian president, Powell stated, supports the 
Bush administration’s new sanctions policy against Iraq because “he, too, is concerned 
about weapons of mass destruction” (cited in Gambill 2001). Powell’s earlier visit to 
the Middle East in February 2001 had also previously attracted controversy as he had 
abruptly cancelled a stopover in Beirut after discussing tensions in South Lebanon with 
Syrian officials in Damascus. The incident had prompted an angry Rafik Hariri, then 
Prime Minister of Lebanon, to declare to a local TV channel that “it is not enough for 
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him [Powell] to visit Damascus .........Lebanon is Lebanon and Syria is Syria”42. The 
former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Dr. Vincent Battle (2001 – 2004) came closest to 
admitting allegations surrounding the U.S.’s tacit support for Syrian forces in Lebanon 
when he stated in an interview with Michael Kerr that the U.S. did not push Syria to 
implement Ta’if in the letter and spirit of the agreement because the Lebanese 
Government did not ask the U.S. to do so (Kerr 2003).  
It is noteworthy that despite the considerable efforts of representatives of the Lebanese 
American community to goad Bush into action over Syria, the president and Powell; 
both reportedly refused to meet with Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, the Patriarch of 
Lebanon’s Maronite Church and a staunch opponent of the Syrian presence, during the 
latter’s month-long visit to the United States in March 2001. Powell even declined to 
make an appearance at a luncheon held in Sfier’s honour at the Vatican embassy in 
Washington on March 9, 2001 saying that his schedule was too full (Gambill 2001).  
Based on the above events, it did seem that, because of the U.S.’s perceived concerns 
about the delicate balance of regional security, it afforded Syria the latent authority to 
influence almost all civil, political, and security institutions and organisations in 
Lebanon.   
In summing up, the picture that emerges shows that throughout the decades leading up 
to the events of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War, U.S. democracy strategy was hesitant, 
subdued in tone and content, and more often, constitutive of an afterthought to the main 
thrust of the prevailing U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, Lebanon and the wider Arab 
world. Suffice to say, the cause of democracy did not feature prominently in U.S. 
foreign policy initiatives toward these countries and across the region, as the U.S.’s 
                                                          
42 Murr Television (MTV – Beirut), 25 February 2001 (cited in Gambill 2001);   
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values of liberty, human rights and rule of law became subordinated to its more 
important objectives.  
In Iraq’s case, the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations both invoked human 
rights to justify the sanctions regime against that country and to propel the U.S. military 
into action. Yet, neither Bush nor Clinton, hesitated to admit that what really was at 
stake was the protection of U.S. interests across the wider Arab world. This pattern of 
promoting U.S. interests in Iraq in favour of respecting human rights and democratic 
freedoms was continued by George W. Bush Jnr. when he took up office in January 
2001 up until the events of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. The George W. Bush 
Administration’s pre-9/11 and the 2003 foreign policy toward Lebanon mirrored U.S. 
policy in Iraq. In the process of turning a blind eye to Syria’s influence in Lebanon, the 
U.S. failed to prevent Damascus from establishing a political stronghold in Lebanon in 
the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war.  
Then came the 9/11 terrorist attacks and thereafter, the 2003 Iraq war. These 
momentous events were accompanied by a remarkable change in U.S. foreign policy 
toward democracy promotion and support for human rights in Iraq, Lebanon and the 
wider Arab world. In the build up to these watershed events, the hesitancy and subdued 
tone and content of the U.S.’s Mid-East democracy strategy became aligned with the 
‘turf wars’ and bureaucratic infighting between members of the George W. Bush’s 
cabinet as they struggled to agree a unified Iraq policy . This bureaucratic conflict was 
clearly evident in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, and as we shall see later, also 
during the post-war occupation of that country.  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
Iraq Policy in Pre-9/11 George W. Bush Administration – Indecisions and 
bureaucratic politics 
__________________________________________________________ ___________ 
The first glimpses of indecision, bureaucratic infighting and conflicting U.S. 
interagency agendas which affected strategic cooperation and convergence on 
approaches to U.S. policy towards Iraq were noticeable in the pre-9/11 era of the Bush 
administration.  
There are differences of opinion about whether Bush himself was ‘hawkish’ and 
interventionist from the start and was set upon invading Iraq from the first day he 
entered into office. Bush himself gave mixed signals about his internationalist and 
interventionist tendencies prior to the events of 9/11. In his 1999 campaign 
autobiography, A Charge to Keep, he states that:  
Our greatest export is freedom, and we have a moral obligation 
to champion it throughout the world (Bush 1999:240).  
However, in his presidential campaign in 2000, he took up foreign policy positions 
flowing from criticisms that had been made of Bill Clinton’s administration during its 
eight year tenure in office. Bush famously called for a “humble” foreign policy, meant 
to contrast with the interventionism of Clinton’s presidency, and promised to focus on 
“enduring national interests” rather than idealistic humanitarian goals43. As a 
presidential candidate, Bush warned against the notion that:   
                                                          
43 Commission on Presidential Debates: Presidential Debates, October 3, 2000 Boston, and 
October 11, 2000 – accessed via http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-3-2000 and 
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000 – on 11/12/2013; 
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Our military is the answer to every difficult foreign policy 
situation – a substitute for strategy (cited in Gordon 2006: 75-
86).  
To underscore his scepticism surrounding the use of force and “nation-building” 
expeditions, he suggested that as president, he would not have intervened in either Haiti 
or Somalia. As Bush put it at the time,  
I would be guarded in my approach. I don’t think we can be all 
things to all people in the world. I think we’ve got to be very 
careful when we commit our troops44.  
Also, during his presidential campaign in 2000, Bush’s team of advisers hardly spoke 
about Iraq and there was no sign that the former president had accepted the logic of a 
pre-emptive strike against Saddam Hussein (Elliot and Carney 2003). Professor Peter 
Berkowitz, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University points out 
that, nothing in the first seven and a half months of Bush’s presidency gave the slightest 
indication that he was inclined to adopt a more ambitious internationalist approach. 
Berkowitz describes Bush as being thoroughly believable in his presidential campaign 
debates with candidate Al Gore when he declared his opposition to a foreign policy 
based on ‘nation-building’ and his modest attitude towards intervening in the internal 
affairs of other nation states. According to Berkowitz, Candidate Bush was firm and 
unequivocal and his stance reflected classical conservative realism45. 
                                                          
44 Commission on Presidential Debates: Presidential Debates, October 3, 2000 Boston, and 
October 11, 2000 – accessed via http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-3-2000 and 
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000 – on 11/12/2013; 
45 Participatory comments made by Professor Peter Berkowitz during a public discussion 
evening organised by the Harold Hartog School of Government and Policy at Tel Aviv 
University in Israel on Bush’s Foreign Policy and Neo-conservative ideology after 9/11 – 
accessed via http://socsci.tau.ac.il/government/images/PDFs/bush - on 17/12/2013; 
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It would appear then, that despite his initial reference to ‘freedom’ in his 1999 campaign 
autobiography, Bush’s early rhetoric when he took up office as U.S. President, 
suggested that he might follow the prevailing realist view which opposed any attempt 
by the United States to meddle in the internal affairs of other nation states. Bush’s 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith (2001 – 2005) endorses this 
point in his article published in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Why We Went to War 
in Iraq”. In it, Feith states that:  
As a participant in the confidential, top-level administration 
meetings about Iraq, it was clear to me at the time that, had 
there been a realistic alternative to war to counter the threat 
from Saddam, Mr. Bush would have chosen it (Feith 2008b). 
Bush’s foreign policy appointments following his electoral triumph in 2001 were 
broadly reflective of his presidential campaign rhetoric as the more central players of 
his Administration appeared to be closer to his pre-9/11 realist views. As Secretary of 
Defense in his father’s Administration, George W. Bush’s Vice President, Dick Cheney 
(2001 – 2009), had opposed using U.S. forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein during the 
first Gulf War and had even lobbied against sanctions as CEO of the giant oil-services 
company; Halliburton in the late 1990s. In many interviews after the Gulf War cease-
fire in February 1991, Cheney explained why he opposed marching to Baghdad. If U.S. 
forces got there, he had argued, it would not be clear what they were meant to do. 
Cheney also explained during these interviews that it was not evident how a new 
government would handle divisions among Iraq’s Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, how long 
the U.S. would have to stay in Iraq, or what would happen when it left (cited in Elliot 
and Carney 2003). Bush’s Secretary of State during his first term in office, Colin Powell 
(2001 – 2005), was also famously cautious about the use of force to pursue foreign 
goals. In the U.S. State Department, Powell was working on a plan for “smart 
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sanctions” on Iraq while allowing more humanitarian support for innocent Iraqis (Elliot 
and Carney 2003). Powell did not want to scrap the sanctions, as he was of the view that 
they simply needed to be made more effective. He stated in February 2001 that: 
 Though [the Iraqis] may be pursuing WMD of all kinds, it is not 
clear how successful they have been. We ought to declare this a 
success. We have kept him contained, kept him in his box (cited 
in Elliot and Carney 2003). 
Powell had also questioned whether Iraq posed a serious threat and had suggested in his 
January 2001 confirmation hearings that U.S. policy would be to “keep[the Iraqis] in 
the rather broken condition they are in now” (cited in Gordon 2006). In addition, in her 
Republican Party foreign policy manifesto published in January/February 2000 issue of 
Foreign Affairs, Bush’s former National Security Adviser, and later U.S. Secretary of 
State in the Bush Administration , Condoleezza Rice– a protégé of the realist icon Brent 
Scowcroft46 - gave an idea of what Bush’s foreign policy would be like if he won the 
election. Rice wrote that regimes such as those in Iraq and North Korea were “living on 
borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them”. Rice called for the first 
line of defence to be “a clear and classical statement of deterrence – if they do acquire 
WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring 
                                                          
46 Brent Scowcroft was the United States National Security Adviser under Presidents Gerald 
Ford and George H.W. Bush. He served as Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board under President George W. Bush from 2001 – 2005. He was a leading 
Republican critic of American policy towards Iraq before and after the 2003 invasion. 
Explaining in 1998 why as part of the Bush Snr.’s administration, they did not go on to Baghdad 
in 1991 after they had ousted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, he explained “Had we gone the 
invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly 
hostile land” – cited in White, Craig M. (2010) Iraq: The Moral Reckoning – Applying Just War 
Theory to the 2003 War Decision (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books), p.147; 
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national obliteration” (cited in Gordon 2006). Rice had also earlier insisted that the role 
of the 82nd Airborne47 was not to “escort kids to kindergarten” (cited in Gordon 2006).  
While Bush and his team had identified Saddam Hussein as a problem that had to be 
dealt with, indecisions over Iraq policy in pre-9/11 Bush Administration were evident 
from the differences of opinion expressed by key White House staff. John Dumbrell 
makes the point that Bush’s foreign policy was notable for the very early emergence of 
high-level splits, notably between Powell’s defence of multilateralism and the 
pugnacious ‘Americanism’ of Rumsfeld and Cheney (Dumbrell 2005: 35-47). 
In previous Administrations – both Republican and Democratic – relations between the 
U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense in particular were often 
characterized by suspicion and distrust. Feith reports that the senior Mr. Bush (George 
H.W.), while Ronald Reagan’s Vice President, had disapproved of the bureaucratic 
warfare between Caspar Weinberger’s Pentagon and George Shultz’s State Department. 
According to Feith, many issues became deadlocked in contentious meetings and had to 
be elevated to President Reagan for decision. When George H.W. Bush became 
president, Feith states that he insisted on an interagency process that minimized such 
disputes. He got it, largely by allowing Secretary of State James A. Baker III a more 
dominant role than Secretaries of State had played throughout most of the Reagan 
Administration (Feith 2008: 249). Donald Rumsfeld’s successor, the former U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates (2009 – 2011) noted that through most of his career, 
the Secretaries of State and Defense often “weren’t speaking to one another” and that 
“it could get pretty ugly” (cited in Shapiro 2012). John Hamre, a former Washington 
                                                          
47 The 82nd Airborne Division is an active duty airborne infantry division of the United States 
Army specializing in parachute assault operations into denied areas. In the aftermath of 9/11, the 
82nd Airborne was called upon by Bush to fight global terrorism. The Unit was later deployed to 
Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
102 | P a g e  
 
Government Official and President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) also remarked ironically in his speech at a CSIS conference 
aptly titled ‘A New Era in State-Defense Cooperation’, that the two institutions, State 
and Defense Departments, ‘love each other like brothers’, alike ‘Cain and Abel’, with 
each wanting to ‘kill each other to get the other guy’s inheritance’. Hamre also noted 
that a raw tension exists between the two institutions (cited in Shapiro 2012). Andrew J. 
Shapiro, the former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political – Military Affairs (2009 – 
2013) endorses the views of Gates and Hamre and he admits that despite being 
inextricably connected and requiring a need to work together, the two bureaucracies do 
not normally do that. Shapiro admits that whilst the State Department prides itself on 
the work it carries out through foreign policy and diplomacy which is about building 
and tending to relationships, for too long, the State Department was not building this 
sort of durable relationship with the Defense Department. He admits that as a result, 
contact and communication between the two institutions in the past was ‘stove-piped’ 
(Shapiro 2012) meaning that information was transmitted higher in the hierarchy or 
chain of command while bypassing intervening levels that remain uninformed about 
such information. These observations were reflected in press stories which depicted 
policy disagreements between State and Defense which often descended into 
bureaucratic back-stabbing.  
The divisions over Iraq policy in pre-9/11 Bush Administration between key White 
House staff was clearly seen from the differences of opinion expressed during National 
Security Council (NSC) meetings and inter-agency meetings during the first eight 
months of the Administration’s life prior to the 9/11 suicide attacks. The Bush 
Administration included major players from the neoconservative camp. The highest 
ranking members included Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary 
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of Defense, Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, John Bolton, and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board 
Advisory Committee, Richard Perle – all of whom believed that, regimes like Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorial Iraq, which were willing to acquire and use terrifying weapons, 
posed the most significant threat to the United States and other democracies.  
During these NSC meetings, each major official had his or her own opinion about what 
to do, which was never resolved. Some wanted to continue with containment policy of 
the previous presidents while others advocated military options to overthrow Saddam 
and bring about regime change in Iraq. The formulation of a new Iraq policy was an 
important issue on the agenda of the first NSC meeting which took place on January 30, 
2001. Colin Powell advocated diluting the multinational economic sanctions against 
Iraq in the hope that a weaker set of sanctions could win stronger and more sustained 
international support. Essentially, Powell wanted more targeted sanctions on Iraq as 
current sanctions were in his view failing because they were blocking common goods 
like medicines from entering the country, and causing mass hardships. Powell was of 
the view that Saddam was manipulating the situation and turning international opinion 
against the embargo. Powell’s proposed idea of targeted sanctions aimed to block dual 
use military equipment, and allow other goods to enter Iraq. Also present at the 
Administration’s first NSC meeting was the CIA Director George Tenet and he went 
over the intelligence he had on Iraq. He showed a photo of a factory he claimed was 
producing WMD. Tenet also pointed out that Saddam was giving money to families of 
Palestinian suicide bombers as well and that Iraq was selling oil to Syria and Jordan at 
cut-rate prices to undermine U.S. sanctions. At the end of the meeting, Bush called for 
more action on the sanctions and Iraq’s WMD. He then told everyone to continue on 
with their work. Powell and the State Department would explore revising the sanctions 
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regime and the Pentagon would look into rebuilding an international coalition against 
Iraq, and also into the best possible ways to support the Iraqi opposition. Tenet and the 
CIA were ordered to prepare a report about how to collect more intelligence on Iraq, 
and Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neil would devise solutions to cutting off Iraq’s 
international finances.  
The next NSC Meeting held on 1st February 2001, aimed amongst other matters to 
revisit the plans for Iraq discussed in the first NSC conference. But somehow, this 
meeting emphasised the divisions that were already emerging within the cabinet. Colin 
Powell set out the State Department’s proposal for strengthening sanctions whilst 
Donald Rumsfeld advocated for regime change as opposed to sanctions and claimed 
that getting rid of Saddam would transform the entire Middle East region and send a 
message to the World about the United States’ aims and power. Rumsfeld stated clearly 
that: 
 What we really want to think about is going after 
Saddam.....Imagine what the region would look like without 
Saddam and with a regime that’s aligned with U.S. interests.....It 
would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would 
demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about (cited in Hurst 
2009:158).  
In his memoir, Known and Unknown, Rumsfeld stated that the sanctions 
administered through the UN’s Oil –for-Food-program had loopholes big 
enough to drive trucks through (Rumsfeld 2011: 418).  
Tenet floated the possibility of a coup to achieve Rumsfeld’s goals but leaned more on 
the side of caution on the basis that the prospects of success were remote at best. 
Treasury Secretary O’Neil thought that Rumsfeld wanted to make an example out of 
Saddam’s Iraq by stopping other countries from acquiring chemical and biological 
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weapons and developing WMD. Throughout these discussions, there was noticeably no 
mention of an invasion of Iraq. Like the first NSC meeting, no decision was made on 
what the Bush administration’s stance should be towards Iraq but Rumsfeld had put the 
idea firmly on the table.  
Rumsfeld’s approach was notably aggressive as he hoped to impose the U.S's will in 
Iraq, the wider Middle East region and in other trouble spots, ultimately forcing 
adversaries to submit to U.S. military superiority thus making the world safer for U.S. 
interests. Rumsfeld long regarded weapons inspections in Iraq as a game of hide-and-
seek and in essence, a waste of time, while Powell used his influence to get Bush to 
seek the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq to exhaust their investigations. The author Bob 
Woodward writes that on one occasion, when Rumsfeld raised Iraq as a potential war 
target during an NSC meeting with Bush, Powell approached Army General Hugh 
Shelton, the former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (1997 – 2001) and expressed 
concerns about the Defense department’s proposed military plan. Woodward quotes 
Powell as saying “What the hell, what are these guys thinking about? ....Can’t you get 
these guys back in the box?” (cited in Woodward 2003:61). Being one of the few senior 
cabinet members to have been involved in the Vietnam War, Powell was more cautious 
about going to war in Iraq and he viewed it as a last resort. James Mann points out that 
Powell was concerned that Bush and those in the administration advocating the use of 
force did not appreciate the difficulties involved in overthrowing Saddam Hussein. In 
Powell’s view, the advocates of war underestimated the danger of Iraq descending into 
civil and religious conflict (Mann 2004). According Woodward, the top echelon of the 
Bush administration was otherwise noticeably free of those who had seen combat. Bush 
had served in the Texas Air National Guard but had not been in combat. Cheney had 
never served in the military himself, though he was Defense Secretary during the Gulf 
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War. Rumsfeld had been a Navy fighter pilot in the 1950s but not during wartime. Rice 
and Tenet had not been in combat (Woodward 2004:78). Only Powell had been in 
combat. He had served two tours in Vietnam as a major in the U.S. Army in 1968 and 
earlier, as South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) adviser from 1962 – 1963 and he had 
witnessed the horrors of war. In his memoir, My American Journey, Powell explained 
how he was haunted by his recollections of the nightmare of the Vietnam War (Powell 
and Persico 1995: 147-150). By inclination, Powell saw nuances and favoured 
diplomatic solutions toward Iraq where possible, however arduous and rugged the road 
may prove to be. The difference in views between Rumsfeld and Powell on how the 
U.S. should approach Iraq was succinctly analysed by Robert Einhorn, an analyst with 
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies who served until August 2001 as 
Assistant U.S. Secretary of state for non-proliferation. According to Einhorn, "These are 
two genuinely different, and very strongly held, views on how the United States should 
behave in the world," (cited in Foundation for Defense of Democracies 2014).  
But whilst the debate during first and second NSC meetings was about policy, its 
fervour stemmed from the personalities and philosophies of the main protagonists – 
Powell and Rumsfeld. "You have two very different geopolitical views and two very 
strong personalities, two men who are not only sure of themselves personally but are at 
the capstone of their careers," said P.W. Singer, a former Pentagon official and now a 
political strategist at the New American Foundation (cited in Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies 2014). "They're also both secure in that they know they have a certain 
constituency and know it would be very difficult for President Bush to choose between 
them and say it's either one or the other” added Singer (cited in Foundation for Defense 
of Democracies 2014). Indeed, the outcome of the tug-of-war between the Bush 
administration's two most powerful cabinet members in the pre-9/11 era would not only 
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later affect the Bush Administration’s future conduct in Iraq and the wider Arab world 
but also how others view the United States’ political manoeuvring in the region.   
Iraq was also discussed in the NSC meetings which took place on 5th and 7th February 
2001 but the only decision made was to collect more intelligence on Saddam’s WMD 
programs. However, on 16th February 2001, Bush told one of his chief speechwriters 
David Frum that he was going to get rid of Saddam Hussein, but he never mentioned 
how48. During this second month of the Administration’s tenure, the Department of 
Defense made it clear that it was the strongest supporter of getting rid of Saddam. Like 
the rest of the government, it had not however decided how to achieve that goal but it 
was willing to use the full force of the American military to do so.  
On 27th February 2001, at his Senate Confirmation hearing, Paul Wolfowitz said that a 
U.S. invasion of Iraq had not been discussed, but that the administration was reviewing 
its Iraq policy, and was looking into how to support opposition groups like the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC) run by Ahmad Chalabi, an American-educated mathematician 
who left Baghdad in 1958, and the Iraqi National Accord (INA) led by Ayad Allawi 
who later became prime minister of Iraq’s interim government following the 2003 U.S. 
– led invasion of Iraq.  
In staff meetings, Wolfowitz argued that the U.S. should arm the INC, and back their 
attempt to overthrow Saddam. That included an option to send in troops to defend them 
if they were able to start an uprising against the regime. As previously discussed, this 
was an idea that Wolfowitz had been advocating for since the early 1990s. Indeed, 
shortly after the end of Gulf War in 1991, whilst serving as Under Secretary of Defence 
                                                          
48 Musings on Iraq, Indecision Over Iraq Policy In Pre-9/11 Bush Administration, Friday, 16th 
September 2011 – accessed via http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk – on 12/12/2013;  
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for Policy in the Pentagon in the George H.W. Bush Administration, Wolfowitz was 
asked by Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, to carry out a comprehensive 
overhaul of the Pentagon’s basic strategic – planning document, known as the ‘Defense 
Planning Guidance’. The main emphasis of the document is an evaluation of the threats 
faced by the United States following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The document 
detailed potential threats and suggests strategies in reference to almost every country in 
the world, including Iraq and the broader Middle East.  In March 1992, assisted by other 
neo-conservative intellectuals such as the former Director of the Office of Special Plans, 
Abram Shulsky, and the former Chief of Staff to the Vice President Cheney, I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby (2001 – 2005), Wolfowitz drafted a document - which was first leaked 
to the New York Times – and which under one section read as follows:  
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is 
to remain the predominant outside power in the region and to 
preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. As 
demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains 
fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of 
powers from dominating the region (cited Elliot and Carney 
2003).  
The document also suggested that the United States should discourage other 
nations “from challenging our leadership”. The U.S., the draft went on to 
say, “may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to 
prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction” (cited 
Elliot and Carney 2003). Those steps, Wolfowitz argued, might include pre-
emptive action – and the Guidance made it clear that both Iraq and North 
Korea were among those at whom the new policy would be aimed.  
During the George W. Bush Administration’s second month in office, Rumsfeld also 
mentioned war for the first time saying that an incident over the no fly zones might be 
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used as a justification to attack Iraq. Prior to the suicide attacks of 9/11, Rumsfeld took 
a hard-line stand on his Administration’s Iraq policy but he seemed unable to press for a 
comprehensive strategy consistent with that which was advocated by his committed 
neoconservative colleagues such as Wolfowitz, who believed that the United States was 
first in rank and grade above other nation states.  
During NSC meetings held on June 22nd, July 13th and August 1st 2001, Wolfowitz and 
the Pentagon pushed again for providing training to the Iraqi opposition in the hope that 
it could pull off a revolt against Saddam. Rumsfeld was of the view that though Iraq 
was discussed occasionally at senior levels of the administration, by the summer of 
2001, U.S. policy remained essentially what it had been at the end of the Clinton 
administration – adrift and at the mercy of external circumstances. For this reason, 
Rumsfeld felt compelled to bring his questions about the U.S.’s inherited Iraq strategy 
to the members of the NSC to seek, in his own words, “some clarity and presidential 
guidance” (Rumsfeld 2011: 419).  
On 1st July 2001, Donald Rumsfeld urged in a memo to the other Principals that all the 
friendly, democratic Iraqi opposition groups be organized into a cooperative body. 
Rumsfeld based his request on a paper written by his Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, Peter Rodman, which advocated “organizing the 
democratic opposition groups into a real political-military force”, in order to avoid a 
political vacuum in Iraq (cited in Feith 2008: 252).   
On 27th July 2001, Rumsfeld sent another to memo to Condoleezza Rice and Dick 
Cheney in which he urged the Administration to come up with a completely new Iraq 
policy. In his memo, Rumsfeld stated that the U.S. could end the no fly zones and 
sanctions, and work with its Arab allies to formulate a new stance. He said that this was 
110 | P a g e  
 
necessary because Iraq was developing WMD, which meant that the U.S. was going to 
have to deal with Iraq sometime in the future (cited in Feith 2008: 535). In early August 
2001, the CIA under Tenet created the Joint Task Force on Iraq as part of its new focus 
upon the country. The Task Force’s chief carried out a review of the Agency’s options, 
which decided that a coup would not work, and only an invasion could get rid of 
Saddam Hussein.  
During the NSC meetings Wolfowitz discussed the INC’s Liberation strategy, which 
involved a Kurdish and Shiite uprising in northern and southern Iraq that would lead to 
a provisional government being formed. Powell disagreed with that plan, because the 
State Department and the CIA did not trust Chalabi. The CIA favoured Allawi’s INA. 
Wolfowitz was close to Chalabi and the INC, so he advocated giving them support. The 
Pentagon’s stance was running into direct opposition from Powell’s State Department 
and Tenet’s CIA, which believed that giving aid to the INC was ill-conceived because 
Chalabi had failed at leading uprisings in the 1990s, and the State Department had lost 
faith in him. Douglas Feith reports that in a paper distributed at a Deputies Lunch, the 
State Department described Chalabi as “autocratic” and criticized him for his “efforts to 
dominate” and unwillingness “to work cooperatively with others”. In the same paper the 
State Department praised Allawi and the INA for favouring “pluralistic democratic 
government” and for “good working relationships” with Saudi Arabia and others, and 
“good relations with a variety of  Shi’a clerics and tribalists” (cited in Feith 2008: 243). 
The State Department repeatedly warned that U.S. officials should not allow Iraqi 
oppositionists to play a major role in post-Saddam Iraqi politics. There was in effect a 
major divide between State and Defense departments on how to deal with the Iraqi 
external opposition groups, and in particular with Ahmad Chalabi and his INC party. In 
a paper distributed at a Deputies Lunch on 6th June 2002 the State Department argued 
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that the U.S. government  should not rely on any Iraqi émigré grouping to carry a heavy 
load (cited in Feith 2008: 256). The State Department warned that external players 
cannot form a credible provisional government and it cautioned against forming a 
provisional government before regime change (Feith 2008: 256). According to Allawi, 
Colin Powell publicly disavowed the possibility that the Iraqi opposition would be 
militarily enabled to challenge the regime of Saddam Hussein claiming that its role 
would be limited to ‘public diplomacy’ and humanitarian work (Allawi 2007: 80).  
Whilst all this was happening, Allawi states that Dick Cheney’s office was issuing 
statements that gave the INC ‘100%’ support and calling for Saddam’s overthrow 
(Allawi 2007: 80). According to Feith, on countless occasions, State and CIA officials 
declared that the Iraqi externals lacked “legitimacy” and would therefore have no 
substantial political support in Iraq after regime change (Feith 2008: 372). Feith argues 
that there was more to the CIA and State Department’s lack of faith in Chalabi. He 
states that the CIA had its own personal reasons for opposing Chalabi. He explains that 
following the 1995 and 1996 clashes between Iraqi oppositionists, which led to 
recriminations between the oppositionists and U.S. officials, Chalabi denounced the 
CIA for incompetence and gained a respectful audience with members of the U.S. 
Congress and other former U.S. officials for doing so. As a consequence, Feith argues 
that Chalabi effectively burned his bridges with the CIA (Feith 2008: 190).  
In an interview with FRONTLINE, America’s longest-running investigative 
documentary series on U.S. television, Richard Perle described the quarrel over Chalabi, 
and in particular, the CIA’s opposition to Chalabi as follows: 
 
The CIA doesn’t like him, because they don’t control him, and 
they only like people they control. Their view has always been 
that we should propagate a coup against Saddam; that we 
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needed to find another strongman like Saddam, that the problem 
was Saddam and not the Baa’th structure.  So they were quite 
happy to find some other Baa’thists to replace Saddam. They 
went to extraordinary lengths attempting to do so. They 
organized coups that failed. People were killed (Perle 2003). 
Perle also asserts that the State Department did not want Chalabi’s INC functioning at 
all and blocked efforts to set up an interim administrative authority early on. According 
to Feith, it is hard to overstate how important the State department and CIA’s actions 
were in shaping thinking about post-Saddam Iraq at State, the CIA and CENTCOM 
(Feith 2008: 372). Seymour Hersh also asserted in a May 2002 New Yorker article, “A 
dispute over Chalabi’s potential usefulness preoccupies the bureaucracy, as the civilian 
leadership in the Pentagon continues to insist that only the I.N.C. can lead the 
opposition” (cited in Feith 2008: 254). Furthermore, in his memoir, George Tenet 
described the Department of Defense’s proposals for post-Saddam Iraq as “thinly veiled 
efforts to put Chalabi in charge” (cited in Feith 2008:255). This charge was denied by 
Douglas Feith. Feith stated in response that: 
I do not know what might exist in the file cabinets of every 
official in the Defense Department, but of the thousands of 
pages of material that senior Defense Department officials 
wrote for interagency meetings on post-Saddam Iraqi 
governance, I know of not one supporting this charge. Even in 
informal meetings and conversations, I never heard anyone at 
the Defense Department make an argument or suggest a plan 
for putting Chalabi into power in Iraq (Feith 2008: 255).  
Reflecting on U.S. strategy at the time, Richard Perle explains that the United States did 
not align itself with any Iraqi opposition and as result a strategy that might have entailed 
building up the opposition so that if and when the United States went into Iraq, it would 
go in with some thousands of Iraqis ready to go, trained and organized, never happened. 
According to Perle, the reason why it did not happen was a stubborn refusal by the State 
Department and the CIA to embrace an opposition –oriented strategy. Perle states that 
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the United States never had such a strategy (Perle 2003). Stephen Hadley, Deputy 
National Security Adviser (2001 – 2005) and National Security Adviser (2005 – 2009) 
saw a useful role for the Iraqi opposition leaders as potential U.S. partners: “to promote 
an Iraqi government that would not oppress its own people or threaten others, to build 
international support for action against Saddam, and to contribute to U.S. intelligence 
on Iraq” (cited in Feith 2008: 242). According to Feith, Hadley was however left 
exasperated because anti-Chalabi manoeuvring was impeding ‘sensible’ cooperation 
with the Iraqi opposition (Feith 2008: 242).  
Bush’s Vice President, Dick Cheney also thought that in Iraq, it was important to 
establish Iraqi political legitimacy as soon as possible. Cheney was aware of the policy 
differences relating to Iraq which emerged in bitter disagreements over the role of the 
Iraqi externals, and particularly the role of the INC. He understood the concerns of the 
State Department and CIA and their opposition, scepticism and stiff resistance to 
Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles. Cheney appreciated that the idea had a certain “crawl-
before-you-walk” appeal but he felt the idea of bringing a government –in-waiting to 
Iraq to run  the country, a provisional Iraqi government – even an imperfect one – could 
help convince Iraqis that the U.S. government was serious when it promised to send a 
liberating force, not an occupying force (Hayes 2007: 428).  In his memoir, In My Time, 
Cheney stated that: 
I have watched so-called externals play a crucial role in Iraq’s 
democratic government. The prime minister of Iraq today, Nouri 
al Maliki, lived in exile until 2003, as did Ayad Allawi, whom 
Maliki narrowly defeated in the 2010 national elections. The 
idea that we shouldn’t work closely with opponents of Saddam 
who were living in exile slowed us down. I think we should have 
done a better job in the wake of Saddam’s ouster if we had had 
a provisional government, made up of externals and internals, 
ready to take over as soon as Saddam fell. This would have put 
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Iraqis in charge of Iraq and helped avoid the taint of occupation 
that we began to experience under the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (Cheney 2011: 387).  
The Chalabi affair was a good illustration of the hidden weakness that lay at the heart of 
the administration’s embrace of pre-emption. It has long been a rule of politics that 
relying on exiles can be dangerous, and the Iraqi case was no exception (Ehrenberg et al 
2010: 164). Bob Woodward states in his book, Plan of Attack that one of the core 
differences between Rumsfeld and Powell was on the issue of pre-emptive attacks. 
Since 9/11, Rumsfeld had been saying categorically that defence was not enough, that 
the U.S. needed an offense. The battle had to be taken to the terrorists, they had to be 
attacked, taken out pre-emptively. According to Woodward, any discussion of 
employing the military under some theory, and not an immediate threat to U.S. national 
security, made Powell exceedingly nervous (Woodward 2004: 129).  
Eight months into the Bush Administration’s tenure in office, there had been lots of 
talk, and many disagreements about what to do about Iraq, but little had progressed past 
the initial discussions outlined in the first NSC meeting in January 2001. There was no 
concrete Iraq policy emerging and as 9/11 approached, the Bush Administration’s Iraq 
policy was still adrift. Indeed, top officials were increasingly disagreeing over what 
constituted a viable and defensible Iraq policy. According to Feith, while CIA officials 
debated with Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby about the best form of regime change 
in Iraq, State Department officials argued for muddling through with variations on the 
containment policies of the 1990s. He states that Powell and Richard Armitage were 
promoting what they called “smart sanctions” as the way to reinvigorate the Security 
Council’s flagging containment effort (Feith 2008: 204). Feith saw Powell’s smart 
sanctions initiative as a way to seem to be addressing a problem without doing anything 
difficult or risky – or effective (Feith 2008: 205). Richard Armitage sees the picture 
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differently. In an interview with the New York Times reporter Michael Gordon and 
former Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, the co-authors of Cobra II, 
Armitage stated that he and Powell did not oppose going to war against Saddam 
Hussein. Armitage confirmed: “Powell and I did not object to the prospect of taking out 
Saddam Hussein, but we had real questions about timing” (cited in Feith 2008: 246).  
In another interview with FRONTLINE, Richard Haass, the former director of policy 
planning at the U.S. State Department, (2001 – 2003) admitted that there were 
differences between the State Department, Defense Department, and other wings of the 
U.S. government on the U.S.’s Iraq policy (Haas 2003). Edward Walker, President, 
Middle East Institute, and the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
affairs, (1999 – 2001), also gave an interview to FRONTLINE in which he explained 
that there was a sort of suspicion between the two departments – State and Defense, or 
at least elements of State and Defense. Walker makes the point that if only there had 
been a greater degree of confidence between the Pentagon and the State Department 
they could have worked in tandem a lot better than they did, instead of going off in 
different directions (Walker 2003). Richard Perle also states that the White House was 
essentially unable to reconcile differences among the CIA, State and Defense 
departments and as a result it chose not to take the steps that might well have meant that 
when the United States went into Iraq, it would enter with a significant number of Iraqis 
to help promote its agenda (Perle 2003). Feith endorses Perle’s views. Reflecting on the 
Administration’s overall interagency decision-making process, Feith states that he was 
struck by its lack of clarity. According to Feith, on issue after issue, where there were 
disagreements they were not brought to the surface to be presented to President Bush 
for decision. Rather, Feith argues that basic disagreements were allowed to remain 
unresolved – as long as a degree of consensus could be produced on immediate next 
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steps (Feith 2008: 245). He argues that although National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice worked hard to spare Bush the task of having to decide between clear-cut mutually 
exclusive options, she relied on her practice of bridging or blending key elements of the 
views of several interagency players. According to Feith, this approach tended only to 
paper over the cracks, rather than resolve, pertinent differences of policy opinion (Feith 
2008: 250). As a result, there was also no leadership from the top about what to do. 
Against this background of interagency conflict, President Bush was also undecided on 
which course of action to pursue making it more difficult for his Administration to 
devise a clear and concise pre-war Iraq policy.  
What this series of events and reflections show is that while the Bush administration 
had placed Iraq at the centre of its Middle East foreign policy agenda, the debate 
amongst the Administration’s major players was deadlocked. In the first eight months of 
the administration, meetings were held by the deputies and the principals on Iraq, but no 
substantial Iraq policy change was formulated. There was no doubt that all the top 
officials were concerned about Iraq’s WMD programmes but it was also obvious that 
there was clearly a lack of consensus or strategic cooperation amongst them about what 
to do about them and about Saddam’s authoritarian regime. Indeed, the Bush 
Administration found it difficult in its early months to agree on a course of action 
toward Saddam’s Iraq. The Defense Department favoured the idea of cooperating with 
Iraqi democratic opposition groups and wanted to support Chalabi’s INC. The Pentagon 
was talking about regime change one way or the other. The State Department was 
clearly sceptical of the Defense department’s position preferring instead a traditional 
form of Republican realism which aimed to continue with the previous containment 
policy alongside new and improved targeted sanctions. The CIA was increasing its 
intelligence collection on Iraq, but it was mainly working of assumptions, rather than 
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hard incontrovertible evidence, and had even found that a coup attempt was unlikely to 
succeed.  
What became clear from all of the disagreements and bureaucratic politics was that the 
Bush administration seemed to be inconsistent with regard to its Iraq policy with no 
particular authority being able to dominate the policy agenda and influence proceedings. 
President Bush knew of the respective positions of his key advisers as his 
Administration struggled to formulate an agreeable Iraq policy. He writes in his 
memoirs, Decision Points, that:  
For months, the National Security Council had been meeting 
almost daily to discuss Iraq. I knew where all my advisers stood. 
Dick Cheney was concerned about the slow diplomatic process. 
He warned that Saddam Hussein could be using the time to 
produce weapons, hide weapons, or plot an attack........Don 
Rumsfeld was not as definitive. He assured me the military 
would be ready if I gave the order......Condi [Condoleezza Rice] 
was careful to stay neutral at the NSC meetings but she gave me 
her opinion in private.....She reluctantly concluded that the only 
way to enforce the UN resolution would be to use the military 
option......Colin [Colin Powell] had the deepest reservations. In 
a one-on-one meeting in early 2003, he had told me he believed 
we could manage the threat of Iraq diplomatically. He also told 
me he was not fully comfortable with the war plans.... (Bush 
2010: 251).  
According to Woodward, the deep divisions and tensions in the war cabinet with Powell 
the moderate negotiator and Rumsfeld the hard-line activist meant no real policy would 
be made until either the president stepped in or events forced his hand (Woodward 
2004: 23). Indeed, despite being privy to the personal thoughts of his key advisers, Bush 
remained uninterested in the aggressive agenda of his Defense Department. This 
remained Bush’s stance up until the suicide attacks of 9/11 when he abandoned his 
cautious realist approach to invade Iraq and embark upon a transformative foreign 
policy focused on spreading democracy and ending tyranny throughout the world.  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
The Eureka Moment – from realism to primacy 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
POST - 9/11 PERIOD 
In the days immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush was still reluctant to press 
ahead with an Iraq policy that called for an immediate ‘regime change’ in Iraq as he 
wanted a more compelling reason for military intervention in order to win domestic and 
international support for removing Saddam Hussein from power. It is reported that, at 
one point during a Camp David meeting which took place after 9/11, Wolfowitz – who, 
according to Allawi, was one of the most vociferous supporters of the view that it was 
in the U.S.’s strategic interest to advance the cause of democracy and to implant the 
values of liberalism, pluralism and human rights (Allawi 2007:83) - tried to persuade 
Bush to back a scheme to ‘lop off’ the southern part of Iraq, including Basra, its third 
largest city, and some important oil fields but that Bush remained unconvinced of the 
virtues of a pre-emptive strike (Elliot and Carney 2003:172).  
Indeed, it did seem that Bush was simply looking for an opportunity to undertake a 
more aggressive policy and 9/11 provided him with this. Bob Woodward states that 
since taking up office, Bush had been seeking ways to undermine Saddam Hussein. 
According to Woodward, the fear was that Saddam was still attempting to develop, 
obtain and eventually use WMDs, and without United Nations inspectors in the country, 
there was no way to know the exact nature of the threat the U.S. faced. Woodward 
states that the terrorist attacks of September 11 gave the U.S. a new window to go after 
Saddam Hussein (Woodward 2003:83).  
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The 9/11 suicide attacks stimulated the rethinking of Bush’s initial realist foreign policy 
and presented the pro-war foreign policy advocates within and beyond his 
Administration with a window of opportunity to advance their case for an aggressive 
grand strategy aimed at promoting a world order more reflective of American ideals and 
values as well as U.S. interests. From the point of view of many commentators, the 
suicide attacks of 9/11 reinforced the rationale for regime change in Iraq by creating a 
tolerant domestic and international political environment that encouraged the pursuit of 
that agenda.  
Bush himself stated in his memoirs, Decision Points, that: 
For my first eight months in office, my policy focused on 
tightening the sanctions – or, as Colin Powell put it, keeping 
Saddam in his box. Then 9/11 hit, and we had to take a fresh 
look at every threat in the world (Bush 2010: 228).  
He added:  
Before 9/11, Saddam was a problem America might have been 
able to manage. Through the lens of the post-9/11 world, my 
view changed. I had just witnessed the damage inflicted by 
nineteen fanatics armed with box cutters. I could only imagine 
the destruction possible if an enemy dictator passed his WMD to 
terrorists ......The lesson of 9/11 was that if we waited for a 
danger to fully materialize, we would have waited too long. I 
reached a decision: We would confront the threat from Iraq, one 
way or another (Bush 2010: 229).  
Bush’s views were shared by key members of his Administration. Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld stated that, 9/11 created “the kind of opportunities that World War II 
offered, to refashion the world” (Rumsfeld 2001).  
Douglas Feith stated that:  
The 9/11 attack was one of those events in history potent enough 
to stimulate fresh thought and disturb the complacent. Rumsfeld, 
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Wolfowitz, and I shared the view that the President had a duty to 
use his bully pulpit in order to promote awareness of the 
challenge from terrorist extremists. Whereas Powell stressed the 
importance of respecting the views of allies and friends abroad, 
we encouraged the President to act, with due respect, to shape 
those views (Feith 2008:59).  
Dick Cheney also stated that: 
I think probably it is fair to say that 9/11 was a watershed event. 
And it was the kind of thing that was so significant, such a 
dramatic change from what had gone before, nineteen guys with 
box cutters can kill 3,000 Americans, that it forced all of us to 
go back and look fresh at what had transpired, at what had led 
up to that point........(Hayes 2007: 348) 
Cheney added: 
I think after 9/11 when you move into a situation where your 
biggest threat is the possibility of terrorists, state – sponsored 
terrorists, or a terrorist with a relationship with a rogue 
government able to get their hands on deadly technologies, 
Saddam Hussein is a hell of a problem. And he was a problem 
before 9/11, but he became a bigger problem after 9/11 in light 
of that threat that we’re living with still to this day, the 
possibility of an al Qaeda cell in the middle of one of our cities 
with a deadly biological agent or a nuclear weapon (Hayes 
2007: 393).  
After 9/11, the hawkish members of the Bush administration cited the post-World War 
II experience of Germany and Japan to bolster their case for invading and occupying 
Iraq. It soon became clear that in terms of achievability, the trump cards in the hands of 
advocates of the Bush administration’s Iraq and Middle East democracy policy were 
indeed the examples of post-World War II Germany and Japan49. In both countries, the 
                                                          
49 In his book, American Foreign Policy and Post-war Reconstruction: Comparing Japan and 
Iraq, Jeff Bridoux provides a detailed analysis of the reconstruction of Japan and Iraq in order to 
understand why the G.W. Bush administration’s officials believed that extensive social 
reengineering aimed at seeding democracy and economic development, as performed after 
World War II, was replicable in Iraq. In his analysis, Bridoux contrasts the successful 
reconstruction of Japan after WWII with the not-so-successful case of Iraq in the aftermath of 
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U.S. Army helped transform militaristic dictatorships into pillars of liberal democracy. 
The successful cases of U.S. political engineering in Japan and West Germany – and 
one might add Italy and Austria as well for the sake of completeness - in the aftermath 
of World War II have lasting importance. These cases laid the groundwork for the 
perception that democracy can be externally imposed and that the United States is 
capable of exporting it. The post-war reconstruction of Japan and West Germany 
following World War II is widely considered the most successful example of 
democratic nation-building engineered by the United States and its allies. A leading 
RAND study of American ‘nation-building’ declares, “The cases of Germany and 
Japan set a standard of post-conflict nation-building that has not since been matched” 
(cited in Dobbins et al 2003:xiii). Others have likewise lauded U.S. and allied efforts in 
the former ‘Axis’ countries as the “apex,” “pinnacle,” and “gold standard” of 
democratic nation-building (Von Hippel 2000:11; Coyne 2008; Brownlee 2007:323). 
Bush also invoked the American – led democratization campaign in post-World War II 
Germany and Japan as outstanding examples of magnanimity and statesmanship stating 
that there were many doubters, amongst them American and Japanese experts who 
claimed that Japan in particular was not ready for democracy (cited in Wallesten and 
Perry 2005). In his speech marking the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for 
Democracy in Washington D.C., Bush stated that,  
 
After the Japanese surrender in 1945, a so-called Japan expert 
asserted that democracy in that former empire would ‘never 
work’. Another observer declared the prospects for democracy 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the 2003 Iraq war. He argues that U.S. policy managed to achieve a workable balance between 
coercion and consensus in the case of post-war Japan whereas in Iraq, the U.S. relied so much 
on coercion that it left little room for developing consensus among elites which left it short of 
achieving its goal of establishing a neo-liberal historical bloc (Bridoux 2011: 99).  
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in post-Hitler Germany is, and I quote, ‘most uncertain at best’ 
– he made that claim in 1957 (Bush 2003).  
 
Later, in his speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia in 2005, 
Bush confidently explained, 
We've done this kind of work before; we must have confidence in 
our cause. In World War II, the free nations defeated fascism 
and helped our former adversaries, Germany and Japan, build 
strong democracies -- and today, these nations are allies in 
securing the peace. In the Cold War, free nations defeated 
communism, and helped our former Warsaw Pact adversaries 
become strong democracies -- and today, nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe are allies in the war on terror (Bush 2005).  
Bush also stated in his memoirs Decision Points that:  
I had studied the histories of post-war Germany, Japan, and 
South Korea. Each had required many years – and a U.S. troop 
presence – to complete the transition from devastation of war to 
stable democracies .............With time and steadfast American 
support, I had confidence that democracy in Iraq would succeed 
(Bush 2010: 357).  
The transformation of the former ‘Axis’ countries into peaceful democracies 
also influenced neoconservative thinking  - both inside and outside the 
administration of George W. Bush. Referring to the ‘democratic peace’ 
theory, the neo-conservative political commentator Charles Krauthammer 
claimed that:   
 
The spread of democracy is not just an end but a means for 
securing American interests. The reason is simple. Democracies 
are inherently more friendly to the United States, less 
belligerent to their neighbours, and generally more inclined to 
peace (Krauthammer 2004:11).  
 
The successful democratization experiences in the aftermath of World War 
II somehow also dictated U.S. foreign policy and reinforced the political 
thinking that America is not only the freest country in the world, but that it 
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is also the best equipped to bring democracy to other countries. Indeed, 
Americans of various political persuasions believe profoundly that it is their 
divine right and duty, and indeed their destiny, to promote freedom and 
democracy in the world. According to Matthew Alan Hill, the United States 
has always proclaimed its unique sense of mission and suggested that it 
plays a particular role as a beacon of freedom and righteousness for the rest 
of the world (Hill 2011:1). Hill points out that the rhetoric of American 
presidents, perhaps best expressed in Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ 
speech to a joint session of Congress in January 1918 for a new world 
order50, and voiced since by Republican and Democrat presidents alike, 
suggests that the United States has a divinely sanctioned mission to spread 
its own version of liberal democracy to the rest of the world (Hill 2011:1). 
Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki, also argue that democracy promotion 
constitutes one of the foundational elements of American foreign policy. 
Bridoux and Kurki point out that it is difficult not to consider the United 
States as the cradle of democracy promotion because U.S. foreign policy has 
been principled in its support for democracy since the inception of the 
Republic (Bridoux and Kurki 2014:3). According to Bridoux and Kurki, 
liberal internationalism, and thus the promotion of democracy, remained 
central to the foreign policy of successive American presidents over the 
course of the twentieth century with the likes of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Truman, Kennedy, Reagan and Clinton all championing freedom and 
democracy(Bridoux and Kurki 2014:5). Bridoux and Kurki identify the peak 
                                                          
50 In Woodrow Wilson’s view, the best way to achieve American security was not to defend the 
United States against the outside world but to change the outside world fundamentally. In policy 
circles, this tradition became known as Wilsonianism or Wilsonian liberalism.  
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of this strategy as an embodiment of Ronald Reagan’s 1982 address to 
members of the British Parliament. In his speech, Reagan declared that: 
 
If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of 
freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist 
the campaign for democracy. We must be staunch in our 
conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky 
few, the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. Let 
us now begin a major effort to secure the best – a crusade for 
freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next 
generation (Reagan 2004). 
 
Certainly, George W. Bush’s transformation into a democratic crusader 
follows in the footsteps of his predecessors. Bush who once championed 
modest foreign policy goals, and who entered office pledging to focus on 
narrowly understood “vital interests” such as building a national missile 
defence system, managing relations with China and Russia and getting the 
United States out of the nation-building business, suddenly decided to 
harness American power to liberal ends by embracing democracy promotion 
as his vision for the future of Iraq and the wider Middle East region. Indeed, 
the 9/11 suicide attacks radically transformed Bush’s worldview so much so 
that he pledged that the United States “will use this moment of opportunity 
to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” (Kaplan 2003: 21-23).  
 
In his second inaugural address on 20th January 2005, Bush set out what 
later became known as his “freedom agenda”. In his speech to the American 
nation, Bush enunciated his new thinking when he declared that, 
 
America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from 
our most basic beliefs.....It is the policy of the United States to 
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seek and support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture (Bush 2005).  
Overall, most commentators argue that, the events of 9/11 made it easier for the neo-
conservatives to convince Bush and Congress to wage the same war that they had earlier 
failed to convince the Clinton administration to undertake in 1998.  They assert that the 
Bush Administration capitalized on the hostility toward the Middle East voiced by 
American public opinion and Congress in order to pass a resolution to invade Iraq in 
March 2003 and remove Saddam Hussein from the seat of power. Toby Dodge, who 
served as an occasional adviser to U.S. General David Petraeus who commanded the 
multinational forces in Iraq in 2007 – 2008, argues that the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist 
attacks were seen as an opportunity to rework the envelope within which previous 
American foreign policy had been conducted (Dodge 2009: 93). To this, John Dumbrell 
adds that in various ways, “9/11 bolstered the neo-conservative agenda, which clearly 
included military action, sooner rather than later, in Iraq” (Dumbrell 2005:35-47).  
It would take a change in mentality and a convergence of nationalist realist and neo-
conservative forces to convince Bush of the need for urgent military action against 
Saddam Hussein. It was only when key presidential advisers and hardliners decided to 
align their thinking with the neoconservative members of the Administration that the 
possibility of invading Iraq became a realistic prospect. Robert Singh makes the point 
that after 9/11, the neo-con solution seemed, to the conservatives in the Bush 
administration to be the American solution. Singh asserts that the events of 9/11 
encouraged the Bush administration to enlist and adapt certain neo-conservative 
arguments in support of its policies and that Iraq represented the clearest example of the 
new conservative convergence (Singh 2009:33-47). Singh’s assertion obviously begs 
the question of how did the long-time true believers who argued for ‘regime change’ in 
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Iraq end up convincing Bush and his close circle of advisers of the need for urgent 
military action against Iraq.  
The general feelings of insecurity which dominated the American mindset following the 
events of 9/11 and also an awareness of America’s supreme military strength amongst 
key members of the Bush Administration would seem to provide the answer to this 
enquiry. The sudden sense of vulnerability which Americans up and down the country 
felt in the aftermath of the 9/11 suicide attacks, was enough to convince Bush and his 
advisers of the danger posed to America if WMDs fell into terrorists hands. Once this 
sense of vulnerability became pervasive, it became necessary for the Administration to 
identify a potential supplier of WMDs to terrorists such as al-Qaeda. Whilst no evidence 
was found linking Saddam to the 9/11 suicide attacks, it was only a matter of time 
before a link to Baghdad would be established. As Saddam had once admitted 
developing anthrax weapons to U.N. inspectors and now anthrax was being used to 
murder innocent Americans at home51, Bush officials readily latched on to evidence dug 
up by alliance soldiers in November 2001 when they raided and combed through al-
Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan. The evidence retrieved in the form of documents and 
                                                          
51 American investigators who probed anthrax outbreaks in Florida and New York in 2001 
concluded that they had all the hallmarks of a terrorist attack. Saddam’s Iraq was named as a 
prime suspect adding to what Bush’s hawks said was a growing mass of evidence that Saddam 
Hussein was involved, possibly indirectly, with the 9/11 hijackers. Bush’s hawks repeatedly 
tried to pin the anthrax attacks on Saddam and use it as a basis for attacking Iraq. The focus on 
Iraq was based on its record of developing a germ arsenal and also on what some commentators 
said was a desire on the part of the Bush administration to find a reason to attack Iraq in the war 
on terrorism. The UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter pointed out that the evidence did not 
support the conclusion that Iraq was involved. Ritter knew the strain of anthrax Iraq had 
developed and knew that it was not the strain sent in the anthrax attacks. The repeated attempts 
to link Iraq to the anthrax attacks turned out to be speculation at best.  
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computer records, revealed that Osama bin Laden’s network had been trying to acquire 
WMDs. From this point onwards, Administration officials did not have to work hard to 
identify Iraq as the most likely supplier of WMDs to al-Qaeda. A White House official 
is quoted as saying that “Iraq was the easiest place they [al-Qaeda] could get them 
[WMDs] from” (cited in Elliot and Carney 2003:172). Another former senior 
Administration official is quoted as saying that:  
The eureka moment was that realization by the President that 
were WMD to fall into [terrorists’] hands, their willingness to 
use it would be unquestioned. So we must act pre-emptively to 
ensure that those who have that capability aren’t allowed to 
proliferate it (cited in Elliot and Carney 2003:172).   
The argument that the suicide attacks of 9/11 did create a new sui generis rationale for 
regime change in Iraq in the form of fear of WMD-armed terrorists was seemingly 
reinforced by Dick Cheney during his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) 
convention in August 2002. In his speech to VFW convention, Cheney stated that a 
WMD-armed Iraq: 
 Could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle 
East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy 
supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the 
region and subject the United States or any other nation to 
nuclear blackmail (Cheney 2002).  
Cheney’s statement did serve as an endorsement of the Bush administration’s unaltered 
pre-occupation with American hegemony in the Arab world. Toby Dodge argues that:  
Iraq personified the problems, writ large, faced by U.S. 
hegemony in the Middle East..........if it could be removed, the 
full force of U.S. military might could be displayed in one of the 
most important states in the region, then the rest of the Arab 
regimes could be made to submit fully to US hegemony (Dodge 
2006).  
Inevitably, the reasons for the U.S.’s decision to invade Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 
suicide attacks attracted considerable speculation amongst commentators prior to the 
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event. There were reports of other motives for the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and these 
pointed mainly towards Bush’s personal motives. In an article in the Philadelphia 
Inquirer on the U.S. intentions towards Iraq, Dick Polman posed the question:  
Is this a grand crusade, or a grand match? Is this about 
securing world peace, or grabbing the oil fields? (Polman 
2002:1-2).   
He then goes on to say that:   
There is a nagging suspicion that Bush’s motives for toppling 
Saddam Hussein are far more personal, that what he really 
wants is to avenge his father and open the Iraqi oil reserves to 
his friends (Polman 2002: 1-2).    
Polman presents Bush as the main source of the vengeance theory. “The audience grew 
quiet,” Polman writes, “in a Houston ballroom........when Bush said about Hussein, 
‘After all, this is a guy who tried to kill my dad” (Polman 2002: 1-2).   Polman also 
reports that George H.W. Bush Snr. told CNN, “I hate Saddam Hussein” (Polman 2002: 
1-2). Another source Polman presents is Larry Kudlow, a former aide to Ronald Reagan 
who served on the transition team of George W. Bush Jnr. and Vice President Cheney. 
Kudlow is reported to have said that:  
The ‘Baby Bush’ factor raises the issue of whether the current 
president isn’t going after Saddam Hussein merely to avenge his 
father’s unfinished business. This thought mars George W. 
Bush’s clear-headed logic (cited in Polman 2002: 1-2).   
Bruce Buchanan, professor of government at the University of Texas and a long-time 
Bush observer commented that Bush’s remarks “do not surprise him at all”. He then 
went on to add:  
A leader has to be careful with word choice, but every once in a 
while, Bush’s feelings about Saddam Hussein sneak through. 
That indicates he is personalizing things to some degree (cited 
in Omran 2003:278). 
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Some commentators also argued that, the fact that Iraq has the second – largest proven 
reserves of petroleum in the world next to Saudi Arabia must have figured highly 
among George W. Bush’s motives for wanting to topple Saddam Hussein. Michael 
Klare, an expert on the geopolitics of oil stated that:  
The oil factor is crucial and these [administration] people are 
very conscious of it, even if they would rather not talk about it. 
They know that if they talk about the oil, they can kiss goodbye 
to getting speedy support at the UN (cited in Omran 2003: 278 - 
279).  
To this Marcy Katpur, a Democrat and the U.S. Representative for Ohio’s 
9th congressional district added: 
The driving force of this potential war on Iraq is oil 
(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 2002).  
Buchanan also points out that: 
 This president [Bush], in particular, can’t mention it [oil] in 
connection with Iraq, because he and Cheney don’t want to 
draw fresh attention to their long-standing business ties or to 
campaign –finance reports that show that, in 2000, oil industry 
donors favoured Bush more than any other presidential 
candidate (cited in Omran 2003:279).  
Another expert, Bill Minutaglio, the Bush biographer, said that: 
 Bush really does believe that what is best for Big Oil is best for 
America. His whole formative world view was formed by being 
hip-deep in the oil patch (cited in Omran 2003:273). 
Personal motives aside, Elsayed M. Omran states there were also reports that another of 
Bush’s motives was what his advisers anonymously referred to as redrawing the 
political map of the Middle East (Omran 2003: 279). A number of pro-Israel, right-wing 
think tanks in which Pentagon hawks were entrenched, such as the Hudson Institute, the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Jewish Institute for National Security (JINSA) among 
others, advocated the invasion of Iraq on the basis that such a war would create a pro-
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American regime in Iraq and enable Washington to remap the region. The various 
reports produced by these organizations argued that the ouster of Saddam Hussein and 
the installation of a U.S. – backed democracy in Baghdad could trigger democratic 
change in neighbouring Iran and put pressure on the Saudi monarchy (Omran 2003: 
279).  
On the heel of these reports, Bush’s State of Union address on January 29, 2002 hinted 
at a strategy of bringing democracy to the Middle East. In his address, Bush stated: 
America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they 
are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. 
No nation owns these aspirations and no nation is exempt from 
them. We have no intention of imposing our culture, but 
America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands 
of human dignity, rule of law, limits on the power of the state, 
respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice 
and religious tolerance. America will take the side of brave men 
and women who advocate these values around the world, 
including the Islamic world, because we have a greater 
objective than eliminating threats and combating resentments. 
We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror 
(Bush 2002). 
The promotion of democracy in Iraq thus became a primary U.S. objective given the 
consensus amongst Bush’s team of ‘hawks’ that people who live under democracy are 
less prone to join terrorist organizations – this predominant thinking derived its logic 
from the ‘democratic peace theory’. Accordingly, the Bush administration aptly named 
the invasion of Iraq ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. On 16th March 2003, in a speech a few 
days before the invasion, Bush declared that:  
We would undertake a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi 
people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours 
......we will support the Iraqi people’s aspirations for a 
representative government that upholds human rights (Bush 
2003).  
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The decision to advance democracy in Iraq had been widely touted by the so-called neo-
conservatives for some time but as we have seen, it had been notably absent from the 
George W. Bush administration’s thinking prior to 9/11. In the aftermath of this event, it 
became inextricably linked to the issue of U.S. security. In his biography of Paul 
Wolfowitz entitled Paul D. Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker, and 
Strategist, Lewis Solomon makes the point that:  
The failure to find WMD in Iraq and the inability to conclusively 
prove relevant connections between Saddam and al-Qaeda led 
the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq on an 
idealistic policy of an Arab world political transformation. Iraq 
formed a key place to test the hypotheses that Arab nations 
could support democratic institutions (Solomon 2007: 122).  
Indeed, Bush left no one in doubt about his faith in democracy being a universal 
antidote to terrorism. In his remarks on 21st March 2003, Bush stated that:  
I have determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is 
consistent with the United States and other countries continuing 
to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and 
terrorist organizations.....United States objectives also support a 
transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq 
Liberation Act of 1998(Public Law 105 -338) (Bush 2003). 
Bush also repeated the U.S. objective of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy as 
two sides of the same coin. On 8th September 2003, Bush stated that:  
In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country 
to build a decent and democratic society at the centre of the 
Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture 
chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free 
institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly – yet worthy 
of our country, and critical to our security (Bush 2003).  
Bush stated further in the NSS 2006 that:  
Because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty 
will make America more secure (Bush 2006).  
Bush’s idealism was also evident in his memoirs Decision Points when he states that: 
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 Freedom is the most practical way to protect our country in the 
long run (Bush 2010). 
The idea of promoting democracy as an antidote to terrorism was also 
backed by the neo-conservative camp in George W. Bush’s administration. 
Paula Dobriansky declared in a speech before the Heritage Foundation that: 
 
 [the] advancement of human rights and democracy . . . [is] the 
bedrock of our war on terrorism. The violation of human rights 
by repressive regimes provides fertile ground for popular 
discontent . . . cynically exploited by terrorist organizations. . . 
.[A] stable government that responds to the legitimate desires of 
its people and respects their rights, shares power. . is a powerful 
antidote to extremism (Dobriansky 2001). 
Feith also stated in his memoir that: 
Critics have accused the Administration of going to war in Iraq 
for the sake of a political experiment in Arab democratization. 
But the primary decision the President faced was not whether 
democracy could or should flourish in Iraq, but whether the 
United States could live with the risk that Saddam Hussein 
might one day threaten to attack us, directly or through 
terrorists, with biological or other catastrophic weapons. If we 
decided we had to remove Saddam from power, the next 
decision was whether the United States should try to help the 
Iraqis build democratic institutions – or accept the possibility 
that Saddam might be replaced by another military dictator. 
Given the options, President Bush decided that the interests and 
principles of the United States required us to try to promote 
democracy (Feith 2008: 236).  
Thus, the official Bush motives for the Iraq invasion can be categorized as long-term 
and short-term. The short-term interests included stripping Saddam Hussein’s regime of 
weapons of mass destruction, toppling the regime, and cutting links, if there were any, 
between Saddam’s regime and al-Qaeda (Russett 2005:396). The long-term interests 
included the construction of democracy in Iraq (Yetiv 2006:397-98). 
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In short, the Bush administration came to the conclusion that promoting political 
liberalism in Iraq and throughout the Arab world was the only guarantee of U.S. 
domestic security. What followed was a rhetorical onslaught aimed at unequivocally 
declaring Bush’s brand new policy to advance and establish the foundations of 
democratic governance in the Middle East. Suddenly, the previously obscure topic of 
the Arab – Islamic World’s “democracy deficit” became the focus of wide discussion in 
U.S. media and policy circles.  
 
U.S. rhetoric vis-a-vis democracy promotion towards the Arab world post – 9/11 
______________________________________________________________________ 
George W. Bush placed a greater rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion than any 
of his predecessors and he raised the rhetorical bar to new heights. In his National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America 2002, Bush speaks of 
democracy promotion as an idealistic burden and he states that: 
 The United States must defend liberty and justice because these 
principles are right for all people everywhere (Bush 2002).  
Paula J. Dobriansky also argued in her article published in Foreign Affairs 
magazine in 2003 entitled ‘Democracy Promotion’, that the promotion of 
democracy was a key foreign policy goal of the Bush administration and 
that the NSS of 2002 prominently features democracy promotion as a core 
part of post – 9/11 U.S. foreign policy strategy.  
Bush also affirmed his commitment to democracy promotion in personal and religious 
terms. In a July 2007 meeting he stated:  
I come at it [his belief in spreading liberty globally] many 
different ways. Really not primarily from a political science 
perspective, frankly, it’s more of a theological perspective. I do 
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believe there is an Almighty, and I believe a gift of that Almighty 
to all is freedom. And I will tell you that it is principle that no 
one can convince me that doesn’t exist (cited in Brooks 
2007:A21).    
Furthermore, in his memoirs Decision Points he states that “.....freedom is a 
universal gift from Almighty God......” (Bush 2010:397).  
Bush’s foreign policy re-orientation was a significant change of course – rhetorically, it 
moved away from the decades of support for political stasis and from deep attachments 
to autocratic rulers in the Arab world. Indeed, a year after the 9/11 attacks, Richard 
Haas, publicly acknowledged that the U.S.’s policy toward the Middle East had been 
operating in default mode. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in 
Washington, D.C. on December 4, 2002, Haas pled guilty to a mild version of the 
allegation that U.S. policy towards the region was hypocritical because it coupled 
platitudes about the importance of democracy with cosy relationships with semi-
authoritarian and authoritarian regimes. In his speech, Haas stated:  
At times, the United States has avoided scrutinizing the internal 
workings of countries in the interests of ensuring a steady flow 
of oil, containing Soviet, Iraqi and Iranian expansionism, 
addressing issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, resisting 
communism in East Asia, or securing basing rights for our 
military. Yet by failing to help foster gradual paths to 
democratization in many of our important relationships – by 
creating what might be called a “democratic exception” – we 
missed an opportunity to help these countries become more 
stable, more prosperous, more peaceful, and more adaptable to 
the stresses of a globalizing world (Haas 2002). 
The U.S.’s conduct during those sixty years was also concisely considered by Lisa 
Anderson when she made the point that: 
 The United States has generally colluded with Arab misrule 
based on ‘fixed elections’ and ‘human rights fakery’, thus 
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providing ‘a fig leaf’ for both patron and clients ‘to continue in 
the game (Anderson 2001).   
This theme of self-criticism was bravely adopted by Bush when he announced a brand 
“new policy” toward the Middle East region to commemorate the occasion of the 20th 
Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. In his speech in Washington 
D.C. in November 2003, Bush stated that: 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the 
lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – 
because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the 
expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place 
where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with 
the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our 
country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the 
status quo. Therefore, the United States has adopted a new 
policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East (Bush 
2003). 
Also in his memoir, Decision Points, Bush reflected on the U.S.’s missed opportunity to 
address the deficit in freedom he had identified in the Arab world. With a sense of 
purpose, he states that: 
 For most of the Cold War, America’s priority in the Middle 
East was stability. Our alliances were based on anticommunism, 
a strategy that made sense at the time. But under the surface, 
resentment and anger built. Many people turned to radical 
clerics and mosques as a release. Amid these conditions, 
terrorists found fertile recruiting ground. Then nineteen 
terrorists born in the Middle East turned up on planes in the 
United States. After 9/11, I decided that the stability we had 
been promoting was a mirage. The focus of the freedom agenda 
would be the Middle East (Bush 2010:398).  
The desire for change was advanced by Bush when he raised the subject of political 
reform in meetings and press conferences with Arab leaders notably during visits by 
former presidents Mubarak of Egypt and Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia in spring 
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2004. Later, in his second inaugural speech on January 20, 2005, Bush set out what 
became known as his ‘freedom agenda’ declaring that: 
 America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes 
from our most basic beliefs. So it is the policy of the United 
States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements 
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate 
goal of ending tyranny in our world (Bush 2005).  
Bush’s Middle East policy re-orientation notably broke new ground because it was the 
first time that a U.S. president had publicly criticized some of America’s Arab allies for 
their authoritarian ways and had mentioned democratization as explicitly as a leading 
objective of U.S. Middle East policy (Hawthorne 2004:4). According to Larbi Sadiki, 
President Bush will go down in history as the only U.S. President to summon the 
courage to engage in self-criticism about American aiding of autocracy and, by 
implication, inaction on democracy promotion in the Middle East for sixty years (Sadiki 
2009:165).  
In political discourses, interviews and speeches, some of Bush’s officials voiced the 
President’s ambitious democracy agenda towards the Arab world. Despite there being  a 
sense of uneasiness and concern amongst key defence officials about Bush’s strong 
language on democracy promotion,  formal policy declarations and speeches 
characterised a major element of the Bush administration’s ‘stepped – up line’ on 
democracy promotion. Through a spate of speeches and other public remarks by key 
members of the administration, and then by highlighting the issue at the 2004 G-8, 
European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summits, the Bush 
administration placed the promotion of political reform and democratization in the 
Middle East region firmly on the U.S.’s foreign policy agenda.  
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In a major policy speech addressing government officials and academics at the 
American University in Cairo on Monday, 20 June 2005, Condoleezza Rice delivered a 
forceful call for democratic reform in the Arab world. Referring to Bush’s second 
inaugural address in which he said his aim was to help people find their democratic 
voice and not to impose a U.S.-style government on them, Dr. Rice stated purposefully 
that: 
 For 60 years, the United States pursued stability at the expense 
of democracy.....and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a 
different course. We are supporting the democratic aspiration of 
all people52.  
As mentioned earlier, the Administration’s rhetoric on democracy promotion did not 
receive the full approval of key Defense officials who saw the danger in using strong 
language to make simplistic references to democracy. For some, such as Douglas Feith, 
the fear was that the Administration’s emphatic language on democracy promotion 
would become synonymous with the success of the war effort – that is to say that 
America’s success depended on whether Iraq became a model democracy – an 
accomplishment which Feith believed, was beyond the Administration’s ability to 
guarantee. Feith also saw strategic, political, and even legal drawbacks to the notion that 
the United States was considering war not for self-defence but for the purpose of 
implanting democracy in Iraq (Feith 2008: 285). He states in his memoir that: 
The statement that the United States aimed to create democracy 
in Iraq struck both Rumsfeld and me as off base. The proper way 
to think about this, we believed, was that the Iraqis would have 
to create their own democracy; the United States should not do 
it for them.(Feith 2008: 284).  
Feith argues: 
                                                          
52 US Department of State Archive – accessed via http://2001-2009.state.gov – on 16/11/2012; 
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Democracy is complex; it is a lot more than just organising an 
election. We both [together with Rumsfeld] worried that loose 
talk about democracy might lead foreigners to think we intended 
to impose an American model on them. Our democratic system 
worked well for us, but it might be altogether wrong for people 
in different geographies, with different histories, cultures, and 
other circumstances (Feith 2008: 287) 
He stated further that: 
Rather than talk simplistically of creating democracy, we 
concluded, U.S. officials should think of creating democratic 
institutions, calling attention to the building blocks of 
democracy and freedom: the rule of law (that is law that 
constrains not just ordinary citizens, but also the highest 
officials); the decentralisation of power; an independent 
judiciary; a free press; and private property (Feith 2008: 287). 
 
In summing up, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. placed a premium on 
fighting terrorist groups and states that harbour terrorism, while every other interest 
took a back seat to this drive including the steady supply of oil from the Arab world. At 
the same time, the U.S. also launched a political offensive to democratize Iraq and the 
wider Arab world and it began to shift its role in the region from an enabler of 
authoritarian rule to an advocate of gradual, but genuine, democratic change and a 
supporter of human rights. This new policy was spearheaded and spelled out clearly by 
George W. Bush Jnr. and some members of his administration. They claim that the time 
had come for the United States to fully live up to its support for democratic principles 
and, after some sixty years of support for authoritarian Muslim regimes, to opt for the 
establishment of functioning democratic systems of government throughout the region. 
The ambition to forge a new Middle East by igniting mounting aspirations for 
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democratization in Iraq was pursued aggressively, and it commenced with the U.S.-led 
invasion of that country.  
On 1st May 2003, George W. Bush dressed as a fighter pilot and standing before a huge 
banner proclaiming “Mission Accomplished” addressed the crew of the USS Abraham 
Lincoln just off the coast of San Diego.  With Saddam gone from power, the U.S.’s 
central objective became helping the Iraqis develop a democracy that could govern 
itself, sustain itself, defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war on terror. George W. 
Bush admits that this objective was ambitious, but that he was optimistic it could be 
achieved (Bush 2010: 257).  
In the next chapter, this thesis will present evidence of how the continuing tensions, turf 
wars and bureaucratic infighting between U.S. agencies choked cooperation and co-
ordination on the ground in Iraq, effectively derailing Bush’s freedom agenda in that 
country.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
‘U.S. STYLE DEMOCRACY’ PROMOTION IN IRAQ POST-9/11 AND THE 
2003 
IRAQ WAR 
 
The ideal of government coordination – lively debate leading to unity and teamwork – 
was not achieved in the George W. Bush administration. In particular, Iraq policy 
making in the Bush Administration did not conform to a pattern of collaboration and 
mutual cooperation. Following on the turf wars which were a predominant feature of 
interagency relationships during the pre-Iraq War era, various senior State Department, 
CIA and Defense officials continued to disagree with each other’s analyses and 
proposals in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. There were many stories in 
the U.S. media of policy disagreements in the Bush administration descending into 
bureaucratic backstabbing. These bureaucratic disagreements and infighting contributed 
to the failures that marked the post-invasion period of the war. 
The argument in this chapter will draw on the personality clashes between Bush’s key 
officials, and the internecine bureaucratic turf wars that characterised their interagency 
relationships. It will show how these interagency conflicts filtered down the 
bureaucratic chain and choked cooperation on the ground in Iraq. The point being made 
in this chapter is that collectively, U.S. political decision-making, development 
initiatives, programmes and activities were not sufficiently coordinated or synchronised 
at the best of times as diverse actors had competing and conflicting agendas which they 
failed to coordinate from a vantage point.  
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POST- WAR PLANNING – THE FUTURE OF IRAQ PROJECT AND 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS  
 
The U.S.’s post-war planning for Iraq began on 9th April 2002, when Thomas S. 
Warrick, a veteran civil servant in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern 
Affairs held the first meeting of the grandly titled, Future of Iraq project which brought 
together experts at State and the CIA as well as Iraqi exiles in the United States and 
Europe with professional experience in fields ranging from transitional justice to oil 
policy. The initiative had researched and assessed various post-war reconstruction 
issues that the United States would confront after Saddam’s reign ended and it aimed at 
joining Iraqi exiles with public administration experts by forming working groups on 
topics such as health, finance, water, and agriculture. The State Department, it did seem, 
was adopting a more sober approach to the impending likelihood of a post-Saddam era 
in Iraq. Condoleezza Rice states that the launch of the Future of Iraq Project by 
Powell’s State Department indicated that there was a sense of urgency by the 
Administration to do something about Iraq which the United States wanted to get right 
(Rice 2011: 177). Indeed the State Department effort was dubbed in U.S. media circles 
as “the earliest and most comprehensive planning undertaken by the U.S. government 
for a post-Saddam Iraq” (cited in Rumsfeld 2011: 486).  
Notwithstanding the optimism that surrounded the State Department’s Future of Iraq 
project, some commentators argue that it was plagued from the start by bureaucratic 
wrangling and turf wars with the Defense Department. For instance, Allawi argues that 
Chalabi’s INC was firmly against any such State Department-led initiative, fearing that 
it would lead to strengthening the hand of the State Department’s protégés in the 
struggle for supremacy inside the Iraqi opposition. According to Allawi, the INC’s 
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position coincided with Defense Department’s own suspicions about the groups that 
were being sponsored by the State Department. Allawi states that, the Future of Iraq 
project moved in fits and starts as a result (Allawi 2007: 83). Bradley Graham also 
wrote in the Washington Post that many senior State Department officials were bitter 
about what they saw as the Pentagon’s failure to take seriously their planning efforts, 
particularly in the ‘Future of Iraq’ project53. Rumsfeld disputes these arguments and the 
criticism levelled at his Defense Department. In his memoir, Known and Unknown, he 
states that senior Defense officials did review and consult the papers relating to the State 
Department’s initiative and found some of them to be helpful (Rumsfeld 2011: 486). 
Notwithstanding, Rumsfeld argues that the initiative - which outlined broad concepts – 
did not constitute post-war planning in any sense of the word. According to Rumsfeld, 
the project did not outline operational steps or any detailed suggestions about how to 
handle various problems (Rumsfeld 2011: 486). CPA Chief, Paul Bremer shared a 
similar view about the State Department’s initiative. According to Bremer, “the project 
did not provide a comprehensive plan for post-war Iraq. Rather, [i]ts purpose was to 
engage Iraqi-Americans thinking about their country’s future after Saddam was ousted” 
(Bremer 2006:25). For some commentators, the project “produced an extremely long 
and somewhat unfocused set of papers”54. One Iraqi exile who participated in the 
project’s democratic –principles working group characterized the endeavour as “mostly 
busywork for Iraqi exiles whom [the State Department] wanted to guide and control”55. 
Ryan Crocker, himself a former State Department official and a future ambassador to 
                                                          
53 Bradley Graham, “Prewar Memo Warned of Gaps in Iraq Plans,” Washington Post, August 
18, 2005;  
54 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Iraq without a Plan”, Policy Review 128 (December 2004 – January 
2005):36; 
55 Reul March Gerecht, “Now What?” New York Times Book Review, July 10, 2005, p.9; 
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Iraq, who was heavily involved in the project also later acknowledged, “It was never 
intended as a post-war plan”56.  According to Rumsfeld, if the initiative had been 
intended as a post-war plan, it could at least have given his department a blueprint to 
discuss and consider [Rumsfeld 2011: 486]. Professor George Joffe of Cambridge 
University who was part of a group of academics - all experts on Iraq and Middle East 
and international affairs dubbed the “six wise men” - summoned to Downing Street in 
November 2002 to advise the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair on what could 
happen if Britain and the United States invaded Iraq, stated that the State Department 
spent a year preparing a detailed briefing about how the post-invasion scenario should 
be handled but all that was “junked as officials were making up policy on the hoof”57. 
Allawi accepts that the ‘Future of Iraq Project’ was a half-hearted and unreal attempt to 
tackle the issues that would confront the overseers of a country with a devastated 
economy and a dictatorial political culture. He points out that most of the groups 
assembled by the State Department dealt with issues on which the participants had no 
up-to-date information, or any immediate experience. He makes the point that the real 
importance attached to the project was reflected in the State Department’s allocation of 
a single basement office to act as the ‘control’ centre (Allawi 2007: 84).  
Notwithstanding, Allawi argues that the tug of war between the State and Defense 
departments over control of the administration and governance of Iraq masked a far 
more serious issue. He argues that the entire process of planning for a post-war Iraq was 
                                                          
56 John Ware, “Blair Was Warned of Looming Disaster in Iraq”, The Telegraph, 28th October 
2007;   
57As reported by The Independent, “Iraq invasion 2003: The bloody warnings six wise men gave 
to Tony Blair as he prepared to launch poorly planned campaign” – Accessed via 
http:www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/Iraq-invasion-2003-the-bloody-warnings-six-
wise-men-gave-to-tony-blair-as-he-prepared-to-launch-poorly-planned-campaign-
10000839.html - on 04/03/2015. 
144 | P a g e  
 
mired in ineptitude, poor organisation and indifference. Professor Joffe endorsed 
Allawi’s views. He stated that the people who were put in charge in Iraq had very little 
knowledge or experience of the Middle East. According to Joffe there was nobody in 
leadership with any practical experience of how to handle a transition to democracy like 
that. Joffe also states that those in charge were quite childish in somehow believing that 
democracy would bloom in Iraq. According to Joffe the behaviour of U.S. officials 
displayed ignorance not only of the region but also of the way politics works58. Jeff 
Bridoux shares a similar view. According to Bridoux, while efforts were made to 
identify Iraq’s inside – actors that could play a role in the post-invasion period, there 
was an over-reliance on opposition groups in exile, which quickly realised the gap 
between those who stayed and those who left Iraq. Bridoux states that no efforts were 
made to understand what the political realities in Iraq might be without the iron grip that 
Saddam had on the various ethnic and religious groups in the country – no serious 
thoughts were given to the possibility that ousted Sunnis might revolt against the new 
order or that disenfranchised Shi’as might swiftly drive for power, opposing the 
American ideal of introducing capitalism and democracy in Iraq (Bridoux 2011: 92).  
Allawi suggests that the lack of clarity about the administration’s true intentions in post-
Saddam Iraq may have also contributed to the confusion about the plans for the 
governance of the country. According to Allawi, by the time the military option 
appeared to have been definitively selected, it was too late to start seriously thinking 
about the administration of a post-war Iraq (Allawi 2007: 84). This point is endorsed by 
other commentators who argue that the late start of the post-war planning and the 
consequent obvious shortcomings that resulted constitute an indictment of those 
                                                          
58 Ibid;  
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policymakers whose optimism proved lethal to U.S. reconstruction efforts (Diamond 
2005: 284 and Galbraith 2006: 88 – 90).  
Douglas Feith Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (2001 – 2005), concludes that 
although post-war planning for the reconstruction of Iraq existed, “The teamwork did 
not develop, however. Nor were the old divides transcended” (Feith 2008:277). Bush’s 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2001 – 2006) echoed Feith’s comments in his 
memoir, Known and Unknown. Rumsfeld stated that: 
Post-war planning for Iraq lacked effective interagency 
coordination, clear lines of responsibility, and the deadlines and 
accountability associated with a rigorous process. I suspect that 
the failure to fashion a deliberate, systematic approach by 
which the President could establish U.S. policy on the political 
transition in post-Saddam Iraq was among the more 
consequential of the administration (Rumsfeld 2011: 487).  
 
Rumsfeld added:  
the lack of resolution on issues relating to the administration’s 
Iraq strategy at the NSC level had been a major contributing 
factor to the problems in the first place (Rumsfeld 2011: 525). 
 
Indeed, against this background, it did seem that most of the planning for the post-
invasion phase was poor and lacked coordination and leadership.  
 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS - PERSONALISED CONFLICTS AND THE WAR 
OF WORDS  
 
Bureaucratic politics was a significant feature of the post-invasion phase of the 2003 
Iraq war. In the aftermath of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq, key departments of the U.S. 
government with special emphasis on those who worked abroad (State Department, 
Defense Department, CIA, et al) were called into action to implement Bush’s post-war 
plans for Iraq. During the implementation process, interdepartmental tensions and the 
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war of words between key Administration officials intensified and at times filtered into 
the public domain.  
According to David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud, conflict within the Bush 
administration reverberated from top to bottom, including the deputies in each 
bureaucratic office. There were disagreements between Secretary of State Colin Powell 
on one side and Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
on the other on the handling of Iraq. There also seemed to be an independent centre of 
power in Cheney and his office (Mitchell and Massoud 2009:273). Bob Woodward 
states that, Powell once remarked: “Things didn’t really get decided until the president 
had met Cheney alone” (cited in Woodward 2004:392). According to Mitchell and 
Massoud, the coalition between Rumsfeld and Cheney was successful in using the 
bureaucracy to limit options considered and thereby influence the outcome, all of which 
was at Powell’s expense (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 273). They argue that 
Department of Defense did everything it could to protect its influence when it came to 
the control of post-war Iraq (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 276).  
 
The bureaucratic “pulling and hauling” between Powell on one side and Cheney and 
Rumsfeld on the other was further reflected in the relationship among deputies and 
undersecretaries with Richard Armitage, Bush’s former Deputy Secretary of State (2001 
– 2005) and a close ally of Powell, doing battle with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz (2001 – 2005) and Cheney’s Chief of Staff I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby (2001 – 
2005) while Marc Grossman, Bush’s Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2001 
– 2005), clashed with Douglas J. Feith (DeYoung 2006: 416).  
There were allegations being made against the State Department and its key officials 
were charged with leaking perverse stories to the U.S. media. According to Rumsfeld, 
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President Bush was aware of these leaks and also of the personalised conflicts between 
his top brass. Bush had concerns about the effect interagency conflicts would have on 
his Administration’s post-war plans for Iraq. Rumsfeld stated that: 
Several months later the subject of leaking came up in a meeting 
with the President and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card in 
the Oval Office......As the meeting closed, Bush raised the issues 
between the State and Defense Departments that were being 
leaked to the media. “The controversy between DoD and State is 
hurting. It needs to stop” the President said. (Rumsfeld 2011: 
504).  
Feith blames State and CIA officials for leaking news stories to the media in an attempt 
to gain public support for their own views. According to Feith, high-level State and CIA 
officials were being frequently cited (anonymously) in news stories, leaking their 
criticisms of President Bush, his supporters and his policy (Feith 2008: 250). In his 
memoir Feith states that:  
Instead of arguing their positions boldly within the 
Administration, however, some leading officials chose to air 
their dissent outside. They supplied journalists and former 
officials with a stream of mutually reinforcing stories – full of 
inaccuracies – designed to make the President and his 
supporters look unreasonable .........they did not facilitate 
teamwork – the energetic, unified, government – wide action the 
President needed to implement his decisions (Feith 2008: 273).  
 
Rumsfeld also confirmed in his memoir that the interdepartmental policy 
differences that had not been decisively resolved came to the surface. For 
instance, according to Rumsfeld, the handling of the appointment of CPA 
chief Paul Bremer added another layer of difficulty. Bremer’s selection was 
apparently leaked to the media and the New York Times promptly 
announced “The choice of Mr. Bremer is a victory for the State Department 
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over the Pentagon”59. The New York Times added “Some administration 
officials were so concerned that the move not look like a setback for Defense 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that they were considering having him 
announce it upon his return from Baghdad on Friday night, to make it look 
like a Pentagon initiative”60. Rumsfeld stated that he did not know who 
“some administration officials” were, but that from within the Pentagon it 
looked like Richard Armitage was again feeding the press his version of 
events. Rumsfeld stated that Armitage’s leaks were so brazen that he finally 
mentioned them to Powell. “Colin, we have a problem, Rich Armitage has 
been badmouthing the Pentagon all over town. It’s been going on for some 
time and it’s only gotten worse” he said in one such conversation with 
Powell on 31st March 2003.  Rumsfeld stated that he asked Powell to try to 
manage his deputy because the President was facing rearguard disloyalty 
from a small band of “senior State Department officials” who were 
attacking the administration and the effort in Iraq in the press as anonymous 
sources. Rumsfeld stated that he told Powell “I don’t know what the hell is 
in Armitage’s craw but I’m tired of it” (Rumsfeld 2011: 503). 
Notwithstanding President Bush’s warning, the war of words between Defense and 
State Department officials continued to intensify. Notable Defense officials aimed 
passing shots at Secretary of State Colin Powell’s State Department blaming it for the 
ineffective implementation of Bush’s post-war plans for Iraq. Danielle Pletka, who ran 
the foreign policy and defense section at the American Enterprise Institute and was the 
                                                          
59 Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Set to Name Civilian to Oversee Iraq,” New York Times, 2nd May 
2003 – cited in Rumsfeld 2011:503.   
60 Ibid  
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee's top staff member on the Middle East took aim at 
Powell’s State Department and stated that "The world is such a different place after 
9/11, and the State Department hasn't caught up". "Iraq is one of the first real tests of a 
new vision of the threat to the United States and of a new Middle East, and it's one that 
was resisted very strongly by the State Department," Pletka said. She said the agency 
had a "go along to get along attitude" that no longer served the national security (cited 
in Foundation for Defense of Democracies 2014). P.W. Singer, a former expert on 
modern warfare at the Brookings Institution who also worked for the Balkans Task 
Force in the U.S. Department of Defense stated that with military victory in Iraq, "you 
see an increased swagger coming out of the Pentagon. We were right and therefore we 
should have a broader mandate" (cited in Foundation for Defense of Democracies 
2014). Also, Clifford May, President of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 
a U.S. based non-profit policy institute focusing on foreign policy and national security, 
urged Secretary of State Powell to examine the U.S.’s diplomacy:   
My view is that the military learns from its mistakes and is 
always trying to do better in the next battle," May said. "I don't 
think you see the same thing at the State Department, which 
seems unwaveringly committed to the policies of the past (cited 
in Foundation for Defense of Democracies 2014).  
May’s comments were echoed by Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, an ally of 
Rumsfeld who advised the Pentagon as a member of its Defense Policy Board. Gingrich 
lambasted the State Department stating that “six months of diplomatic failure were 
followed by one month of military success in Iraq” (cited in Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies 2014). To this, Armitage responded, "It's clear that Mr. Gingrich is off his 
meds and out of therapy" (cited in Foundation for Defense of Democracies 2014). 
Armitage further claimed that the Pentagon conducted its own foreign policy, often 
undercutting the State Department (DeYoung 2006).  
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Personal criticisms were also levelled against Powell and Armitage by Defense 
officials. Douglas Feith criticised Powell for acting as an operator or crisis manager and 
not as a strategist or innovator within Bush’s cabinet (Feith 2008: 60). Feith argues that 
media accounts that describe Powell as “dovish” suggest, wrongly, that he advocated a 
solution other than war in Iraq. According to Feith, Powell became the leader of the 
neither-fish-nor-fowl faction. Feith states that whilst acknowledging that the Iraqi 
regime was dangerous, Powell tended to downplay the degree and urgency of the threat 
and caused disagreements in the Situation Room by proposing tactical measures – for 
example, reviving United Nations inspections of Iraq – that could impede President 
Bush’s evolving strategy of regime change. Despite all his ideas, Feith states that 
Powell did not propose a different solution to the Iraq problem (Feith 2008: 246). 
Furthermore, it was during the run-up to the Gulf War in 1990-91, after Saddam had 
invaded Kuwait, that Powell earned his reputation as a “reluctant warrior”. The 
Washington Post reporter Rick Atkinson, in his book Crusade: The Untold Story of the 
Gulf War, uses the term to describe Powell’s political inclinations. Feith argues that the 
term “reluctant warrior” was ironic and not flattering. He makes the point that the term 
could also be taken without irony as a political win-win for Powell. According to Feith, 
the term had allowed Powell (and his many admirers) to emphasize either the warrior 
part or the reluctant part, depending on the circumstances and the audience. Feith states 
that Powell reprised his role as a reluctant warrior in the George W. Bush 
Administration (Feith 2008: 247). In his book Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward wrote that 
Powell urged restraint but he did not argue for leaving Saddam in power. He had not 
said to Bush don’t attack Saddam’s Iraq. Woodward states that perhaps Powell had been 
too timid and felt able to talk only within the confines of the preliminary goals set by his 
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boss (Woodward 2004). Taking together the points attributed to Powell’s arguments, 
Feith argues that, America would have been better served if Powell had provided 
strategic rather than just tactical advice. He states that because Powell blew an uncertain 
trumpet, U.S. diplomacy on Iraq lacked consistency, conviction, energy, or creativity 
(Feith 2008: 248 - 249).  Bush’s Vice – President Dick Cheney also jumped on the 
bandwagon of criticism levelled against Secretary of State Powell. In his memoir, In My 
Time, Cheney stated that:  
I’d been sorry in 1992 when Bill Clinton’s election brought an 
end to my working relationship with Powell at the Pentagon, but 
when President Bush, after his re-election in 2004, accepted 
Powell’s resignation, I thought it was for the best (Cheney 
2011:425 – 426).  
 
In his defence, Powell's supporters said he considered the global impact of using 
American might. They argued that Rumsfeld was impulsive and created unnecessary 
problems with other countries, including allies. Against this background of institutional 
hostilities, bureaucratic infighting and personalised conflict, the ensuing discussion 
argues that the interdepartmental conflicts between Bush’s top brass had a negative 
impact on U.S. policy on the ground in Iraq. 
U.S. MID-EAST DEMOCRACY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ 
The Bush Administration’s “democracy promotion” programs in Iraq involved several 
tiers of policy design, funding, operational activity, and influence. A range of 
governmental and non-governmental actors were tasked with constructing a 
rudimentary democratic framework in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 War. The two 
main executive branch agencies allocated hundreds of millions of dollars and tasked 
with administering U.S. democracy aid programs in Iraq were the U.S. Department of 
State and USAID. The main recipients of U.S. democracy aid channelled via the State 
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Department and USAID were the non-governmental U.S. organizations which included 
the self-described “non-profit, non-governmental, bipartisan, grant-making 
organization”, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the U.S. Institute for 
Peace (USIP). The NED was created in 1983 as a central organ, or clearinghouse, for 
new forms of “democratic” political intervention abroad61. Its stated purpose is to “help 
strengthen democratic institutions around the world”62. The organizations that received 
USAID and NED funds in Iraq are extensive and they include a series of ostensibly 
“private” U.S. organizations that are in reality closely tied to the U.S. policymaking 
establishment and aligned with U.S. foreign policy. These include amongst others: 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) 
described as ‘officially the foreign policy arms of the U.S. Democratic and Republican 
parties respectively’ (Robinson 2004:442-447). The other tier of private American 
organisations contracted by USAID to implement its programmes on the ground in Iraq 
include the American Development Foundation (ADF), International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES), America – Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc. 
(AMIDEAST), Research Triangle Institute (RTI) and the Center for International 
Private Enterprise (CIPE).  
Additionally, U.S. universities, private contractors, and intellectuals were also 
contracted to promote U.S. style “democracy programmes” on the ground in Iraq. For 
                                                          
61 Prior to the creation of the NED, the CIA had routinely provided funding and guidance for 
political parties, business councils, trade unions, student and civic groups in the countries in 
which the U.S. intervened. In the 1980s a significant portion of these programmes were shifted 
from the CIA to USAID and the NED and made many more times sophisticated than the often-
crude operations of the CIA.  See Robinson, William I., (2004) What to Expect from U.S. 
Democracy Promotion in Iraq, New Political Science, Volume 26, Number 3 (UC Santa 
Barbara: Global and International Studies) pp.442 -447. 
62 [Internet source: Available from: http://www.ned.org/].   
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instance, the Los Angeles Times of 20th March 2004, reported that Larry Diamond was 
brought into Iraq in January to lecture on “democracy” to “700 Iraqi tribal leaders, 
many of them wearing Western business suits underneath their robes” (cited in 
Robinson 2004:444). Other institutions such as DePaul’s University College of Law 
International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) and University of Albany’s Center 
for Legislative Development (CLD) were also contracted to carry out USAID’s work on 
the ground in Iraq. Most of these private U.S. organizations provided “grants” in the 
form of funding, guidance and political sponsorship to a host of local organizations in 
Iraq. Some of these local organizations existed prior to U.S. efforts to promote 
democracy in Iraq but were penetrated through “democracy promotion” programmes 
and incorporated in new ways into U.S. foreign policy designs (Robinson 2004:444). 
Other local organisations were created entirely from scratch. These local organizations 
took the form of local political parties and coalitions, trade unions, business councils, 
media outlets, professional and civic associations, human rights groups and so on. Many 
of these groups touted themselves as being “non-partisan” (Robinson 2004:445).  
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ: U.S. ‘STYLE DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION’ 
The Bush administration and the plethora of U.S. agencies and NGOs tasked with 
‘democracy promotion’ in Iraq, resorted to the use of checklists – comprised of the 
essential elements constituting a liberal democratic political system - to implant 
democratic traditions in this country. Because liberal democracies in the West have 
constitutions, parliaments, independent judiciaries, free and investigative media, 
women’s organisations, vibrant civil societies and human rights groups, U.S. democracy 
promoters on the ground employed this blueprint design on the basis that Iraq 
presumably required a similar set of institutions and organizations. It is within this case 
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–specific and one-size-fits-all methodological approach to democracy promotion that 
this study reveals evidence of competing and conflicting agendas amongst U.S. actors 
tasked with initiating the installation of ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in Iraq. The 
relevant elements in the liberal democratic canon to be examined within the context of 
this discussion include free and fair elections; free and investigative media; respect for 
human rights and free and independent civil society.  
Free and Fair Elections 
In the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, the Bush Administration placed an incalculable 
value in Iraq having a more or less free electoral contest that would establish a 
representative government in that country as elections are the first evidence turned to in 
assessing democratization in a particular region. In its September 2005 Report to U.S. 
Congressional Committees entitled “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 
2005 Elections”, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
concluded that “Elections are a critical goal for achieving the U.S. policy objective of a 
peaceful and stable Iraq” (GAO 2005:11). Donald Rumsfeld also makes the point that:  
We (U.S.) had a priceless advantage in an ideological struggle 
against the enemy. We could offer the Iraqis a future the 
majority of Iraqis wanted – a future of self-government and 
national pride. We could also finally disprove the notion that the 
Americans were occupiers there to steal their oil. Elections 
would be a critical step toward that goal (Rumsfeld 2011: 676).  
During the Bush Administration, the Iraqi Government, with the assistance of USAID 
and other international organizations, organised and conducted a series of national and 
regional elections and referendums that took place on the following dates: 30th January 
2005 (elections for the Transitional National Assembly, along with elections for the 
Kurdish Regional Parliament and Iraq’s 18 Governorate Councils); 15th October 2005 (a 
national referendum on a draft constitution); 15th December 2005 (parliamentary 
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elections of 325 members to the newly formed Iraq’s Council of Representatives which 
replaced the Transitional National Assembly). These electoral events provide the first 
focus for the search for democratization in Iraq. Whilst largely overseen by the main 
occupying force, the United States, these elections were intended by the Bush 
administration to induct not only Iraqis but also the rest of the Arab Middle East into 
Western pluralism.  
The Bush Administration assigned the task of achieving its electoral objectives in Iraq 
to USAID. To help strengthen the Iraqi electoral system, USAID/Iraq entered into a 
cooperative agreement, totalling $40 million, with IFES to implement the Electoral 
Technical Assistance Programme (OIG 2012). IFES is an independent, non-
governmental organisation providing professional support to electoral democracy63. 
USAID had previously employed IFES to implement its electoral sub-programmes in 
Bosnia and Afghanistan. Through fieldwork, applied research and advocacy, IFES 
strives to promote citizen participation, transparency and accountability in political life 
and civil society64. IFES’s USAID-funded programme in Iraq was intended to 
coordinate and work closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq 
(UNAMI) to establish and strengthen the Iraqi electoral system during the various 
election cycles. The agreement covered the period 1st September 2004 to 30th September 
2011 (OIG 2012). With funding provided by USAID, IFES’s policies in Iraq focused on 
two main components: to develop an Iraqi-owned electoral administrative body to 
conduct and run elections and to educate the population on how to vote and the 
importance of voting (Hill 2011:148). It was also a principal objective of USAID’s 
                                                          
63 Available from: http://www.ifes.org (accessed on 11/12/13).   
64 ibid – organizational background;  
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electoral technical assistance programme to help the Iraqi-owned electoral 
administrative body to become a sustainable, self-sufficient entity (OIG 012).  
Regarding the first goal, IFES helped establish the Independent Electoral Commission 
of Iraq (IECI) in September 2004 and tasked it with administering and regulating 
elections fairly for the Iraqi people. IFES provided the IECI with “a legal review of 
elections regulations, training staff, planning logistics and procuring ‘needed items’, 
(such as printer voter registration forms) for the 30th January [2005] elections” (GAO 
2005). In February 2007, Iraqi Law Number 11 replaced the IECI and established the 
permanent Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to announce, organise, and 
supervise Iraqi elections (OIG 2012). The IHEC has been involved in all national and 
regional elections in Iraq since the January 2005 National Assembly Elections.  
In cooperation with the United Nations, IFES provided technical election assistance to 
the IECI during the 30th January 2005 and 15th December 2005 elections to increase its 
staffing, skills, and capacity. The technical election assistance rendered include: helping 
to prepare a comprehensive plan and cost estimate for voter registration for election 
events; embedding 14 technical experts within the IECI who worked in full partnership 
with the UN; providing legal expertise, which led to the establishment of the electoral 
legal framework that defines Iraq’s electoral systems; and providing training for 
commissioners and IECI employees on election administration, logistics, voter 
education, public outreach, and conflict mitigation (USAID: December 2005: 9 - 10).  
The January 2005 Iraqi election installed a National Assembly charged with drafting a 
new constitution – emphasizing democracy, rule of law, the private sector, and human 
rights. IECI was also the electoral authority running the 15th October 2005 referendum 
on Iraq’s draft constitution. The Iraqi constitutional drafting commission/committee 
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received technical assistance and support from USAID through its implementing 
partners on the ground, namely, ADF and members of the Consortium for Elections and 
Political Party Strengthening (CEPPS); NDI, IRI, and IFES. The NDI supported the 
Drafting Committee by providing expertise in legislative and constitutional issues, 
national surveys, and in-depth issue studies. Together with the IRI, NDI provided 
results from over 111,000 national surveys covering key issues. The IRI also assisted in 
the development of a public communications strategy for the Constitutional Committee, 
trained public relations officers, and helped produce press releases on the constitutional 
process. In addition to the technical assistance rendered to the Constitutional Drafting 
Committee, ADF, NDI and IRI supported constitutional workshops across Iraq. Under 
the Constitutional Awareness Initiative, NDI conducted over 3,000 sessions in all 18 
Iraqi governorates for the benefit of over 140,000 participants of which one-third were 
women. IRI in turn produced 500,000 constitutional supplements in Arabic and Kurdish 
with a foreword by the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee. The supplement was 
inserted into national, regional, and local newspapers, reaching Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish 
communities nationwide (USAID: Assistance for Iraq – Supporting Iraq’s Constitution) 
USAID’s second electoral ambition was to educate the Iraqi population on how to vote 
and the importance of voting. To realise this goal, USAID allocated nearly $24 million 
to IRI to develop an NGO network, the Civic Coalition for Free Elections (CCFE), to 
design and implement a national voter education campaign to inform and mobilize 
voters. According to IRI, this network, made up of 63 NGOs, developed public service 
announcements for television. For example, IRI reported that the coalition organized 
Iraq’s first televised candidate debates in the run-up to the January 2005 elections. 
CCFE and other civic groups developed and disseminated thousands of election 
brochures, t-shirts, and posters. CCFE also assisted the Rafadin Women’s Coalition 
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with a voter education campaign to emphasize the message that women should vote 
according to their own beliefs. IRI further reported that it worked separately in 
collaboration with eight Sunni organizations and five women’s organizations to execute 
voter education activities targeting specific groups and geographic regions to ensure that 
all sectors of the community are reached. For example, according to IRI, an Iraqi 
coalition member organized an elections conference for 130 women civic leaders from 
Kirkuk and Mosul (GAO 2005).   
USAID in Iraq also provided $1 million to Voice for Humanity to implement a voter 
education campaign through the use of media players with pre-recorded messages and 
programming. These messages and programmes emphasized elections as a path to 
security and peace. According to the Voice for Humanity, it distributed 15,000 such 
devices throughout Iraq through social networks that included tribal sheikhs, religious 
leaders, and political leaders in the latter half of January 2005. Further, Voice for 
Humanity estimated that 20 percent of the devices were provided to Sunnis (GAO 
2005).  
USAID also supported programmes which assisted Iraqi NGOs capacity to 
systematically monitor elections – related violence. To this end, USAID allocated $14.2 
million, approximately 11 percent of the nearly $130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi 
elections, to IFES to build an Iraqi NGO network that would identify and monitor 
elections-related violence. According to IFES officials, 45 days before the January 2005 
elections, IFES-trained monitors were operating throughout Iraq gathering information 
on elections-related violence. Once the monitors verified the information, they 
aggregated these incidents into a Web-based database designed to track information 
about where, when, and who had been involved in elections-related violence (GAO 
2005).  
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Additionally, USAID supported programs which assisted Iraqi NGOs capacity to 
monitor and report on electoral events. To this end, USAID allocated $14 million, 
approximately 11 percent of the total U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, to develop an 
Iraqi NGO domestic elections monitor network and train party agent elections monitors. 
This second type of monitoring was organised by NDI. NDI reported having provided 
training and assistance to help form the Iraqi Election Information Network (EIN) 
comprised of over 150 NGOs. According to EIN, more than 8,000 domestic monitors 
were deployed on 30th January to approximately 80 percent of polling stations (GAO 
2005). The IRI was also contracted by USAID to produce an educational manual with 
IECI that taught party officials the rules and regulations regarding party monitors at 
elections (Hill 2011:149).   
The 30th January 2005 Iraqi elections received considerable media coverage in Western 
world as international journalists descended on Iraq to witness a historic day in the 
country’s political history. Anthony Shadid of the Washington Post reported that: "Over 
the course of the day, fear gave way to elation. Men and women danced in the streets 
and waved their purple fingers in the air65. Shadid quoted the director of one polling 
station in a Sunni neighbourhood in Baghdad rejoicing: “It’s like a wedding. I swear to 
God, it’s a wedding for all of Iraq.....No one has ever witnessed this before. For a half-
century, no one has seen anything like it. And we did it ourselves”66.   
The January 2005 election installed a National Assembly charged with drafting a new 
constitution – emphasizing democracy, rule of law, the private sector and human rights. 
USAID provided technical assistance to the Constitutional Drafting Commission in the 
                                                          
65 Anthony Shadid, “Iraqis Defy Threats as Millions Vote” Washington Post, 31st January 2005;  
66 Ibid;  
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form of international constitutional expertise to support the drafting process. USAID 
also assisted in the development of a public communications strategy for the 
Constitutional Committee, trained public relations officers, and helped produce press 
releases on the constitutional process (USAID: Assistance for Iraq – Supporting Iraq’s 
Constitution). 
The above accomplishments and efforts to enhance the democratic process in Iraq were 
cited by the Bush administration as evidence to show that U.S. foreign policy towards 
Iraq post-9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war was driven by a genuine desire to promote 
democracy in that country. The U.S. Department of State’s Report of February 2006 
entitled ‘Rebuilding Iraq, U.S. Achievements through the Iraq Relief & Reconstruction 
Fund’ argued that there was some significant evidence that Iraq has started advanced 
steps towards the path of becoming a democratic country. The report cites the December 
2005 elections which were held to elect a four – year government as an important step 
towards democratic advancement in the aftermath of the 2003 war. These elections were 
reported to have proceeded smoothly, although there were reports of insurgency and 
violence. Also, the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE), an international 
non-governmental body established in 2004 (comprising of independent electoral 
management bodies as well as the league of Arab States as an observer) assessed the 
2005 Iraqi elections and concluded in its final report in 2006 that the design of the legal 
framework, institutions and procedures governing the December 2005 elections 
conformed with international standards. According to the IMIE’s Report, the December 
2005 elections, widened the scope of participation, and voter turnout was high. The 
Report adds that despite the ongoing armed violence and bad security conditions, the 
Iraqi people voted in numbers which would do credit to democracies in more settled 
parts of the world (IMIE 2006).  
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In spite of these advances in electoral participation, and despite being certified as free 
and fair by international monitors (Freedom House 2007), the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) reported that the January 2005 elections were boycotted by the Sunni and 
Shiite ‘urban – slum underclass’ populations on the orders of their political leaders (ICG 
2009). Consequently, the impact of ‘key constituencies’ deciding not to vote, meant that 
there were significant imbalances in the parliament and the regional councils (Hill 
2011:154). These imbalances led to dissatisfaction with the political system and along 
with other factors ultimately to civil war during 2005 to 2007 (Hill 2011:154).  
The IMIE Report of 2006 also noted that amidst the significant advances in electoral 
participation during the 2005 elections, shortcomings appeared in the management of 
the elections as reflected in the inadequate numbers of polling centres, shortage of 
ballots and problems with the voters’ list. Some 2000 complaints were submitted, 
alleging a wide range of electoral violations and irregularities that include ballot stuffing 
and theft, tally sheet tampering, intimidation, violence and multiple voting. In its 2006 
report, the IECI argued that it did not have at its disposal the technical and human 
resources to adequately and expeditiously investigate and resolve the volume of 
complaints it received.  
In addition, much has been said by U.S. implementers of democracy in Iraq about the 
achievements surrounding the process of election monitoring. According to Iraq 
specialist Rahman Aljebouri, a Senior Programme Officer, Middle East & North Africa, 
with NED in Washington, the reality of the situation is that the volunteers who turned 
up in numbers to assist in this process were only participating in the democratic process 
because they were getting paid on average, about a $100 to a man per day. This, 
according to Aljebouri, was the main incentive for volunteering as an election 
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monitor67. The U.S. made it out to look as if Iraqis had overnight become enthused by 
the spirit of democracy and that their efforts were voluntarily rendered. But the issue of 
payment for volunteering was hardly mentioned by U.S. implementers who were more 
intent to popularise the manner in which Iraqis generally had embraced U.S. efforts to 
advance the prospects of democracy in their country.  
EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION OR 
CONVERGENCE AMONGST DEMOCRACY ACTORS 
 
The lack of cooperation between IFES and the U.N. organization, UNAMI 
Starting off with USAID’s electoral technical assistance programme, the audit report of 
the Office of Inspector General found that there was insufficient coordination between 
USAID’s implementer, IFES and the U.N. organization, UNAMI. According to the 
cooperative agreement between USAID/Iraq and IFES, IFES was required to work with 
UNAMI on a donor coordination team, called the International Elections Assistance 
Team. This team was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 to provide 
election support to the Government of Iraq. The idea was to ensure that the resources 
provided under the award were used in the most efficient manner and to address the 
most critical requirements of Iraq’s electoral system. In fact, USAID/Iraq designed the 
electoral program to optimize available resources, including financial and technical 
support from UNAMI. This close coordination between IFES and UNAMI was 
supposed to identify institutional gaps in IHEC and to develop an effective strategic 
plan that would result in a sustainable administrative body for elections (OIG 2012).  
 
                                                          
67 Aljebouri, R. (2013).  Interview on 21st November 2013. NED office, Washington D.C.;  
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Despite these agreements and requirements, the audit report of the Office of Inspector 
General found that coordination was not sufficient and that IFES did not coordinate 
with UNAMI to identify institutional gaps in IHEC, and did not determine which gaps 
each organisation would work on to develop an effective strategic plan which would 
address the most critical requirements of Iraq’s electoral system. The audit report cites 
as an example in its findings that although IFES coordinated with UNAMI to provide 
technical assistance and training in developing IHEC’s voter registration database, IFES 
did not coordinate with UNAMI to identify gaps in IHEC’s administrative support 
areas, such as financing, procurement, and human resources. The audit report confirms 
that IFES officials stated that they worked with UNAMI to conduct elections, but did 
not keep track of which tasks each organisation performed. UNAMI officials stated that 
for the past several years they had only informal discussions with IFES about work plan 
activities (OIG 2012).  
 
Furthermore, in September 2009, IFES broke away from UNAMI-led donor 
coordination team and signed a memorandum of understanding with IHEC. In it, IFES 
agreed to advise IHEC independent of UNAMI. However, USAID/Iraq did not modify 
its agreement with IFES to revise the relationship between IFES and UNAMI in 
advising IHEC. The memorandum between IFES and IHEC was non-binding and ended 
on 31st December 2010. According to IFES officials, IFES and IHEC verbally extended 
their memorandum until the end of the program on September 30, 2011. The mission 
did not have a memorandum of understanding under the follow-on agreement, which 
began on October 1, 2011. In addition, according to both IFES and UNAMI officials, 
personality conflicts existed between them, and they disagreed about the roles each 
organisation would play in advising IHEC. Subsequent to issuance of the Office of 
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Inspector General’s audit report, USAID/Iraq provided emails showing communication 
between mission officials and IFES discussing the difficult relationship with UNAMI. 
The emails did not show that USAID/Iraq directed IFES to break away from UNAMI 
and establish a memorandum of understanding with IHEC, but it was clear from these 
emails that USAID/Iraq was made aware of the difficulties existing between IFES and 
UNAMI.  Furthermore, an IHEC official stated that IFES and UNAMI disagreed on 
how to count votes. USAID/Iraq, IFES and UNAMI officials did not provide any 
additional information to the audit team concerning this matter (OIG 2012).   
 
As a result of the lack of strategic cooperation or convergence between USAID/Iraq, 
IFES and UNAMI, on approaches to implement the mission’s electoral technical 
assistance programme, the audit report concluded that USAID/Iraq did not know 
whether IFES and UNAMI duplicated efforts, or whether the programme’s $102 million 
spent over seven years was used efficiently to address the most critical needs of Iraq’s 
electoral system. In its recommendation to help USAID/Iraq improve various aspects of 
the electoral technical assistance programme, the Office of Inspector General, urged the 
mission to require IFES to (1) coordinate with the UNAMI in Iraq and the IHEC to 
identify institutional gaps in writing, (2) determine and document which gaps each 
organization will work on, and (3) continually coordinate with the UNAMI to avoid any 
duplication of efforts. In response, USAID/Iraq agreed with the audit findings and with 
the recommendation. It stated that under the new Elections Support Programme, 
UNAMI and IHEC have identified institutional gaps and determined which of these 
each organisation will work on to avoid duplication of effort (OIG 2012).  
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Some commentators argue that the Bush administration deliberately rejected the idea of 
collaborating with international organisations such as the UN. General Abizaid viewed 
the rejection of the UN as a costly mistake. Abizaid wanted the U.S. to join forces with 
international organisations to assist its reconstruction efforts in Iraq. As he puts it, “we 
[the U.S.] are an anti-body in their [Iraqi] society [......] The key thing is to 
internationalise the problem. We really need the U.N. stamp of approval. It would be 
crazy to keep the U.S. government in charge [of Iraq] for too long” (cited in Gordon 
and Trainor 2007: 187). Jeff Bridoux also points out that the Pentagon moved away 
from previous U.S. – led nation-building experiences by refusing to include the UN in 
the projected occupation and reconstruction of Iraq (Bridoux 2011:92). According to 
Bridoux, the role of the UN was considered in early drafts but later frowned upon 
condescendingly because the Bush administration considered earlier UN-led nation 
building projects as failures and the Security Council’s letdown regarding retaliation 
against Saddam’s Iraq as proof of its inefficiency (Bridoux 2011: 93).  
 
Writing the Iraqi constitution 
 
There was also a clear lack of strategic cooperation between Washington and Bremer’s 
CPA during the process of the writing of the Iraqi constitution. The major issue here 
was the timetable that had been created by the CPA and the Iraqi leadership for the 
constitution process. TAL stipulated 30th January 2005 elections for a Provisional 
Assembly that would elect a Provisional Government. Much more importantly, within 
six months, the Provisional Assembly was to draft a constitution. The draft constitution 
had to be completed no later than 15th August of that year, followed by a popular 
referendum on the constitution to be held on 15th October and thereafter, the holding of 
new elections for a permanent Assembly on 15th December. If the Provisional Assembly 
did not request an extension, and did not complete a draft of the constitution by 15th 
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August, TAL called for its dissolution and a “start-over” from the beginning. Whilst the 
CPA Administrator, Bremer believed unquestioningly that it was essential to meet the 
prescribed deadlines in order to “maintain the momentum of the political process” in 
Iraq, he explains in his memoir that key members of the Bush Administration did not 
share his standpoint (Bremer 2006:289-290). As Bremer puts it “some major 
Washington players went wobbly on our ‘etched in stone’ deadlines” (Bremer 2006: 
289 - 290). On this point, Bremer refers to a conversation he had with Condoleezza Rice 
in which the then National Security Adviser told him that “some people here are still 
leaning toward handing sovereignty to an appointed government in April with no 
constitution” (Bremer 2006: 217). Bremer stated that to him, it sounded like these 
people being referred to were people in the Pentagon’s policy office. He stated in his 
memoir that he told Rice that he strongly recommended against the route proposed by 
Pentagon staff as it did not serve the President’s or America’s interests in Iraq (Bremer 
2006: 217). Bremer recollects that during an NSC meeting on 13th February, Donald 
Rumsfeld suggested that since the United States now had so much leverage in Iraq, it 
should consider divesting sovereignty “in pieces” or ‘sliding’ the date. Bremer stated 
that during the same meeting Colin Powell added that it would not be a failure if the 
U.S. transferred sovereignty on the 1st of August instead of the 30th of June in order to 
be sure the Iraqi provisional government was ready to exercise power. According to 
Bremer, President Bush himself said that although it would be a defeat if the date 
slipped, the U.S. could perhaps “calibrate sovereignty” in some way (Bremer 2006:289-
290). The views of key White House staff left Bremer thinking that a real threat to the 
complex political structure that he and other like-minded individuals were struggling to 
build in Iraq existed in the form of a lack of strategic cooperation emanating from the 
corridors of power in Washington. Indeed, Bremer found it difficult to hold the Iraqis to 
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carry out the 15th November Agreement if Washington was ‘wobbly’ over the issue or 
was not firm. He felt that it was vital that U.S. public statements regarding the 30th of 
June handover remain unwavering. Bremer also felt that any delay in meeting the 
prescribed timetable would ignite doubts about the U.S.’s ultimate intentions in Iraq 
which in turn could cost American lives (Bremer 2006:289-290). It did seem that, 
Bremer was committed to meet the prescribed deadlines, even if every milestone only 
marked a hollow achievement. As the man in the field, Bremer had been given great 
latitude to gauge the situation on the ground and craft out workable solutions.  
 
 
The Chain of Command: Transfer of Sovereignty, Broken lines of authority and 
communication, and the tug of war between the CPA and the U.S. Defense 
Department 
 
The issue of restoring Iraq’s sovereignty and transferring authority to Iraqis was also at 
the centre of the problems that evolved between Bremer’s CPA, Rumsfeld’s Defense 
Department and Powell’s State Department which effectively obscured the Bush 
Administration’s post-war plans in Iraq. Before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
the Defense Department did work on post-war political planning to keep the U.S. out of 
the role of military occupier. The capstone of this effort was the U.S. plan for the Iraqi 
Interim Authority (IIA), which became official U.S. policy when it received President 
Bush’s formal endorsement on 10th March 2003. Feith states that, “The IIA was the 
official U.S. policy for post-Saddam governance of Iraq, a plan developed through the 
interagency process and approved by the president” (Feith 2008: 413).  
 
The State, CIA officials and Bremer’s actions and views were at odds with IIA policy of 
early transfer of authority. According to Feith, State and CIA officials had difficulty 
reconciling their opposition to occupation with their opposition to an early Iraqi 
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government, which would be dominated by externals. Feith states that despite President 
Bush’s approval, the State Department and the CIA never resigned themselves to the 
IIA concept. According to Feith, in May 2003, Colin Powell once again began 
advocating a go-slow approach to transferring sovereignty in Iraq. Feith states that at 
that point, it became clear to him that the Administration’s Iraq policy was becoming 
dangerously ambiguous. Although President Bush never reversed his 10th of March 
decision to create the IIA “as soon as possible”, Feith states that neither Condoleezza 
Rice nor Colin Powell reaffirmed the policy when Powell denied the need for urgency 
(Feith 2008: 436). In this regard Feith wrote that:  
 
[T]he chief mistake was maintaining an occupation government 
in Iraq for over a year – even though the dangers of occupation 
had been recognized throughout the Bush Administration, and 
even though the President’s policy had called for the early 
creation of an Iraqi interim authority. The central task of 
liberation was to bring about political transition in Iraq, but this 
was impeded, beginning months before Saddam’s overthrow, by 
self-induced anxieties at State and CIA about the externals’ 
presumed lack of “legitimacy” (Feith 2008: 516).  
 
On his part, Bremer later explained that he developed a different understanding in the 
days before his departure for Iraq, during meetings with President Bush, Powell, and 
Rice and in the Principals Committee and NSC meetings he attended. Bremer was under 
the impression that he was simply following orders. According to Feith, Bremer related 
that he understood that he was free to set the IIA plan aside, because Bush wanted him 
to “Get over there and give us your recommendation” (cited in Feith 2008: 437). Acting 
on the instructions he claimed he had received from President Bush, Bremer published 
in the op-ed page of the Washington Post on 8th September 2003 an article headlined 
“Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty” which Feith stated set tongues wagging as it declared that 
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the CPA would stay in existence and would remain Iraq’s occupation government – 
until the country had achieved the ‘seven steps’ on the path to full Iraqi sovereignty as 
set out in Bremer’s article (Feith 2008: 453). Feith added that together with Rumsfeld 
and Wolfowitz, they had no idea that Bremer opposed the IIA policy. He stated that no-
one in the Pentagon seemed aware that Bremer had concluded, even before he left 
Washington, that an early transfer of power to the Iraqis was a “reckless fantasy” (Feith 
2008: 441). Bridoux argues that by the time an IIA was ready to act, CPA judged that 
the conditions on the ground were not conducive to a transfer of any parcel of power to 
Iraqis. According to Bridoux, the CPA was of the view that the U.S. had to be in charge, 
reinforcing further the perception of the Iraqi population that they were now an 
occupied people, and hence burying further the possibility to rally the population to the 
making of a new Iraq (Bridoux 2011:92).  
 
Mitchell and Massoud also argue that Bremer did not have high regard for the 
leadership of the external Iraqis. They state that Bremer believed that power should be 
handed over to a representative authority in Iraq after elections had been held. 
According to Mitchell and Massoud, Bremer’s op-ed piece in the Washington Post on 
8th September 2003 was not cleared with Rumsfeld or others at the Department of 
Defense. They state that in fact, the plan resembled the State Department’s vision for 
handing over power to Iraqis (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 276). Feith agrees with 
Mitchell and Massoud’s view and he argues that what Bremer was outlining in his 
Washington Post article was not the Administration’s policy of early transfer of 
authority in Iraq but a timetable which corresponded, in fact, to the State Department’s 
original proposal for a transitional civil authority, which was designed to keep authority 
out of Iraqi hands for several years (Feith 2008: 453). Bremer later wrote “what would 
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have happened if the U.S. government had turned over Iraq to the exiles in May, as 
some in Washington had wanted? (cited in Feith 2008: 499).  Suffice to say, Bremer’s 
Washington Post article triggered considerable controversy over the full extent of 
Bremer’s authority as CPA chief in Iraq.  
 
Rumsfeld stated in his memoir that Bremer’s ambitions went far beyond the limited role 
for the United States that the Department of Defense and the interagency process had 
planned for and well beyond the role that had been resourced. He stated that 
CENTCOM had planned to liberate Iraq and set up the rough framework for the country 
to govern itself. The military, according to Rumsfeld, had not planned to occupy every 
corner of Iraq with an American soldier or to try to impose a Western-style democracy 
on the country. Rumsfeld stated that the result was that the CPA and Iraq ended up with 
the downsides of an occupation strategy and few of the benefits – and without the 
resources that might have allowed some mitigation. The means, according to Rumsfeld, 
were not well linked to the ends. Rumsfeld stated that it took several months before he 
and others in Washington fully recognised that a shift in policy had occurred (Rumsfeld 
2011: 513).  
 
Reflecting on the shift in policy Bremer sought to advance on the ground in Iraq, 
Douglas Feith argued that “The United States would have been in a far better position to 
help Iraqis fulfil President Bush’s vision of a new, free, and benign Iraq if we had been 
able to work with them as partners rather than as overlords” (Feith 2008: 501). Feith’s 
argument was endorsed by Isam al-Khafaji, former Iraq Reconstruction and 
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Development Council (IRDC)68 member, who resigned from his post in protest stating 
that: “We have reached a point where we started asking ourselves: are we informers or 
advisers? Being an adviser means that you sit around the committee table devising the 
orders, but we were implementing orders without being consulted in their devising. So 
we were not seen as advisers, let alone as decision-makers. All the big decisions – 
dissolving the Iraqi army and the security apparatus, privatisation, oil policy, the 
banking system, the restructuring of the media – were made [by the CPA] behind closed 
doors” (Allawi 2007: 190).  
 
Condoleezza Rice also expressed concerns over Bremer’s actions following the 
publication of his Washington Post article. Rice stated:  
 
Obviously, we had to help the Iraqis find a path to sovereignty. 
Jerry (Bremer) understood this very well and proposed a road 
map that he published in the Washington Post on September 8, 
2003. The problem was that he did so without fully consulting 
Washington. The seven-point plan he presented in the paper’s 
op-ed pages touched off a firestorm in Iraq and consternation in 
the White House and State Department. Jerry had suggested 
that a new constitution be written through a process organised 
by the Iraqi Governing Council, with elections to follow. That 
drew a rebuke from perhaps the most powerful man in Iraq, 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who objected to the sequence Jerry 
(Bremer) had outlined. Sistani believed that Iraq’s constitution 
had to be written by representatives elected by the Iraqi people, 
not through a process devised by an organisation that emanated 
from the CPA (Rice 2011: 241).  
 
                                                          
68 IRDC (Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council) was a group of 150 Iraqi expatriates 
—most of whom were American citizens— recruited by the Pentagon in March 2003 to assist 
the Coalition Forces with post-war reconstruction planning. The group was headed by Emad 
Dhia, a former Pfizer Corporation executive. The group was dissolved in June 2004 and some of 
its members preferred to stay in Iraq. 
172 | P a g e  
 
According to Rice, Bremer’s ‘unauthorised’ actions left her convinced that there had to 
be better connectivity between the CPA chief and Washington. Together with Colin 
Powell, Rice stated that she talked to Donald Rumsfeld about the problem of 
pronouncements coming out of Baghdad without due consideration in the NSC (Rice 
2011: 242). But Rumsfeld, it would seem had very little leverage or control over 
Bremer despite Bush’s appointment letter to Bremer clearly instructing him [Bremer] to 
work under the “authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense”69. In 
taking on the CPA job, Feith stated that Bremer made a point of presenting himself as a 
decisive, bureaucratically clever chief executive – eager to take charge and impatient 
with what he [Bremer] calls the Defense Department “squirrel cage” and the 
“bureaucratic hamsters” (Feith 2008: 441).  Despite stating in his memoir that, “as the 
senior American in Baghdad, I would be President George W. Bush’s personal envoy 
.....My chain of command ran through Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and 
straight to the President (Bremer 2006), Bremer chose to think of himself as working 
not for Rumsfeld, but for the President (Feith 2008: 441). Indeed, Bremer sometimes 
talked directly to President Bush and the White House, which disturbed Rumsfeld. 
Bremer stated that in a meeting in Baghdad in December 2003, Rumsfeld pulled him 
aside and said: “Look, it’s clear to me that your reporting channel is now direct to the 
president and not through me” (Bremer 2006:245). Rumsfeld stated that he discussed 
with Bremer the need to work closely together and that he had decided he would give 
Bremer considerable latitude for decision – making, since he was the man on the 
                                                          
69 Bremer was designated as President Bush’s special envoy but he was supposed to report to 
and through the Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld (Memo from Secretary of Defense for 
Presidential Envoy to Iraq, “Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority”, 13th May 2003. See also Letter from President George W. Bush to Bremer, 9th May 
2003 appointment letter– cited in Dobbins et al 2009: 16).  
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ground. According to Rumsfeld, Bremer however had a robust definition of the term 
“latitude”. Rumsfeld stated that Bremer assumed that he had direct access to President 
Bush from the start and that it became clear that Bremer intended to not be exclusively 
connected to any cabinet official. Rumsfeld stated that Bremer was encouraged to adopt 
this approach by President Bush and Rice who both not only accepted but facilitated 
Bremer’s unfiltered contact with them. Bremer later wrote that after one of his private 
meetings with President Bush, “Bush’s message was clear. I was neither Rumsfeld’s nor 
Powell’s man. I was the president’s man” (Bremer 2006: 36 – 37). According to 
Rumsfeld, such actions contributed to a confused chain of command. Rumsfeld argues 
that this imprecision damaged Washington’s communications with the CPA throughout 
the period of Bremer’s tenure. He states that the muddled lines of authority meant that 
there was no single individual in control of or responsible for Bremer’s work. As 
Rumsfeld puts it: There were far too many hands on the steering wheel, which, in my 
view, was a formula for running the truck into a ditch (Rumsfeld 2011: 506 – 507). 
Rumsfeld was clearly not able to get the formal chain of command altered. On paper, 
Bremer continued to work for Rumsfeld, though in fact he never really did, and he did 
so less and less over time. Bremer came to report directly to a number of people, which 
meant that he effectively had no boss. This, according to Feith was not how the 
interagency process was supposed to work (Feith 2008: 471).  
 
Bremer, for his part, found that his reports to the Pentagon were initially not getting 
through to other U.S. agencies. According to Mitchell and Massoud, up until July 2003, 
Bremer had been sending his reports to Rumsfeld and counting on Rumsfeld or the 
Pentagon to relay such reports to the NSC, but Rumsfeld was holding on to the reports 
(Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 277). Bremer stated that “it became a serious problem 
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that reports I was sending to Secretary Rumsfeld and the Pentagon were not being 
shared outside of the Pentagon” (cited in Dobbins et al 2009: 16). Bob Woodward 
makes the point that by withholding material information, Rumsfeld was throwing his 
weight around, and the rest of the NSC was just too weak to do anything about it 
(Woodward 2006: 236). Barton Gellman also depicts Rumsfeld as having little respect 
for the office of the National Security Adviser and provides many examples of 
Rumsfeld deliberately refusing to attend NSC meetings summoned by Condoleezza 
Rice (Gellman 2008).  
 
Furthermore, when Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12th May 2003, he immediately made 
it clear that he was in charge. As the administrator of Iraq, Bremer exercised supreme 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. He could issue decrees and he began his 
tenure as Head of the CPA with two controversial orders to dissolve the Iraqi Baath 
party (CPA Order 1 which entered into force on 16th May 2003) and disband the Iraqi 
army (CPA Order 2 which entered into force on 23rd May 2003). Bremer had informed 
Bush and the other members of the NSC of his intended actions prior to executing the 
orders but it would seem that no – one from the Pentagon had brought this information 
to the attention of other key officials. In his memoir, Bremer makes it clear that his 
order to dissolve the Iraqi military and security forces was communicated to Rumsfeld 
and the president (Bremer 2006:57). Bremer also stated that he told his staff, “The 
White House, DOD and State all signed off on this” Bremer (2006:40). According to 
Frank Miller, the senior NSC staffer responsible for coordinating Bush’s policy toward 
Iraq, Bremer’s decrees were ‘blown through the system’ with ‘advanced warning’ (cited 
in Dobbins, J et al 2009: 58). CIA Chief, George Tenet also stated that he was not 
consulted on CPA Order No. 2 which Bremer issued on May 23 dissolving Iraq’s 
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military and national security entities. Feith admits in his memoir that he did not bring 
the matter to the Deputies Committee because he “missed some important 
communications at this time” – for example, how Rumsfeld responded to the Memo 
from Bremer dated 19th May 2003 on the dissolution (Feith 2008:433). He accepts that 
it would have surely been better if the decision to issue the order had been debated 
throughout the government particularly because the decision became associated with a 
number of unnecessary problems and proved to be  a mistake (Feith 2008: 433 - 434).  
Rice writes in her memoir that there has been a good deal of retrospective examination 
of whether the order to disband the Iraqi army was adequately reviewed by and 
coordinated with Washington. She confirms that a post-mortem conducted by the late 
Peter Rodman, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, shows 
that the Pentagon was aware of Bremer’s intentions to issue an order dissolving Iraqi 
security organizations, including the army as a part of the de-Baathification effort. Rice 
confirmed that Rumsfeld received a memorandum to this effect on 19th May 2003, but 
he did not bring it to her attention or that of President Bush. According to Rice, Bremer 
has said that he raised the issue at the NSC on 22nd May 2003. Rice states that several 
participants remember that the issue was brought up only in general terms during a 
discussion of de-Baathification. Rice does not remember these discussions as being 
constitutive of a request for permission to issue the order of disbanding Iraq’s army 
(Rice 2011:238). Partly for this reason, Condoleezza Rice asked her staff to use their 
informal contacts in the Pentagon to find out what was going on in Baghdad, since she 
was receiving so little information through formal channels (cited in Dobbins et al 2009: 
16).  
Against this background, Mitchell and Massoud argue that the whole interagency 
process seemed to had broken down and with president Bush not really being in charge 
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of resolving conflicts, the picture that emerged was one of disorganization and disarray 
(Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 277). Feith also states: “Looking back on the interagency 
decision-making process, I am stuck by its lack of clarity. On issue after issue, where 
there were disagreements they were not brought to the surface to be presented to the 
President for decision. Rather, basic disagreements were allowed to remain unresolved 
– as long as a degree of consensus could be produced on immediate next steps”.  
Overall, it is fair to say that the differences between Bremer’s CPA, and more broadly 
between State and Defense Departments, regarding the transfer of authority and the 
restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty via the processes of constitution-making and elections 
were never clearly or firmly resolved by the principals in the NSC. In particular, the 
CPA’s views on Iraqi governance and occupation did not reflect those of Rumsfeld’s 
Defense department to which the CPA was answerable by way of presidential order. 
Communication lines were also blurred and at times almost non-existent which 
portrayed a severe case of interagency and personalised conflict amongst Bush’s top 
brass.  
 
 
Free and Investigative Media 
The Iraqi media suffered decades of brutal suppression of opinion and submission under 
Saddam’s regime. During Saddam’s rule, the Iraqi media was completely state-
controlled. Allawi states that “Variety, topicality, critical and investigative reporting 
were all absent in the media of the Ba’ath regime (Allawi 2007: 153). Reporters Sans 
Frontieres described Saddam as a ‘predator of press freedom’ who managed the Iraqi 
media with ‘an iron fist and has given them the single mission of relaying his 
propaganda’ (Reporters Sans Frontieres 2003). Nada Shawqat who served as the 
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editorial supervisor for Az-Zaman newspaper70 in Baghdad in the aftermath of the U.S. 
– led invasion explains that under Saddam, she had some freedom to write until his two 
sons, Uday and Qusay, took an interest in the press. “Then we started getting 
instructions every day from the Minister of Information, telling us what to write and 
what not to write – it just got worse and worse over the last 13 years” explains Shawqat 
(cited in Fisk 2003b).  
After 35 years of Saddam’s rule, Iraqis were suddenly faced with the task of creating a 
professional and independent media to convey reliable facts, support responsible debate 
and represent the diversity of communities and views within their country. The removal 
of controls on a free press was an essential component of the political strategy of the 
CPA in Iraq. Bridoux states that the CPA identified the establishment of a free press as 
essential to spread ideas and values congenial to the whole American project of re-
formatting the Iraqi society along democratic lines. Indeed, according to Bridoux, the 
establishment of a free press was an essential element of the CPA’s attempt at 
manufacturing consent among the Iraqi population (Bridoux 2011: 123). The virtues of 
an open and tolerant society could be easily demonstrated by guaranteeing free and 
uncensored journalism, which it was thought, would more endear Iraqis to the ways of a 
liberal democratic society (Allawi 2007: 153). More than 100 newspapers sprung into 
operation in Baghdad in the aftermath of the war to accept this challenge, and in 
addition to Az-Zaman, two other newspapers – the Iraqi National Congress’s al-
Moutamar and the Kurdish Al-Ittihad – also came out of exile to print in Baghdad (cited 
in Fisk 2003b). Shawqat explains in the aftermath of the U.S. liberation of Iraq that: 
                                                          
70 Az-Zaman which, roughly translated, means The Age, is run by Saad al-Bazaz, the former 
Iraqi diplomat who fell out with Saddam and published his paper from London through the long 
last years of Baathist rule. Bazaz was himself the former editor of Saddam’s Al-Jumhouriya 
newspaper. Az-Zaman was printed in London for many years whilst Al-Bazaz was in exile.  
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 It’s good to feel like a real journalist at last..... We have a 
circulation of 50,000 in Baghdad, another 15,000 in Basra, each 
edition carrying 12 pages of foreign and Arab news and eight of 
local news (cited in Fisk 2003b).  
The Freedom House, Country Report on Iraq 2007 also reported that in the aftermath of 
the U.S. liberation of Iraq, over a dozen private television stations operated, major Arab 
satellite stations were easily accessible - as roughly one-third of Iraqi families owned a 
satellite dish - and internet access was not restricted by the authorities (Freedom House 
2007).  
Allawi also observed: 
One of the immediate and most noticeable changes after the fall 
of the Ba’athist regime was the explosive growth of a newly free 
press and media. The stultifying media that had existed for 
decades, a key element in Ba’athist control, were swept away. 
Within weeks of the occupation, tens of newspapers were 
started, and there were at least eighty-five new titles by the end 
of June 2003 (Allawi 2007: 153).  
The task of creating an independent media in the aftermath of the liberation of Iraq 
however faced serious obstacles as censorship remained a fundamental issue. 
Abdulzahra Abdulsahib of Al-Mada newspaper which was founded by the former Iraqi 
communist Fakhri Karim, and Sahar Muhammad of the daily Al-Sabah explained that 
the situation on the ground in Iraq at the time prevented them from delivering what was 
urgently needed – ‘unbiased, factual information – to make democracy, transparency 
and accountability work’ 71. For example, it was ‘unthinkable’ to criticize political or 
religious leaders like Muqtada Sadr or Nouri al-Maliki or the Shiite Ayatollahs in Najaf. 
Sahar Muhammad further explained that besides the lack of independence confronting 
journalists, there were still no laws protecting the press freedom and the rights of 
                                                          
71 Musharbash, Yassin (2004), Der Spiegel in Pirouz, Rouzbeh and Nautre, Zoe (2005), An 
Action Plan for Iraq: The Perspective of Iraqi Civil Society (London: Foreign Policy Centre); 
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journalists and that working conditions for Iraqi journalists had not improved and were 
still the same as they were under Saddam’s regime72.  
Article 38 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution was drafted with these notable challenges in 
mind and it aimed to guarantee press freedom and the rights of journalists. It states that: 
 The State shall guarantee in a way that does not violate public 
order and morality: 
(a) Freedom of expression using all means; 
(b) Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and 
publication; 
(c) Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration, and this shall 
be regulated by law (Iraqi Constitution 2005). 
Also, Article 40 of the 2005 Constitution notes that: 
 Freedom of communication and correspondence, postal, 
telegraphs, electronic, and telephonic, shall be guaranteed and 
may not be monitored, wiretapped, or disclosed except for legal 
and security necessity and by a judicial decision (Iraqi 
Constitution 2005)..  
Moreover, Article 42 of the 2005 Constitution states that: 
 Each individual shall have the freedom of thought, conscience, 
and belief (Iraqi Constitution 2005). 
USAID supported the development of free media in Iraq following the collapse of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. Developing an independent media in Iraq was part 
of a wider project called the Iraqi Civil Society and Independent Media Support 
Programme (ICSP). ADF was contracted by USAID to implement the ICSP from 16th 
August 2004 through to 30th June 2007. ADF implemented the media assistance 
component both directly and, from March 2005 through October 2006, through a 
                                                          
72 Ibid;  
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subcontract with International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), a self-described 
international non-profit organisation ‘providing leadership and innovative programmes 
to improve the quality of education, strengthen independent media and foster diverse 
civil society’73.  
The ICSP Independent Media component was designed to strengthen Iraq’s independent 
media and its independent news and public affairs reporting capacities (USAID 2007). 
ADF worked with journalism schools to improve the formal training journalists receive 
and it also trained in excess of 1,000 journalists and media-based workers (USAID 
2007). The total number of participants in the workshops and training courses 
represented 50 percent of the active journalists on the ground in Iraq. Training topics 
included features such as basic news writing; editorial management, coverage of 
constitutional processes and elections; specialized journalism (human rights, gender, 
economic issues, court reporting, and corruption); and professional standards (USAID 
2007).   
Furthermore, ADF provided technical assistance to the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) in 
its development to become a public broadcasting network. The IMN was operated by a 
defence contractor, the San Diego-based Science Applications International 
Corporation, under a $108 million contract from the Defense Department (Allawi 2007: 
473). The idea was that the IMN would be the cornerstone of Iraq’s new media efforts. 
ADF also supported reform of the legal and regulatory system through advocacy for 
sound Public Broadcasting and Freedom of Speech Laws, as well as the adoption of 
ethical standards by the media (USAID 2007). Institutions for reform, such as Iraqis for 
Public Broadcasting (a media watchdog that monitored broadcasts for fair and objective 
                                                          
73 International Research and Exchanges Board, Support for Independent Media in Iraq. 
Available from: www.irex.org;  
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reporting) and the Iraqi Association for Defending Journalist Rights, were strengthened 
in the process. One of ADF’s most significant achievements was the establishment of 
the independent, nonpartisan National Iraqi News Agency (NINA). NINA had a 
national network of correspondents producing independent, balanced and quality news 
reports and stories on politics, security, transparency and other information for news 
clients including radio, television and newspapers. It operates 24 hours a day and it 
serves as a window on Iraq for international media and their correspondents in Baghdad 
and the region. ICSP provided significant technical assistance to enhance the 
management and future sustainability of NINA, as well as its infrastructure and ability 
to conduct business (USAID 2007).  
Another project aptly styled “The Support for Independent Media in Iraq” (SIMI) was 
supported by a grant from the U.S. Department of State, the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labour. The SIMI project supported Iraqi media outlets, journalists, 
media managers, and free-press advocates in their efforts to build a sustainable and 
professional media system74. The project provided operational, training, and consulting 
support to improve NINA and it developed a professional press centre in the Media 
Department of the Council of Representatives (CoR) which allowed Iraqi journalists to 
follow breaking news, conduct interviews, and file their reports directly from 
parliament. In addition, the project developed Iraqi trainers through a Training of 
Trainers (TOT) program in investigative reporting, election coverage, and a new media 
resulting in over 270 trained trainers across Iraq75.  
                                                          
74 International Research and Exchanges Board, Support for Independent Media in Iraq, 2008. 
Available from: www.irex.org 
75 Support for Independent Media in Iraq (SIMI). Available from 
http://www.irex.org/project/support-independent-media-iraq-simi (accessed on 12/12/12);  
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On the surface, it is clear that Iraq’s media in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion bore 
no relation or comparison to that which operated under Saddam’s rule. Indeed, the U.S. 
it would seem, played a positive role that helped Iraqis to establish an independent and 
free media. In the post-Saddam era, the U.S. boasted of a thriving new free press and a 
diversity of media outlets in contrast to the status of the media during Saddam’s rule, 
where governmental censorship was noticeable and only one political orientation 
prevailed. Paradoxically however, nowhere in the world are journalists less free to 
practice their craft without the morbid fear of disastrous personal consequences as in 
Iraq. The concerns which surround violence negatively affected the jobs of Iraqis and 
foreign journalists in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Freedom House’s 
Country Report on Iraq 2007 argued that ‘whilst freedom of expression is protected by 
the Iraqi constitution and generally respected by the authorities, this freedom has been 
seriously impeded by sectarian tensions and fear of violent reprisals’. The report also 
states that, ‘although the Iraqi media are not subject to direct government censorship, 
violence against journalists has hindered their ability to report widely and objectively’ 
(Freedom House 2007).  
EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION OR 
CONVERGENCE AMONGST DEMOCRACY ACTORS 
USAID’s programme and activities to support and promote free and investigative media 
in Iraq were not coordinated from a vantage point as diverse democracy actors worked 
at cross-purposes at the best of times.  
According to ADF’s final report on USAID’s ICSP, the pairing of the media component 
with the civil society component created unnecessary competition for resources and 
confusion over the extent to which these two components should interface (USAID 
2007). The Report explains that by its very nature, a programme to develop an 
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independent media needs to foster independence and instil the values of impartiality and 
independence whilst on the other hand civil society programmes teach Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) how to use the media for expanding their profile, conducting 
advocacy, and educating the public (USAID 2007). With the media unit housed in the 
same structure as the civil society units, the Report explains further that there was 
pressure on the media unit to utilize its contacts to facilitate the connection. This, 
according to the Report resulted in some cases in the blurring of boundaries because the 
media programme became focused on “advocacy” for human rights and other civil 
society functions rather than helping journalists learn the skills to cover civil society as 
it should cover politics, corporations, religion or government – by being impartial 
observers and champions of truth (USAID 2007).  
Furthermore, and given all that has been said about the Bush Administration’s efforts to 
advance the independence and freedom of the media in Iraq, the foregoing discussion of 
the progress made in that direction is seriously questioned by the allegations which 
strongly suggests that the CPA suppressed alternative voices in the Iraqi media. As it is 
known, many Iraqi television channels and newspapers took a hostile view of the U.S. 
occupation of their country in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. – led invasion. The 
journalist Robert Fisk points out that, in the aftermath of the war, many sections of the 
Iraqi media called for a jihad against the Americans with some newspapers blatantly 
publishing untruthful stories about the occupation army, claiming that U.S. soldiers 
have been involved in distributing pornographic pictures to school girls or taking Iraqi 
women to the bedrooms of the Palestine Hotel (Fisk 2003b).The U.S.’s occupation of 
Iraq placed it in a strategic and prime position to sanction Iraqi efforts aimed at building 
a free media in their country. Fisk argues that Bremer’s CPA sought to stifle and 
discourage the growth of a free and investigative media by suppressing public opinion 
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and criticism of the U.S. presence in Iraq. Al-Jazeera – along with its rival channel, al-
Arabiya – were denounced by the U.S. appointed “Governing Council” prompting the 
Iraqi columnist, Hassan Fattah to remark that:  
The council and the interim will be silent for two weeks, 
throughout much of the Arab world, including Iraq itself. The 
resistance and the terrorists, meanwhile, will still be able to say 
what they want. What a perfect opportunity to pour their footage 
onto the airwaves and capture the hearts and minds of Iraqis 
desperate for stability and some leadership (cited in Fisk 
2003b).   
According to Fisk, in the face of public criticism propagated by the Iraqi media, 
Bremer’s CPA imposed heavy-handed censorship when it listed – through its 
mouthpiece, the “Iraqi Governing Council” – a series of “do’s” and “don’ts” for all the 
media which ranged from a prohibition on inciting violence all the way to a ban on 
reporting on the rebirth of the Baath party or speeches by Saddam (cited in Fisk 2003b). 
The U.S. censorship of the Iraqi media took the form of the CPA controversially issued 
Order 14 in June 10, 2003, which prohibited media activities aimed at inciting violence, 
civil disorder, rioting, or action against Coalition forces or CPA personnel. The order 
also gave Bremer sole authority to close media organizations. One of the first radio 
stations closed down by the CPA was Sawt Bagdad (Voice of Baghdad) only one month 
after its launch (Reporters Sans Frontieres 2003). On 12th June 2003 Coalition forces 
closed down Sada al-Uma (The nation’s echo) newspaper in Najaf stating that it incited 
violence against coalition troops by inviting the people of Najaf to join the Sunni 
resistance in Ramadi city in Anbar province (Rohde 2003). Also, the CPA ordered the 
closure of Al-Mustaqila (independent) newspaper in July 2003 after publishing an 
article ‘proclaiming the killing of spies who cooperate with the United States to be a 
religious duty’ (Freedom House 2004). By far the most publicised and controversial 
heavy handed display of authority by the CPA was the March 2004 closing of Al-Hawza 
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al-Natiqa al-Sharifa, a weekly newspaper seen as the mouthpiece for the Shiite cleric 
Muqtada Al-Sadr, on grounds that it incited violence against American forces in Iraq. 
U.S. forces confiscated the weekly newspaper’s last edition together with the editions of 
a quarterly journal called al-Mada. The closure of the newspaper for sixty days led to 
weeks of violence between Shiite militias and coalition forces (Freedom House, Press 
Release 2004). Fisk states that Iraqi writers felt at the time that the Bremer “code of 
conduct” – forbidding “intemperate speech that could incite violence” – was an example 
of “selective democracy”, similar in spirit if not in effect to the censorship under 
Saddam (Fisk 2003b). Referring to the CPA’s Order 14, the journalist Khadhim 
Achrash lamented that, “the decision doesn’t fit with the U.S. announcement that they 
came here to liberate Iraq and set up a democratic system” (cited in Fisk 2003b). 
According to Fisk, many Iraqi journalists believed that the semi-legal “press syndicate” 
which took shape in Iraq under Bremer’s stewardship was still Baa’thist at root (Fisk 
2003b). Veteran network news foreign correspondent Don North who worked for the 
IMN for almost three months as a senior TV advisor and trainer and who was also hired 
by the CPA to rebuild the official Iraqi TV Al-Iraqiya, observed that U.S. forces started 
to visit the headquarters of offending Iraqi newspapers and caused great damage to their 
property. North went as far as stating that: “If the Washington Post reported terrorist 
threats or Bin Laden statements in Baghdad today, it would probably be closed down” 
(North 2003). 
In addition, and as mentioned earlier, ADF provided technical assistance to the IMN in 
its development to become a public broadcasting network or public service media outlet 
like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Writing in The New York Times, 
Richard Opel states that the IMN’s original goal was to be ‘an information conduit’ 
instead, it became ‘just rubber-stamp flacking for the C.P.A.’ (Opel 2003) because U.S. 
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authorities could not resist manipulating and tainting the real stories. Allawi also makes 
the point that the conundrum which confronted the IMN was whether it was an arm of 
the CPA or a genuine, independent public broadcaster. According to Allawi, whilst the 
IMN claimed to be modelled on public broadcasting stations in the USA and the UK, in 
truth it was a mouthpiece for the CPA (Allawi 2007: 154). Indeed, many IMN staff 
members felt disillusioned as a result of the CPA’s overt interference in its media 
operations and by its apparently double standards. For instance, Don North called Al 
Iraqiya 'Project Frustration' when he quit in July. North also wrote that: 
IMN has become an irrelevant mouthpiece for CPA 
propaganda, managed news and mediocre programs. I have 
trained journalists after the fall of tyrannies in Bosnia, Romania 
and Afghanistan. I don't blame the Iraqi journalists for the 
failure of IMN. Through a combination of incompetence and 
indifference, CPA has destroyed the fragile credibility of IMN 
(North 2003). 
North subsequently testified before the U.S. Senate Democratic Policy Committee, 
stating that Al-Iraqiya had been provided with a ‘laundry list of CPA activities to cover’ 
and that CPA officials had informed him that ‘we were running a public diplomacy 
operation’ (cited in Margask 2005). Also, Jalal al-Mashta, who first worked as an 
editor-in-chief of the veteran Iraqi politician and diplomat, Adnan al-Pachachi’s 
newspaper, al-Nahdha, was nominated as IMN’s head in May 2004, but he resigned 
after six months due to the lack of support and the CPA’s overt influence over IMN 
(Haner 2004). 
The allegations surrounding the Bush Administration’s efforts to shape public opinion 
in Iraq intensified following the emergence of reports in 2005 which accused the 
Pentagon of negatively influencing the Iraqi print media by providing financial 
incentives to newspaper editors, to publish supposedly independent articles in fact 
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written by the U.S. military. As first revealed by the Los Angeles Times in December 
2005, the U.S. military allegedly paid editors of Iraqi newspapers to publish pro-
American stories written by U.S. information troops. The Los Angeles Times reported 
that:  
As part of a psychological operations campaign that has 
intensified over the last year, the [U.S. Information Operations 
Task Force] had purchased an Iraqi newspaper and taken 
control of a radio station, and was using them to channel pro-
American messages to the Iraqi public. Neither is identified as a 
military mouthpiece (cited in Mazzeti 2005). 
A December 11, 2005 New York Times publication also revealed the existence of the 
secret Pentagon Military Analysis Programme, which paid Iraqi media outlets to publish 
articles favourable to the U.S. invasion and occupation. Three years later, the same 
paper obtained thousands of pages of emails, briefings, tape recordings, and letters that 
revealed the grand scope of the operation. It reported that the Pentagon had selected 
retired military officers – who were working as “news analysts” for various television 
networks and magazines in the United States – to act as a propaganda machine for U.S. 
policy in Iraq and elsewhere (Ehrenberg 2010:301).  
The above alleged wrongdoing was reportedly carried out under a contractual 
arrangement between the Washington-based government contractor Lincoln Group 
through its subsidiary company Iraqex, and the U.S. military’s Information Operations 
Task Force in Baghdad. According to Andrew Buncombe, the Lincoln Group was the 
recipient of a $100m (£56m) contract from Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defence 
for allegedly buying space in Iraqi newspapers to place deliberately one-sided stories 
written by U.S. "psy-ops" troops. Buncombe states that this was happening at a time 
when the chaos of Iraq “makes genuine journalism all but impossible and when 
journalists risk their lives on a daily basis to report the truth” (Buncombe 2005). 
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According to former Lincoln employees, under this arrangement, their main task was to 
take news dispatches, called storyboards, which had been written by specially trained 
psy-ops troops, have them translated into Arabic and then distribute them to the 
newspapers. They would also deal directly with members of the Iraqi media through 
something called the ‘Baghdad Press Club’, a group of journalists who were paid to 
write and publish positive stories. Typically, Lincoln paid newspapers between $40 and 
$2,000 to run the articles as either news or adverts (Buncombe 2005). These revelations 
created a furore. President Bush was said to be "very troubled" by the news, while on 
Capitol Hill members of both the Senate and House armed services committees 
demanded inquiries prompting the Pentagon to launch an immediate investigation 
(Buncombe 2005). The inquiry, which was not made public, was ordered by Gen. 
George W. Casey Jr., who served as the Commanding General, Multi-National Force in 
Iraq from June 2004 to 8th February 2007. The inquiry found that Lincoln did not 
violate military policy by paying Iraqi news outlets to print positive articles. The inquiry 
findings did however prompt the Defense Department to introduce new rules to govern 
such activities. 
Whilst General Casey’s investigation and none of the published items reviewed by the 
Los Angeles Times and New York Times disclosed a point blank connection to the U.S. 
military, the strong suspicion of masked transgressions or improprieties occurring in a 
secret military programme that pays Iraqi newspapers to publish information favourable 
to the U.S. mission triggered some very strong responses from the U.S. Congress. U.S. 
Senator John Warner, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
promised at the time that he would continue to press the Pentagon for more details about 
the operation after being told by military officials that articles and advertisements 
placed in Iraqi news outlets by a defence contractor were identified as U.S. government 
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products (Mazzeti 2005). “I remain gravely concerned about this situation,” Warner 
said after the meeting with Pentagon officials. “This apparently has got some elements 
in it that bear closer scrutiny and maybe stopping it altogether” he added (cited in 
Mazzeti 2005).  Briefed by Warner, Lawrence DiRita, the former special assistant to 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, also acknowledged that U.S. military troops or Lincoln 
Group employees might have acted improperly. “I am willing to believe that there were 
some transgressions along the way, and that’s what we’re trying to figure out,” said 
DiRita (cited in Mazzeti 2005). Following the scandal surrounding the Lincoln Group 
and its subsidiary, Iraqex, Gary Gambill, the former country report analyst for Freedom 
House who has published widely on U.S. democratization efforts in the Middle East, 
made the point that:  
The most astonishing aspect of the scandal was not the breach 
of ethics on the part of the U.S. military (which also paid 
monthly stipends to bonafide Iraqi journalists in return for 
favourable coverage), but the fact that a very broad cross-
section of publications, including independent newspapers that 
had hitherto earned a measure of international respect, were 
revealed as willing to publish thinly disguised propaganda for a 
price (Gambill 2009). 
Away from the spotlight, it would seem that there was a lot more to the media scandal 
in Iraq than was initially reported. Western media reports unravelled the many links and 
connections between the Lincoln Group and Bush’s Republican Party. Among the 
lobbyists registered to represent the Lincoln Group was Charles Black, an adviser to 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush Sr., and Marlin "Buzz" Hefti, who served 
as a director at the Pentagon. The Lincoln Group also listed as a partner the Virginia-
based private intelligence group WCV3 Security. In 2004, that company's executive 
vice-president took unpaid leave to produce Stolen Honour: Wounds That Never Heal, a 
film that, at a critical time in the presidential election campaign, condemned the 
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Democrat John Kerry and questioned his version of events in Vietnam (Buncombe 
2005). Furthermore, in September 2005, Lincoln’s subsidiary, Iraqex, won a $6m 
Pentagon contract to design and execute "an aggressive advertising and PR campaign 
that will accurately inform the Iraqi people of the Coalition's goals and gain their 
support"(Buncombe 2005).  According to the aforementioned 2005 New York Times 
article, Iraqex formed a partnership with another American PR firm called Rendon, 
famous in Washington for having promoted Ahmed Chalabi and his Iraqi National 
Congress (INC).  
In addition to these stories relating to the Pentagon’s covert operations, the Bush 
administration reportedly attempted to shape U.S. and Iraqi public opinion in other 
ways, such as with the 2004 launching of a domestically based satellite television 
channel called al Hurra, “the Free One”, which broadcast pro-U.S. information 
exclusively in the Middle East (Ehrenberg 2010:301).  
Against this background of alleged wrongdoing and suspicions of U.S. influence in 
shaping Iraq’s media, it can be argued that the good faith efforts by the U.S. State 
Department and USAID to bolster and promote the professionalism and ethics of the 
Iraqi media and carry the banner of media freedom and democracy, were discreetly 
undermined by the Pentagon. This supports the argument that U.S. government agencies 
pursued competing and conflicting agendas in their formulation of the ‘democratisation 
project’ with perplexing and perverse results. The Iraqi writer and novelist, Iqbal 
Hassoon al-Qazwini endorses this point when she accused the U.S. authorities of 
following ‘their own agenda, paying lip service to the concept of a proper public 
broadcasting system, while doing what they feel is good for the Coalition, not for the 
Iraqi people’ (Al-Qazwini 2004).  
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Respect for Human Rights 
Until its fall in 2003, Saddam Hussein’s regime murdered, tortured, and caused the 
disappearance of many thousands of Iraqis suspected of or related to persons suspected 
of opposition politics and a variety of other activities. After the overthrow of the 
Ba’thist regime, the CPA encouraged the incorporation of human rights principles 
during Iraq’s constitutional and legal reconstruction leading to the adoption of the TAL 
document which expressly prohibited torture and other cruel human or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  
Article 37 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution incorporated the TAL’s human rights 
safeguards and it states that: 
(1) the liberty and dignity of man shall be protected; 
(2) No person may be kept in custody or investigation except 
according to a judicial decision; 
(3) All forms of psychological and physical torture and inhuman 
treatments are prohibited. Any confession made under force, 
threat, or torture shall not be relied on, and the victim shall 
have the right to seek compensation for material and moral 
damages incurred in accordance with the law (Iraqi 
Constitution 2005). 
Human rights awareness and education was also treated as a cross-cutting theme 
interwoven throughout USAID’s Civil Society Programme. ADF incorporated the issue 
of human rights awareness and education in civil society, civic education, women’s 
advocacy, anti-corruption and media components. In the latter half of its contract, ADF 
created an ICSP management unit for human rights. Human rights protections were not 
well understood by many Iraqis, including public officials, and the number and severity 
of human rights violations increased with the rising of insecurity in the aftermath of the 
U.S. liberation of Iraq. As a result, ICSP strengthened human rights CSOs using 
192 | P a g e  
 
training, technical assistance and forums as a means of institutional strengthening, skills 
enhancement, expanding understanding of human rights as a concept, advancing 
knowledge of specific topics, and developing increased levels of joint action. Under 
ICSP, CSOs undertook expanded actions such as massive public education campaigns 
to educate the Iraqi public and government institutions about human rights and also to 
advocate human rights, including the rights of children and detainees. These public 
education campaigns included workshops, mobile theatre, posters, banners, art shows 
and festivals. More focused advocacy actions targeted the Iraqi security sector, 
including police and prison officials and employees of the Ministry of Interior and 
Ministry of Defence. ICSP Human Rights staff and CSO implementing partners made 
successful efforts in different regions to raise police awareness of human rights, 
developing partnerships with police departments in Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, 
Karbala, Diwaniyah, and elsewhere. ICSP also established a strong working relationship 
with the Ministry of State for Human Rights and Parliament’s Committee on Human 
Rights. ICSP provided technical assistance and guidance to these institutions, including 
assisting the Ministry of Human Rights in the development of a draft law which would 
establish an independent Human Rights Commission according to the Paris Principles 
for national human rights institutions (USAID 2007:5-6 & 15).  
Notwithstanding the Bush Administration’s efforts to strengthen and clarify human 
rights guarantees, the status of human rights in Iraq is one of the most controversial 
issues that critics of the Bush administration have relied upon to dismiss the U.S.’s push 
for democratic advancement in that country. The evidence supporting the contradictions 
between the Bush administration’s rhetoric claims of promoting human rights in Iraq 
and its practices in that country became irrefutable following the release in late 2004 of 
the first photographs showing U.S. military personnel humiliating, torturing, and 
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otherwise mistreating detainees at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Dick Cheney 
reflects on that fateful day on 10th May 2004, when he went with President Bush to the 
Pentagon to view photos that had recently been made public, as well as some that hadn’t 
been released, of American soldiers abusing Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. 
Cheney describes the photos in his memoir as deeply disturbing. He reflects further that 
the behaviour recorded in them was cruel and disgraceful and certainly not reflective of 
U.S. policy (Cheney 2011:420).  
In his book Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, Seymour Hersh 
states that the United States committed human rights violations including torture of 
detainees in Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Hersh refers to an internal U.S. 
Army report written by retired Major General Antonio M. Taguba – best known as the 
Taguba Report - which reviewed the torture perpetrated towards detainees by U.S. 
soldiers in the Abu-Gharib prison in Iraq. The report concluded that the U.S. is guilty of 
horrible violations of human rights contrary to its obligations under the Geneva 
Convention and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment (“CAT”). With reference to the Taguba report, Hersh outlines the 
following human rights violations perpetrated by US forces:  
breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on 
detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating 
detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male 
detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch 
wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed 
against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a 
chemical light and perhaps a broom stick; and using military 
working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of 
attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee (Hersh 
2004:22). 
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The Human Rights Watch report “The Road to Abu –Ghraib” 2004 also argues that 
after President Bush declared the end of major combat in Iraq in May 2003, more than 
120,000 Iraqis were taken into custody by U.S. forces and detained for weeks or 
months. The U.S., according to the 2004 report, employs coercive methods designed to 
extract information from detainees. These methods include holding detainees in painful 
stress positions, depriving them of sleep and light for prolonged periods, exposing them 
to extremes of heat, cold, noise and light, hooding and depriving them of all clothing 
(Human Rights Watch 2004). An Amnesty International Report published in 2006 
entitled - “Abu Ghraib torture victims still seeking redress” - argues that the U.S.-led 
coalition forces detained thousands of people after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
According to the 2006 Report, most of these people were interned for over two years 
whilst others were released without an explanation or apology after spending months in 
detention (Amnesty International 2006). Furthermore, another report of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that the main human rights violations in Iraq 
include “brutality against protected persons upon capture and initial custody, 
sometimes causing death or serious injury. The ICRC’s report also points out that 
psychological coercion was used during interrogation to secure information” (ICRC 
2004). In addition, Amnesty International report on Iraq published in 2007 confirms that 
“there were frequent allegations that U.S. forces committed human rights violations 
against Iraqi civilians, including unlawful killings”. According to the Report, in 
December 2006: 
 Four US soldiers were charged with unpremeditated murder 
and faced trial before a military court. The charges related to 
the deaths of 24 men, women and children in Haditha, north of 
Baghdad. In November 2006, a US soldier pleaded guilty before 
a military court to raping and killing Abeer Qasim Hamza, a 14 
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year old girl. He was sentenced to life imprisonment (Amnesty 
International 2007). 
The documentary evidence and the visual images of human rights atrocities committed 
by U.S. soldiers in Abu – Ghraib prison had a profound effect on the credibility of the 
U.S.’s freedom agenda in the Middle East. The photographic evidence relating to 
human rights atrocities perpetrated by U.S. soldiers in Abu-Ghraib was circulated 
globally and it caused the U.S. administration much embarrassment. Overnight, the U.S. 
became synonymous with torture and humiliation and it lost its credibility, already 
suspect in the eyes of many Arabs, as a staunch and committed proponent of democratic 
advancement in Iraq and the entire region. In the executive summary and the 
conclusions of the Committee’s report of its inquiry into the treatment of detainees in 
U.S. custody, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Democrat Senator Carl 
Levin from Michigan made the salient point that: 
 The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody compromised our moral 
authority and damaged both our ability to attract allies to our 
side in the fight against terrorism and to win the support of 
people around the world for that effort (Levin 2008).  
Condoleezza Rice shared Levin’s views in her memoir. She stated:  
[T]he few people responsible for those acts became, for some, 
the public face of U.S. military forces. It was a stain that should 
never have touched them but did, and regrettably the image of 
the U.S. soldier around the world became associated with the 
depravity of Abu Ghraib (Rice 2011: 274). 
Rice goes on to say: 
We never fully recovered from Abu Ghraib, which quickly 
became muddled in the press – and perhaps in people’s minds – 
with the detention facility in Guantanamo, Cuba, and the 
administration’s broader detention and interrogation policies 
(Rice 2011: 274).  
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The former U.S. Congressman John Patrick “Jack” Murtha, Jr., member of the U.S. 
House of Representatives from Pennsylvania’s 12th district (1974 – 2010) also 
announced:  
We are not going to recover from this damage. This one incident 
has destroyed our credibility in Iraq and in all the Arab world76. 
The late Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy, the former senior Senator from Massachusetts 
and member of the Democratic Party (1962 – 2009) declared on the floor of the United 
States Senate:  
Shamefully, we now learn that Saddam’s torture chambers 
reopened under new management – U.S. management77.  
Rumsfeld states in his memoir that: “For some in the United States and around the 
world, Abu Ghraib was a metaphor. The pictures from the prison had come to 
symbolize the war many had come to oppose” (Rumsfeld 2011: 547). He argued that 
critics expanded their attacks by taking the inexcusable acts at the Abu Ghraib prison as 
the basis of a systematic critique of the Bush administration’s war policies. An article in 
The New Yorker, citing anonymous sources, asserted that the abuses were part of 
official and systematic coercive interrogation methods78. These charges were repeated 
by others. “What happened at the prison, it is now clear, was not the result of random 
acts by a few bad apples,” stated Al Gore. According to Gore, “It was a natural 
                                                          
76 Tom Curry, “Will Rumsfeld Survive Abuse Scandal?” MSNBC, 6th May 2004 - 
cited in Rumsfeld 2011: 546;  
77 Edward Kennedy statement, “The Prisoner Abuse Resolution,” 108th Cong., 2d sess., 
Congressional Record, vol.150, no. 64, May 10, 2004, p. S5058 - cited in Rumsfeld 2011: 546; 
78 Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker, 10th May 2004 – cited in 
Rumsfeld 2011:776;  
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consequence of the Bush administration policy”79. The Economist went as far as placing 
a picture of a detainee on its cover under the headline “RESIGN, RUMSFELD.” Similar 
calls came from the New York Times, the Boston Globe, and Democratic members of 
Congress80.  
Notwithstanding the above charges against his office, Rumsfeld points out that after 
twelve nonpartisan independent reviews and investigations of Defense Department 
detainee policies did not unearth evidence that abuse had been encouraged or condoned 
by senior officials in the Defense Department – military or civilian. (Rumsfeld 2011: 
552 & 777).  
EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION OR 
CONVERGENCE AMONGST DEMOCRACY ACTORS 
In the immediate aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Bush Administration sought 
to portray the abuse as an isolated incident, the work of a few “bad apples” acting 
outside the scope of their authority and duties. On May 4, 2004, Rumsfeld, in a 
formulation that would be utilised repetitiously by U.S. officials, described the Abu 
Ghraib scandal as “an exceptional, isolated” case (Human Rights Watch 2004). In a 
nationally televised address on May 2004, Bush also spoke of “disgraceful conduct by a 
few American troops who dishonoured our country and disregarded our values” (cited 
in Human Rights Watch 2004).  
According to Rumsfeld, the Abu Ghraib atrocities were the senseless crimes of a small 
group of prison guards who ran amok in the absence of adequate supervision (Rumsfeld 
2011: 545). Dick Cheney also states that one of his greatest regrets about Abu Ghraib is 
                                                          
79 Al Gore, remarks, New York University, New York, 26th May 2004 – cited in Rumsfeld 
2011:776. 
80 Rumsfeld 2011: 776;  
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the focus it put on a relatively small group whose actions were in such marked contrast 
to the deep and enduring commitment to duty and honour that he had observed time and 
again in the men and women of America’s military. According to Cheney, the wanton 
abuse committed by those few soldiers did lasting damage to America’s image, but they 
do not represent the United States or the men and women who defend it (Cheney 2011: 
422).  
Despite claims by Rumsfeld to be “stunned” by abuses in Abu Ghraib, and that these 
were an “an exception” and “not a pattern or practice”, Hersh argues that the scandal of 
Abu-Ghraib was not limited to the acts of U.S. soldiers that committed crimes against 
humanity on Iraqi detainees but represented a strategy of coercion and torture employed 
by Bush and his Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in their war on terror (Hersh 
2004:22). Also in the aforementioned Committee’s report of its inquiry into the 
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody, Senator Carl Levin and Ranking Member 
Republican John McCain from Arizona blamed U.S. officials, mainly, Rumsfeld, for the 
mistreatment and physical abuse carried out by U.S. forces on detainees in U.S. 
custody. The report concluded inter alia:  
The abuse of detainees at Abu – Ghraib in late 2003 was not 
simply the result of a few soldiers acting on their own. 
Interrogation techniques such as stripping detainees of their 
clothes, placing them is stress positions, and using military 
working dogs to intimidate them appeared in Iraq only after 
they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at 
Guantanamo. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s 
December 2, 2002 authorization of aggressive interrogation 
techniques and subsequent interrogation policies and plans 
approved by senior military and civilian officials conveyed the 
message that physical pressures and degradation were 
appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody. 
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What followed was an erosion in standards dictating that 
detainees be treated humanely81. 
Furthermore, Amnesty International directed consistent allegations of brutality and 
cruelty by U.S. agents against detainees towards the highest levels of the U.S. 
government, including Bush’s White House, Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense, and 
the State Department (Amnesty International Press Release 2004). In July 2003, 
Amnesty International raised allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Iraqi detainees 
by U.S. and Coalition forces in a memorandum to the U.S. Government and CPA in 
Iraq. Despite repeated requests, Amnesty International was denied access to all U.S. 
detention facilities prompting the then Secretary General of Amnesty International Irene 
Khan to strongly criticize the Bush Administration’s commitment to the advancement of 
human rights in Iraq. Khan stated that:  
If the administration has nothing to hide, it should immediately 
end incommunicado detention and grant access to independent 
human rights monitors, including Amnesty International and the 
United Nations, to all detention facilities. The U.S. 
administration has shown a consistent disregard for the Geneva 
Conventions and basic principles of law, human rights and 
decency. This has created a climate in which U.S. soldiers feel 
they can dehumanize and degrade prisoners with impunity. 
What we now see in Iraq is the logical consequence of the 
relentless pursuit of the ‘war on terror’ regardless of the costs 
to human rights and the rules of war (Amnesty International 
Press Release 2004). 
Against this background of inexcusable human rights violations carried out by U.S. 
soldiers in Iraq, it was argued that the well-intentioned efforts by USAID and other U.S. 
agencies to strengthen and clarify human rights guarantees in Iraq were once again 
undermined by the Pentagon. This point supports the argument that one of the systemic 
                                                          
81 Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody 
(2008). Available from: www.levin.senate.gov.  
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problems that impeded U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq and plan for the post-Saddam 
era was the lack of strategic cooperation or convergence between U.S. agencies tasked 
with ‘democracy promotion’ on approaches to democratisation ‘on the ground’. The 
Pentagon it would appear worked at cross-purposes with other U.S. agencies by being in 
favour of strong arm tactics and aggressive post-war controls. Administrative 
experience and knowledge of Iraq and its people it would seem, were less important 
than the crude pursuit of dominance on the ground.  
Civil Society Reform 
In his presentation to NGO leaders at the Convention Center in Baghdad on February 
10, 2004, Larry Diamond, then Special Adviser to the CPA in Iraq, spoke about the role 
that civil society could play in building and strengthening democracy in the country. He 
explained that by ‘civil society’, he meant the entire range of organized groups and 
institutions that are independent of the state, voluntary, and at least to some extent self-
generating and self-reliant. This, Diamond stated, included non-governmental 
organizations like the ones who attended his presentation, and also independent mass 
media, think tanks, universities, and social and religious groups. Diamond advised his 
audience that to be part of civil society, groups must meet some other conditions as 
well.  He stated that in a democracy, civil society groups have respect for the law, for 
the rights of individuals, and for the rights of other groups to express their interests and 
opinions. He explained that part of what the word “civil” implies is tolerance and the 
accommodation of pluralism and diversity. Diamond concluded his presentation by 
asserting that a democratic state cannot be stable unless it is effective and legitimate, 
and has the respect and support of its citizens. Civil society, he advised further, is a 
check, a monitor, but also a vital partner in the quest for this kind of positive 
relationship between the democratic state and its citizens (Diamond 2004). 
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Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, civil society and participatory politics in Iraq was 
notably under-developed. In June 2004, Oxford Research International (ORI) 
interviewed 2,912 people across Iraq and the feedback obtained exposed not only the 
relative under-development of Iraqi Civil Society but also the transformational and 
developmental difficulties it faced. The lack of trust in government was notable when 
interviewees were asked ‘which national leader, if any, do you trust most’ to which 34 
per cent answered ‘none’. In response to the question ‘which political party would you 
vote for in a national election’, 41.5 per cent of Iraqis interviewed did not know and 
23.8 per cent refused to answer82. Toby Dodge makes a similar point and he argues that:  
Before the liberation of Bagdad it was impossible to talk about 
civil society in Iraq.....autonomous collective societal structures 
beyond the control of the Ba’athist state did not survive. In their 
place society came to be dominated by aspects of the shadow 
state, flexible networks of patronage and violence that used to 
reshape Iraqi society in the image of Saddam and his regime83. 
Dodge argues further that: 
By the late 1980s, Iraqi society had been effectively atomised, 
with intermediate institutions, political, economic or social, 
broken by the military and economic power of the regime. Those 
societal institutions the regime thought useful were reconstituted 
under government patronage to serve as vehicles for 
mobilisation, resource distribution and control. Trade unions 
and social organisations external to the state were either co-
opted or dismantled. Individuals found their welfare and 
economic needs depended upon their own unmediated relations 
                                                          
82 Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, June 2004; 
83 Dodge, Toby, testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee’s hearing on 
‘The Iraq Transition: Civil War or Civil Society?’ on 20th April 2004 – cited in Pirouz, Rouzbeh 
and Nautre, Zoe (2005) An Action Plan for Iraq: The Perspective of Iraqi Civil Society, p.4 
(London: The Foreign Policy Centre);  
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with the state. Put simply, there was no functioning civil society 
in Iraq before regime change in 2003 (Dodge 2005:46).  
Following the liberation of Iraq, and after the post-Saddam transitional government was 
replaced by Council members elected in January 2005, change seemed evident as there 
was a rapid proliferation of political and social movements on the ground. Thousands of 
independent citizen-based organizations sprung up within Iraq to take advantage of the 
open political and social space afforded by the collapse of the Ba’ath regime. Dodge 
notes that: 
By July 2003 this new space for political action had given rise 
to at least 140 different interest groups and political parties 
mobilising popular opinion and lobbying the occupying 
authorities. In addition, 170 daily, weekly and monthly 
publications sprung up, giving a platform to the diversity of 
views that could be openly expressed in post-Saddam Iraq 
(Dodge 2005:708). 
U.S. Army Captain, A. Heather Coyne, who was deployed to Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-
led invasion, and who spent fifteen months in Iraq assigned to the CPA as Civil Society 
Officer for the Baghdad region, similarly noted that after the invasion, Iraqis formed 
hundreds of new NGOs. According to U.S. Captain Coyne, whilst some NGOs wanted 
to benefit directly from the donor money, most however, just wanted to be involved in 
rebuilding the society and to help their fellow Iraqis. Captain Coyne points out that 
however well-intentioned the majority of Iraqi NGOs were, all were very weak and had 
no capacity to plan or implement projects which necessitated the U.S.’s capacity 
building efforts (Coyne 2010:225-237).  
The Bush Administration aimed to establish a functioning civil society in Iraq by 
encouraging and promoting the early signs of its development. The presence of a free, 
independent and vibrant civil society was seen by the Bush Administration as the key to 
protecting and maintaining Iraq’s anticipated established freedom, liberty and 
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democracy for generations to come. A United States Department of State Working 
Group Report entitled “The Future of Iraq Project: Civil Society Capacity Building” 
stated that it is important for Iraqis to start thinking and imagining their country without 
Saddam Hussein and to set in motion the seeds for a robust, independent and free civil 
society. The Report argued that: 
Freedom, liberty and democracy are noble goals that are only 
achieved through dedication and struggle by segments of the 
society that believe in these ideals and are willing to work hard 
to achieve them. However, achieving freedom, liberty and 
democracy in a society are dear accomplishment that requires a 
mechanism in place to protect and maintain, lest lost to political 
upheaval, ideology competition or worse hijacked by an officer 
through military coup. The safety valves to prevent the above 
from happening are embedded in the tenets of a free and 
independent civil society outside the control of the government, 
a civil society that is empowered by the people to act as the 
checks and balance to the government84.  
Andrew Natsios, the former USAID Administrator (2001 – 2006) and former U.S. 
Special Envoy to the Darfur region in Sudan (2006 – 2007), argued further that: ‘If a 
new democratic ethos is to replace that of autocracy, it must be built from the ground 
up in Iraq and made part of the ordinary operations of Iraqi society’ (Natsios 2005).  
The reform of civil society in Iraq was addressed by the Bush Administration primarily 
through USAID’s ‘Iraq Civil Society Programme’ (ICSP). The ICSP was a $43 million 
U.S. Government initiative intended to “promote an informed, sustainable, and active 
indigenous Iraqi civil society that effectively and responsibly participates within a 
democratic system of governance” (USAID 2007). The ICSP was implemented by 
America’s Development Foundation (ADF) on behalf of USAID from 2004 through to 
                                                          
84 United States Department of State, Working Group Report “The Future of Iraq Project: Civil 
Society Capacity Building”, 09/08/2003;  
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2007. The project’s objective was to build the organizational and advocacy capacity of 
CSOs. This was realised through the establishment of four Civil Society Resource 
Centres (CSRCs) in Erbil, Baghdad, Hillah and Basrah. The CSRCs served as regional 
hubs for the delivery of training and technical assistance and their work was aimed at 
helping Iraqi CSOs serve their constituents and mission. Special effort was paid to Iraqi 
CSOs engaged in civic education, women’s advocacy, media, anti-corruption, and 
human rights. A small grants fund was reserved for specific actions in support of these 
issue areas (USAID 2007).  
The ICSP reportedly engaged approximately 2,000 Iraqi CSOs, awarded 391 grants 
worth over $6 million in small grant support, and delivered roughly 3,600 training and 
technical assistance sessions reaching over 30,000 CSO members. The project’s 
awareness raising activities which included forums and regional and national 
conferences reportedly reached another 13,000 Iraqis of which 38 percent were women 
(USAID 2007). According to ADF, the ICSP’s impact on Iraqi Civil Society was 
manifested in the independent actions of Iraqi CSOs in response to training or technical 
assistance from ICSP resource centers, small grant assistance, or both (USAID 2007).  
In March 2006, ICSP officially documented 449 instances of CSOs exercising their 
right to assembly, awareness raising, and advocacy that is the hallmark of a vibrant civil 
society within a pluralistic and democratic Iraq (USAID 2007). Furthermore, in its 
December 2006 bulletin entitled “Top Strategic Accomplishments in Iraq”, USAID 
published a summary of the ICSP’s accomplishments specific to the targeted issue areas 
as follows (USAID, Iraq 2006): 
Issue Area Notable Accomplishments 
Anticorruption Supported CSOs lobbying for the 
addition of 13 anticorruption provisions 
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to the Iraqi Constitution 
Women’s 
Advocacy 
Supported women’s rights CSOs 
lobbying for the adoption of 12 
constitutional provisions benefiting 
women 
Human Rights  CSOs developed partnerships with 
police departments, human rights 
departments and other government 
agencies to support the protection of 
human rights 
Civic 
Education 
Assisted CSOs who mobilized citizens 
to participate in Iraq’s constitutional 
referendum and the electoral processes 
 
To further assist Iraq in building a framework for a democratic and civil society, 
USAID operated three other major programs for community development in Iraq. These 
programs, namely, The Local Governance Programme (LGP), the Community Action 
Programme (CAP) and the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme were all aimed 
at establishing and strengthening the conditions, institutions, capacity, and legal and 
policy framework for a democratic local governance system.   
Starting off with the LGP, USAID awarded two cost-plus-fixed contracts to the North 
Carolina based contractor RTI between 2003 and 2005. The RTI is often tasked with the 
implementation of USAID’s international development programmes around the world 
and it describes itself is an independent, non-profit research organisation offering 
innovative research and technical solutions to governments and businesses worldwide in 
the areas of international development, economic and social policy and education and 
training among other services (Cravens & Brinkerhoff 2013). The first of the two 
contracts, known as the Local Governance Programme – 1 (LGP1), was awarded to RTI 
with an effective date of 26th March 2003, to procure and provide technical and other 
206 | P a g e  
 
assistance to strengthen local administrations, civic institutions, and processes in Iraq 
(SIGIR 2003). According to the USAID Regional Inspector General (USAID/RIG) 
during its first year of the contract “the local governance programme focused on: 
 Restoring basic services through the use of rapid response grants; 
 Developing transparent and accountable local and provincial governments by 
providing technical assistance, and; 
 Strengthening civil society organizations by providing training (SIGIR 2003). 
In its second year, the LGP-1 programme focused on facilitating Iraq’s transition to a 
sovereign state, with an emphasis on institutional capacity building to enable local 
governments to take responsibility for providing services to citizens effectively and 
efficiently” (SIGIR 2003). The LGP-1 programme ended in May 2005. 
The second of the two contracts, known as Local Governance Programme-2 (LGP-2), 
was intended to build the capacity of representative councils and sub-national offices of 
the central government ministries to manage more effective, efficient, and responsive 
customer services. The contract was awarded with an effective date of 9th May 2005 for 
a base period of two years with three option years. The objectives of the LGP-2 
activities were to consolidate gains made during the first LGP-1 from 2003 – 2005, and 
to continue to work with Iraqis to establish and strengthen the conditions, institutions, 
capacity, and legal and policy framework for a democratic local governance system. 
The programme focused on creating the capacity to govern at the provincial and lower 
levels through the following activities: 
 Promote policy reform in support of local governance; 
 Support clarification of the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government; 
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 Promote increased efficiency of local service delivery; 
 Assist in the development of regularised mechanisms of citizen participation in 
governmental decision-making processes; 
 Capture learning through systematic study and reflection (USAID, OIG 2009). 
In carrying out these activities, LGP-2 focused primarily on training members of 
provincial and local councils along with other local government officials (USAID, OIG 
2009). A set of basic and intermediate training courses were offered to council 
members. Course titles included among others, Introduction to Council Services, Public 
Budgeting and Auditing, Strategic Planning, and Government –Media Relationship. In 
its audit findings the Office of Inspector General reported that the provincial councils 
benefited from these courses, and that 16 of 18 councils met the relevant functioning 
criteria. In addition, each of Iraq’s 18 provincial councils had finalized provincial 
development strategies for use as their provinces’ public investment plans, and 16 of the 
18 councils had invested in projects listed in their respective provincial development 
strategies. The LGP-2’s activities effectively ended on 31st December 2008 (USAID, 
OIG 2009).  
USAID’s other project, the CAP, aimed at giving ‘Iraqi citizens a voice in decisions 
affecting their communities’ by supporting community action groups to first ‘identify 
and prioritize local needs’ and second, to ‘develop and implement projects that address 
those needs’ (USAID Contracts and Grants: Iraq). Under Saddam’s reign, Iraqis 
experienced the hardships of three wars and harsh economic sanctions. As a result, 
unemployment levels rose, income eroded, and productivity decreased. This economic 
decline, coupled with lack of investment, affected the quality and capacity of the 
provision of social services (Barton & Bathsheba 2003). To aid resolving this problem, 
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CAP aimed at encouraging Iraqi citizens to become involved in addressing the issues 
that affect their communities. CAP identified Iraqi community associations and 
encouraged them to prioritize their needs, mobilize community and other resources, and 
monitor project implementation. This process provided a vehicle for empowering 
communities, building community cohesion, and providing evidence that the U.S. is 
committed to improving Iraqi lives (USAID, OIG 2005). The CAP project was 
managed by USAID/Iraq’s Democracy and Governance Office and it was implemented 
under USAID’s Strategic Objective 4.2, “Increase Citizen Participation in Local 
Government Decision-Making” (USAID, OIG 2005).  
To carry out the CAP effort in Iraq, USAID drew on five of its traditional allies 
delivering development and relief programs around the world: Mercy Corps, 
International Relief and Development, Agricultural Cooperative Development 
International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA), 
Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) International, and Save the Children. USAID 
awarded cooperative agreements to each of the five organisations (USAID 2003). 
With funding from USAID, CHF International (now renamed Global Communities) 
began operating in Iraq in June 2003 and initiated its efforts in three governorates in 
southern and central Iraq namely, Babil, Karbala and Najaf because these regions were 
identified as areas in Iraq most affected by decades of oppression, conflict, poverty, and 
systematic neglect, which had left their infrastructure in an advanced state of decay 
(CHF 2008). CHF International focused on building the capacity of civil society groups 
as a grassroots movement for democracy. Its programmes aimed to promote the voices 
of women, youths and other minority groups by organising them to communicate with 
local government offices and request services and facilities (CHF 2008). CHF 
International operated USAID’s CAP project in three stages. CAP I was contracted out 
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to a number of organisations and ran its course from May 2003 to late 2006, early 2007, 
depending on the organisation. CAP II ran from September 2006 to December 2008 and 
CAP III operated from the final months of the Bush administration (October 2008) 
through to March 2010 (Hill 2011:151). According to CHF International, the main 
highlights of its involvement in the first two phases of CAP (from May 2003 to June 
2008) are as follows:  
o $55.4 million – the value of CHF’s USAID funded CAP projects; 
o 639 community associations formed and trained in the CAP process; 
o 845 projects completed; 
o 90,000 Iraqis actively participated in democratic activities and processes; 
o 11.3 million Iraqis directly benefited from CHF CAP projects (51% women) (CHF 
2008).  
Notable CHF International CAP success stories include: the Solid Waste Removal 
Project in Babil which not only created a highly mechanized solid waste management 
facility but also 1,350 jobs; and the vocational training courses in Najaf which included 
a electrician’s training course that helped some of its participants to open their own 
electrical workshops and electrical equipment shops (CHF 2008). 
Also through USAID’s funded CAP, Mercy Corps partnered with local communities in 
Iraq to strengthen Iraqi civil society and to promote sustainable development (Mercy 
Corps in Iraq). Mercy Corps CAP – funded programmes in south-central Iraq provided 
community and local government leaders with the requisite skills to ensure that the 
needs of communities are prioritized and met through projects they themselves initiated 
and implemented. These projects included building infrastructure, raising women’s 
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awareness, providing support for people with disabilities, and celebrating community 
achievements (Mercy Corps in Iraq).  
ACDI/VOCA also undertook quick impact projects which it implemented through a 
participatory process whereby town meetings were called with community leaders to 
decide the most pressing needs. The types of projects implemented by ACDI/VOCA 
were mainly focused on supply of material, rebuilding, repairs or renovations to 
schools, public halls, provision of water, electricity – geared towards the rebuilding of 
public infrastructure that had suffered from years of deprivation and/or the effects of 
war (USAID ICAP 2003). Notable ACDI/VOCA CAP success stories include the 
building of the Khabat Cultural Centre, and the provision of water supply to the 
Sosokan village, three kilometres from Tawella, in the region of Sulaymaniyeh in 
September 2003.  
In the case of the construction of the Khabat Cultural Centre, when ACDI/VOCA asked 
the community members of Khabat, a town located 50 km west of the city of Erbil in 
northern Iraq, about their greatest development needs; they identified a cultural centre 
for women and youth as a top priority. A small town with a population of about 45,000, 
Khabat is very conservative; women are not allowed to mix freely with men. In 
addition, local youth had no place to come together to participate in constructive 
activities. To deal with both of these issues, the community members requested 
ACDI/VOCA’s assistance in constructing a community centre. ACDI/VOCA provided 
the materials and labour for the construction of a centre with one large hall and six 
smaller rooms. The community members and local government also contributed to the 
project by providing the land, electricity and sewage connections and by fully 
furnishing the centre (USAID ICAP). Furthermore, with USAID backing, ACDI/VOCA 
programmes helped Iraqis attain financial independence by setting up their own 
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businesses and creating job opportunities. For example, through the Marla Ruzicka Iraq 
War Victims Fund, small-businesses which were started and established helped change 
the lives of innocent war victims, people whose stories are often inspiring (USAID 
CAP).  
Reflecting on the U.S.’s above efforts to promote and develop Iraq’s civil society, it 
would seem that the various initiatives - albeit being well-intentioned and beneficial to 
some extent - had a limited and patchy localised impact. Indeed, the overall 
achievements of USAID’S CAP projects could perhaps be best summarized in the 
following words from Save the Children’s Semi-Annual Report of June 2004:  
These often small victories – some actually quite major – were 
instrumental for instilling confidence and a sense of 
accomplishment in the communities to encourage their further 
commitment and growth. Although often an untidy process, it 
can be said that it did achieve the purpose – communities were 
recruited, projects were completed, needs were met (USAID 
ICAP 2006). 
These views expressed in Save the Children’s Semi-Annual Report were endorsed by 
U.S. Captain Coyne. According to Coyne, CAP was very successful as it resulted in the 
development not only of individual leaders, but of small groups of people who 
organised themselves around a project (Coyne 2010:225-237). In essence, this was 
indeed the main goal of USAID’s CAP project. Having people work together toward a 
common goal ensured that the targeted community as a whole felt accountable for the 
programme. Through the participation process, decisions were made about which 
projects were a priority. Community members thus had a vested interest in completing 
the planned projects and at the same time they felt a sense of ownership over what they 
had built or created. Because of their engagement at every stage of the process, 
community members learned what democracy and citizenry means in practice.  
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Finally, USAID’s third project, the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme 
(CSCBP) was designed to help new grassroots organizations develop and implement 
projects of their own. The CSCBP helped the other CAP programs to move to the next 
level of organisation, namely to apply for donor funds and to start work on the next 
highest priorities identified by their communities (Coyne 2010: 225). The project aimed 
at shifting power away from the central government to the people through empowering 
their private establishments.  
The above ‘well-intentioned’ initiatives however did not engineer a civil society in Iraq 
that could support the development of democratic institutions. The U.S.’s promotion of 
civil society reform was dependent on it being embraced by the main stream of Iraqi 
society. As a result of the decades of brutal suppression of opinion under autocratic rule, 
Iraqis remain understandably suspicious of the state. A culture of ‘rights and duties’ 
towards the state failed to blossom as structural problems such as sectarian and ethnic 
violence made it difficult for Iraqi society to tackle the instability that affects the  
political and social environment. Against this background, U.S. efforts aimed at gaining 
the trust of the Iraqi populace were largely unsuccessful. Captain Coyne explains that 
the major reasons for the U.S.’s failure to gain local support were: the lack of follow-up 
efforts to what were good initial efforts including a lack of continued support for newly 
established institutions such as local councils and women’s groups; failure to translate 
rebuilding funds into visible, long term institutional development; failure to publicise 
good works performed by the local councils; failure to tie nuts-and-bolts reconstruction 
projects to a larger vision of progress; poor targeting of funds among other reasons 
(Coyne 2004). Thus, we see that traumatised by decades of oppression and wars, and 
then torn apart by invasion and occupation, Iraqis struggled to rediscover a shared 
national narrative.  
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EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION OR 
CONVERGENCE AMONGST DEMOCRACY ACTORS 
The U.S.’s efforts to bolster Iraqi’s civil society also revealed how U.S. agencies on the 
ground worked at cross-purposes with each other and also with the local populace. 
Captain Coyne makes the point that, whilst the three major community programmes run 
by USAID in Iraq namely, the LGP, the CAP and the CSCBP were all run from the 
same USAID department, they were not co-ordinated or synchronized and they not only 
failed to reinforce each other, but in fact undermined each other (Coyne 2010: 225-237). 
Rahman Aljebouri, Senior Programme Officer at the NED endorses this view and he 
explains that whilst it is the case that the Bush administration’s efforts to strengthen Iraq 
civil society did seem well-intentioned, a great variety of U.S. projects on the ground in 
Iraq were designed with a specific focus notwithstanding the fact that Iraqi society as a 
whole required an overall coordinated strategy to enable it to accommodate the host of 
U.S. democratic initiatives being implemented85. Aljebouri adds that the U.S. embarked 
on a campaign to democratize Iraq but failed to firstly provide the essential landscape 
for such a governance system to flourish. He states that the democratic system like any 
political system requires certain prerequisites to be in place for it to prosper and that the 
U.S. faced insurmountable obstacles and challenges because of this lack of vision in 
Iraq. Crucially, Aljebouri points out that there were instances where Iraqis themselves 
would identify a specific need or project that would benefit their communities but the 
U.S. would choose to implement its own version of that need or project. By way of an 
example, Aljebouri notes that Iraqis would complain about not having basic necessities 
such as healthcare or housing but the U.S. would emphasise the need to urgently hold 
elections. He points out that on the occasions when U.S. implementers consulted Iraqis 
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about their specific needs, the need once identified and realised became meaningless 
because Iraqis were unable to sustain and maintain the project following the immediate 
withdrawal of U.S. funding upon completion. According to Aljebouri, this was the 
major problem underlying the vast majority of U.S. initiatives on the ground in Iraq 
which aimed at fostering a vibrant civil society. He states that Iraqis were left deflated 
when U.S. funding which set up, for example, infrastructure, was withdrawn after the 
project had been completed. Iraqis could not maintain and sustain completed projects 
because of funding withdrawal. In the end, Aljebouri argues that the U.S.’s good work 
came to nothing and was largely in vain in most instances.  
 
The issue of sustainability of the programmes implemented impacted negatively on U.S. 
efforts to strengthen Iraq civil society. To this Captain Coyne adds that the U.S. military 
in particular had little experience in sustainable development (Coyne 2010:225-237). 
Coyne explains that, Military Commanders were looking at the immediate needs of the 
communities, and attempting to address these needs straight away. For example, Coyne 
states that U.S. implementers would identify a community that needed health care and 
decide to build a clinic. Soon they would have a shiny brand new clinic but empty 
shelves and no doctors, because they had not built or factored in operating costs for 
medicines or figured out how to hire doctors to work there (Coyne 2010). Aljebouri also 
explains that Iraqi NGOs experienced budgetary deficits which impacted on the 
feasibility of their programmes. He points out that, some U.S. implementers of 
democracy had little expertise in budgeting and contracting. Aljebouri describes a 
situation such as where U.S. implementers of democracy would make a contract with a 
local Iraqi NGO to refurbish a school. However, because of the security situation, the 
project which was awarded a grant of, for example, $100,000 would spend the bulk of 
215 | P a g e  
 
that money to secure the safety of its personnel who would perhaps be required to travel 
to and fro and in safety to the designated project site. Securing the safety of personnel, 
Aljebouri points out, would for instance require the purchase of an armoured vehicle or 
Humvees and/or the hiring of security staff. For a project that was awarded a small grant 
these additional project expenses significantly reduced the amount that was needed to be 
spent to enhance the prospects of success of the intended programme or initiative. 
Again, it would seem that operating costs for ancillary expenses were crucially 
neglected. In this way, Aljebouri concludes that U.S. projects on the ground in Iraq 
were not providing long term solutions to the basic problems and needs of the Iraqi 
people as the bulk of them were short-sighted and uncoordinated at the best of times86.  
 
In addition to the above observations, Coyne also refers to the Commanders Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) which aimed to provide a better sense of the systemic 
shortcomings brought about by the U.S.’s implementation capability and strategy on the 
ground in Iraq. CERP was created to tackle the problems associated with the ‘slow- 
thinking- civilian-bureaucracy’ and it was funded to carry out community projects 
independently. Coyne explains that CERP received a lot of credit for being flexible and 
having an immediate impact, but three major problems bedevilled it.  
 
First, the military has little expertise in sustainable development. According to Coyne, 
Military Commanders were looking at the immediate needs of the community, and 
attempting to address these needs straight away. They were in such a hurry to help that 
they did not prepare the analysis that might have indicated that what was actually 
                                                          
86 Aljebouri, R. (2013).  Interview on 21st November 2013. NED office, Washington D.C.;  
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needed was needed. In this way, Coyne states that the projects were not really helping 
solve problems.  
 
The second problem Coyne identified was that the units that were running CERP also 
had little expertise in budgeting and contracting. Put altogether, Coyne states that there 
was no integration with other projects to create a sense of a building momentum. 
CERP’s projects were all ad hoc, unconnected to each other or to any sense of a well 
thought-out process of decision-making. Coyne states that Iraqis simply saw a few 
improvements here or there, which only fed a mentality of “what have you done for us 
lately”, instead of creating local involvement in and ownership of community 
development activities (Coyne 2010:228).  According to Coyne, the various branches of 
the U.S. government consistently bought the wrong items, empowered the wrong 
people, and sent the wrong messages. Coyne’s view is that the lack of expertise on the 
ground was exacerbated by the overreliance on the military, which did not have the 
necessary skill sets or even the appropriate organisational culture for such a mission 
(Coyne 2010:228).  
 
Rumsfeld also states in his memoir, that he learned later from his senior military 
assistant, retired U.S. Navy admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, that Bremer was 
uncomfortable with CERP. According to Rumsfeld, CERP was an enormously valuable 
way to allow American military commanders across Iraq to help fund small-scale 
development projects in their area of responsibility (AOR). The local military 
commanders knew which projects were needed to earn local support to make headway 
against the insurgency. Rumsfeld claims that U.S. military commanders were convinced 
the funds were often more valuable than bullets, but Bremer refused to allocate CERP 
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money to the military from the Saddam government’s seized assets (Rumsfeld 2011: 
512).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Bureaucratic infighting, particularly between the U.S. State Department and Defense 
Department, was most evident in post-war planning of the reconstruction of Iraq. The 
Bush administration was split internally regarding post-war planning as key members of 
the Administration competed with one another to advance their preferred policy 
positions. The formation of bureaucratic politics created animosities between Bush’s top 
brass causing them to disregard the perspectives of each other.  
 
Aided by a checklist comprising of the essential facets of the liberal democratic order,  
this chapter sought to evaluate the effectiveness of the Bush Administration’s efforts to 
engineer sustainable ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in Iraq in the aftermath of the 
9/11 suicide attacks and the 2003 Iraq war. Within this context, research results 
significantly show that one of the systemic problems that impeded U.S. efforts to 
democratize Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war was the lack of strategic 
cooperation or convergence between U.S. agencies on approaches to democratisation on 
the ground. The discussion that unfolded along these lines underscores the argument 
that U.S. government agencies and the plethora of non-governmental organizations and 
private organizations tasked with democracy promotion in Iraq often worked at cross-
purposes with at times competing and conflicting agendas which produced perplexing 
and perverse results. The audit reports issued by the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) together with the primary research material advanced – in the form of political 
memoirs, biographic material, interviews and the views and opinions of U.S. personnel 
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on the ground - paint a sobering picture of uncoordinated planning and execution on the 
part of the U.S. government agencies, NGOs and private organizations tasked with 
democracy promotion in Iraq.  Against this background, the results of this analysis also 
show that, whilst the Bush administration’s efforts to foster democracy was widely 
implemented by a range of governmental and non-governmental actors in Iraq, these 
efforts yielded far less than the ‘democratic revolution’ that was promised.  
The next chapter will focus on the U.S.’s efforts to export ‘Western style’ liberal 
democracy to Lebanon. The ensuing discussion will aim to show that notwithstanding 
the non-aggressive approach the Bush administration pursued in Lebanon through 
‘democracy support’ or ‘democracy assistance’, its efforts still fell short of the ‘high 
flown’ rhetoric which accompanied the shift in U.S. foreign policy toward democracy 
promotion in this country in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
‘U.S. STYLE DEMOCRACY’ PROMOTION IN LEBANON POST - 9/11 AND 
THE 2003 IRAQ WAR 
 
Background 
The shift in Washington’s policy towards Lebanon in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and the 2003 Iraq war demonstrated the new salience of promoting democracy 
in the Arab world.  
Indicators of change in U.S. foreign policy toward Lebanon became apparent around 
2003 – 2004, on the heels of Syria’s inclusion by Bush into his administration’s list of 
countries which made up the so-called ‘Axis of Evil’. From this perspective, U.S. 
foreign policy toward Lebanon was determined by Washington’s perceptions of the role 
played by Syria in that country as well as the Bush administration’s declared 
commitment to isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them 
to change their behaviour. In its Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 report, the U.S. 
State Department lists Syria as one of seven states supporting terrorism87. 
Thus, whereas the U.S. had avoided intervening in Lebanese politics between 1992 and 
2003, U.S. foreign policy toward Lebanon witnessed a change between 2004 and 2008, 
when the administration of George W. Bush expressed enthusiastic support for 
Lebanon’s freedom and sovereignty away from the political clutches of Syrian 
domination. For instance, during his visit to Damascus on 3rd May 2003, Colin Powell 
                                                          
87 U.S. State Department Report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, 30th April 2003 – accessed via 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/pdf/index.htm  - on 01/01/14;  
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presented then Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad with a long list of U.S. demands 
aimed at, among other things, loosening Syria’s grip on Lebanon88.  
It did seem that it was only when the United States acknowledged its inability to elicit 
Syrian cooperation in the 2003-led invasion of Iraq and support for Israel’s occupation 
of the Palestinian territories that it decided to depart from its policy of ignoring Syria’s 
continuing dominance of Lebanon’s political system and for the first time took 
significant diplomatic measures to express its concerns with the situation in Lebanon. 
This argument complements the view of most commentators who argue further that 
U.S. pressure on Syria was part of a more ambitious strategy to reshuffle the geopolitics 
of the Middle East and neutralize Israel’s Arab adversaries89. Writing in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, Warren Strobel makes the point that the Bush administration 
considered a “post – [Saddam] Hussein pivot that would make Syria – also on the U.S. 
list of terrorist-sponsoring states and a long time enemy of Israel – the next focus of 
U.S. action in the region” (Strobel 2002). The Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act introduced by the U.S. Congress on 12th April 2003 were 
believed to be part of this strategy.  
The U.S.’s foreign policy shift towards the Syrian presence in Lebanon after 9/11 and 
the 2003 Iraq war climaxed with the promulgation of the UNSC Resolution 1559 on 2nd 
September 2004, which effectively called for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon or to face 
international sanctions. Commenting on UN Security Council Resolution 1559, the U.S. 
representative asserted that Syrian actions in Lebanon:  
                                                          
88 See "The Road to Damascus." Foreign Affairs. Available from: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59898/steven-simon-and-jonathan-stevenson/the-road-
to-damascus; - accessed on 01/01/14;  
89 See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2007) “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy”, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux: 229 -79;  
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had made a ‘crude mockery’ of the principle of a free and fair 
presidential electoral process, [and that] the Syrian government 
had imposed its political will on Lebanon and had compelled the 
Cabinet and Lebanese National Assembly to amend its 
constitution and abort the electoral process by extending the 
term of the current President by three years. Clearly, the 
Lebanese Parliament had been pressured, and even threatened, 
by Syria and its agents to make them comply (UN Press Release, 
SC/8181). 
The assassination of Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005, only a few months after the 
passing of UNSC Resolution 1559 was another key event that ultimately led to Syria’s 
exit from Lebanon. Hariri’s death catalysed an unexpected popular uprising in Lebanon. 
In the aftermath of Hariri’s death, approximately one million people from all parts of 
Lebanon raised their voices by going to the streets of Beirut to demonstrate for a free 
and independent Lebanon as they had been waiting for many years for the opportunity 
to end Syrian occupation. Those protesting demanded to know the truth behind Hariri’s 
assassination as they blamed Syria for his murder. Following Hariri’s assassination, the 
American ambassador to Syria was recalled home for “consultations”. Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Middle East, William Burns, who attended Hariri’s funeral, 
declared that his death “must give renewed impetus to achieving a free, independent and 
sovereign Lebanon” (US Department of State 2005). Burns also called for the 
immediate and complete implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559 and specifically the 
complete and immediate withdrawal by Syria of all its forces from Lebanon. 
The push for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was much welcomed by the Bush 
administration. In his remarks at a news conference at the White House on Wednesday, 
16th March 2005, Bush stated that: 
Our policy is this: We want there to be a thriving democracy in 
Lebanon. We believe that there will be a thriving democracy but 
only if Syria withdraws not only her troops completely out of 
Lebanon but also her secret service organisations, intelligence 
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organisations – not secret service – intelligence organisations. I 
am concerned and the world should be concerned that the 
intelligence organizations are embedded in a lot of government 
functions in Lebanon, and there needs to be a free election. And 
we will – this Government will work with elected leaders of a 
free, truly free Lebanon, and looking forward to it90.  
The next day, Paula J. Dobriansky declared in her speech on 17th March 2005 at the 
opening of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva that: 
 In Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, the people have 
raised their voice for a true democracy with free and fair 
elections and a sovereign nation free from foreign occupation 
and influence. There is now enormous momentum for democracy 
to reach every corner of the globe (Dobriansky 2005). 
The following month President Bush declared in an interview with the 
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation on 18th April 2005 that: 
There’s a movement toward freedom around the world and the 
Lebanese people have made it clear that they want to be free of 
Syrian influence; they want there to be free elections. And the 
United States stands squarely with the people of Lebanon91.  
Following the Bush Administration’s public support for democratic reform in Lebanon, 
the U.S. sought to practise democracy promotion and implement its brand of democracy 
in this country in a more modest, realistic and incremental way. Compared to Iraq, the 
U.S.’s investment in democracy promotion in Lebanon was insignificant as democracy 
assistance towards this country paled in comparison to the huge military, security and 
reconstruction effort in post-Saddam Iraq.  
 
                                                          
90 Accessed via http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/  - on 12/01/2015;  
91 George W. Bush interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation on 18th April 2005 in 
the Map Room at the White House – accessed via 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73663 on 13/12/2014; 
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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON 
In Iraq, the Bush Administration went as far as to involve direct American military 
engagement to install democratic government in that country. Bridoux and Kurki argue 
that the use of violence to remove Saddam Hussein from power and build a new 
democratic Iraq constituted an extreme example of democratic intervention (Bridoux 
and Kurki 2014: 54-55). Indeed, Iraq was an extraordinary instance of democracy 
promotion unlikely to be repeated. In contrast, and to achieve its objective to implant 
democracy in Lebanon, the Bush Administration pursued a “bottom-up” approach by 
funding international organizations to help strengthen the bases for gradual democratic 
transition. Different U.S.-funded projects focused on engaging civil society, political 
party training, and other strategies such as promoting female political participation. In 
Iraq, the Bush administration participated in an internationally controlled 
democratisation effort which pursued ‘top-down’ institutional and civil society reforms. 
Operating as an occupying force in Iraq afforded the U.S. far more leverage to introduce 
its brand of liberal democracy in that country. This was not the situation in Lebanon 
where the political tools used by the Bush Administration to promote democracy were 
explicitly non-coercive in nature. According to Bridoux and Kurki, these are arguably 
the same tools most states and international organizations use today to promote 
democracy – all the more so since the Iraqi intervention (Bridoux and Kurki 2014: 54 -
55). Thus Lebanon, with all of its peculiarities, represented perhaps the germane 
approach the U.S. would pursue to promote democracy abroad. In line with this 
approach, the U.S. deliberately operated in a multilateral and collaborative manner with 
local democracy support actors on the ground in this country.  
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In correlation with the U.S.’s democratic efforts in Iraq, the discussion in this chapter 
will aim to prove the disconnection between the Bush administration’s rhetoric and its 
efforts to promote democracy in Lebanon. Accordingly, this chapter will examine the 
particular dimensions of the gap between the U.S. rhetoric and the evidence of political 
reform taking shape on the ground in Lebanon. To do this, and to correspond 
structurally with the examination of the U.S.’s efforts in Iraq, the discussion to follow 
will employ the use of a checklist comprising of the essential elements constituting a 
liberal democratic political system.  
Free and Fair Elections 
The right of every Lebanese citizen to hold public office and contest elections is 
guaranteed by Article 12 of the Lebanese Constitution promulgated on May 23, 1926 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1926 Constitution’) (as amended by the constitutional 
law of November 9, 1943) which states that: 
 Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office; no 
preference shall be made except on the basis of merit and 
competence, according to the conditions established by law. A 
special statute shall guarantee the rights of civil service in the 
departments to which they belong (Lebanese Constitution 1926).  
During the tenure of the Bush Administration, elections and political participation took 
place in Lebanon in 2005. The holding of parliamentary elections on time, free of 
Syrian influence, became the Bush Administration’s rallying cry for democracy in 
Lebanon following Syria’s withdrawal from that country in the aftermath of the 
Lebanese ‘Cedar revolution’ in 2005. Against this backdrop, the U.S. pressed for swift 
parliamentary elections. Speaking at the National Defense University in Washington on 
8th March 2005, President Bush welcomed free and fair elections in Lebanon. He stated 
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that the Lebanese people had the right to determine their future free from domination by 
a foreign power and to choose their own parliament free of intimidation92.  
The effect of the political mobilisations in Lebanon, and the Bush Administration’s 
urgent call for the formation of a new Lebanese government, resulted in the first 
elections held in Lebanon without a Syrian military or intelligence presence in over 
three decades.  
Leading up to the 2005 election days, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) sought to 
promote a democratic electoral process and to encourage citizen participation through 
domestic election monitoring. NDI’s objectives were aimed at strengthening the 
capacity of Lebanese civil society organizations to monitor the integrity of the electoral 
process and effectively communicate their findings to the Lebanese public and 
international community and also to foster regional cooperation in support of 
democratic development by encouraging the establishment of a regional election 
monitoring network. To achieve these objectives, NDI issued a $200,000 sub-grant to 
The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE)93 to increase civil 
society’s ability to observe elections and increase public confidence and participation in 
the electoral process (CEPPS/NDI 2005). NDI’s DC-based senior sub-grants 
Administrator travelled to Beirut from 3rd May to 8th May to finalize the terms of the 
                                                          
92 Transcript of Bush Speech on Terrorism, Tuesday, 8th March 2005 – accessed via 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/ALL/POLITICS/03/08/bush.transcript/  
93 The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) was founded in Lebanon by a 
number of activists in the public sector on 13th March 1996. LADE describes itself as a civil, 
independent and non-profit organization specialising in elections and how closely they are 
linked to democracy. The association is concerned with monitoring the elections in their 
different forms as well as studying the electoral systems and laws according to the international 
democratic electoral standards, especially standards that guarantee free, fair and transparent 
elections. LADE advocates the introduction of the desired reforms to the electoral law by 
exerting pressure on the political parties to adopt the standards needed to ensure democratic 
elections – accessed via http://www.lade.org.lb/LADE/About.Us.aspx on 13/13/2014;   
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agreement between NDI and LADE and to assist LADE in understanding and 
developing efficient mechanisms to implement NDI accounting procedures. NDI’s sub-
grant allowed LADE to open and run 9 regional offices throughout the country and 
refurbish its Beirut headquarters (CEPPS/NDI 2005). Through NDI assistance, LADE 
was able to professionalize a part of its all volunteer operations during the elections in 
order to ensure a quality monitoring effort as well as timely response to developments 
and external queries. LADE also coordinated the efforts of 37 organizations under the 
umbrella of the Coalition for the Observation for Elections (CLOE) (CEPPS/NDI 
2005). Furthermore, LADE trained 1,150 observers by the end of the election cycle and 
deployed on average 500 observers on each election day (CEPPS/NDI 2005). In 
addition, LADE trained 4,000 candidate and party agents (CEPPS/NDI 2005). Through 
sample templates of observation tabulation sheets provided by NDI, LADE was able to 
develop observer forms to facilitate their reporting and analysis. LADE produced maps 
using districting software purchased with the help of NDI, and produced all components 
of the observers’ toolkits and uniforms for election days (CEPPS/NDI 2005). Following 
each round of elections, LADE drafted preliminary statements of observer findings and 
disseminated them via their website, which was updated and maintained with the help 
of NDI (CEPPS/NDI 2005). NDI’s sub-grant to LADE allowed the organization to 
purchase news broadcasts, bulletins, and political programs on television, radio, 
newspapers for media monitoring and analysis (CEPPS/NDI 2005). 
 
The 2005 parliamentary elections in Lebanon also marked the first time international 
observers officially observed an electoral process in Lebanon. Furthermore, it marked 
the first time national observers were accredited to observe election activities in 
Lebanese polling stations. Because it was the first time electoral authorities in Lebanon 
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had to manage international and national observers on this scale, the Ministry of 
Information requested international assistance in coordinating observer related 
activities. IFES provided the services of an Election Observation Specialist to the 
Director General of the Ministry of the Interior. The specialist was available to assist the 
Director General with planning the accreditation of observers, providing information to 
observer groups, and coordinating the activities of different observer groups. On each of 
the four election days, the Election Observation Specialist, together with IFES staff 
members, accompanied senior Ministry of Interior officials on visits to the governors 
responsible for implementing the elections in the various electoral districts (IFES 2005). 
During these visits different issues relating to the implementation of elections in the 
various electoral districts, including coordination of observer activities were discussed 
(IFES 2005).  
From early April to late May 2005 IFES also conducted and electoral “mapping” 
mission in Lebanon to enable the development of an effective follow-on electoral 
assistance strategy in a political environment where none had previously been provided 
(IFES 2005). IFES deployed a five member team of elections and regional experts in the 
areas of election law, management and administration, security, representation systems 
design, voter education, communications and outreach, delimitation of constituency 
boundaries, Lebanese history and political processes (IFES 2005). They conducted an 
assessment and provided a detailed analysis of the current political situation in Lebanon. 
The electoral mapping mission was followed by the Lebanon Electoral Assistance 
Program. One of the objectives of the Lebanon Electoral Assistance Program was to 
rapidly respond to the changing electoral environment and in turn address changing 
voter education needs. After the first round of voting, IFES met with various Lebanese 
and international groups, including USAID, NDI and IRI, to discuss voter education 
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needs for the subsequent rounds of voting (IFES 2005). Following these discussions, it 
was agreed that voter education messages during the final weeks should remind voters 
to make an independent choice, based on the credibility of candidates, and discourage 
illegal practices such as vote selling and buying (IFES 2005).  
The organizations also endorsed IFES support for a public awareness campaign 
focusing on the need to make the process accessible to disabled citizens. The Lebanese 
Physical Handicapped Union (LPHU), in conjunction with the Youth Association of the 
Blind, had launched an awareness campaign, “My Rights” to inform disabled persons, 
targeted groups, and the general public, of the rights of disabled persons in the electoral 
process (IFES 2005). The campaign generated considerable media attention and drew 
the attention of top government officials. It resulted in significant improvements in 
accessibility to polling stations and accommodation of the needs of the disabled during 
the second set of elections in the South. Upon instruction from the Ministry of the 
Interior, governors responsible for elections in the southern electoral districts 
cooperated with the LPHU to identify polling centres where voters with handicaps were 
due to vote, and ensured that those polling centres were more accessible for voters with 
disabilities, for instance by installing ramps to ensure wheelchair access (IFES 2005). 
IFES’ support not only enabled the LPHU to continue its campaign into the final round 
of the elections, but allowed them to produce billboards, posters, and brochures. The 
brochures include guides for media, observers, and polling staff on various accessibility 
issues for the disabled. Materials produced by LPHU were used after the election to 
educate other organizations and political leaders within the country on the rights of the 
disabled. These materials were also made available to organizations in the region 
wishing to launch similar advocacy campaigns (IFES 2005).  
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IFES support also enabled the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA)94 to augment 
its election-related media campaign with three television spots emphasizing the 
independence of voter choice and discouraging corrupt practices, such as vote-buying 
(IFES 2005). The television spots, which aired on three networks -- LBC, New TV, and 
Future reached 98% of the country and were broadcast during the most critical point in 
the electoral process (IFES 2005). The message for the first video clip was, “It’s your 
right to know your right.” This message aimed to stress the need for voters to make 
informed choices. The message for the second spot was, “Hold responsible those who 
are responsible.” The ad featured people laughing with a voiceover saying, “They 
laughed at you in the past. Don’t let them laugh at you now.” The message aimed to 
stress the need to hold elected officials accountable (IFES 2005). The final spot in the 
series showed voters with price tags on their foreheads. It was a dramatic anti-vote 
selling, vote buying visualization. The spots were intended to be used for future 
elections as the messages they sought to drive home will continue to be relevant (IFES 
2005). 
Whilst being pronounced free and transparent, the 2005 elections were notably 
governed by old laws which violated international standards and provided room for 
manipulation, voter intimidation, and fraud (Safa 2010). Despite taking place after the 
Syrian military withdrawal, these elections were governed by an electoral law – the 
Syrian 2000 Elections Law which manipulated the size of electoral districts and the 
formation of candidate lists - that reflected heavy Syrian influence. After the 2005 
                                                          
94 The Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) was established in May 1999 and it is the first 
Lebanese NGO which focused on curbing corruption and promoting the principles of good 
governance through civil society. The organisation resorts to all appropriate means to fight 
corruption, improve the quality of life, and encourage civil society to take measures towards 
transparency and accountability – see http://www.transparency-lebanon.org;  
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elections, a National Commission on Election Law was established and presided over 
by former minister Fouad Boutros, with the aim of drafting extensive electoral reforms. 
In September 2008, Lebanon’s parliament passed the new election law which 
introduced a number of safeguards against election fraud such as:  
 the establishment of a permanent and much improved voter register; the use of indelible 
ink to limit the possibility of multiple voting;  
 the provision of transparent ballot boxes and serialised envelopes for ballots and the 
provision for storing ballots rather than burning them directly after counting;  
 the prohibition of campaigning materials or activities in the immediate vicinity of 
polling centres and the establishment of a full day without campaigning through the 
media directly before election day;  
 the right of election observers to accompany the electoral process to ensure 
transparency; and the decision to count blank ballots rather than qualify them as invalid 
to allow for valuable recognition of citizens who use their vote to express their 
dissatisfaction (EU Election Observation Mission 2009).   
There were also some other achievements phased in by the new election law such as the 
holding of elections on only one day; more transparency for campaign financing, and an 
attempt for equal media coverage for all the political contestants, as well as the creation 
of a Supervisory Commission (EU Election Observation Mission 2009).  
Overall, the conduct of the 2005 elections in Lebanon paved the way for the country’s 
2009 electoral contest. The 2009 elections, whilst not held during the period of the Bush 
administration’s tenure in office, benefited from the improved legal framework 
provided for by the new election law. These elections were hailed as an important step 
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in the democratic development of the country as it confirmed Lebanon’s commitment to 
democracy (Council of EU, Press Release 2009). The Bush administration was credited 
with this political development in Lebanon’s electoral history. The New York Times 
columnist Thomas Friedman stated with reference to the 2009 elections that: “We must 
give credit where it is due for this triumph of free elections (and of Washington): 
Without George Bush standing up to the Syrians in 2005 – and forcing them out of 
Lebanon after the Hariri killing – this free election would not have happened. Mr. Bush 
helped create the space. Power matters”95.  
Despite the apparent success of the 2005 parliamentary elections, which gave a majority 
to a large, anti-Syrian bloc known as the Bristol Gathering96 or the March 14 Coalition 
Movement, headed by Saad Hariri, the son of the late Rafik Hariri, the electoral system 
resulted in a mixed government, which complicated its ability to adopt clear policies 
(CRS 2011: 19). For the first time in Lebanese history a member of Hezbollah made up 
the 24-member cabinet which also contained 15 members of Hariri’s bloc. The 
prospects for stability in Lebanon were soon jeopardized by months of protracted 
political crises and renewed sectarian violence (CRS 2011: 19). From mid-2007 until 
the agreement in Doha in May 2008, Lebanon’s political environment was paralyzed by 
a number of interrelated disagreements (CRS 2011: 20).  
 
 
                                                          
95 Thomas L. Friedman, Ballots Over Bullets, published 9th June 2009 – accessed via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/op.......ofriedman.html - on 12/11/2013;  
96 So-called because the March 14 Coalition held its meetings at the old Bristol hotel in Beirut 
where prior to Lebanon’s ‘Cedar Revolution’, the opposition gathered and voiced its 
disapproval over incessant Syrian involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs;  
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Free and Investigative Media 
Freedom of the press and expression is guaranteed under the Lebanese constitution and 
enshrined in law (Media Sustainability Index 2009). 
Article 13 of the 1926 Constitution (as amended) states that: 
 The freedom to express one’s opinion orally or in writing, the 
freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom 
of association shall be guaranteed within the limits established 
by law (Lebanese Constitution 1926, Art.13).  
The Lebanese press was restricted and censored on a large-scale during Syrian military 
and political domination of Lebanon. According to a 2005 report on the country by 
Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) a spate of politically motivated attacks on journalists 
restricted press freedom in Lebanon to a large extent97. Lebanon plummeted 52 places 
in the media watchdog’s global index of press freedom during the period 2002 to 2005.  
It was ranked to 108th out of 164 nations listed by RSF in its published 2005 annual 
report98.  
The Bush administration aimed to guarantee press freedom and investigative media in 
Lebanon through its launch in 2001 of the AMIDEAST – administered, USAID-funded 
Transparency and Accountability Grants (TAG) Program which provided small grants 
to local NGOs and media organisations. The cooperative agreement which USAID 
awarded to AMIDEAST to administer the TAG Program ended in December 2010 
(AMIDEAST TAG Project 2001 - 2010), a year after Bush left office. The main grant 
                                                          
97 IRIN Middle East – Beirut, Lebanon, 18th October 2005 “LEBANON: The press is free but 
journalists remain intimidated by violence” – accessed via 
http://irinnews.org/report/25603/lebanon-the-p on 17/01/2015;  
98 Ibid;  
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recipients during the period 2001 – 2010 included organisations such as Al Sohof  - a 
journalism review dedicated to press freedom and investigative reporting - which 
received a grant from the TAG project for the period 2001 – 2002 to develop and launch 
a bi-lingual, bi-weekly electronic magazine to encourage press accountability, 
transparency, and investigative reporting (AMIDEAST TAG Project 2001 - 2010). The 
Tewfik Mishlawi organisation99 also received a grant from the TAG project for the 
period 2001 – 2002 to launch the “Lebanon Journalism Review” (LJR), a critical media 
publication, which aimed at monitoring the Lebanese press, and encourage improved 
accuracy, fairness, balance, and unbiased reporting by the local news media. As a media 
watchdog, LJR highlighted areas within the sector which needed improved 
transparency, accountability, and professionalism (AMIDEAST TAG Project 2001-
2010).  Another grant from the TAG project was awarded to Lebanese Center for Civic 
Education (LCCE) organisation100 for the period 2007 – 2008 to train senior young 
journalism students at the Faculty of Media of the Lebanese University on the principles 
of investigative journalism. After their training, the students were provided a space to 
publish their investigative articles in Annahar newspaper. The trained students also 
organized investigative journalism days at the Lebanese University campus to share the 
                                                          
99 The Tewfik Mishlawi organisation is named after the late Tewfik Mishlawi, a veteran 
naturalised Lebanese journalist who was well known and respected in the Middle East and the 
Arab world. Mishlawi served as deputy editor in chief of Lebanon’s only English language daily 
newspaper, the Daily Star from 1963 – 1973. He also worked as Special Middle East 
correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and the London Times. He died on 24th January 2012.  
100 In its Mission Statement, The Lebanese Center for Civic Education (LCCE) states that its 
mission is to spread the concepts of democracy, human rights and responsible citizenship in the 
Lebanese society. 
LCCE builds on the postwar experiences of finding common grounds, acceptance of the other, 
conflict resolution in a diverse society, and building coalitions as a foundation for a new 
democratic experience – see http://www.lccelebanon.org;  
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lessons learned from the training and investigations with their colleagues (AMIDEAST 
TAG Project 2001 - 2010). The Daily Star newspaper was also awarded a grant by the 
TAG project during the period 2005 – 2006 to produce a weekly one-page supplement 
under the title of “Reform and Transparency” both in their printed and on-line editions 
for a period of 26 weeks (6 months). The supplement covered and investigated the 
Lebanese economic, social, judicial, and governmental sectors news (AMIDEAST TAG 
Project 2001 – 2010). Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that the role of the 
Lebanese media as a provider of information is critical in the fight against corruption 
and transparency and accountability, the Daily Star newspaper was again awarded a 
grant by the TAG project during the period 2009 – 2010 to produce a weekly one-page 
section in both its printed and on-line editions for a period of 20 weeks (6 months), 
serving as a cornerstone for transparency, accountability, and good governance issues in 
Lebanon. The subjects covered by the Daily Star’s weekly publications focused on non-
political, non-polarized issues in the period prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections – 
such as education, environment, access to health, women’s empowerment and rights, 
specific consumer concerns, protection of minorities, migrant workers, electoral reform 
etc. (AMIDEAST TAG Project 2001 - 2010).  
Notwithstanding the Bush Administration’s efforts to promote free and investigative 
media in Lebanon, reports surfaced in August 2007 accusing the U.S. of inhibiting and 
negatively influencing freedom of speech in Lebanon contrary to its rhetoric to foster 
the same in that country. As reported by Asad Abu Khalil, a popular Lebanese-
American blogger and professor at Stanislaus University in California in his blog, The 
Angry Arab News Service, the U.S. used its political humanitarian tool, USAID, to 
coerce Lebanon's English newspaper The Daily Star into writing pro-government 
articles. According to the Angry Arab blog, the Daily Star had published a damning, 
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investigative report by Lysandra Ohstrom on the gigantic real-estate group, Solidere. 
Solidere is Rafik al-Hariri's legacy – a company that rebuilt one section of Beirut (the 
predominantly Sunni Downtown Beirut) allegedly through monopoly, extortion, illegal 
confiscation of private property, exploitation of workers (underpaid Syrian labour). 
Ohstrom's article explored Solidere's alleged unscrupulous transactions aimed at 
enriching Hariri. With Saad Hariri (son of Rafik) becoming the leader of Lebanon's 
governing pro-American March 14 alliance, the Bush administration, according to 
Angry Arab blog became quite passionate about victory in Lebanon and pursued every 
possible policy to ensure that Saad Hariri was on top of the other political contestants. 
The Angry Arab blog claims that Bush's insistence to hold onto the March 14 alliance 
was conspicuously reiterated when he declared that he would target anyone that tried to 
undermine the Siniora Government. So when The Daily Star published an article 
charging Hariri's Solidere with corruption, the U.S. was quick to respond. The Angry 
Arab blog quotes USAID as stating that “the USAID funders have requested that the 
coming pages (of Daily Star examiner section) all have their writers submit synopses of 
their pieces for vetting ... the political agenda of the donors is not to undermine the 
Fouad Siniora government”101. USAID’s stance underlined a serious issue in another 
perceived episode of American double standards. The Angry Arab blog concluded that 
after seven years of ‘erratic’ rule by George W. Bush that the American agenda in the 
world was never about freedom or democracy. It goes on further to lament that, there is 
something particularly cynical about using a grant to develop investigative journalism 
and micro-manage a paper's coverage102.  
                                                          
101Available from: http://angryarab.blogspot.com (accessed on 19/01/2012).  
102 Ibid;  
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Allegations of U.S. double standards and hypocrisy aside, and despite being 
constitutionally unhindered in principle, freedom of the press and expression is subject 
to restrictive regulations in Lebanon. For instance, article 9 of Press Law of 1962 which 
states that journalism is “the free profession of publishing news publications” also 
forbids publishing of material deemed dangerous to national security or insulting to 
high –ranking Lebanese officials (Media Sustainability Index 2009)103. An additional 
statute, the Audiovisual Media Law passed in 1994 (No. 382/1994) effectively restricted 
ownership of television and radio stations to influential politicians and heads of 
communities despite being designed to prevent political parties from owning TV 
networks. Almost all Lebanon’s major television stations are owned by or affiliated 
with a particular party or politician. Al Manar, is operated by Hezbollah; OTV is allied 
to General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement; NBN is linked to the Shia speaker 
of parliament and leader of the Amal party, Nabi Berri; MTV is owned by Lebanese 
politician Gabriel Murr, who is allied to the March 14 coalition; and the Lebanese 
Broadcasting Company (LBC) is allied to the Lebanese forces and the March 14 
coalition (Media Sustainability Index 2009). Indeed, Lebanon’s nine private television 
stations and fifteen daily newspapers are divided among the various political factions 
and cater to their respective needs.  
There is also an unspoken rule against directly attacking religious leaders in the media 
for fear of inciting sectarian conflict, though that does not prohibit media outlets from 
                                                          
103 Post – George W. Bush era, and on 11th August 2010, Hassan Allek, a reporter for the daily 
Al-Akhbar, was detained and interrogated by the Lebanese defence ministry for alleging in a 
story that certain Lebanese government and military officials were cooperating with Israel 
intelligence services. Allek’s detention and interrogation was a flagrant violation of media law 
and it prompted Reporters Without Borders to raise doubts about a readiness to respect the rule 
of law on the part of those who are supposed to uphold it in Lebanon – see article entitled “Al-
Akhbar Reporter Held And Interrogated Illegally By Defence Ministry”, 13th August 2010 – 
accessed via http://en.rsf.org/al-akhbar-reporter-held-and-13-08-2010 - on 11/02/2015;  
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using a sectarian discourse or having a political agenda104.While the media broadcast 
law bars incitement and sectarianism, television stations aired divisive, polarizing 
coverage during street clashes in February 2007 and January and May 2008. The 1994 
law imposes onerous licensing fees and taxes on media outlets, making the 
establishment of new ones a costly enterprise. According to the Media Sustainability 
Index report of 2009, the state-owned channel Tele Liban is underfunded and dull, 
faring poorly in competition with private stations. The state media do not receive 
preferential legal treatment, but they rarely challenge the ruling authorities (Media 
Sustainability Index 2009). 
Furthermore, whilst freedom of speech is guaranteed in the constitution, there is no 
freedom of information law, meaning journalists must rely on leaks and anonymous 
sources. The 1994 Media law allows censorship of pornography, threats to national 
security, political opinion, and slander against religion (Safa 2010). Individuals are free 
to criticize the government but are legally prohibited from publicly criticizing the 
president and foreign leaders (US Department of State 2010). In 2008, the General 
Directorate of State Security prohibited the circulation of three films and censored one 
foreign publication (cited in Safa 2010). Impunity for violent attacks against journalists 
also presented a serious problem. Investigations into the 2005 car-bomb assassinations 
of prominent journalists Gebran Tueini and Samir Kassir, and an attack the same year 
that left television journalist May Chidiac permanently injured have made no headway 
in recent years, and no arrests have been made (Safa 2010). Lesser attacks, such as the 
beating of journalists from one political camp at their opponents’ rallies, went 
unpunished. Journalists are restricted from reporting from some Hezbollah-controlled 
areas without the group’s explicit permission and oversight. In addition, during the May 
                                                          
104 Ibid 
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2008 factional fighting, opposition forces shut down two newspapers, a magazine, a 
television station, and two radio stations; the outlets resumed operation shortly 
afterward following a public outcry (Safa 2010). Internet access is unrestricted, though 
the government reportedly censored some internet sites such as pornographic and 
religiously provocative websites. In June and July 2010, the government applied libel 
and defamation laws to Internet communication for the first time and arrested four men 
for setting up a Face-book page critical of President Suleiman (US Department of State 
2010). 
The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, but the government 
sometimes restricts these rights in practice. The Ministry of Interior required prior 
approval for rallies and it sometimes did not grant permits to groups that opposed 
government positions. There were however no reported cases of security forces abusing 
demonstrators or failing to prevent violence against them (US Department of State 
2010). 
The law also provides for freedom of association, but the government imposed limits on 
this right. The law requires every new organization to submit a notification of formation 
to the Ministry of Interior, which then issues a receipt. The ministry sometimes imposed 
additional and inconsistent restrictions and requirements and withheld receipts, turning 
the notification process into an actual approval process. In some cases the ministry sent 
notification of formation papers to the security forces to initiate inquiries on an 
organization’s founding members. Organizations must invite ministry representatives to 
any general assembly where members vote on bylaw amendments or positions on the 
board of directors. The ministry must then validate the vote or election; failure to do so 
could result in the dissolution of the organization (US Department of State 2010).  
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Respect for Human Rights 
Article 8 of the 1926 Constitution (as amended) states that:  
Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No one 
may be arrested, imprisoned, or kept in custody except 
according to the provisions of the law. No offense may be 
established or penalty imposed except by law (Lebanese 
Constitution 1926, Article 8). 
USAID-funded Transparency and Accountability Grants (TAG) Programme provided 
small grants to local NGOs and media organisations to clarify and strengthen human 
rights guarantees in Lebanon. The Association for the Defense of Law and Liberties 
(ADDL) organisation received a grant from the TAG project for the period 2003 – 2004 
to produce and distribute information guides on freedom of expression and freedom to 
publish and the launching of an interactive website which were all aimed at achieving 
better accountability and transparency in various legal rights associated with human 
rights (AMIDEAST TAG project 2001-2010). Another TAG project launched in 2003 – 
2004 under the auspices of Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (CESMO)105 
aimed at promoting and enforcing implementation of important clauses in the 
“Convention on the Rights of the Child” in North Lebanon to children (AMIDEAST 
TAG project 2001-2010). Justice without Frontiers (JWF)106 also received a grant from 
the TAG project for the period 2005 – 2006. JWF organised outreach activities and 
lectures in the regions to discuss specific issues that are important to the public and hold 
                                                          
105 In its Mission Statement, CESMO states that it implements specific development and 
education to democracy projects aimed at reaching a more equalitarian and fair society – see 
http://www.cesmo.org/index.php  -  on 13/11/20134;  
106 JWF is a secular, non-political, non-profit, non-governmental, juristic civil organisation 
incorporated in November 2005 and headquartered in Beirut. It focuses on the principles of 
Human Rights and international humanitarian and criminal law, and works towards prosecuting 
violators and supporting victims at the national, regional, and international levels – see 
http://justicewithoutfrontiers.org – accessed on 13/11/2014;  
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a major launching event during the International Human Rights week (AMIDEAST 
TAG project 2001-2010). Justicia Foundation for Development and Human Rights 
(JFDHR)107 was another TAG grant recipient during the period 2009 – 2010. By 
expanding its “Equal Under the Law: Know Your Rights” project, JFDHR aimed to 
help citizens gain access to legal information on key issues. This project authored, 
published and distributed three new legal rights guides: “Municipal Rights”, “Bank 
Customer Rights”, and “Children’s Rights”. The assumption was that providing 
Lebanese citizens with knowledge about their rights under Lebanese law would better 
empower citizens (AMIDEAST TAG project 2001-2010).   
Notwithstanding U.S. efforts to foster a culture of respect for human rights in Lebanon, 
Human Rights Watch report entitled “Lebanon’s 2009 Parliamentary Elections – A 
Human Rights Agenda”, states that Lebanon’s human rights record is abysmal, with 
torture and ill-treatment remaining a serious problem in Lebanese detention facilities 
and jails (Human Rights Watch, Lebanon 2009). The 2009 Report states that 
documented cases of torture and ill-treatment range from security forces beating a 
janitor suspected of theft during his interrogation, to members of the intelligence 
services subjecting individuals, suspected of membership in violent Islamist groups, to 
systematic torture over many days.  
While Article 401 of the Lebanese Penal Code criminalizes the use of violence to 
extract confessions, the Report stated that the Lebanese judiciary rarely, if ever, 
investigate or prosecute allegations of torture (Human Rights Watch, Lebanon 2009). 
The 2009 Report acknowledged however that since 2007, Lebanon had taken some 
                                                          
107 Justicia Foundation for Development and Human Rights (JFDHR) is a non-profit Lebanese 
Civil Society organisation. Its main objective is to protect and promote human rights. It also 
works to empower marginalized individuals, strengthen democracy and encourage good 
governance – see http://www.justiciah.org – accessed 13/11/2014;  
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steps to counter torture such as granting the International Committee of the Red Cross 
access in February 2007 to all Lebanese detention facilities, including those run by the 
Ministry of Defense (Human Rights Watch, Lebanon 2009). Such a pro-active step was 
quickly followed by the Internal Security Forces’ (ISF) creation in February 2008 of an 
internal unit tasked with monitoring human rights violations by its members. 
Furthermore, on December 22, 2008, Lebanon ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture (OPCAT) (Human Rights Watch, Lebanon 2009). 
Notwithstanding these evidences of commitment towards the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, the 2009 Report pointed out serious concerns that the fate of 
OPCAT will be similar to that of the United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) which Lebanon 
ratified in 2000. Despite being a signatory of CAT, Lebanon has yet to comply with its 
provisions. Already, Lebanon has failed to set up a ‘national preventive mechanism’ to 
help prevent torture through visiting and monitoring places of detention. According to 
OPCAT, signatories have one year following ratification to enact a national preventive 
mechanism (Human Rights Watch, Lebanon 2009:6).     
Religious Freedom 
The Lebanese Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the freedom to practice 
all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. The Constitution requires 
the state to respect all religions and denominations and guarantee respect for the 
personal status and religious interests of persons of every religious sect (US State 
Department report 2010).  
Article 9 of the 1926 Constitution (as amended) states that: 
There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in 
rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all 
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religions and creeds and shall guarantee, under its protection 
the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order 
is not disturbed. It shall also guarantee that the personal status 
and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious 
sect they belong, shall be respected (Lebanese Constitution 
1926, Art.9).  
According to the U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 
2010 on Lebanon, the Bush Administration actively promoted religious freedom with 
the Lebanese Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The 
2010 Report confirms that the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was tasked with advancing this 
goal through contacts at all levels of society, public remarks, embassy public diplomacy 
programs, and the funding of relevant projects. The Report states that the Bush 
Administration supported the principles of the 1989 Ta’if Agreement, and that embassy 
staff regularly discuss the issue of sectarianism with political, religious, and civic 
leaders (US Department of State report 2010). The U.S. Ambassador and embassy 
officers met regularly with leaders of religious communities and regularly discussed 
matters related to religious freedom and tolerance (US Department of State report 
2010).  
Notwithstanding the positive statements enunciated in the State Department report it is 
difficult to imagine how the Bush administration was able to effectively reach out to all 
levels of Lebanese society in its efforts to foster religious freedom in Lebanon. Indeed, 
it is highly unlikely that the U.S. embassy staff would have engaged in consultations 
with Hezbollah. The U.S. government considers Hezbollah to be a global terrorist threat 
and a menace to the stability of the Middle East region. The two are sworn enemies who 
insist they will never work together. Indeed, the US State Department designated 
Hezbollah a foreign terrorist organisation in October 1997.  
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Whilst the Lebanese government generally respects religious rights, there are however 
some notable restrictions. First, the country’s constitutional provision for apportioning 
political offices according to religious affiliation can be viewed as discriminatory as it is 
based on confession rather than merit. The constitution declares equality of rights and 
duties for all citizens without discrimination or preference but stipulates a balance of 
power distributed among the major religious groups. The 1989 Ta’if Agreement, which 
ended the country’s 15 – year civil war, reaffirmed the arrangement stipulated by the 
1943 “National Pact” for the distribution of political power at both the national and 
local levels of government. The political establishment is reluctant to change this 
“confessional” system, because politicians perceive it as critical to the country’s 
stability. The Ta’if Agreement calls for the eventual elimination of political 
sectarianism in favour of “expertise and competence” but little progress has been made 
in this regard (US Department of State report 2010).  
Some religious groups do not enjoy official recognition, such as Baha’is, Buddhists, 
Hindus, and unregistered Protestant Christian groups. These groups are disadvantaged 
under the law in that their members do not qualify for certain government positions. For 
example, a Baha’i could not run for parliament as a Baha’i candidate because there is no 
seat allocated for the confession, nor could such an individual hold senior positions in 
the government, since these are also allocated on a confessional basis. Representatives 
from the lesser represented, or “minority”, Christian groups, such as Syriac rite 
Christians, stated that the government discriminated against them because no one from 
their religious classification had been appointed a minister. While they have served in 
some high-level civil service positions, such as director general, these groups stated that 
most positions were filled by Maronites and Greek Orthodox. These groups further 
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stated that while they estimated their population at 54,000, they were allocated only one 
representative in parliament (US Department of State report 2010). 
 
Gender rights (specifically women’s rights) 
Article 7 of the 1926 Constitution (as amended) states that: 
All Lebanese shall be equal before the law. They shall equally 
enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by 
public obligations and duties without any distinction (Lebanese 
Constitution 1926, Art.7).  
The major vehicle through which the Bush Administration tried to promote this aspect 
of its democratization policy in Lebanon was the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI)108. On the heels of the publication of the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Arab Human Development Report 2002, President Bush argued that: “No 
society can succeed and prosper while denying basic rights to the women of their 
country” (cited in Ottaway 2004:3). Colin Powell echoed the sentiment, arguing that: 
“Until the countries of the Middle East unleash the abilities and potential of their 
women, they will not build a future of hope” (cited in Ottaway 2004:3).  
From 2007, MEPI sought to empower Lebanon’s women through projects totalling over 
$42 million (US Embassy Beirut, Press Release 2009). Through its partnership with 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), MEPI provided support to a group of Lebanese NGOs - 
including the Lebanese Council to Resist Violence against Women (LECORVAW) - 
working to empower women through training and advocacy. LECORVAW’s goal is to 
                                                          
108 Created in 2002 to provide direct support to non-governmental organizations, the private 
sector, and academic institutions, as well as governments in the Near East and North Africa, the 
MEPI aims to expand political participation, strengthen civil society and the rule of law, 
empower women and youth, create educational opportunities, and foster economic reform 
throughout the region. 
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confront the issue of gender-based violence publicly, educate Lebanese women to see 
the signs of abuse, and offer practical social and legal aid when needed.  
USAID funded AMIDEAST – administered Transparency and Accountability Grants 
(TAG) programme also awarded small grants to various Lebanese NGOs to promote 
women’s rights in Lebanon. NGOs such as the Non-Governmental Committee for the 
Follow-up of Women’s issues were notable recipients in 2003 - 2004. This activity 
aimed at promoting women’s legal rights in Lebanon. Beginning with a review of 
current Lebanese laws and documents for articles that discriminate against women, the 
group organised focus group meetings and drafted new laws or amendments to those 
that discriminate against women. These draft laws and amendments were presented to 
Parliament in a national conference, followed by lobbying of Parliamentarians until the 
laws are amended and adopted (AMIDEAST TAG project 2001 – 2010). Also, the 
Lebanese Council of Women (LCW) received a grant award for the period 2005 – 2006 
to launch a public awareness campaign promoting a quota for women in the new 
parliamentary election law, debated in January 2006. LCW produced and aired 30 
second TV public service announcements on all key Lebanese TV stations (LBCI, FTV, 
NBN, TL) over a period of one month (30 days) in an advocacy campaign promoting 
fair participation and inclusion of women in the national decision making process 
(AMIDEAST TAG project 2001 – 2010).  
The Committee for Women Political Empowerment was another grant recipient during 
the period 2005 – 2006. This activity lobbied for the adoption of a transitional quota 
system for women’s representation in the Lebanese Parliament (12 extra seats) within 
an overall framework of achieving better representation of women in the different 
decision-making bodies in Lebanon. The Committee lobbied to secure support from 
current members of Parliament for a quota system. Simultaneously, it worked to build 
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support prior to the Parliamentary elections in May 2005 with a campaign including 
regional meetings, billboards, and a petition drive.  
The Non-Governmental Committee for the Follow-up on Women’s Issues (CFUWI) 
also received a grant award for the period 2007 – 2008 to follow-up on its development 
of a simplified guide focused on abolishing discrimination against women in Lebanese 
law. It mobilized the public and empowered local communities throughout Lebanon to 
advocate for the rights of women and lobby for change. Twenty-four community 
meetings were organized by a team of local facilitators to discuss the specific problems 
of most concern to each community and to develop an action plan to lobby and advocate 
for change. The lobbying and advocacy activities implemented throughout the project, 
such as composing and sending letters to government authorities, signing petitions, 
production of lobbying materials, etc., were determined by the local communities with 
support and coordination from the project team (AMIDEAST TAG project 2001 – 
2010).  
The Beyond Organisation also received a grant award for the period 2009 – 2010 to 
establish a woman’s rights monitor to gather information, monitor violations, and 
launch a website with an on-line forum as part of ongoing effort to eliminate gender 
discrimination in Lebanon. Furthermore, a network of NGOs working on women’s 
issues, rights, and needs was also established to form a “Women’s Protection Network” 
nationwide. After conducting a gender baseline analysis on selected women’s issues to 
be monitored in Lebanon, Beyond Association trained 26 women from qazas (districts) 
across Lebanon to establish this monitoring system and reporting of violations to the 
Monitor. Findings of the baseline analysis and of the monitor were disseminated widely 
through media and activities to both key stakeholders and the general public. This 
project enhanced social inclusion and participation opportunities for women in 
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Lebanon, through information sharing, networking, advocacy, awareness raising and 
enhanced community and civil society engagement (AMIDEAST TAG project 2001 – 
2010). 
USAID also sought to help remove obstacles to women’s rights in Lebanon. USAID’s 
$9.3 million Transparency and Accountability Grants Program awarded to the Institute 
of Progressive Women (IPW) for the period 2009 – 2010 helped to promote Lebanese 
women’s legal rights and empowerment on the level of access to financial services 
(AMIDEAST/TAG project 2001 – 2010)109.  
USAID’s assistance to women extended to support for increased women’s participation 
in elections. USAID’s Shariky (“Participate”) project helped to more than double the 
number of Lebanese women elected to municipal offices, from 201 in 2004 to 531 in 
2010 (USAID/Lebanon 2011. 
Notwithstanding the U.S.’s efforts to eliminate gender discrimination, Lebanese women 
continue to suffer domestic violence and face considerable obstacles which hinder their 
ability to play a greater part in the governance of their country. According to the 2010 
U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on Lebanon, the Lebanese legal system 
does not specifically prohibit domestic violence which remains a problem. The Report 
                                                          
109 Post – George W. Bush era, and on 11th June  2010, the USAID/Lebanon Mission Director 
Denise Herbol attended the closing ceremony for the “Custodial Bank Accounts – End Gender 
Discrimination” project that marked a new milestone on the road to ending discriminatory 
practices against Lebanese women. Funded by USAID through AMIDEAST, the IPW project 
promoted and advanced women’s legal rights through increasing access to financial services. 
The project enabled mothers to open, as guardians, bank accounts in the names of their minor 
children, without the signature of the child’s father as was previously required by banks. Using 
constructive legal interpretation, IPW mobilized thousands of people at the grassroots level to 
lobby for this right. IPW also mobilized female bank customers who, in turn, pressed their case 
with the Association of Banks and individual banks. During the life of the project, the Lebanese 
media played a critical role through extensive coverage of advocacy activities conducted during 
the project (AMIDEAST/TAG project 2001 – 2010).  
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states that despite the operation of a law that sets a maximum sentence of three years in 
prison for battery, some religious courts may legally require a battered wife to return to 
her home despite physical abuse. The Report adds that, women are sometimes 
compelled to remain in abusive marriages because of economic, social, and family 
pressures (US Department of State, Human Rights report, Lebanon 2010). It states 
further that the Lebanese government provided legal assistance to domestic violence 
victims who could not afford it, but in most cases police ignored complaints submitted 
by battered or abused women (US Department of State, Human Rights report, Lebanon 
2010). The failure of Lebanon’s state protection mechanisms to afford women the 
requisite protection they require from abusive partners has an adverse impact on 
women’s participation in the public sphere as it restricts women’s empowerment, and 
can act as a significant impediment to civil, political, and economic, social and cultural 
rights.  
Furthermore, the Report notes that the Lebanese legal system practices discrimination in 
its handling of ‘honour killings’. In 2008, the CEDAW committee, the UN Expert body 
that supervises implementation of the Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
violence against women called upon Lebanon to enact legislation on violence against 
women110. At the time, and according to the Lebanese penal code, a man who kills his 
wife or other female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he demonstrates he 
committed the crime in response to a socially unacceptable sexual relationship 
conducted by the victim. For example, although the penal code stipulates murder is 
punishable by either a life sentence or death, a defendant who can prove the killing was 
an honour crime receives a commuted sentence of a maximum of seven years’ 
                                                          
110 See Human Rights Watch report, Lebanon: Law Reform Targets ‘Honour’ Crimes, 11th 
August 2011 – accessed via http://hrw.org/news/2011/08/11/Lebanon-law - on 12/12/13;  
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imprisonment (US Department of State, Human Rights report, Lebanon 2010). This 
position has now changed as on 4th August 2011, the Lebanese parliament annulled 
article 562 of the criminal code which mitigated the sentence of people who claim they 
killed or injured their wife, daughter, or other relative to protect the family honour111.  
Lebanese women suffer further discrimination under the provisions of Lebanon’s laws 
and in their practice. Despite women’s active participation in all aspects of Lebanese 
society, discriminatory provisions continue to exist in personal status laws, nationality 
laws, and penal laws relating to violence in the family (Human Rights report, Lebanon 
2009). In particular, current Lebanese law does not allow Lebanese women to confer 
nationality on either their spouses or children112. As a result, thousands of children born 
to Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers are denied full access to education, healthcare, 
and residency113. In the event of separation, it is the father who gains automatic custody, 
according to Lebanese nationality law114. Furthermore, the Election Law promulgated in 
2008 consolidates civil registry rules by stating that on marriage, a woman’s location of 
registration is to be transferred to her husband’s115.These rules clearly discriminate 
against women as they restrict their enjoyment of civil and political rights. As a result of 
                                                          
111 Ibid;  
112 In January 2013, Lebanon’s Daily Star newspaper cited that leaked documents revealed that 
the Lebanese ministerial committee studying the draft nationality law rejected it in its entirety – 
The Daily Star, Lebanon, “2nd Class Citizens”. Available from: 
www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=202706&mode=print (accessed on 21/01/2013).   
113 Ibid  
114 The Nationality Law was established in 1925 and partially reformed in 1994 in a complex 
decree. According to a 2008 report by the NGO Frontiers Association, the 1994 amendment 
allows the child of a Lebanese mother and foreign father to gain Lebanese citizenship after the 
child’s marriage to a Lebanese, and at least five years uninterrupted residency in the country, 
including one year after marriage.  
115 Articles 25 and 26, Registration of Personal Status Documents Dec 7th 1951 and Article 32, 
Parliamentary Election Law 2008 
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sustained efforts by Lebanese women’s rights groups, the issue of amending Lebanese 
citizenship law to grant Lebanese women the right to confer nationality has gained 
momentum and has received the endorsement of many political leaders (Human Rights 
Watch report, Lebanon 2009). However, certain Lebanese officials and politicians have 
suggested that any amendment to the law on citizenship should exclude Lebanese 
women married to Palestinian men, pursuant to the Lebanese constitution’s prohibition 
on the “nationalization” of Palestinians (ostensibly to avoid undermining their “right of 
return”) (Human Rights Watch report, Lebanon 2009). Some politicians have argued 
further that to allow Lebanese women to nationalise the children they have with non-
Lebanese, such as Syrians and Palestinians, would be to shake up the delicate sectarian 
demographic on which the country’s political system is founded. But according to the 
activist Roula Masri, figures from the Interior Ministry from 2001 indicate that only 
1,000 Lebanese women are married to foreigners, although she admits that these figures 
need to be updated with field research, Masri asserts that the issue is not about how 
many women are married to Palestinians, Syrians or other foreigners but that the 
Nationality Law should be amended to ensure respect to women’s human rights 
(Russeau 2008). The exclusion of Lebanese women married to Palestinian men from the 
proposed amendment to the Nationality Law would be discriminatory and would 
replace one form of discrimination (between Lebanese men and women) with another 
(between women married to non-Palestinians and women married to Palestinians) 
(Human Rights Watch report, Lebanon 2009).  
Further evidence of gender discrimination is reflected in the fact that whilst Lebanese 
women today enjoy senior positions in the private sector, political appointments have all 
but eluded them. Despite the fact that Lebanese women were granted suffrage in 1953, 
the number of women who have been elected is extremely low. There is a saying in 
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Lebanon that the only woman you will see in parliament is the one wearing black, 
mourning for the death of her husband or brother, whose political mantle she has 
inherited. Four such examples are Myrna Boustani, who became the first Lebanese 
woman in parliament upon her father’s death; Nayla Mouawad, who entered parliament 
as a widow after the death of her husband, former President Rene Mouwad; former 
Industry Minister Leila Solh who joined after her father’s death; and Solange al-
Gemayel, the wife of slain President Bashir al-Gemayel. But even when a female 
politician arrives in parliament without the help of tragedy – such as Bahia al- Hariri in 
1992, well before the assassination of her brother and five – time prime minister, Rafik 
al-Hariri – it still seemed to be a requirement that she hail from a rich and traditionally 
political family (Mahdawi 2009). According to some commentators, it is virtually 
impossible for independent, self-made women to enter Lebanon’s political arena 
(Mahdawi 2009).  
Overall, the experience of women’s participation in politics and the outcome of the 
parliamentary elections demonstrated the male chauvinistic mentality held by the 
leaders of the parliamentary blocs. Most party leaders limit the presence of women to 
the second and third ranks of the parties and refrain from appointing a woman to a 
position within the party’s inner circles even if her aptitude and competence over her 
male peers is unquestionable.  
Independent Judicial System 
Historically, the independence of the judiciary in Lebanon has been weakened by the 
authorities vested in the Government of Lebanon’s executive branch. The recognisable 
Western standards for the separation of powers between the judicial, legislative, and 
executive branches are not the norm in Lebanon. The Lebanese executive branch of 
government includes the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet of ministers. Within the 
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judicial branch, the Supreme Judicial Council is a 10-member council that is responsible 
for appointing, promoting, and transferring judges but is subject to the approval of the 
Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice, as a member of the executive branch, 
approves the appointments made by the Supreme Judicial Council, but the council, as a 
part of the judicial branch, is supposed to function independently. On an institutional 
level, the President and the cabinet jointly approve appointment of 8 of the 10 council 
members (OIG/USAID 2010). 
The Lebanese judiciary is also subject to pressure by parochial sectarian interests, 
particularly in nominations to the Constitutional Council and the Judicial Council whose 
seats must be apportioned by confession. Judges and other officials in the judiciary are 
appointed in a similar manner, based on a sectarian quota defined in advance. The 
delicate sectarian balance makes it difficult to completely protect the judiciary from 
interference by religious leaders. For example, the mostly Sunni suspects jailed after the 
attack on the Danish consulate in 2006 were quietly released following protests by the 
Mufti of the Republic (Safa 2010).  
Further evidence of political interference in the Lebanese judiciary was obvious in 
2006, when the March 14 Coalition majority in the parliament amended Law No. 
250/1993 to disband the Constitutional Council before its official term expired, purging 
the judiciary of what were considered pro-Syrian judges. Legal experts considered this 
action then as unfair and a dangerous precedent for heavy-handed political interference 
in the judiciary (Safa 2010).  
To encourage judicial independence and promote an effective court system in Lebanon, 
USAID/Lebanon launched the Strengthening the Independence of the Judiciary and 
Citizen Access to Justice (SIJCAJ) project in 2007. USAID/Lebanon awarded a three 
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year, $8.2 million cost-plus-fixed fee completion task order to the National Center for 
State Courts (NCSC) to implement a rule of law project which began on December 11, 
2007 and ended on December 9, 2010. NCSC designed its rule of law programme, with 
one broad objective and three components, to increase the effectiveness and 
independence of the Lebanese judicial system with (1) better educated judges, (2) more 
efficient and transparent courts and legal processes, and (3) frameworks that support 
judicial independence and impartiality (OIG/USAID 2010). NCSC hired the non-profit 
organisation America – Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc. (AMIDEAST) 
as a sub-contractor to help implement USAID/Lebanon’s rule of law program.  
U.S. efforts also spearheaded the formal launch of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in 
2009 to bring to justice those responsible for financing, planning, and carrying out the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. This was an important indication 
of the international community’s determination to see this case solved. As evidence of 
the Bush Administration’s commitment towards promoting justice in Lebanon, the 
United States contributed $14 million and pledged a further $6 million for the second 
year of the Tribunal’s operations (US Embassy, Beirut, Press Release 2009).  
Notwithstanding the above efforts by the Bush Administration, the audit findings of the 
Office of Inspector General on NCSC’s rule of law programme in Lebanon confirm that 
USAID/Lebanon’s rule of law program did not achieve its main goal of increasing the 
effectiveness and independence of the Lebanese judicial system. The audit verified that 
the program had not achieved any results during fiscal (FY) 2008 and had achieved only 
three of the five results during FY 2009. Moreover, from January 2008 to December 
2009, the program completed 50 percent of its activities. In fact, the audit findings 
confirm that the $8.2 million program achieved only 7 percent of its results in 2008 and 
43 percent of the results in 2009. In addition, USAID/Lebanon significantly overstated 
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results for 10 or 12 of the program performance measures that the mission reported to 
Congress and stakeholders during FY 2008 and 2009 (OIG/USAID 2010). The Office 
of the Inspector General’s audit of USAID/Lebanon’s rule of law programme 
documented 14 recommendations for USAID’s action which the mission addressed by 
way of corrective action. Against this background of underachievement, the 2010 report 
of the U.S. Department of State on Lebanon’s human rights, reports that influential 
politicians and intelligence officers intervened at times and used their influence and 
connections to protect supporters from prosecution (US Department of State, Human 
Rights report, Lebanon 2010).  
Civil Society 
Civil society aid was also a valuable component of U.S. democracy promotion in 
Lebanon during the Bush years. Seen as a fundamental building block of democracy, 
and critical to promoting transparency, good governance, and citizens’ access to their 
government, the Bush Administration showed its strong support for Lebanon and its 
citizens by funding civil society organizations in that country. U.S. financial assistance 
to community - based service NGOs in Lebanon dates back to the 1990s when USAID 
spent several million dollars to help local communities rebuild in the aftermath of civil 
war. Because government agencies were very weak, community – based organizations 
and NGOs were considered to be better aid partners. The U.S.’s aid for Lebanese civil 
society gained momentum during Bush’s tenure of office as U.S. policy makers 
identified Lebanon’s civil society as the missing piece of Lebanon’s democracy puzzle.  
On March 27, 2008 the U.S. Embassy in Beirut announced that the U.S. Congress had 
allocated $5 million to enhance the engagement of civil society organisations in a range 
of issues important to Lebanon (US Embassy, Beirut, Press Release 2008). Five U.S. 
NGOs formed partnerships with various local NGOs to develop Lebanese citizens’ 
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involvement with their government. The American Bar Association (ABA) and CIPE 
promoted rule of law by focusing on strengthening government accountability and 
transparency through freedom of information and whistleblower protection. In addition, 
the ABA and the CIPE worked collectively with various organizations to advocate for 
anti-corruption reforms; and, they helped raise awareness among small businesses of 
their lawful rights and how this knowledge can protect businesses (US Embassy, Beirut, 
Press Release 2008). CRS and the International IREX both enhanced community 
decision – making. CRS provided community decision-makers and municipal leaders 
with practical skills to address diverse community issues, thus forming more consensus 
minded communities. IREX focused on youth who will be able to bridge divisions in 
their communities and advance governmental transparency and accountability (US 
Embassy, Beirut, Press Release 2008). Another non-governmental organisation, 
Internews, funded innovative media projects with local organizations, and trained media 
owners and managers in business management techniques (US Embassy, Beirut, Press 
Release 2008). 
From 2007, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives promoted peace and stability 
through the Lebanon Civic Support Initiative (LCSI). The LCSI catalyzes youth 
activism in marginalized areas, enhances the ability of civil society organizations to 
advocate for local or national issues, and mitigates tensions in conflict-prone areas116.  
Lebanese civil society is organized overwhelmingly along confessional lines, with 
groups serving primarily as patronage vehicles to protect community interests (Kingston 
2001). Because of its deeply rooted communalism, Lebanese society is not an integrated 
civil society in the modern sense. The loyalty of the Lebanese first to family and then to 
                                                          
116 USAID: Lebanon: Programs Overview. Available from: 
http://transition.usaid.gov/lb/programs/index.html (accessed on 21/01/2013).   
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religious community has produced a unique ‘democratic’ structure in Lebanon. As a 
political entity, Lebanon lacks central cultural values (Kliot 1987). The weakness of the 
Lebanese state-idea, and the mal-integration of the Lebanese people as a socio-cultural 
community, spreads throughout the country’s political system (Kliot 1987). The ethnic-
religious schism prevents the evolution of a common political culture, and loyalty to the 
Lebanese central political institutions is very weak. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war, the Bush administration deviated from 
its policy of ignoring Syrian hegemony over Lebanon to show full support for the 
country’s sovereignty. This change of policy effectively served Lebanon’s sovereignty 
and independence as well as the U.S.’s strategic goals as it aimed at being consistent 
with the U.S.’s strategy of promoting democracy and defending human rights in the 
Arab world. At the time, success in Iraq was proving to be elusive and difficult to 
achieve and as well as curtailing Syria’s regional influence and power, Lebanon it 
would seem fitted the profile of a more expedient and realistic candidate to achieve 
democratic and economic success in the region.  
Through diplomatic initiatives and special new democracy aid funds, the Bush 
Administration exerted pressure for internal political change in Lebanon. The pressure 
included a special effort in 2005 to bring an end to Syria’s influence in Lebanon, which 
triggered the resulting ‘Cedar Revolution’. From this perspective, Lebanon was a 
verifiable success for the Bush administration. Bringing Syrian presence to an end in 
Lebanon was something which the Bush administration successfully pushed for. Whilst 
Bush received help from the Lebanese in 2005 when they took to the streets in hundreds 
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of thousands to demand a Syrian pullout, his administration stuck with its promise 
afterwards to help the Lebanese establish a democratic government.  
The U.S. strategy assisted Lebanon in bolstering its internal strength and stability. With 
the assistance of USAID, nominated NGOs collaborated with local actors to make 
contributions to the process aimed at strengthening Lebanese state capacity. There was a 
strong focus on partnership based instruments (political dialogue, democracy assistance) 
that relied on the Lebanese NGOs consent or active cooperation for implementing 
measures.  
Despite the hope for political reform which accompanied Syria’s exit from Lebanon and 
notwithstanding USAID’s efforts to promote democracy on the ground, evidence 
gathered in this chapter shows that similar to the Bush administration’s efforts to 
promote democracy in Iraq, U.S. policies in Lebanon did not sufficiently support the 
advancement of ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in this country. Indeed, as in Iraq, 
albeit for different reasons, the reality of U.S. democracy promotion in Lebanon did not 
live up to the bold proclamations of the Bush Administration.  In Lebanon, the 
implementation of ‘soft’ democracy promotion instruments, such as political dialogue 
and democracy assistance, fundamentally depended on the willingness and capacity of 
the Lebanese government and the U.S.’s Lebanese partners’  on the ground to actively 
cooperate and engage in external democracy promotion efforts. Such cooperation and 
engagement was achieved to a limited extent as the U.S.’s support for democracy 
projects in the Lebanon depicted a scattergun approach meaning that it supported a 
disjointed collection of individual projects rather than pursuing a serious strategy for 
boosting reform movements across the country. U.S. democracy projects shied away 
from controversial areas such as the delicate balance of Lebanon’s confessional system 
(possibly because of the memory of Lebanon’s civil war and a fear that any attempt to 
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alter the political system could reignite the tensions that led to the country to fracture 
along sectarian lines in 1975) by repeating the mantra that ‘democracy cannot be 
imposed from the outside’. The U.S. instead preferred to take refuge in generic priorities 
– such as NGOs, women’s rights and human rights legislation – rather than tackling the 
specific challenges of political reform facing Lebanon. The promotion of women’s 
rights for instance, was a straightforward and easy goal for the U.S. to announce as 
besides lending itself to emphatic rhetorical statements, it had the added advantage of 
being relatively cheap and easy to implement (Ottaway 2004:3). These small albeit 
concrete projects did very little to engineer political reform in Lebanon and in essence 
there was reform without fundamental change as the Bush administration’s attempts to 
promote democracy in this country was stuck in a no man’s land -  neither ineffective 
nor effective.   
The discussion in the next chapter will examine Iraqi and Lebanese perspectives on the 
U.S.’s role as a promoter of democracy in their countries in the aftermath of the events 
of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War. It will argue that the Bush enterprise was effectively 
compromised by a prevalent anti-American  sentiment borne out of the deep and 
pervasive suspicions of U.S. motives which many Iraqis and Lebanese harbour and 
share with large sections of the Arab world.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 
THE PROBLEM OF U.S. CREDIBILITY 
 
General perspectives from across the Middle East region 
The contention that the United States lacks credibility as a promoter of democracy in the 
Arab world revolves around several factors.  
First, it is argued that the U.S. has no credibility when it calls for respect for democracy 
and human rights because of its support for Israel against the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and other Arab nations. The second factor commentators cite is 
America’s historic support for Arab autocrats. Next is the issue of the U.S.’s perceived 
unwillingness to accept democratic outcomes regarded as potentially harmful to its 
strategic interests. Finally, there is the issue of the U.S.’s conflation of democracy with 
the 2003 Iraq war. All of these factors provoke accusations of double-standards and 
questions about the U.S.’s commitment to democracy in the Arab world.  
Turning to the first factor, the United States is widely perceived in the Arab world as a 
co-belligerent with Israel in its war with the Palestinians (Rowswell & Crocker 2004). 
The issue of Palestine is so important to Arabs that it serves as a “litmus test” for their 
evaluations of Western countries. Thus, besides Israel itself, the country most widely 
perceived as failing this ‘litmus test’ is the United States due to its exceptional levels of 
moral, military, economic and diplomatic support for Israel (Furia and Lucas 2006). 
Many Arab commentators have written on how far reaching the U.S.’s support for Israel 
is and on what they perceive as U.S. double standards on the whole issue of the 
protection of human rights in the Arab world. Their comments include strong references 
to the plight of the Palestinian people.  
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For instance, writing in 2002, Fahed Fanek, a prominent Jordanian economist and 
journalist who writes for the Jordan Times, asked rhetorically:  
And what does Bush have to say about the so-called Israeli 
democracy, which has produced the worst kind of far – right, 
extremist government, led by General Ariel Sharon, who is 
committed to continued occupation, the demolition of more 
Palestinian houses, the expropriation of Palestinian land, the 
assassination of Palestinian activists, ethnic cleansing and all-
out state terrorism? (Fanek 2002 cited in Ottaway 2003:10).  
Much of the Arab intelligentsia consider that it is not “regime change” that will bring 
democracy to the Arab world, but a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Saudi 
Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, a member of the Saudi Arabia royal family who served 
as ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United States sums up the Arab attitude 
thus:  
In the West maybe freedom for the Palestinians comes second, 
third or fourth, but for us it is central. But this wound which is 
over more than 60 years old or more doesn’t only affect us 
psychologically it also affects the way we behave [as political 
systems] (cited in Hammond 2007:11). 
Prince Turki’s view is shared by some Western commentators. The veteran Middle East 
journalist, Andrew Hammond, for instance, makes the point that once there is no 
conflict, it will be time to end authoritarian military rule, which has had as one of its 
main aims guarding against the transnational movements with pro-Palestinian 
sentiments that threaten the stability and order of the existing map of nation-states in the 
Arab world (Hammond 2007:10).  
The above comments were put into perspective by the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report 
which acknowledged in its findings that: 
 The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East 
unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
regional instability.  
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According to the 2006 Report: 
 There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the 
United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all 
fronts: Lebanon, Syria and President Bush’s June 2002 
commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine 
(Baker et al 2006).  
The argument that is seemingly being made about Arabs generally putting their 
democratic rights on hold pending a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must 
however be considered against the background of the Arab uprisings of 2011. Notably, 
these rebellions were characterised by popular chants for freedom and democracy which 
were influenced by the deep-seated grievances of Arab populations towards ruling elites 
in their countries. Once the tipping point was reached popular contempt triggered 
courageous demands for political reform. Indeed, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not 
the driving force behind the potent popular demonstrations which demanded freedom 
and democracy.  
Turning to the second factor, the attitude of many people in the Middle East region 
toward the United States has been affected by America’s long track record of supporting 
authoritarian regimes. As conceded by Bush himself in the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. 
policy in the Middle East traditionally favoured the stability of friendly regimes, no 
matter how autocratic, over the promotion of democratic change. Marina Ottaway states 
that this acceptance of friendly autocrats was based in part on security considerations, in 
part on dependence on Arab oil, and in part, finally, on the fact that the United States 
had little leverage to force reforms on regimes whose cooperation it needed to maintain 
peace in the region and to secure access to abundant and cheap oil. As a result, the 
democracy aid directed to the region financed cautious projects, carefully designed to 
avoid angering or destabilizing incumbent regimes (Ottaway 2003). Many other 
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commentators, including former highly-ranked U.S. administration officials, have 
expressed their views on the U.S.’s record of embracing autocratic regimes in the Arab 
world at the expense of fostering true democratic change. In his speech in 2002 to the 
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., Richard Haas remarked that before 
the invasion of Iraq, both Democratic and Republican administrations practiced 
“democratic exceptionalism” in the Arab world, subordinating democracy to other 
national interests such as accessing oil, containing the Soviet Union, and grappling with 
the Arab – Israeli conflict (cited in Esposito & Mogahed 2007:59). For this reason, 
Hassan Nafaa, an Egyptian journalist and political scientist at Cairo University, 
questioned the sincerity of Washington’s newly espoused belief that democracy is the 
way forward in the Arab world.  According to Nafaa,  
The U.S. is not the country that people of this region can rely 
upon to generate a foreign climate conducive to fostering and 
supporting a true process of democratization. The U.S. has a 
long record of supporting dictatorships and of plotting to 
overthrow democratically elected governments. Whenever the 
defense of democratic values has come into conflict with the 
defense of U.S. interests, the latter always win out (Nafaa 2002 
cited in Ottaway 2003:10).  
The charge that America tolerated Arab autocrats and continually backed repressive 
governments to safeguard its interests in the Middle East is underscored by the Halabja 
incident in Iraq in March 1988 when Saddam Hussein used poison gas to kill five 
thousand Kurds. In the midst of Saddam’s brutal assault on the Kurds, the U.S.’s 
official response was mild as at the time the policy had been to support Saddam’s 
regime since it served U.S. interests to do so because Saddam’s war against Iran 
prevented the revolutionary Islamism of the Ayatollah’s Iran from extending its 
influence further into the Gulf, a move that the U.S.  perceived was capable of 
undermining the stability of the Gulf elite states. Reflecting on the Halabja incident, 
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Haim Bresheeth, a Jewish academic opposed to the Zionist movement and ideology and 
its impact on both Palestinian and Jews, remarked sarcastically:  
 
Now we are being told that Saddam is not a democrat, is not 
nice at all really, is actually a tyrant who gasses his own people. 
How nice to hear this two decades after the event in Halabja, 
from the very governments who supported him in his first Gulf 
War against Iran. It did not seem to bother them then, or at any 
time in the past two decades (Bresheeth 2002 cited in Ottaway 
2003:10).  
In addition to the Halabja incident, the U.S.’s historic support for authoritarian Arab 
regimes was illustrated by more recent events in Egypt which served to place in 
question the U.S.’s pro-democratic credentials.  
The first event relates to Condoleezza Rice’s cancellation of a scheduled visit to Egypt 
in 2005 in protest at the arrest of Ayman Nour – a leading liberal, democratic politician 
and Mubarak’s closest challenger in the 2005 presidential elections. In doing so, Rice 
appeared to send a clear message that the Bush administration was serious about its 
rhetoric on democratization in the Arab world. Earlier, and on the day of Nour's guilty 
verdict and sentencing, the White House Press Secretary, Scott McClellan (2003 – 
2006) released the following strong statement denouncing Mubarak's action:  
The United States is deeply troubled by the conviction today of 
Egyptian politician Ayman Nour by an Egyptian court. The 
conviction of Mr. Nour, the runner-up in Egypt's 2005 
presidential elections, calls into question Egypt's commitment to 
democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. We are also disturbed 
by reports that Mr. Nour's health has seriously declined due to 
the hunger strike on which he has embarked in protest of the 
conditions of his trial and detention. The United States calls 
upon the Egyptian government to act under the laws of Egypt in 
the spirit of its professed desire for increased political openness 
and dialogue within Egyptian society, and out of humanitarian 
concern, to release Mr. Nour from detention (Bush 2005e). 
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In February 2006, Rice visited Mubarak yet never spoke Nour's name publicly. When 
asked about him at a news conference, she referred to his situation as one of Egypt's 
setbacks. Days later, Mubarak told a government newspaper that Rice "didn't bring up 
difficult issues or ask to change anything." From prison, Nour stated "I pay the price 
when [Rice] speaks [of me], and I pay the price when she doesn't," Nour said. "But 
what's happening to me now is a message to everybody" (cited in Spolar 2006). When 
Rice returned to Egypt a year later in 2007, she reportedly made no public mention of 
Egypt’s regression on democracy and reform. Rice instead described Egypt’s 
authoritarian regime as part of “an important strategic relationship, one that we value 
greatly” (cited in Shadid 2007). 
The second event relates again to Egypt and the unprecedented, revolutionary and 
momentous events that followed the protests in Cairo on 25th January 2011. 
Commentators argue that U.S. ambivalence in the face of genuine and popular demands 
for democracy in Egypt lend support to the allegation that the pattern in recent years has 
been to rhetorically celebrate popular emancipation while operationally defending 
political continuity. It is well documented that initially, the U.S. government did not 
think Mubarak’s hold on power was threatened. “Our assessment,” remarked Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton on January 25, 2011 “is that the Egyptian government is stable 
and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian 
people”117. On Sunday morning talk shows, Mrs. Clinton ignored Mubarak’s main 
political opponent, Mohamed El Baradei’s proposal for a transitional council and said 
the administration supported an “orderly transition”, which became the U.S.’s 
                                                          
117 Brownlee, Jason (2011), “The Transnational Challenge to Arab Freedom”, Current History, 
A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, Vol. 110, No. 739: 317 – 323;  
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watchword for the remainder of the uprising118. Even when a change of regime appeared 
suddenly within reach in Egypt, the U.S’s diplomatic machine was uncharacteristically 
quiet, with White House officials calling for less haste and warning instead, that 
democracy must be balanced with security in the region. Indeed, President Barack 
Obama seemingly defended Mubarak by saying: I believe that President Mubarak cares 
about his country ......He is proud, but he is also a patriot119. In light of the U.S.’s initial 
‘soft’ response to Egypt’s fight for freedom, many Arabs felt that America was willing 
to betray its self-professed democratic principles for fear of its impact on U.S. interests 
in the region.  
Turning to the third factor, two events are usually cited by Arab commentators and 
critics of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world to underscore the point of the U.S.’s 
perceived unwillingness to accept democratic outcomes in the region.  
Firstly, the U.S.’s vacillating credibility as a promoter of democratic reform in the Arab 
world was reinforced by what took place in Algeria in 1991. As mentioned earlier (see 
page 74), the George H.W. Bush administration responded mildly to the Algerian 
military’s undemocratic intervention in seminal multi-party elections in which the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win. The Islamist threat perceived in 
Algeria, along with continuing concerns about the Islamic Republic of Iran, underlined 
America’s conservatism when it comes to indigenous regime change in the Middle East.  
The second event took place in early 2006 when Hamas won the elections for the 
Legislative Council in the Palestinian occupied territories. Hamas’s electoral victory 
                                                          
118 Ibid;  
119 “Egypt: Demonstrations and political pressure, but Hosni Mubarak clings on”, The 
Guardian, Saturday, 5th February 2011 – accessed via 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/Feb/05 - on 11/11/13;  
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was historic and significant as 78 percent of the electorate cast their vote. As a self-
professed champion of democracy and the most vocal advocate for political expression 
and participation in the Middle East, the U.S. might have reasonably been expected to 
acknowledge Hamas’s electoral triumph as a victory for its ‘freedom agenda’ policy. 
The U.S. instead denounced the significance of Hamas’s victory and withheld its 
recognition of the newly elected authority under the pretext that the U.S. administration 
considers Hamas to be a terrorist organisation (Kazziha 2008). Regarding the U.S.’s 
refusal to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government, Kenneth Roth, Head 
of Human Rights Watch, told The Financial Times that:  
They (U.S. officials) are all for democracy as long as they like 
the results (cited in Dinmore 2007).  
Roth believes that America’s mission to promote democracy has become equated with 
“regime change” and has lost credibility in the Muslim world. “It’s [the U.S.’s] push for 
democracy is over now,” he said (cited in Dinmore 2007).   
In the aftermath of the U.S. decision to cut off funding to the Palestinian government 
after Hamas was elected, the Arab press became increasingly vocal in pointing out U.S. 
“double standards” in its promotion of democracy. An editorial in the English – 
language Syria Times said: 
Bush and his neo-conservative aides are still determined to fight 
the whole world using false mottos and hypocrisy. In practice, 
they are standing far away from the principles of freedom, 
independence and democracy120. 
Writing in the state-owned Syrian newspaper, Tishrin, Izz al-Din al-Darwish accused 
the United States of meddling in Palestinian politics to ensure Fatah’s victory despite 
voters’ support for Hamas. His opinion piece read:  
                                                          
120 Syrian Press Highlights (29th January 2007) BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 
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In the Palestinian territories, this administration wants to stop 
the interaction between the leaders and the grassroots, besiege 
the resistance, and drive a wedge between the elected 
government and the people, in harmony with Israeli 
occupational plans. The result was this fighting between the 
brothers121.  
Abdel-Bari Atwan, the Palestinian editor of the London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi also 
pointed to the fact that in Lebanon, the then beleaguered U.S. backed government of the 
former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, which took power in 2005 was resisting an 
opposition drive by Hezbollah, to hold new parliamentary elections. The U.S.’s 
accusation of Hezbollah as attempting a “coup” against a democratically elected 
government prompted Abdel – Bari Atwan to write:  
The U.S. opposes the toppling of the elected Siniora government 
in Lebanon, but is in favour of toppling Hamas’s government 
which is also an elected one, and more dangerously, is even 
starving over four million Palestinians to punish them for 
electing it. What kind of hypocrisy is that? (cited in Blandford 
2006:1).  
Also, writing in The Washington Post, Salameh Nematt, a Jordanian analyst and former 
Washington bureau chief for the Arabic –language newspaper, pointed out that:  
It’s a success story for al-Qaeda, a success story for autocratic 
Arab regimes that made democracy look ugly in their people’s 
eyes. They can say to their people: “Look at the democracy that 
the Americans want to bring to you. Democracy is trouble. You 
may as well forget about what the Americans promise you. They 
promise you death (cited in Shadid 2007:1). 
The final issue which relates to the U.S.’s conflation of democracy with the 2003 Iraq 
war was played out in the Arab world as a costly example of America’s neo-colonialist 
tendencies. Most commentators saw the case for “creating democracy” as a retroactive 
                                                          
121 Syrian Press Highlights (2007, January 29) BBC Worldwide Monitoring.  
268 | P a g e  
 
rationale for invading Iraq only after WMDs in that country did not materialize 
(Esposito & Mogahed 2007:59).  
There was also an impression that the United States was orchestrating an “acceptable” 
American version of democracy in Iraq with its own hand-picked “George 
Washington”, Ahmed Chalabi, as it aimed to transfer power quickly to the exiles it had 
collaborated with before the invasion to steer Iraq in the direction it had mapped out 
(Esposito & Mogahed 2007:59).   
Predictably, the invasion of Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition in 2003 did not succeed in 
reversing the U.S.’s lack of credibility as a pro-democratic actor in the Arab world. 
 
Why Do They Hate Us? 
 
The question ‘Why Do They Hate Us?’ was posed by many Americans including 
George W. Bush in the aftermath of the events of 9/11.  Indeed, Bush’s “War on 
Terror” was premised on the foregoing question. Whilst American political 
commentators and analysts speculated widely on the sources of apparent Arab 
resentment towards the United States122, Bush strongly affirmed that the most obvious 
answer to this question was that Muslim radicals “.......hate our freedoms – our freedom 
of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with 
each other” (Bush 2001). Translated within Muslim societies, Bush’s explanation read 
                                                          
122 American and other political commentators have speculated widely on the sources of 
apparent Arab resentment toward the U.S. The question “Why Do They Hate Us?” is now the 
subject of journalistic and scholarly interest. For instance see: Zakaria, Fareed (2001) The 
Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us? Newsweek, 15 October; Kristof, Nicholas (2002) Why 
Do They Hate Us? The New York Times, January 15; Sardar, Ziauddin, and Merryl Wyn Davies 
(2002) Why Do People Hate America? New York: Disinformation; Brumberg, Daniel (2002) 
Arab Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy: A Complex Encounter, testimony prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Government Reform of the Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House 
of Representatives, 08 October; Stokes, B. and McIntosh, M. (2002) How They See Us, 
National Journal, December 21, pp.3720 – 6.   
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that Muslims do not believe in ‘freedom and democracy’ and do not strive to uphold 
Western values and ideals. Tellingly, Bush’s affirmation appeared less convincing when 
a report published in 2005 by the non-partisan Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) cited amongst a host of other factors, unpopular U.S. foreign policy decisions, 
such as the U.S.- led invasion of Iraq, as a major root cause of ‘anti-Americanism’ in the 
Arab world (GAO 2005). The GAO’s 2005 report was based upon foreign public 
opinion polling data collected by organisations such as the Pew Research Center and 
Zogby International. The polling evidence advanced by these organisations also 
demonstrated that the United States has a chronic and widespread image problem in the 
Arab world. Pew Global Attitudes surveys of 50 nations in 2002 and 2003 found that 
the United States was less popular in the Middle East than in any other part of the 
world. Two years later, a Pew Survey conducted in 2005 found that whilst America’s 
favourability rating had increased slightly, there was still considerable antipathy toward 
the United States in Arab and Muslim countries (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005).  
In his testimony before the U.S. House International Relations Committee in 2005, 
Andrew Kohut, Pew Research Center President stated that opposition to American 
policies and leadership is spreading and deepening around the world and that it 
threatens the national interests of the United States. According to Kohut, record levels 
of ‘anti-Americanism’ could be becoming entrenched (Kohut 2005).  
A further Gallup Poll which surveyed half a million Muslims in 2007 in more than 
thirty-five Islamic states also produced evidence contrary to Bush’s presidential 
rhetoric. Posing questions such as, “Why is there so much ‘anti-Americanism’ in the 
Muslim world123, the Gallup Poll data revealed that though only seven per cent of 
                                                          
123 Gallup posed other pertinent questions that are on the minds of millions such as “Is Islam to 
blame for terrorism?”; “Who are the extremists? Where are the moderates?”; “What do Muslim 
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Muslims condoned the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the broader Arab Public generally 
viewed the U.S. as rapacious and seeking to colonize the Middle East region124. In the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Gary L. Ackerman, then Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs also disagreed 
with Bush’s presidential rhetoric when he stated at a Joint Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the important issue of Arab opinion about the U.S. that: 
 
Our real problem in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world is 
not, as the President has suggested, that people hate us because 
of our freedoms; it is that they do not trust us to work for and 
support theirs. Arabs and the broader Muslim world have 
simply listened to our language for too long and then watched 
us as we repeatedly failed to deliver on the rhetoric. It is 
fairness and justice that they are after, and they do not believe 
that they will receive it from us (Ackerman 2007).  
 
The negative polling data on Muslim opinions of the U.S., and Ackerman’s comments, 
were later endorsed by a U.S. congressional report published in June 2008 and entitled 
“The Decline in America’s Reputation: Why?125 The congressional report pointed out 
that despite an initial show of world-wide sympathy for the United States in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
women really want?” – Cited in John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed (2007) Who Speaks for 
Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think, (New York: Gallup Press).  
124 The Gallup Poll results are cited in Esposito & Mogahed (2007) Who Speaks for Islam? 
What a Billion Muslims Really Think, (New York: Gallup Press). Based on a massive multi-year 
research study, the largest and most in-depth study of its kind, this book introduced data-driven 
evidence and analytical points of view of more than ninety percent of the global Muslim 
community. Between 2001 and 2007, Gallup conducted tens of thousands of hour-long, face-to-
face interviews with residents of more than 35 nations that are predominantly Muslim or have 
significant Muslim populations (approximately 1.3 billion Muslims).  
125 The Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight – part of 
the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs – issued the report on 11th June 2008 after ten 
hearings on the decline of US image. The data presented at these hearings made it clear that 
people in other nations do not hate America because of its values but rather they were 
disappointed with the U.S. because it does not act in a manner consistent with the values it seeks 
to promote and advance.  
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immediate aftermath of 9/11, the U.S.’s Middle East policies and its “perceived war on 
Islam”- Bush’s so-called “war on terror”- contributed to America’s unfavourable image 
in many Islamic countries.  
Bush’s concern about the U.S.’s unpopularity in the Arab world and beyond prompted 
him in September 2005 to appoint Karen Hughes - a former Texan local TV presenter, 
and Bush’s long-time communications adviser during his spell as Governor of Texas - 
as first Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. The appointment of Hughes who 
had very little experience of working in the Middle East did seem symptomatic of 
policy dysfunction. Notwithstanding, and on the back heel of the GAO’s 2005 
unfavourable report, Hughes was despatched by the U.S. State Department as special 
envoy and tasked to promote America’s values and confront ideological support for 
terrorism around the world. However, despite the fanfare and hope that accompanied 
her mission, Hughes’s endeavour was far from successful as she struck many Arab 
intellectuals and commentators as naive when she commented following her return to 
the U.S. as to how surprised she had been to find out that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
is considered so important in the Arab world126. Hughes also came face-to-face with 
Muslim anger over the U.S. - led invasion of Iraq. Generally, from the point of view of 
many Arab commentators, Hughes’s trip to the region was pointless for a number of 
reasons.  
First, the Arab media regarded U.S. policy in the Arab world with disdain. The Gulf 
News, an independent English language newspaper based in Dubai, was very vocal 
about the contempt for U.S. Middle East policy and it posed this question on 28th 
September 2005 during the period of Hughes’s visit to the Middle East:  
                                                          
126 ABC news headlined “Bush Loyalist Karen Hughes Resigns”. Available from: 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2007 - (accessed on 03/08/2013).  
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So why is Hughes on her visit? Anyone who has even a limited 
understanding of events in the Middle East can spell out loud 
and clear exactly what aggrieves people in the Middle East with 
regard to the U.S. It is their policy. Therefore, if the avowed 
intent prior to Hughes visit is for “no change, steady as we go” 
then it is best for Hughes to return home127 . 
Along similar lines, the journalist Salamah A. Salameh also wrote in the Cairo based 
newspaper, Al-Ahram, on 3rd October 2005 that:  
Karen Hughes, the U.S. envoy to the Middle East and Muslim 
countries, clearly hopes to patch up the U.S. image. Her 
instructions are to promote U.S. policy as one might any new 
consumer durable. She hopes to overcome the hostility that 
Muslim and Arab nations feel toward U.S. policy — a hostility 
that is on a par with that felt by the United States toward Osama 
bin Laden. What the United States should be doing is changing 
policy, not dressing it up to look better. We notice the 
harassment that millions of Muslim Americans had to deal with. 
We notice the indefinite detention of hundreds of suspects in 
Guantanamo. We notice the horrors committed in Abu Ghraib. 
We notice things that no one — not even Hughes — can 
justify.128 
The anger directed by the Arab media towards Hughes Middle East visit was also based 
on the whole issue surrounding the U.S.’s attempt to implant its own brand of 
democracy in the Arab world. The Jidda-based Saudi Gazette, a business English 
language newspaper, featured an opinion piece on 1st October 2005 which read as 
follows:  
[In her] recent visit to Saudi Arabia … Hughes appears to have 
predicated her presentation on the assumption that everyone in 
the world wants to live as Americans do and was clearly 
bemused to find not everyone present agreed with her … Saudis, 
                                                          
127 Viewpoints, “Karen Hughes: Selling Bush to the World”, Comment and analysis from Dubai, 
Jerusalem, Jidda, and Cairo posted on 8th October 2005. Available from:  
http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2159.cfm (accessed on 03/08/2013).  
128 Ibid;   
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in common with other Muslims, want to enjoy the technological 
benefits of the modern age while retaining their religious and 
cultural identity. They want progress without the associated 
social ills that bedevil so many economically developed 
countries. It doesn’t seem an unreasonable point of view … 
Islamic values may not accord with the prevailing attitudes in 
places such the United States but then why should they?129 .  
Overall, the Arab media critique surrounding Hughes ‘purposeful’ visit negated the 
U.S.’s attempts to ‘clean up’ its image in the Arab world. The virulent anti-American 
ideology that ‘took hold’ of Arab societies led American policy makers to suspect with 
good reason that their efforts to promote democratic reform in the Arab world generally 
is limited in its effectiveness, simply because it is ‘they’ who are the proponents of 
democratic change. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, America’s public 
diplomacy problems in the Middle East, in particular its credibility, impacts adversely 
upon even positive messages and initiatives, such as the effort to promote reform, 
freedom, democracy, and opportunity in the region (9/11 Commission Report 2001:37). 
The hostility toward U.S. efforts aimed at promoting democracy is expressed in the 
behaviour of governments, in the actions of individual political, religious, and 
community leaders, and in the attitudes of the ordinary citizens of these countries. 
Bearing this in mind, Amaney A. Jamal makes the point that the most immediate 
mechanism of facilitating the path to democracy in the Arab world is to reduce anti-
American sentiment across the region. She points out that whilst U.S. policy makers 
often argue that there is little room for winning the hearts and minds of ordinary Arab 
citizens, the substantial variation in evaluations of the United States within and across 
the Arab world tells us a different story (Jamal 2012: 243). For this reason, Jamal argues 
that the United States can no longer afford to talk about democracy while turning a 
blind eye to democratic and human rights abuses. According to Jamal, it is not sufficient 
                                                          
129 ibid  
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to withdraw from Iraq without a firm commitment to Iraqis that they will not become 
yet another Arab country with an authoritarian leader who is friendly toward the United 
States. (Jamal 2012: 243). Given the conditions of U.S. presence in the Arab world, 
Jamal argues that the road to democracy must address and mitigate the root causes of 
anti-Americanism. (Jamal 2012: 244).  
Notwithstanding Jamal’s views, a small number of Arab commentators 
argued that U.S. initiatives aimed at promoting democratic change should 
not be rejected simply because they have been proposed by the United 
States. Amongst the few dissenting voices that were willing to go beyond 
the anti-American diatribe is the former editor-in-chief of the London-based 
daily Al-Hayat, Jihad Al-Khazen. Al-Khazen argues that: “The American 
proposals for reform are not bad unless you take into account the intentions 
of the Bush Administration”. He states further that:  “They should not be 
rejected only because they were proposed by the U.S”130. Along similar 
lines, the dissident Syrian Christian writer Akram al-Bunni argued 
passionately in defense of the America’s pro-democratic endeavour when he 
wrote: 
Why do we fault democracy, and its advocates, if the United 
States finds it in its interest to support the democratic struggle? 
Is it not utterly unfair to associate every call for liberty and 
pluralism with the United States and its policies; and to accuse 
those who campaign [for democracy and human rights] of 
loyalty to the foreigner and of sowing discord and undermining 
national unity? (Al-Bunni 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007:413).  
                                                          
130 Cited in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) – “Positive Reactions in the Arab 
Media to the Greater Middle East Initiative” - accessed via www.memri.org./report/en - on 
12/12/2012;  
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Another Arab commentator, Salah Eddin Hafez, a veteran columnist in the prestigious 
Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, was more blatant in his attack on intellectuals who 
oppose democratic change simply because it has become part of the U.S. Middle East 
agenda. Writing in Al-Ahram, Hafez succinctly asked “Is it enough to reject their 
democracy?” (cited in Ottaway 2003:13). 
It does seem reasonable to assume that the above mentioned dissenters favoured U.S. 
democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world if meaningful and well-intentioned. 
Certainly, in view of the fact that the prospects for Arab democracy or democratic 
reform are slim at best if left entirely in the hands of the ruling Arab elites, the call for 
U.S. democracy promotion efforts to be embraced was supposedly borne out of the fear 
that Arab regimes could not be trusted to develop and advance the democratic 
aspirations of their own populations. Indeed, Arab elites have been accused of adopting 
and mastering sophisticated techniques of authoritarian rule to dampen domestic 
demands for reform. These techniques, as Augustus Richard Norton points out, included 
a combination of limited political reforms, middle class co-optation, patronage, 
surveillance, and coercion (Norton 2012:14). Accordingly, from the point of view of the 
dissenters, the U.S. ought to be given the benefit of doubt to advance democracy’s 
cause.  
That aside, and notwithstanding the support for U.S. democracy promotion efforts, Arab 
commentators who challenged the collective wisdom regarding the ‘ill-intentions’ of the 
Bush Administration, and the inappropriateness of its proposed reforms for democratic 
change in the region, are perceived to be in the minority as revealed by public opinion 
polls measuring anti-American attitudes in the Arab world. These polls admittedly did 
not capture nuances of viewpoint, nor did they measure the intensity of individuals’ 
anti-American attitudes or their propensity to act upon those views. However, despite 
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their shortcomings, these polls did usefully document the fact that there had been a 
marked rise in anti-American attitudes in Iraq and Lebanon in the aftermath of the 9/11 
suicide attacks and the 2003 Iraq war. One of the best sources of foreign public opinion 
data on Iraqi and Lebanese attitudes towards America comes from the Pew Global 
Attitudes Surveys. The extensive research carried out by the Pew Research Centre 
featuring Iraq and Lebanon, amongst other countries, demonstrates a pronounced rise in 
unfavourable opinions of the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. 
Coupled with, and linked to the resentment towards the U.S., is the sobering reality that 
substantial majorities in Iraq and Lebanon question the U.S.’s credentials as a bona fide 
pro-democratic actor. According to David M. DeBartolo, this widespread distrust is a 
legacy of the U.S.’s historic support for Arab autocrats, its conflation of democracy 
promotion with the Iraq war, and the perceived unwillingness of the West to accept 
democratic outcomes (DeBartolo 2008).  
Against the above regional background, the U.S.’s stated goal to oversee the emergence 
of stable and democratic regimes in Iraq and Lebanon faced enormous challenges with 
the rise of anti-American attitudes being touted as the main cause. The U.S. strategy to 
promote democracy did not meet with a particularly warm response in either Iraq or 
Lebanon in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. From the outset, the distrust of 
U.S. intentions in the immediate aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq triggered 
domestic resistance in Iraq to American attempts to create stability, restore order and 
unify disparate factions in that country. For instance, during a demonstration in April 
2003, the radical preacher, Ahmed al-Kubaisi, encouraged Iraqis to take to the streets of 
Baghdad in thousands to demand the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. The 
demonstrators put up posters which read “Leave our country, we want peace” and 
chanted “America is God’s enemy”, “No to America, we want an Islamic State” (Blair 
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2003). In his sermon to the Iraqi protesters, Al-Kubaisi also accused the U.S. of 
invading Iraq to pacify Israel. Also, speaking to Nir Rosen of the Asia Times in October 
2003, Sheikh Mudhafar al-Ani, Imam of a mosque in al-Qaim, Anbar province stated 
that: 
We reject this occupation.......No country would accept an 
occupation. We have lost our dignity. Until now we have not 
seen anything.......except killing, searches and curfews. There is 
a reaction for every action. If you are choking me, I will also 
choke you. We have a resistance just like the Palestinians, 
Chechens and Afghans (cited in Allawi 2007: 163).  
The scene in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. – led invasion is best described 
by Ali Allawi as follows: 
Within a few weeks of the invasion and occupation, the reflex 
action of Iraqis, honed over generations of dealing with tyrants 
and occupiers, began to kick in. Americans began to experience 
the ambivalence of the Iraqis in their different guises; the 
impenetrability of what they truly thought; the bursts of 
spontaneous violence; the delight in getting the better of the 
occupier ....This was hardly the vision of the neo-conservatives, 
or of the starry-eyed dreamers who wanted to ‘bring democracy 
to the Arabs’, or of the quick-in-quick-out champions of ‘shock 
and awe’. (Allawi 2007: 11 – 12) 
Suffice to say, Iraqis distrust of U.S. intentions presented U.S. democracy promoters 
with difficulties which they found difficult to overcome. Against this background, the 
ensuing discussion will focus on the factors responsible for the apparent resentment 
towards the United States in Iraq and Lebanon.  
The factors responsible for the resentment towards the U.S. in Iraq 
Firstly, the negative image of America permeating Iraqi society is the product of the 
history of U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq. Iraqi ‘anti-Americanism’ evolved from the 
rejection of Western colonialism and imperialism which initially targeted Britain as the 
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Mandatory power (Faath 2006:124). For example, after the 1958 Revolution, Iraq 
demonstratively withdrew from the Baghdad Pact which had been initiated by the 
United States and founded in 1955 in its capital in response to the perceived Soviet 
threat to the region. The perceived inconsistency of U.S. foreign policy in particular, 
towards Iraq and Israel contributed to the intensification of Iraqis animosity toward the 
U.S. The perception amongst Iraqis that a double standard existed in the U.S.’s 
application of international law and justice toward their country created a negative 
image of the U.S. in Iraq. The fact that Israel continues to occupy Palestinian land 
whilst Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 was condemned and reversed militarily was 
seen as a graphic demonstration of this double standard. Similarly, the post-War Iraqi 
regime was put under U.S. – directed sanctions, whereas Israel has routinely been 
sheltered from United Nations Security Council action by the exercise of the U.S. veto 
(Furia & Lucas 2006:596).    
Secondly, the persistent U.S. efforts following the annexation of Kuwait on 2nd August 
1990, to force Iraq to reverse its act of military aggression and to disarm Saddam’s 
regime permanently fuelled a new wave of anti-Americanism (Faath 2006:117). At the 
centre of the resentment was the sanctions regime, which the Americans persuaded the 
United Nations Security Council to impose on Iraq after Saddam’s attack on Kuwait, 
and to maintain after the war was over. The UN imposed sanctions were established by 
Resolution 687 on 3rd April 1991 and their stated purpose was to force Saddam to 
comply with UN demands which required him to dismantle his weapons of mass 
destruction. However, the effect of the sanctions was to push millions of Iraqis into 
poverty and ruin the country’s basic services. The sanctions hit Iraq very hard, resulting 
in the material impoverishment of the majority of the population. Faath states that the 
Iraqi population ‘fell’ victim to the embargo and its grave effects which took the form 
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of malnutrition and epidemic illnesses resulting from lack of medical facilities and clean 
water (Faath 2006:118). The people of Iraq closely associated the sanctions regime with 
the United States (Faath 2006:118).The suffering experienced by Iraqis fed a growing 
outrage combined with a sense of despair. Given the helplessness and hopelessness of 
their particular circumstances, and their inability to tackle the crisis, Iraqis channelled 
their anger through the ‘vent’ they found in ‘anti-Americanism’. Jamal makes the point 
that the Clinton administration’s devastating sanctions on Iraq resulted in the suffering 
of ordinary citizens and that with children being denied basic medicines like antibiotics, 
the sources of anti-Americanism continued to grow in Iraq (Jamal 2012: 242).  
In addition to sanctions, the U.S. launched sporadic air attacks, with the heaviest strikes 
hitting Iraq in December 1998 as part of Operation “Desert Fox”. These attacks 
repeatedly claimed civilian lives leading many Iraqis to blame the U.S. for their misery. 
The hardship they experienced as a result of the economic sanctions and the subsequent 
loss of innocent civilian lives emerged as a main root cause of anti-Americanism in Iraq 
(Faath 2006:118). As we shall examine later, this sense of loss, particularly of civilian 
lives, was to be experienced again during the period of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003.   
Thirdly, Saddam Hussein was also instrumental in fanning the flames of the rampant 
Iraqi anti-Americanism that was rapidly mounting in his country after 1991. He skilfully 
employed propaganda against the United States which acquired a negative connotation 
by association with the most manipulative and jingoistic examples of U.S. attitudes and 
behaviour towards Iraq. According to Rowswell and Crocker, years of Saddam 
Hussein’s propaganda left an indelible mark on the perceptions of Iraqis (Rowswell & 
Crocker 2004:2). Saddam’s propaganda machine underscored the image of a starving 
and ailing nation and it served to stir public sentiment against the United States. 
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Negative propaganda was dispersed in a wide variety of media in order to create the 
desired result in Iraqi attitudes. Under Saddam’s reign, the only broadcasts Iraqis were 
allowed to hear told them that the United States was bent on world domination and on 
the theft of Iraq’s oil resources. These criticisms of the United States received 
unsolicited support in the form of broadcasts into Iraq by non-Baathist news channels 
such as al-Jazira and al-Arabiya (Rowswell & Crocker 2004:2). The fact that these 
news channels were not Baathist organs but rather owned by Saddam’s foes, namely the 
Qataris and Saudis respectively, inadvertently added credibility to the propaganda that 
Saddam aimed to perpetrate against the U.S. The propaganda achieved its goals among 
the Sunni Arab elite who were the main losers under the sanctions regime. The Sunni 
Arab elite held the U.S. responsible for the systematic degradation of their material, 
often even physical and mental well-being. They accused the U.S. of orchestrating the 
destruction of Iraq. Anti-Americanism was also rampant amongst the Kurdish and 
Shiite populations with the Shiites arguing that the sanctions regime did not affect 
Saddam’s regime but specifically them, as they were the weakest and most victimised 
group under Saddam’s rule. Amongst the Kurds, numerous broken promises by the U.S. 
administration in the past regarding Kurdish ambitions for gaining independence and/or 
autonomy created a sense of political scepticism toward the U.S. As examined later in 
this chapter, these ethnic public opinions became varied following the US-led 
occupation of Iraq and the insurgency that accompanied it.  
Anti-American agitation in Iraq was also spurred on by Osama bin Laden following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. Bin Laden’s statements led to a sustained increase in anti-
Americanism in Iraq. His propaganda message was designed to persuade Iraqis to think 
and behave in a certain manner aimed at casting the United States as the villain acting 
against the interests of the Iraqi people. He thrust the sanctions regime and the U.S. 
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military presence in the Islamic region (in places like Afghanistan) into the spotlight of 
anti-American agitation also stressing the fact that Israel enjoyed America’s security 
guarantee (Faath 2006:122). In a TV interview, responding to the beginning of U.S. air 
attacks against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, Bin Laden held the U.S. responsible for 
the suffering of the Iraqi people. Such statements were made against the backdrop of the 
fatwa he issued earlier in 1998 when referring to the sanctions regime, he condemned 
the “on-going aggression against the Iraqi people” (Faath 2006:122). Faath points out 
that, consciously or unconsciously, Saddam’s regime absorbed Bin Laden’s propaganda 
(Faath 2006:122). The day after the terrorist attacks on the United States, Saddam 
addressed the Iraqi people proclaiming - in reference to the terrorist strikes – that the 
U.S. was reaping the harvest it had sown (Faath 2006:122). The centrally controlled 
Iraqi media immediately picked up on this accusation. The next day, Saddam Hussein’s 
son, Udai, sided with the finger – pointing saying in his newspaper Babil, that U.S. 
foreign policy and not the ‘terror’ was the core of the problem (Faath 2006:122). Such 
positions and statements graphically illustrated the deep-seated anti-Americanism 
among the Baath leadership131.  
The fourth factor responsible for the resentment towards the U.S. in Iraq is the Arab – 
Israeli conflict. Because a majority of Iraqis show a strong feeling of belonging to the 
Arab and Islamic world, they share the staunch opinion held in the entire region that the 
United States is giving preferential support to Israel in the Middle East conflict. In 
addition, the widespread perception of the United States as a co-belligerent with Israel 
in its war with the Palestinians further poisons opinions (Rowswell & Crocker 2004:2). 
                                                          
131It is important to note however, that when Saddam recognized that such statements were 
fuelling positions in parts of the U.S. administration aiming at a quick and violent toppling of 
his regime, he refrained from any actions and propaganda that could provoke and initiate U.S. 
military action against his leadership.  
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Needless to say, the Israeli – Palestinian conflict resonates with the public in Iraq, and 
many other parts of the Arab world.  
Next, the 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq fuelled resentment towards the U.S. in Iraq. 
Regarding the invasion of their country in 2003 and the U.S.’s conflation of democracy 
with the war, a bishop of the Syrian Orthodox church in Mosul emotionally summed up 
the Iraqi mood by critically explaining in the presence of government minders, that he 
did not want a war and that the Bush administration was bringing the law of the jungle 
to the world, even if its stated goal was to “liberate” Iraqis. “What are they going to 
liberate us from? Ourselves?” he asked, rhetorically. He added: “I can’t imagine 
someone foreign coming to rule us” (cited in Hammond 2007:103). Indeed, much of the 
rhetoric relating to the U.S.’s commitment to advance democracy sounded very familiar 
to Iraqis who recalled the 1920s when upon their arrival, the British promised the right 
to self-determination and liberation from Ottoman colonial and repressive rule132. When 
asked about American plans for their country, Iraqis display sensitivities about their 
colonial past. They evoke the Sykes-Picot agreement which carved up Arab lands and 
led to the death of early Arab nationalist dreams. Specifically, they point out that within 
a matter of years after their arrival in Iraq, the British shifted their policy from treating 
Iraqis as a liberated, not conquered people, to deciding that the most suitable option for 
governing Iraq was direct colonial rule. Understandably, the arrival and presence of 
Bremer’s CPA in the immediate aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war was perceived as a 
historical re-run by many Iraqis as it reflected the existing patterns of U.S. and Western 
interference in the regional politics of the Middle East region. These feelings later 
                                                          
132 General Sir Frederick S. Maude’s Proclamation to the people of Baghdad on March 11, 1917 
- cited in Fisk, R. (2003) The West Has Been Liberating the Middle East for Centuries: Will We 
Never Learn? The Independent March 7.  
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fuelled the basis for the insurgency that followed which brought Iraq to the brink of 
collapse. Some commentators argue that the Iraqi feelings of being occupied following 
the arrival of the CPA should have been foreseen by the United States. Allawi makes 
the point that: 
Iraq is one of the most invaded and violated territories in the 
history of the world, and over a long period of time the people 
who lived in the country had developed survival and 
accommodation skills that would confound the most determined 
of occupiers. None of this should have come as a surprise. There 
were enough pointers in Iraq’s recent past to show the likely 
response of Iraqis to the massive jolt of a physical occupation by 
foreign powers, and the effects that a violent upending of 
apparently stable relationships would have on the varied 
components of society (Allawi 2007: 12).  
Donald Rumsfeld states that the broader impression of an overbearing U.S. authority 
issuing edicts to the Iraqi people buttressed the anti-coalition arguments of militants like 
Muqtada al-Sadr and Abu Musab al- Zarqawi. According to Rumsfeld, this played well 
into the propaganda that the United States was trying to dominate and exploit Iraq rather 
than liberate it and return it promptly to Iraq control (Rumsfeld 2011:514).  Also, in 
September 2003, when the Gallup Organization asked residents of Baghdad why the 
U.S. and Great Britain decided to invade Iraq, 60% of them listed oil and other 
resources as the motivation. Only 4% believed that the invasion was prompted by 
concerns about weapons of mass destruction or indeed the promotion of democracy 
(Gallup 2003). Furthermore, a January 2006 World Opinion poll found that 80 percent 
of all Iraqis believe that the United States plans to maintain a permanent military 
presence in Iraq133. Bush administration officials had earlier refuted these allegations.  
                                                          
133 “Poll of Iraqis: Public Wants Timetable for U.S. Withdrawal but thinks U.S. Plans 
Permanent Bases in Iraq”, 31st January 2006 – accessed via 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/ - on 17/02/2013;  
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In his prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11th 
February 2003 on the post-war planning of Iraq, Douglas Feith stated: “But it is 
important to stress also that the United States would have a commitment to leave as 
soon as possible, for Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people. Iraq does not and will not belong 
to the United States, the coalition or to anyone else134.   
The War did also trigger a rethinking among the Iraqis who had become increasingly 
wearisome of the UN sanctions. Earlier, and as a first approximation, Iraqi public 
attitudes regarding the occupation could be understood in terms of the effect of the 
U.S.’s sanctions regime and broken promises by the United States in the past. In the 
immediate aftermath of the invasion, Iraqis hatred of Saddam Hussein and their 
rejection of the United States in particular, were balanced. Iraqi opinion regarding the 
occupation, and later the insurgency that accompanied it, varied significantly among the 
nation’s three major ethno-religious communities. The Western and Middle Eastern 
press covered the different expressions of the Iraqi people in response to the sudden fall 
of Baghdad. The Western press focused on the expressions of happiness and 
celebrations in the southern and northern parts of Iraq (the Kurdish and Shia areas). The 
dominant view among the Kurdish and Shia populations had been the satisfaction at 
seeing the removal of Saddam Hussein. The people were jubilant and they expressed 
their joy in many ways. Some of them shouted to the American soldiers ‘welcome Sir’, 
‘thank you’, ‘we are all on your side’, ‘Good, George Bush’ and ‘Down Saddam’135 . 
                                                          
134 Prepared Statement of Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense, Post –War Planning 
Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11th February 2003 – accessed via 
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Hearings - on 12/03/2014;  
135 See Andrew Buncombe, “No Regrets, just wild cacophony of cheers in a Shia slum” , the 
Independent, Thursday, 10th April 2003 (accessed via 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ - on 12/03/2014) and The International 
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Some Kurds even expressed their happiness through dancing and listening to music136. 
In the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, Carl Conetta observed that, 
By almost every measure, the Kurds stand apart as uniquely 
positive in their attitudes about the occupation and the post-war 
situation in Iraq. They strongly support the US troop presence 
and tend to have good relations with the coalition forces, who 
the vast majority of Kurds see as having behaved “well” or 
“very well” (Conetta 2005:15-16).  
Conetta points out that, by contrast, the Sunni Arab community exhibited the strongest 
oppositionist views, being least satisfied with post-war conditions, the foreign troop 
presence, and the behaviour of the U.S. forces (Conetta 2005:15-16). Amongst them 
there was strong opposition to the continuation of a substantial U.S. presence in Iraq in 
the aftermath of the invasion. This Sunni disapproval undermined any approval of the 
original ousting of the Baa’th regime. With regards to the Shiite community, Conetta 
observed that the Shiites represented a midway position between Sunni and Kurdish 
views but on other specific issues such as whether the war did more harm than good, the 
distribution of opinion in the Shiite community was much closer to that held by the 
Sunnis (Conetta 2005:15-16). In his memoir, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, 
Losing the Peace, Ali Allawi captured the various sentiments of Iraq’s major tribes 
during the immediate aftermath of the U.S. – led invasion in the following words: 
The first weeks after the fall of Baghdad had set the stage for the 
drama that had only just started. The mostly Shi’a population of 
the South had stubbornly refused to make the connection 
between the overthrow of a hated regime and the invasion and 
occupation of the country. The Sunni Arabs were alienated, 
sullen and resentful, and bided their time for an appropriate 
response. The Kurds were determined to maximise their gains 
                                                                                                                                                                          
New York Times, 10th April 2003 – The Fall of Baghdad (accessed via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/10/opinion/the-fall-of-Baghdad/ - on 12/03/2014);  
136 Reported in the Lebanese newspaper, al-Nahar, on 11th April 2003; 
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and to set themselves up as the Coalition’s indispensable allies 
(Allawi 2007:95).  
With particular reference to the Shi’a community, Allawi states that: 
The post-war era opened up the prospect for changing the 
political circumstances of the Shi’a of Iraq. They suddenly found 
that their nemesis had been removed .......The key shift in Shi’a 
thinking, however, was a move from the politics of 
‘victimisation’ to an insistence on their rights as a 
majority.......All these currents, most still in the formative stage, 
emerged into the light of day after the fall of the Ba’ath regime 
(Allawi 2007: 137).  
Overall and what is clear also, is that at no point did Iraqi support for Saddam’s removal 
from power translate into a fully fledged support for the U.S. presence in Iraq. Eric 
Herring and Glen Rangwala point out that many commentators have observed that there 
seemed to be a window of goodwill for the U.S. presence in Iraq that lasted only a few 
months (Herring & Rangwala 2006). Indeed, in his testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Peter W. Galbraith, a U.S. academic and former 
diplomat who advised the autonomous Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq in 
2003 predicted that in his judgment, the United States may have an especially short 
window of goodwill in Iraq. Galbraith stated:  
Any occupying power has a relatively short window before the 
goodwill generated by liberation is replaced by anger and 
frustration at the inevitable lack of progress in improving the 
quality of life for the people of the country (Galbraith 2003).  
According to Herring and Rangwala, the opinion poll evidence shows that there was a 
great deal of suspicion amongst Iraqi Arabs from the outset, and the mere fact, and the 
conduct, of the occupation rapidly turned the suspicion to hostility among most of them 
(Herring & Rangwala 2006). In the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. – led invasion, Iraqis 
generally harboured suspicions about the U.S.’s stated efforts to democratize their 
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country. Dr. Salam Saadi, an Iraqi communist and a prominent member of the 
Association of Iraqi Academics UK makes the point that these suspicions of U.S. 
motives obviously had historical links and were fuelled by incidents such as the U.N. 
resolution which empowered the U.S. as an occupying force in Iraq; the use of caucuses 
which reflected past-colonialist tendencies; and the siege of Fallujah by U.S. marines137. 
The incident that took place in Fallujah on 29th April 2003 is particularly notable 
because Fallujah is a Sunni City which had a population then of about 200,000 and 
which unlike most of Iraq, had benefited under Saddam’s regime and was part of the so-
called Sunni Triangle. Describing the incident that took place in Fallujah, the journalist 
and author, Aaron Glantz states that: 
U.S. troops opened fire in Fallujah and killed more than a dozen 
demonstrators who had gathered to celebrate Saddam’s 66th 
birthday and protest against the fact that the U.S. Army had 
taken over one of their schools and turned it into a military 
base. American troops said that the protesters shot first, but 
local community leaders denied this, and no American soldiers 
were hurt (Glantz 2006:20).  
Glantz points out that Sunni Muslims from the west of Iraq had formed the backbone of 
Saddam’s regime in Fallujah and had ruled over both Shiites and Kurds who together 
had made up three-quarters of the population. According to Glantz, if there was any 
place in Iraq where support for armed resistance might be found, it would be Fallujah 
(Glantz 2006:20).  
Iraqi public opinion was also polled repeatedly in the immediate aftermath of the U.S.-
led occupation of Iraq by a variety of firms. Their findings, as Carl Conetta points out, 
left no doubt about the main contours of Iraqi sentiment regarding the U.S.’s occupation 
                                                          
137 Saadi, S. (2013). Interview with on 3rd July 2013. Senate House, School of Advanced Study 
(London: University of London).   
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of their country (Conetta 2005). Indeed, as early as 2004 Gallup Organization asked 
Iraqis whether they primarily thought of coalition forces as liberators or occupiers. 
Seventy-one (71%) said occupiers (Kull 2008).  Also, in another poll in June 2004, ORI 
found 58 percent of Iraqis somewhat or strongly opposed the presence of coalition 
forces in Iraq. The ratio of those strongly opposed to those strongly supporting the 
Coalition presence had increased to 3-to-1 (ORI 2004). Confirming these results, the 
Iraq Centre for Research & Strategic Studies (ICRSS), established in 2003 by Saadoun 
al-Dulaimi, a British – educated Sunni Arab politician who served as a minister in 
successive Iraqi governments from 2005, found in a June 2004 poll that 66 percent of 
Iraqis strongly or somewhat opposed the presence of Coalition forces, while 30 percent 
supported it. The ratio of those strongly opposed to those strongly supporting the 
Coalition presence was greater than 6-to-1(ICRSS 2004). On balance, Iraqis opposed 
the U.S. presence in Iraq, and those who strongly opposed it greatly outnumbered those 
who strongly supported it (Conetta 2005). Moreover, U.S. troops were viewed broadly 
as an occupying force, not peacekeepers or liberators (Conetta 2005).  
It was not simply the military power of the United States that confronted Iraqis in the 
aftermath of the invasion of their country. American economic power was strongly felt 
and visible in the developing presence of U.S. firms throughout Iraq. Rowswell and 
Crocker point out that the vast investments of companies such as Bechtel and Kellogg 
and Brown & Root which were deployed to revitalize the Iraqi economy gave rise to 
concerns amongst Iraqis about foreign ownership of Iraqi assets (Rowswell & Crocker 
2004:3). These developments also created anxiety amongst Iraqis, and in turn, generated 
a degree of resentment toward the perceived source of that change. Speaking before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11th February 2003, Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, sought to appease Iraqi fears about the U.S. 
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presence in their country. Grossman stated that: “We will demonstrate to the Iraqi 
people and the world that the United States wants to liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq or 
control Iraqis or their economic resources” (cited in Allawi 2007: 96).  
Finally, the 2003 invasion brought with it economic strife and lawlessness which in turn 
activated the violence – prone elements within Iraqi society. Iraqis who applauded U.S. 
forces as they toppled a statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad marking the end 
of the Baath Party’s iron-fisted rule were left distraught as their nation shortly 
descended into vicious sectarian warfare in which tens of thousands died. Carl Conetta 
points out that the 2003 Iraq war – related fatalities caused tens of thousands of Iraqi 
families to bear a grudge against the Coalition, a resentment amplified by wider village, 
tribal, and friendship ties (Conetta 2005).  In an interview conducted by the 
International Crisis Group (IGC), a former Iraqi officer and tribal leader estimated that 
10 – 20 percent of the Iraqi military personnel killed in the war had strong tribal ties 
(IGC 2003). Overall, the fact is, many Iraqis blamed the U.S. occupation forces for 
eliciting insurgent violence, or for failing to prevent it, or both138. In the aftermath of the 
invasion, The New York Times quoted a worried Iraqi citizen, Hussein Abdul-Hussein, 
as saying ‘.........I also worry about the chaos that seems to be rising in Iraq, with the 
looting in Baghdad and the death yesterday of a prominent Shiite cleric in Najaf’139. 
Iraqi sentiments towards the U.S.’s handling of the post-war situation was summed up 
by the first interim president of Iraq, Ghazi al-Yawer, who stated that, 
                                                          
138 See Carroll, Jim (2005) Ordinary Iraqis bear brunt of war, Christian Science Monitor, 15 
April, p.6; Fairweather, Jack (2004) Iraqis blame US for bomb attacks on army recruits, News 
Telegraph, 2 December; Galloway, Joseph L. et al (2004), Blunders worsened America’s 
problems in Iraq, Knight Ridder, 18 October; and Fisher, Ian (2003) As Iraqis Become the 
Targets of Terrorists, Some Now Blame the American Mission, New York Times, 17 December.  
139 Reported in the New York Times on 11th April 2003 – http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/11/ - 
accessed on 13/02/2014;  
290 | P a g e  
 
We blame the United States 100 percent for the security in Iraq. 
They occupied the country, disbanded the security agencies and 
for 10 months left Iraq’s borders open for anyone to come in 
without a visa or even a passport (cited in Wong 2004).   
The final factor responsible for the resentment towards the U.S. in Iraq is the Abu 
Ghraib scandal. The reception of the prisoner abuse images from Abu Ghraib in 2004 
was surprisingly low-key in Iraq. Part of the reason was that rumours and tall stories, as 
well as true stories, about abuse, mass rape, and torture in the jails and in coalition 
custody were common currency. Indeed, compared to what Iraqis had been talking 
about, and suspected, the pictures appeared quite benign. It did seem that, the reported 
abuses at Abu Ghraib were somehow expected. Indeed, what most Iraqis were asking is: 
why were these abuses only reported now? Iraqis were always suspecting that there was 
some scheming going on, some agenda on the part of the United States in releasing the 
pictures when it did, and that the timing of it all was part of a carefully conceived plan 
(Said 2004). What followed these revelations was that, in an unprecedented damage-
limitation exercise, Bush went on Arab TV Alhurra - an Arab-language network funded 
by the U.S. government - and told Arab viewers that the treatment of prisoners by some 
members of the U.S. military in Iraq had been “abhorrent” and would be thoroughly 
investigated. Bush stated that Americans were appalled by the pictures and allegations. 
He promised that “justice will be delivered”. Furthermore, he urged Arabs to understand 
that what took place in Abu Ghraib did not represent the United States he knew. Bush 
assured Arab viewers that, the United States he knew is a compassionate country that 
believes in freedom and cares about every individual140. Despite Bush’s apologetic 
stance, CNN reporter Ben Wedeman reported that Iraqis reaction to his apology was 
"mixed": 
                                                          
140Available from: http://www-foxnews.com/story/2004/05/07/bush-apologizes-for-Iraqi-
Prisoner-Abuse (accessed on 13/12/13).   
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Some people react[ed] positively, saying that he's come out, he's 
dealing frankly and openly with the problem and that he has 
said that those involved in the abuse will be punished. On the 
other hand, there are many others who say it simply isn't 
enough, that they – many people noted that there was not a 
frank apology from the president for this incident. And, in fact, I 
have a Baghdad newspaper with me right now from – it's called 
'Dar-es-Salaam.' That's from the Islam Iraqi Islamic Party. It 
says that an apology is not enough for the torture of – yes, the 
torture of Iraqi prisoners141.  
Indeed, few Iraqis appeared convinced of Bush’s sincerity. Many did not believe that 
the perpetrators of the hideous crimes at Abu Ghraib would ever face jail or indeed be 
punished. For many Iraqis, the shocking revelations surrounding the Abu Ghraib abuses 
encouraged the negative image in their country of the United States as an arrogant neo-
colonial power whose human rights rhetoric was little more than a cover for wider 
geopolitical aims. The U.S.’s pro-democratic credentials suffered a serious blow as a 
result of these revelations.  
The factors responsible for the apparent resentment towards the U.S. in Lebanon 
Firstly, religious orientation is a significant predictor of attitudes toward the U.S. in 
Lebanon. Specifically, being a Muslim is consistently associated with unfavourable 
attitudes towards the U.S. in particular, and its policy in the region. Lebanese non-
Muslims, in particular the Christian population, have favourable opinions towards 
America partly because U.S. policies in Lebanon tend to favour them. Marc Lynch 
explains that Lebanon offers a clear case in which attitudes toward America are filtered 
through domestic politics and religious identity. According to Lynch, Lebanese 
Christians tend to have overwhelmingly positive views of America, while Lebanese 
Muslims – especially Shia – express profound distrust (Lynch 2007: 196-226). It is 
                                                          
141 Live At Daybreak, Transcript, CNN.com, 6th May 2004 – accessed via 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0405/06 - on 02/02/2014;  
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widely perceived that the U.S. supports Lebanon’s constitutional power-sharing 
arrangements because it fears that free and open elections could lead to the rise of an 
Islamic – controlled government hostile to Israel and the United States. Furthermore, 
U.S. policy makers suspect that free and open elections could open the door to 
Hezbollah to gain more power in central government, as Hamas did in Palestine. The 
present constitutional power-sharing arrangements do not account for the significant 
demographic shifts after 1943 and thus provide Christians with disproportionate power 
compared to Muslims, who are now the numerical majority. The distribution of seats in 
Lebanon’s Chamber of Deputies continues to be fixed according to the population 
figures for the 1932 census resulting in a degree of political and economic inequality.  
As a result of this inequality, many Muslims feel like second-class citizens in a state 
that many feel will always have a predominantly pro-Western and Christian orientation 
(Najem 2012: 32). The Shi’a feel like third-class citizens since their population has 
increased very significantly and they have no increased representation to show for it, 
while the Sunni community at least has control of the office of Prime Minister (Najem 
2012:32). Consequently, anti-American sentiments remain pervasive in Lebanon among 
the more politically disadvantaged Muslim populations while the Christians recognize 
their tenuous demographic position and seek to work with the U.S. to preserve their 
power within Lebanon.  
The second factor responsible for the resentment towards the U.S. in Lebanon has its 
origins in the 1958 U.S. military intervention in the country and the presence of U.S. 
troops in Lebanon during the period 1982 – 1984. William B. Quandt points out that the 
United States was widely seen as a power broker in selecting Lebanese presidents, as 
during the American military intervention of 1958 it foreclosed a second term of office 
for President Camille Chamoun and arranged the election of Army Commander General 
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Fuad Shehab as president (Quandt 1978:222-228). Most of the Lebanese factions and 
leaders already believed that the United States was deeply involved in Lebanon and that 
the United States was actively backing certain key ‘players’. Because the United States 
was perceived as the primary supplier of arms to Israel, many Lebanese and Palestinians 
in Lebanon counted the United States as an active player in Lebanon on the side of 
Israel. The belief that America was the tacit accomplice of Israel in Lebanon 
engendered hatred in Lebanese and Palestinian extremist circles. The United States was 
also widely believed to be supporting the Lebanese Christian militia (called the 
“Lebanese Forces (LF)”) which received assistance and equipment from Israel. In 
addition, the United States was perceived in the 1970s as having a close relationship 
with the intelligence arm of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and backing Lebanese 
President Elias Sarkis (Quandt 1978:222-228). 
Thus, despite the best of intentions or assertions in Washington, the United States was 
not viewed in Lebanon as a neutral actor in the Lebanese equation. These various 
perceptions of the United States’ role in Lebanon gave rise to violent expressions of 
anti-Americanism.  
Thirdly, although the United States has continually attempted to play a significant role 
in Lebanese affairs, in the light of its connection with Israel, U.S. relations with 
Lebanon have been particularly unstable. Because a significant number of Lebanon’s 
conflicts have in some way been related to Israel, many Lebanese hold Israel 
responsible for much of the devastation experienced in their country. The notable Israeli 
invasions of Lebanon referred to as “Operation Peace for Galilee” (1982), “Operation 
Accountability” (1993) and “Operation Grapes of Wrath” (1996) inflicted considerable 
damage to Lebanese property in Southern Lebanon and other parts of the country. The 
experience of dealing with Israel’s long occupation of Southern Lebanon (1982 – 2000) 
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is still deeply rooted in the national consciousness. The resistance against the Israeli 
occupation evokes hostile feelings toward the Jewish state’s staunchest ally, the United 
States. America’s patronage of the former occupying force has in turn unified anti-
Israeli and anti-American sentiments leading to a systemic rise in a shared hatred for 
both countries among large parts of the Lebanese population. Much of this anti-
American resentment was evident in the immediate aftermath of the July 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah war. Writing shortly after the cessation of hostilities, the journalist Leila 
Fadel points out that many Christians and Druze as well as Shia and Sunni Muslims, felt 
deserted by America as Israeli warplanes bombarded Lebanon for four weeks with 
American-made weapons which destroyed apartment blocks, bridges and roads (Fadel 
2006). Leila Fadel quotes the Greek Orthodox Lebanese politician and former Minister 
of the Environment, Yaacoub al-Sarraf, as saying “Bitter is an understatement about 
American politics in Lebanon. We’re not bitter about them sending bombs; we’re bitter 
about them covering up for murder” (cited in Fadel 2006). Another former Lebanese 
Minister of Trade and Economy, Sami Haddad, a Protestant Christian close to the anti-
Syrian (and pro-Western) March 14th Alliance was quoted as saying “The cost and toll 
in human suffering is enormous, and it’s undermined the capital that the U.S. has in 
Lebanon and other places, not to mention it’s undermining of pro-Western governments 
across the region” (cited in Fadel 2006).   
Graphic illustrations in the form of anti-American posters also became commonplace in 
shopping districts in Beirut in the immediate aftermath of the July 2006 war. Fadel 
describes these graphic images explicitly and she tells us that in one of these images, a 
large banner in central Beirut depicted the former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice staring intently, with piercing fangs of blood dripping from her lips. The message 
on the banner referred to the massacre of at least 28 civilians and many children in an 
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Israeli airstrike on 30th July 2006 on the southern Lebanese town of Qana. It read 
simply: “The massacre of children in Qana is a gift from Rice” (cited in Fadel 2006). In 
another poster, a man lifts a dead child covered in dust with a blue pacifier hanging 
from his shirt, an image from the July 30 Qana bombing. The poster read: “March 21st 
Mother’s Day, June 18th U.S. Father’s Day, July 30th Bush’s Children’s Day” (cited in 
Fadel 2006). Needless to say, the Israeli-U.S. alliance has undermined the United 
States’ agenda in Lebanon and it remains the cause of much popular anger and 
discontent among the Lebanese population. Misbah Ahdab, a Sunni Muslim politician 
who also belonged to the March 14th Alliance was quoted as saying, “You [U.S.] cannot 
see the Middle East only through the eyes of Israel. Either this [Israeli-Hezbollah 
conflict] is settled immediately and we hurry and work to rebuild, or it will be a mini-
Iraq and all the extremists will come to Lebanon to fight Israel” (cited in Fadel 2006).  
There is also the issue relating to the conflict with Syria for which many Lebanese 
blame the U.S. for failing to prevent Syria from establishing a coercive political 
structure in Lebanon in the aftermath of the civil war. Because of the Israeli-Syrian 
conflict and the delicate balance of regional security, the U.S. is accused of standing by 
for over a decade and watching Syria penetrate almost all civil, political, and security 
institutions and organisations in Lebanon. It was understood by many Lebanese that, as 
long as the Israeli-Syrian dispute remained unresolved, the U.S. would tread carefully 
and avoid policies that might alienate Syria and damage the prospects of an eventual 
settlement. It did appear that everyone, with the possible exception of the Lebanese 
themselves, seemed content to wait for a settlement of the Israeli-Syrian dispute before 
placing substantial pressure on Syria about its effective hegemony in Lebanon. Indeed, 
it is widely believed that it was only when the United States acknowledged its inability 
to elicit Syrian cooperation in Iraq and the occupied Palestinian territories that it 
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decided to depart from its policy of ignoring Syria’s continuing dominance of 
Lebanon’s political system and for the first time took significant diplomatic measures to 
express its displeasure with the situation in Lebanon. Most commentators argue that 
U.S. pressure on Syria was part of a more ambitious strategy to reshuffle the geopolitics 
of the Middle East and neutralize Israel’s Arab adversaries (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007).  
The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act introduced by the 
U.S. Congress on 12th April 2003 was part of this strategy. Similarly, on 3rd May 2003, 
then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented Bashar al-Asad with a long list of 
U.S. demands aimed at, among other things, loosening Syria’s grip on Lebanon (Nasif 
2004).This U.S. pressure on Syria climaxed with the promulgation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1559 on 2nd September 2004, which effectively called for 
Syria to withdraw from Lebanon or to face international sanctions. Pierre Maroun, a 
political analyst and the chairman of the American Lebanese Center for Cultural 
Research, sought to explain the obvious reasons why the U.S. could not use military 
force against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. According to Maroun, the objective of the 
Bush Administration was to free Lebanon’s democratic system from foreign influence. 
To do so, the U.S. had to use political pressure only. This was in part due to the fact that 
the Syrian presence in Lebanon was legally and politically covered by the U.S. as well 
as by the Arab League. Maroun explains when the war broke out in Lebanon in the 
1970s and the PLO controlled large parts of Lebanon, from which it launched its attacks 
against Israel, the U.S. secretly negotiated an agreement, known as “The Redline 
Agreement” between Israel and Syria, in which it regulated the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon. Maroun argues that the main aim of the agreement was to control the PLO’s 
activities. Furthermore, after the war broke out in April of 1975, The Arab League 
established the Arab Deterrent Forces, which were predominantly composed of Syrian 
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troops at the beginning and later on Syria became the only power on the ground after all 
other Arab nations withdrew their troops142.  
Whilst U.S. diplomatic pressure helped set the stage for the Cedar Revolution in 2005 
that ultimately led to Syria’s exit from Lebanon, many Lebanese recall that during the 
period in which International human rights watchdogs, such as Amnesty International, 
tried in vain to call attention to the perpetration of significant human rights abuses by 
the Syrian-backed Lebanese government against its political opponents, the U.S. 
strategically stepped aside and chose to ignore the plight of the Lebanese people. 
Consequently, the U.S.’s strategy then, and to date, is understandably viewed with open 
distrust by many Lebanese.      
The next factor is the Arab-Israeli conflict even though it is argued that amongst the 
Middle Eastern states, Lebanon was arguably the least moved by the liberation of 
Palestine as a political issue. This attitude is attributed to the involvement of 
Palestinians in the 15 – year Lebanese civil war and, more specifically, to negative 
perceptions of the repercussions of having hosted Palestinian refugees in Lebanon for 
over six decades143. Logically enough, and however, diminished sympathy for 
Palestinians by no means translates into favourable Lebanese evaluations of Israel 
(which occupied parts of Lebanon from 1978 until 2000) (Furia & Lucas 2006: 585-
605) or indeed the U.S.’s pro-democratic efforts.  
Writing in 2002, Talal Salman, a Lebanese journalist and the founder of the independent 
leftist newspaper, As Safir, argues that: 
                                                          
142 Maroun, P. (2013). Email correspondence with candidate on 5th July 2013.   
143 See Fisk, Robert (1992) “Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War”, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press); Collings, Deirdre, (Ed). (1994) “Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction”, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
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The United States cannot claim today to be the champion of 
freedoms while it is waging ‘vicious’ wars against the Arabs in 
most of their countries, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, and from 
Iraq to Yemen......This superpower, which protects and sponsors 
Sharon’s mass killings and systematic destruction of Palestinian 
life, cannot emerge as an ‘angel’ in Lebanon, calling for 
virtuous work and looking after the seeds of democracy! 
(Salman 2002 cited in Ottaway 2003:10). 
Also, speaking at the Arab Strategy Forum in Dubai in December 2004, Ghassan 
Salameh, a respected academic and former minister of culture in Lebanon who was an 
adviser to the UN in Iraq in 2003 stated that:  
If you have globalization across the Arab world, if you have 
democratic government, you will find that the normal Arabs are 
more interested in Palestine than the governments. The idea that 
it’s because of the governments that most Arabs are interested 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict is not true. It’s exactly the opposite. I 
know it’s very fashionable at the moment in Washington to think 
that it will go away if you have democracy. Most Arabs are 
genuinely and legitimately concerned about this conflict.......the 
answer is not to say ‘no, let’s forget about Palestine144.  
Needless to say, the Israeli-U.S. alliance gives rise to suspicion of the U.S.’s democracy 
promotion motives amongst sections of the Lebanese intelligentsia. The views of the 
Lebanese commentators show the extent to which they recognised the political 
importance of tackling the issue of Palestine. The recurring theme is the call for the 
United States to place the Arab-Israeli conflict on its most urgent agenda and address it 
with the same sense of fairness and justice that it claims is the driving force behind its 
ambition to promote the spread of democracy in the Arab World.  
Finally, the U.S. evaluation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation is a source of 
controversy in Lebanon. Hezbollah has existed in Lebanon as the only military force 
                                                          
144 Forum on “The Arab World: Between the Realities of Today and the Promises of 
Tomorrow”, 14th  December 2004 – accessed via: 
http://www.godubai.com/citylife/press_release_page - accessed on 11/11/2013;  
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able to stand up to Israel and the U.S., and as a result, has gained considerable support 
from a variety of Lebanese citizens. Because Hezbollah enjoys a high standing in 
Lebanon, many Lebanese denounce the U.S.’s criminalization of the so-called ‘Party of 
God’. The support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese is not necessarily an expression 
of support for Hezbollah’s fundamentalist values, but rather an expression of a shared 
hatred for Israel. In an interview with Gaby Jamal, a Palestinian political analyst and 
documentary film maker born in Lebanon, he pointed out that because the U.S. sides 
with Israel, it’s condemnation of Hezbollah has led to the profound rejection of its 
proposals for Western-style liberal democracy among the Lebanese population145.    
Regarding the US’s conflation of democracy with the Iraq war, many Lebanese viewed 
the invasion as an attempt by the United States to impose its tutelage upon the Arab 
world and not as was much publicised, to neutralize Saddam’s armoury of chemical and 
biological weapons. Many Lebanese opposed the invasion of Iraq and sections of the 
population organized various protest marches against a possible Iraq war in 2003.  One 
such event attended by 6,000 demonstrators took place in Tripoli in early March 2003. 
It featured slogans such as: 
 Bush, the criminal, a shame for humanity.......Boycott American 
interests and American and Israeli terrorism (Faath 2006: 152).  
The occupation of Iraq was widely seen by many Lebanese, as well as Arabs generally, 
as a neo-colonialist adventure aimed at securing American interests. The Lebanese 
journalist Michael Young, a frequent columnist for the Beirut Daily Star newspaper, 
summed up Lebanese perspectives when he commented that:  
The American agenda has completely changed. What Iraq was 
set out to be has been supplanted by a completely different 
                                                          
145 Jamal, G. (2013). Interview with candidate on 5th January 2013 (Hamra, Beirut: Lebanon).  
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agenda – containing Iran and containing Iran’s allies.......The 
democracy debate has ended today, and I regret that (cited in 
Shadid 2007).  
Certainly, the various communiqués issued by the late Lebanese Shi’a religious 
authority, Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah on the occupation of Iraq by US-led 
forces also had a negative effect on Lebanese perspectives. In a statement issued in 
which he referred to a study undertaken by a non-profit American centre for studies 
which stated that George W. Bush made “259 false statements” about Iraqi weapons and 
al-Qaida, Fadlallah labelled Bush as an ‘apostle of lies and a preacher of destruction 
and terrorism’. Fadlallah further called for Bush to be tried as the number one liar in the 
world who has caused the death of tens of thousands of people (Fadlallah 2008a). In 
another communiqué on developments in Iraq, Fadlallah stated that: 
 The entire world knows that the Iraqi people repudiate the 
occupation..........The United States, and its administration, is a 
country that seeks to secure its strategic interests in the world. It 
won’t be a sincere friend to any country unless the latter secures 
its empire and hegemony. Even in this case, this friendship is 
temporary and is contingent upon the continuance of this 
interest (Fadlallah 2008b).  
The U.S.’s credibility as an effective advocate of democratic ideals was also tarnished 
in many Lebanese eyes following the release of photographs on 28th April 2004 
showing the degradation and torture of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. service personnel. These 
publicised human rights abuses called into question the morality of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq and the occupation of that country by U.S.-led forces.  
In his testimony to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on 19th May 2004, retired 
U.S. Army Central Commander, General John P. Abizaid, an American of Lebanese 
Maronite Catholic descent, who succeeded General Tommy Franks in Iraq as 
Commander of US CENTCOM on 7th July 2003, stated that following the Abu Ghraib 
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scandal he talked to many Iraqis before he left Iraq who expressed shock, disgust and 
disappointment over the images of human rights abuses.  Abizaid admitted that: “No 
doubt, we [U.S.] have made mistakes in Abu Ghraib. We have suffered a setback”146.  
Referring also to the abuses carried out by U.S. soldiers, Ghassan Salameh, argues that: 
 A superpower that calls for respecting human rights but permits 
its troops to act the way they did at Abu Ghraib has no moral 
authority (Salame 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 402). 
Omar Nashabe, director of the research unit of the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, also 
noted the effects of Abu Ghraib on Lebanese and Arab perceptions of the United States 
and stated that: 
Images of torture at Abu Ghraib have destroyed the credibility 
of the US Administration. These images also revealed as hollow 
the arguments for democracy, freedom, and human rights that 
the Americans have raised [in] their ongoing military, cultural, 
political, and social onslaught on our Arab world (Nashabe 
2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 403).  
                                                          
146 [Internet source]: Available from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg96600 – 
(accessed on 30/08/2014).   
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Comments such as those from Salame and Nashabe substantiate long-standing 
assumptions by the Lebanese population regarding the low value that the U.S. seemed 
to place on Arab lives. Crucially also, such comments led many Lebanese to question 
U.S. motives and objectives for it would seem that the U.S. did not practise what it 
preached.   
The remainder of this chapter will examine the reactions of the Lebanese towards 
notable U.S. policy initiatives which aimed at promoting political reform in the Arab 
world in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. In particular, my discussion will 
draw attention to the Bush Administration’s campaign to effect democratic change in 
the Arab world articulated in the Administration’s most prominent initiatives namely 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) launched in December 2002 and the 
Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA) launched in 
June 2004147. Both of these initiatives were formulated in response to regional deficits 
in ‘democracy’ identified in the Arab Human Development Report published in 2002 
and as a follow-up to the mild and hesitant U.S. democracy promotion efforts that 
formed part of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab World in the 1990s. Throughout the 
ensuing discussion I will aim to show how instead of embracing the U.S.’s 
democratization agenda, Lebanese commentators in particular demonstrated deep 
suspicions of American motives with many articulating vociferous criticisms of U.S. 
initiatives aimed at promoting democratic reform.  
 
                                                          
147 The BMENA was launched in partnership with the G-8 and it was a product of a flurry of 
transatlantic meetings held in June 2004 – the G – 8 meeting, the brief U.S. /E.U. summit, and 
the NATO summit. 
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The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI): Background, contents, and Iraqi 
and Lebanese reactions 
The first meaningful attempt by the United States to “win Arab hearts and minds”, 
which followed the U.S.’s hesitant and subdued efforts to democratize the Arab world 
prior to 9/11, took the form of a public diplomacy campaign namely, the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The MEPI was launched by the U.S. State Department 
and officially unveiled by then Secretary of State Colin Powell in December 2002. 
Powell’s official launch of the U.S.’s MEPI had been postponed several times leading 
up to its announcement. A day before Powell’s statement, then CIA Chief George Tenet 
spoke about the same issue. During his remarks at the Nixon Center Distinguished 
Service Award Banquet, Tenet stated that the war on terrorism cannot be won by merely 
defeating and dismantling Al-Qaeda, but by dealing with the circumstances that fuel 
desperation, weaken governments, and create a power vacuum, which extremists rush to 
fill. Tenet also called for encouraging moderate Islam and providing opportunities for 
people, especially women (Tenet 2002). A week prior to Tenet’s statement, Richard 
Haas proposed similar ideas when he admitted, albeit cautiously, that successive U.S. 
administrations had made mistakes over the past fifty years by failing to promote the 
spread of democratic principles in the Arab world.  
MEPI was explained in a speech delivered by Colin Powell to the conservative right-
wing Heritage Foundation on 12th December 2002. In his speech, Powell stated that he 
was pleased to announce an innovative set of programs and a framework for future 
cooperation called the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative. He stated that: 
 The initiative is a bridge between the United States and the 
Middle East, between our governments and our peoples, that 
spans the hope gap with energy, ideas, and funding (Powell 
2002).  
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Powell added further that: 
 Our Partnership Initiative is a continuation, and a deepening, 
of our longstanding commitment to working with all the peoples 
of the Middle East to improve their daily lives and help them 
face the future with hope. Just as our decision to rejoin 
UNESCO is a symbol of our commitment to advancing human 
rights and tolerance and learning, so this Initiative is a concrete 
demonstration of our commitment to human dignity in the 
Middle East (Powell 2002).  
In sum, the MEPI aimed to promote entrepreneurship, political change, educational 
reform and women’s rights in the Middle East148. Specifically, the initiative was 
designed to encourage “expanded public space where democratic voices can be heard in 
the political process, the people have a choice in governance, and there is respect for 
the rule of law”149. Jeremy Sharp, Middle East specialist with the US Congressional 
Research Service explains that:  
In order to meet these goals, MEPI officials, in conjunction with 
Arab governments, invest[ed] funds in programs geared toward 
strengthening Arab civil society, encouraging micro-enterprise, 
expanding political participation, and promoting women’s 
rights (Sharp 2005). 
Despite the ‘loud noises’ and heightened U.S. rhetoric that paved the way for the 
MEPI’s launch, the initiative failed to appease the anger against the United States. Its 
central features were vehemently criticized by Lebanese commentators in particular150. 
                                                          
148 G8 Research Group: Interim Compliance Report, February 28, 2005, p.9; 
149 Middle East Partnership Initiative, U.S. Department of State. Available from: 
http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/(accessed on 20 May 2012);   
150 The central component of the MEPI was a series of mini-TV documentaries entitled “Shared 
Values”, produced at a cost of $15 million. The programs aimed to show that Arabs and, more 
generally, Muslims in the United States were free to live according to their values and pursue 
their religion but at the same time were accepted and well integrated into mainstream society. 
The series aired from October 28 to December 10 on pan-Arab television stations and in 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Pakistan.  
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The press media in Lebanon greeted the MEPI with scorn and angrily dismissed it as a 
misguided public relations exercise which added insult to injury by proposing to 
interfere in internal Arab politics and only earmarking puny resources for this exercise. 
Compared to the tens of billions the United States would spend on a war in Iraq, the 
sum set aside to advance MEPI’s democratic programmes, was seen by Iraqi and 
Lebanese commentators as a clear sign that the United States only pretended to care 
about the transformation of the Arab world and that its real priorities lay elsewhere151.  
Funded at a trifling $29 million for the entire region for 2003, with $7 – 8 million 
earmarked for women’s rights and civil society support (with the rest going to education 
and development programs), MEPI was perceived as an extension of the cautious U.S. 
democracy promotion policy of the 1990s152. Powell stated during his aforementioned 
speech to the Heritage Foundation that the U.S. was initially dedicating $29 million to 
get the MEPI off to a strong start. He added also that in collaboration with Congress, the 
Bush Administration would seek significant additional funding for the following year. 
These funds, he stated, would be over and above the more than $1 billion the U.S. 
provides in economic assistance to the Arab world every year (Powell 2002).  
In summing up of the Arab press reaction to the MEPI, the U.S. State Department’s 
International Information Programme wrote:  
                                                          
151 The overall sum of $293 million dollars for MEPI over four fiscal years compared to the 
bilateral economic assistance of over $1 billion extended annually to BMENA countries was 
dwarfed by US expenditure in Iraq and the war on terror globally, which ran into tens of billions 
– see Dalacoura, K. (2001) US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 
September 2001: a critique, International Affairs 81, 5(2005) 963-979.   
152 The MEPI’s objectives are divided into four overarching categories: political reform, 
economic reform, educational reform and women’s empowerment - see Jeremy M. Sharp, “The 
Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview”, CRS Report for Congress, February 8, 2005, 
p.2; 
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Arab media panned MEPI as a misguided effort to improve the 
U.S.’s image in the Arab world and gain legitimacy for a war 
against Iraq” and “critics dismissed MEPI as ‘peanuts’ 
compared to U.S. military expenditures in the region153.  
This theme was quickly picked up by the Lebanese media. For some, the U.S. had 
clearly failed to demonstrate any seriousness toward its self-proclaimed priority to 
democratize the Arab world. The fact that there was a significant mismatch between 
funds allocated for the Iraq war and that which was earmarked and set aside for 
democracy promotion, angered Lebanese journalists leading to allegations of U.S. 
manipulation and a lack of seriousness on its part. Reporting for the El-Shark 
newspaper, the Lebanese journalist Awni Kaaki wrote:  
The United States has allocated $29 million for [MEPI], while 
the supposed war against Iraq will be costing it $100 billion 
dollars...This is what falls within the frame of subduing the Arab 
world and controlling its capabilities to force it into accepting a 
new Middle East order154.  
The allocated sum equated to only 10 cents to be spent on every Arab man, woman, or 
child to teach them about the basic notions and principles of democracy. While the 
allocations to the MEPI were later increased, reaching $98 million in its first 15 months, 
the programme still remained very cautious, and focused “less on political change than 
on improving the performance of Arab governments, economies, and schools” (Wittes 
2004). Media reactions in Iraq, Lebanon and the wider Arab world remained undiluted 
following the increased allocations as larger calculations based on a projected ten-fold 
                                                          
153 Department of State, International Information Program, Foreign Media Reaction, “Middle 
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI): Arab Press Wary”, 20th December 2002 – cited in Ottaway 
2003:12;  
154 Awni Kaaki, As-Sharq (Lebanon), quoted in Department of State, International Information 
Program, Foreign Media Reaction, “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI): Arab Press 
Wary”, 20th December 2002 – cited in Ottaway 2003:12;  
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increase in the initial sum of $29 million revealed that only $1 (one dollar) would be 
spent on each Arab for the U.S.’s declared goal.  
The Beirut – based Al-Safir newspaper’s editor Joseph Samaha summed up Lebanese 
Media and official reactions toward the MEPI when he wrote in an editorial in that 
newspaper that the purpose of MEPI was to link “the ambitions of some people in the 
Arab world to the objectives of the United States, not the objectives of the United States 
to the ambitions of the people in the Arab world”155. Samaha’s critical analysis of the 
MEPI’s purpose aimed at showing the disconnection between the U.S.’s stated 
objectives and the ambitions of Arabs generally. He contended that there was a disparity 
between U.S. funding levels and Arab needs and seemed to suggest that despite its 
financial contribution towards political reform in the Arab world, it was clear that the 
United States is working at cross-purposes with local Arab reformists. Ghazi al-Aridi, a 
prominent Druze politician and the Minister of Information in Rafik Hariri’s 
government, stated during an interview reported by the Daily Star newspaper that 
Powell’s initiative on U.S. involvement in the Middle East was an attempt to 
“consecrate American hegemony over the region” (cited in Flayhan 2002). Al-Aridi 
also told the Egyptian Middle East News Agency (MENA) correspondent in Beirut that 
the move was tantamount to a “formal announcement of a desire to interfere in all 
internal affairs of the region’s countries and establish regimes in harmony with 
American policies” (cited in Flayhan 2002). The former minister added that: 
 the American initiative aims to lay hands on the region’s 
resources and consecrate Israel’s strategic superiority.....[and 
that] it was out of place, as it came from a country that was 
                                                          
155 “Pennywise Commitment to Arab Democracy”, Asia Times, January 9, 2003 – cited in 
Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview”, CRS Report for 
Congress, February 8, 2005, p.6; 
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leading the way in corruption, not good government (cited in 
Flayhan 2002).  
According to Al-Aridi, American officials had been implicated in “huge corruption” 
scandals at firms such as Enron and WorldCom, “which led to the fall of some financial 
empires” (cited in Flayhan 2002).  
Al-Aridi’s scathing remarks encapsulate several themes which have served to 
undermine the U.S.’s pro-democratic credentials in the Arab world. He asserts that the 
U.S.’s objective via its flagship initiative is aimed at consecrating American hegemony 
over the Arab world and Israel’s regional superiority. He argues further that the 
underlying motive of the MEPI is to interfere in Arab domestic politics, and he accuses 
American officials of being corrupt, which he argues, renders them unfit to pioneer the 
democratization of the Arab world. Al-Aridi’s comments echoed similar allegations 
levelled against the U.S.’s democracy promotion efforts by other Iraqi and Lebanese 
politicians and commentators. Indeed, altogether, the criticisms levelled against the 
MEPI constituted a comprehensive rebuttal of the U.S.’s pro-democratic credentials. 
There is little dispute that many Lebanese commentators viewed the MEPI with 
suspicion from its inception. With issues of the U.S.’s lack of credibility as a pro-
democratic actor still abound and apparently still fresh in Iraqi and Lebanese minds, it 
was clear that, the U.S’s flagship initiative would require a dramatic change of Arab 
hearts and minds for it to successfully pursue its ultimate goal to help usher in more 
democratic systems in the Arab world.  
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The Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA) or 
The Greater Middle East Partnership (GMEI) (hereinafter “the BMENA” or “the 
GMEI”): Background, contents, and Iraqi and Lebanese reactions 
The U.S.’s BMENA was unveiled at the 2004 Sea Island Summit in June. The initiative 
was motivated by the U.S.’s desire to stifle the threats of political instability, economic 
stagnation and terrorism in the wider Middle East region. The plan was based upon 
earlier initiatives aimed at democratization in the region, including the afore-mentioned 
MEPI156. According to the official statement released by the G-8, the BMENA’s plan to 
support reform was focused on the need to deepen democracy and broaden public 
participation, build a knowledge society, and promote economic development. 
Accordingly, the BMENA focused on three areas, namely the political, social/cultural 
and economic spheres. In the political sphere, the BMENA aimed to foster progress 
toward democracy and the rule of law. In the social sphere the emphasis was on 
promoting education for all, freedom of expression, equality between men and women, 
as well as, securing and providing access to global information technology which is 
deemed crucial to modernization and prosperity. The BMENA aimed to create jobs as a 
number one priority in the economic sphere. Within this sphere, the BMENA aimed to 
work with governments and business leaders to promote entrepreneurship, expand trade 
and investment, increase access to capital, support financial reforms, secure property 
rights, promote transparency and fight corruption (ICG 2004).  
The initial reaction in Iraq and Lebanon to the BMENA was also largely negative. The 
flagship initiative received vociferous criticism and Lebanese commentators again 
furiously repeated charges against of lack of consultation and neglect of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The U.S.’s perceived support for Israel is a recurrent theme which lies on top 
                                                          
156 G8 Research Group: Interim Compliance Report, 28th February 2005.  
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of a pile of criticisms continually levelled against the U.S.’s democracy promotion 
efforts in the Arab world. Many Arab commentators continue to articulate and reiterate 
that the United States wants to impose its own priorities on the region, get rid of 
“undesirable” regimes, achieve hegemony over Middle East states and integrate Israel 
into the “Greater Middle East” before an agreed resolution to the Palestinian issue is 
reached. According to a editorial in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, the BMENA 
aims at integrating Israel into the Middle East, “something the Arab countries oppose as 
long as Israel continues with its aggressions against the Palestinian people”157.Writing 
in the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Mustaqbal, George Masri also notes that the term 
“Greater Middle East” is not innocent, for it has the political purpose of weaving Israel 
into “the region’s political and cultural fabric and thus legitimizing its presence” 
(Masri 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007:410). He adds further that “the GMEI is a mere 
rationalization for the Zionist presence and a justification for the culture of apartheid” 
(Masri 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 411). 
Other commentators believed that the United States took advantage of the pro-US 
feelings that swept Western capitals in the wake of 9/11, to carry the war against 
terrorism to its alleged breeding ground: the Islamic world. The respected late Lebanese 
journalist and editor, Joseph Samaha was a proponent of this view and saw the BMENA 
as part of the post-9/11 American campaign on terrorism. Writing in the Lebanese 
newspaper, Al-Safir, Samaha argued that the BMENA, “exonerates and exalts” the 
United States and its ally Israel, depicting both as good countries confronting “an axis 
of evil which inherited Nazism and Communism, and which is responsible for all kinds 
                                                          
157 “Kalma al-Yawn: Kalam Ma’ qul wa Maqbul min Wazir Britani Mas’ul” [“Today’s 
Thought: Reasonable and Acceptable Talk from a Responsible British Minister”] - reported in 
Al-Akhbar, March 3, 2004, http://www.elakhbar.org.eg/issues/16180/0205.html  
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of evil deeds”. He went on to state that – according to the Americans – this alleged “axis 
of evil” comprises: 
 fundamentalist terrorism that threatens civilization, freedom, 
and the American way of life and failed Arab regimes and 
dictatorships who seek to direct public anger towards Israel and 
the West in order to deflect attention from the calamities they 
have inflicted on their people (Samaha 2004 cited in Baroudi 
2007:407 ). 
Writing also in the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Nahar, ‘Imad Shayya, stated that the 
attacks of 9/11 represented a “critical historic juncture in the American hegemonic 
experience”. In the aftermath of the attacks, Shayya argues, the United States 
“abandoned liberal thought, and slipped to religious –nationalism, with a taint of 
racism towards other people and nations” (Shayya 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 407). 
Another journalistic piece which featured in Al-Nahar and written by Samir Abou 
Hamid argued that:  
It is evident that the new directions [in American foreign policy] 
in the region are based on fighting radical Islamic forces and 
demolishing the foundations that give rise to and sustain them 
under the slogan of ‘those who are not with us are against us 
(Hamid 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 407). 
Given this backdrop, Lebanese politicians and journalists predictably labelled the 
BMENA as a mere smokescreen to foster the U.S.’s aggressive stance on the ‘war on 
terror’. They also alleged that the BMENA was created to conceal America’s 
geopolitical ambitions and its plans to gain unimpeded access to the Arab world’s vast 
oil resources. Bassem Yamout, a pro-Syrian member of the Lebanese Parliament 
between 2000 and 2005, argued that one aim of the BMENA was to provide the United 
States with control over Middle Eastern oil, which it would use to “manipulate the 
economies of its rivals for global leadership” (Yamout 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 
406). Whilst these allegations remain unproved they are supported by a historical 
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precedent which argues that, with the onset of the Cold War, access to the oil resources 
of the Middle East was, from the U.S.’s point of view, a crucial strategic interest in the 
struggle with the Soviet Union. For Joseph Samaha, U.S. foreign policy was based on 
cold-blooded calculations rather than on emotions. He compared the United States to a 
“cold-blooded animal” that gives priority to protecting its interests over everything else 
(Samaha 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007:402). Talal Salman saw in the BMENA,  
an embellished and stepped up version of earlier U.S. projects 
dating back to the Eisenhower Doctrine to dominate the region 
under the avowed goal of inheriting the old [European] 
imperialism that had its death blow during the Second World 
War (Salman 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 407 - 408). 
Other writers still begged the question of how could the United States be a force for 
good in the world, if it did not really apply within its own borders or in its international 
conduct the values it preached. A proponent of this view is the Lebanese author ‘Adnan 
Haydar Ahmad. Writing in the Lebanese newspaper, Al –Mustaqbal, Haydar Ahmad 
opened his opinion piece with a popular Arab proverb that translates as “you cannot 
offer what you do not have” in order to emphasize that the United States cannot offer 
democracy to the world because it does not have it in the first place. According to 
Haydar Ahmad, money buys U.S. presidential elections, while only those candidates 
loyal to Israel win congressional seats (Ahmad 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007:399). In his 
opinion piece reported in Al-Safir, the Lebanese Maronite Christian politician Wadi’ al-
Khazen, took the argument further by criticizing the abrogation of Arab Americans’ 
civil rights in the wake of 9/11 (Al-Khazen 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007:401). It would 
seem that Lebanese commentators tested the U.S.’s pro-democratic credentials by 
examining the U.S.’s modelling of itself by words and actions. For many, it did seem 
that it was not just about what the U.S. proposed to do to bring about political reform in 
the Arab world but also whether the qualities and benefits it aimed to convey via its 
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democracy promotion efforts were manifestly evident within American society itself. 
The results of their examination did not convince Lebanese commentators that the U.S. 
practiced what it preached. Consequently, the criticisms levelled against the BMENA 
aimed to expose U.S. officials as image managers, posers and hypocrites.  
The BMENA was also regarded as an extension of the aggressive and imperialist nature 
of U.S. foreign policy. In this regard, the Lebanese Christian writer Ilyas Sahhab wrote 
sarcastically:  
As if the Arabs in the twenty –first century needed the present 
U.S. Administration to coin the expression ‘Greater Middle 
East’ in order to be reminded that the entire Arab region, since 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, is still placed in the morgue 
of global politics, under the knives of major powers, which slice 
it according to their interests and expansionist and imperialist 
projects (Sahhab 2004:19 cited in Baroudi 2007: 408).  
A substantial majority of commentators in Lebanon also raised the problem of 
credibility and consistency as the main issue limiting the impact of U.S. policy 
initiatives, with many agreeing that reform in the Arab world was none of America’s 
business. Salim Al- Hoss, the prime minister of Lebanon during the years 1976 -80, 
1987-90, and 1998-2000, remarked that America cannot be equally serious about 
democracy promotion and about maintaining friendships with Arab autocrats. Al-Hoss’s 
comments draw upon the U.S.’s subdued and hesitant democracy promotion efforts 
during the years leading up to 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. He advanced his critique of 
BMENA by denouncing America’s suitability as a promoter of democratic reform. Al-
Hoss challenged America’s pro-democratic credentials when he stated that:  
I invite the US to reflect on its actions throughout the Arab 
world and find one single act it has done to promote democracy. 
Democracy promotion needs more than a declaration 
[GMEI].....It needs principled US Administrations ....Since Bush 
Senior the Arab world has been made weaker, more divided, 
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more autocratic, and increasingly more in the hands of the rich 
few not the moral publics who struggle for dignity, equality and 
liberation from dependence and occupation.....Plus America has 
nothing to teach the Arab world in democracy when it ignores 
world public opinion and invades a sovereign Arab state [Iraq] 
in the name of democracy promotion. That is not democratic158.  
Within this context, Ghassan Salameh provided one of the most articulate and thorough-
going critiques of US foreign policy to emanate from the Arab world when he wrote 
that:  
The Neoconservatives in the United States have spearheaded a 
campaign [BMENA] to divert attention from the real causes of 
terrorism. They try to trace the conflict with the West to cultural 
reasons that derive from Islam and contemporary Arab history. 
By posing the question, ‘why do they hate us?’ the 
Neoconservatives dismiss the role of specific American policies 
in provoking Arab resentment as if hatred to America is 
embedded in our culture and not caused by US conduct 
(Salameh 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 402).  
According to Salameh, the objectionable international conduct of the United States 
strips it of any moral authority to call on the Arab world to democratize. He writes 
further:  
Whoever is asking us to make a quick transition to the rule of 
law, democratic life, and respect for human rights should be 
above all reproach, like Caesar’s wife.... A superpower that 
calls on us to inhale the sweet breezes of freedom but prevents 
the application of the Geneva protocols on the detainees at 
Guantanamo has no moral authority, a superpower that calls 
for respect of international law but allows itself to sidestep the 
opinion of the majority of members of the Security Council and 
refuses to sign the treaty establishing the International Criminal 
Court and the Kyoto accords has no moral authority....a 
superpower that believes Israel has the right to assassinate one 
                                                          
158 Al-Hoss, S. (2005). Interview with Larbi Sadiki on 23 June 2005, Beirut, Lebanon. Cited in 
Sadiki, Larbi (2009) “Rethinking Arab Democratisation: Elections Without Democracy”, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.183.  
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Palestinian leader after the other and build a separation wall 
that cuts through Palestinian villages and groves has no moral 
authority (Salameh 2004 cited in Baroudi 2007: 402).  
Again referring to U.S. detainees at Guantanamo Bay military base, the former 
Lebanese Information Minister, Ghazi al-Aridi disapprovingly asks: 
 What is America doing about the prisoners at the Guantanamo 
Bay military base? Where is the ‘civil society’ that they talk 
about? America is ruling through military justice which gives 
absolute authority to the person of the United States president 
(cited in Flayhan 2002). 
The themes expressed by the above-named Iraqi and Lebanese writers and politicians 
are echoed by dozens of Arab writers. Nader Fergani, the principal author of the 2002 
and 2003 Arab Human Development Reports, also dwelt on the lack of U.S. credibility 
in the Arab world. With a great deal of emotion, triggered perhaps by a sense of betrayal 
and disappointment at how the United States used the reports to market its policies in 
the region, he wrote:  
This initiative [BMENA] suffers from the lack of credibility of its 
authors.....The Arabs have every right to question the 
qualifications of the authors of this reformist project, for the 
hallmark of their history has been one of sowing discord in Arab 
lands and undermining the interest of the Arab nation. Does the 
devil suddenly turn to an angel by penning a document 
declaring all sorts of good intentions? (Fergani 2004: 10 cited in 
Baroudi 2007:403).  
Conclusion 
Against the background of the Arab world’s perspective of the U.S.’s pro-democratic 
credentials, this chapter has sought to show that large sections of the Iraqi and Lebanese 
populations harboured deep suspicions of U.S. efforts to advance ‘Western style’ liberal 
democracy within their societies. The chapter also argues that, the “American ideal” of 
promoting democracy which was ambitiously espoused by the George W. Bush 
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administration, faced difficult and insurmountable challenges as a result of the 
widespread distrust and suspicion surrounding U.S. motives. The discussion of the 
specific factors responsible for the negative image of the U.S. permeating important 
sections of Iraqi and Lebanese societies traces the historical origins of anti-
Americanism in Iraq and Lebanon, and it shows how U.S. foreign policy towards both 
countries gradually served to cultivate deep and pervasive suspicions of U.S. motives 
amongst many Iraqis and Lebanese. Furthermore, widespread and sustained criticisms 
of the U.S. flagship initiatives, namely, MEPI and BMENA, reflected the extent to 
which anti-U.S. sentiments served to undermine the Bush administration’s democracy 
efforts in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. Regarding the Lebanese 
perspectives, it is noteworthy that the critics of the U.S. have diverse religious 
backgrounds with Christians (who are generally perceived to have favourable attitudes 
towards the U.S.), Sunni, Shia and Muslims all voicing strong criticisms of U.S. 
democracy promotion motives. This is a significant observation as it highlights the 
extent to which the U.S.’s credibility as a pro-democratic reformer had been tarnished 
across different sections of the Lebanese population. 
In the next chapter, I will show how the hypotheses and research questions set out at the 
beginning of this study have been addressed. Having examined the adverse impact upon 
the U.S.’s post-war Iraq and Middle East ‘democracy policy’ caused by turf wars and 
conflicting U.S. agency agendas on the one hand, and the impact of the negative Iraqi 
and Lebanese perspectives on the U.S.’s democracy promotion efforts on the other, I 
will now seek to advance suitable questions requiring further research.     
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_____________________________________________________________ 
 
                                    CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION______________ 
 
The reasons for the George W. Bush administration’s bungled attempts to initialize the 
installation of successful democracies in Iraq and Lebanon have been documented and 
debated extensively elsewhere. Political analysts generally focus on a host of prominent 
factors such as whether the type of democratic political system that was being exported 
by the United States was capable of being embraced and accepted in these countries. 
Also put forward; is the argument that democracy cannot be fostered by outside powers 
even in the absence of military intervention, if they simply aim to transfer a set of 
Western institutions. In the case of Iraq, political analysts focus mainly on failures in 
post-war planning, and the higher order of decisions that had the most impact, such as 
troop levels, the CPA’s twin orders of ‘de-Ba’athification’ and the dissolution of the 
army, and even whether a nation-building or democratisation effort in Iraq was possible 
in the first place given the country’s background of sectarian and multi-ethnic tensions. 
Regarding Lebanon, the discussion often surrounds other independent variables such as 
the country’s complex political system – the so-called confessional system – which is 
based on the premise that a careful balance in all aspects of political life must be 
maintained among the seventeen recognized religious communities. Commentators 
argue that while this confessional system has spared Lebanon the authoritarianism 
experienced by many regimes in Arab world, paradoxically it has stifled the transition 
to a truly democratic state. In addition, it is widely accepted that any strategy for 
political reform in Lebanon cannot start until the complex issue of Hezbollah’s 
disarmament is resolved.  
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While the above factors shaped – and perhaps doomed – the course of the U.S.’s post-
9/11 democracy ambitions in Iraq and Lebanon, analysis often neglects the impact of 
two other factors which form the focus of this study and, which helped derail Bush’s 
democracy campaign in these countries. First is the adverse impact on the Bush 
administration’s Iraq democracy policy caused by the conflicting agendas of U.S. 
agencies tasked with promoting democracy in this country. Second is the prevalent anti-
American sentiment which many Iraqis and Lebanese harbour and share with large 
sections of the Arab World.   
In addressing the first research question, focused on the gulf between the rhetoric and 
substance of political reform, it is argued that coordination and cooperation between 
U.S. agencies was of crucial importance to efforts to democratize Iraq in light of Bush’s 
post-9/11 foreign policy ambitions and the U.S.’s prominent military posture in the 
aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. Within this context, the need in particular, for an 
effective collaborative effort, and joint enterprise between the two main protagonist 
institutions, U.S. State Department and Defense Department (Pentagon), cannot be 
overemphasised. This thesis presents evidence of competition and turf wars between the 
U.S. State Department and the Pentagon - and at times, the U.S. intelligence community 
- which impeded U.S. efforts to plan for the 2003 Iraq war and the post-Saddam period.  
The evidence of a lack of strategic cooperation or convergence between U.S. agencies 
and actors took many shapes. First, in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, research 
carried out reveals evidence of bureaucratic in-fighting between competing U.S. 
agencies. There is evidence of conflict about decisions, ideas, directions and actions and 
also personalized conflict fuelled by a blatant lack of consistency and cooperation 
between the Departments of State and Defense which served as a political divide. In the 
first instance, Secretary of State Colin Powell believed in strengthening multilateral 
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alliances to promote national security whilst Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and 
his top aides were more hawkish on foreign policy issues than the moderate Powell and 
saw international institutions not only as a nuisance but also as a threat. Those in favour 
of Donald Rumsfeld’s strong arm tactics say he understood the urgency of the global 
terrorist threat , and that he faced up to problems at the Pentagon, improving the place 
through transformation. As the gulf between the two departments grew, the Bush 
Administration faced mounting challenges in its attempts to formulate a unified Iraq 
policy. Whilst Washington's leaders – State versus Defense - have had clashes in the 
past, they were never so publicly played out in times of national crisis as they were in 
the build up to the 2003 Iraq war and during the era of the CPA in Iraq. The actual 
history of the Bush administration’s pre-war work and post-war planning efforts in Iraq 
is a story of substantial discord, with the discord sometimes undermining the 
Administration’s best laid plans. Much of the discord had its origins in the arguments 
and disagreements about cooperating and working with the Iraqi oppositionists or 
externals such as Ahmad Chalabi and his INC party. The interagency discord gave rise 
to broken lines of communication and authority leading to a tug-of-war between George 
W. Bush’s top brass. As a consequence, and during the post-war occupation of Iraq, the 
turf battles between Washington’s major players filtered down the bureaucratic chain, 
choking-off cooperation on the ground in Iraq. This made it impossible to implement 
President Bush’s strategic idea that the United States should assume the posture of 
liberator rather than occupier in Iraq. Against this background, this study presents 
evidence of a lack of strategic cooperation or convergence on approaches to 
democratisation on the ground in Iraq on the part of the plethora of U.S. agencies and 
NGOs tasked with promoting ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in this country.   
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Starting off with USAID’s electoral technical assistance program, the Audit Report of 
the Office of Inspector General, styled Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electoral Technical 
Assistance Programme, revealed evidence of divergence and insufficient coordination 
between USAID’s implementer, IFES and its international partner,  the U.N. 
organization, UNAMI. Notably, the obstacles that hindered U.S. interagency 
cooperation in Iraq, were present, and often multiplied, when the U.S. dealt with foreign 
governments and international organisations. Although this thesis does not discuss it in 
depth, international cooperation in post-war reconstruction matters represents a third 
dimension of interagency relationships affecting the U.S. government. Indeed, 
according to the testimonies of both IFES and UNAMI officials, personality conflicts 
characterised their relationships, and they were mostly at odds with each other about the 
role each organisation should play in advising IHEC. As discussed at page 163, this lack 
of strategic cooperation or convergence between U.S. agencies and their international 
partners such as the UN caused the most critical needs of Iraq’s electoral system to 
remain unaddressed.  
 
There was also a clear lack of strategic cooperation regarding the time frames for the 
writing of the Iraqi constitution and the handover of sovereignty back to the Iraqi 
people. Bremer was of the strong view that the timetable that had been created by his 
CPA and the Iraqi leadership must be strictly adhered to. Whilst Bremer considered it 
essential to comply with prescribed deadlines in order to maintain the momentum of the 
political process in Iraq, the evidence shows that the views of key White House staff 
were at complete odds with the CPA’s proposals. Within this context, there was also 
uncertainty over the chain of command as Bremer and Rumsfeld’s Defense Department 
tussled over the former CPA chief’s authority on the ground in Iraq.  
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The U.S.’s efforts to strengthen and bolster Iraq’s civil society also provide evidence of 
a lack of a coordinated and collaborative effort on the part of U.S. agencies on the 
ground in Iraq. The three major community development programs run by USAID in 
Iraq namely, the LGP, the CAP and the CSCBP, albeit all being run from the same 
USAID department, were not coordinated or synchronized as they not only failed to 
reinforce each other, but in fact inadvertently undermined each other. Additionally, 
there was also evidence of duplication of donors’ efforts which did not support long-
term development work.  
 
Furthermore, and with regards to the promotion of human rights in Iraq, a case in point 
is the evidence of prisoner abuse carried out by U.S. soldiers in Iraq. The ‘liberators’ 
whose job was to ‘liberate’ the Iraqi people and ‘induct’ them into democracy were 
themselves exposed as the perpetrators of grotesque human rights violations at the Abu 
Ghraib prison facility in 2003 and 2004. The human rights abuses in Abu Ghraib prison 
badly tarnished the positive image of democracy many Iraqis held prior to the 2003 U.S. 
led invasion of their country. This scandal underscores the point being made about the 
adverse impact on Bush’s Mid-East democracy policy brought about by conflicting U.S. 
agency agendas which produced perplexing results. There was an almost complete 
militarization of the post-war situation in Iraq which facilitated the Pentagon’s exercise 
of strong armed tactics and aggressive post-war controls.  The Pentagon’s dominance of 
the post-war situation effectively ended the State Department’s role as a significant 
Washington player in Iraq as USAID and other U.S. agencies operating under the 
banner of the State Department watched powerlessly as their efforts to safeguard human 
rights in Iraq were in essence undermined by the Pentagon  - albeit as Rumsfeld’s points 
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out, by American soldiers acting outside the ambit of their authority and whose actions 
were unreflective of U.S. policy in Iraq.  
The U.S.’s efforts to promote free and investigative media in Iraq also showed 
conflicting agendas amongst U.S. agencies which had an adverse impact on Bush’s Iraq 
democracy policy. Contrary to the ‘good faith’ efforts by the U.S. State Department and 
USAID to carry the banner of media freedom and democracy in Iraq, there were strong 
substantiated allegations that Bremer’s CPA and the Pentagon sought to influence Iraqi 
public opinion and the media. Indeed, control over the CPA’s media policy by the 
Defense Department became a serious talking point on Capitol Hill during Bremer’s 
reign as CPA chief in Iraq.  
Similar U.S. political manoeuvring was experienced in Lebanon when reports surfaced 
in August 2007 accusing the U.S. of inhibiting and negatively influencing freedom of 
speech in Lebanon contrary to its rhetoric to foster the same. The accusation that the 
U.S. used its political humanitarian tool, USAID, to coerce Lebanon's English 
newspaper The Daily Star into writing pro-government articles in August 2007 is a case 
in point. Notwithstanding, the Bush Administration pursued a predominantly ‘positive’ 
approach to democracy promotion in Lebanon relying on capacity building instead of 
coercion or negative incentives. This supported the bold proclamations made by the 
Administration in the aftermath of the Cedar revolution when it stated that it would help 
Lebanon to establish a democracy and a Government that responds to the people. Whilst 
an assertive democracy policy was not pursued in the case of Lebanon, the research shows that 
the Bush Administration’s efforts still fell short of the ‘high-flown’ rhetoric which accompanied 
the shift in U.S. foreign policy toward democracy promotion in this country in the aftermath of 
9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war. The evidence gathered on Bush’s efforts to democratize Lebanon 
mirrors his administration’s efforts to promote democracy in Iraq, as U.S. policies on the ground 
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in Lebanon did not sufficiently support the advancement of ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in 
this country either.  
In addressing the second research question regarding the Arab perceptions of the U.S., 
the case studies of Iraq and Lebanon show that the U.S.’s democracy promotion efforts 
faced insurmountable challenges as a result of the widespread distrust and suspicion of 
U.S. motives amongst a substantial portion of the Iraqi and Lebanese populations who 
despise U.S. foreign policy not only towards their respective countries, but across 
Middle East region as a whole. Such distrust and suspicion is reflective of the broader 
issues of credibility and trust which have bedevilled U.S. democracy promotion across 
the region. For this reason, Bush’s policy of seeking to spread democracy quickly 
became incoherent in practice in Iraq and Lebanon where it did seem to the majority 
that the desire to carve out a political system exactly like the one operated by the United 
States and other Western countries implied arrogance or overbearing presumptuousness 
on the part of the U.S. about the virtues and benefits of its own system of governance.  
Regarding Iraq, even prior to the 2003 invasion, the possibility that a U.S.-led coalition, 
backed by its military, might exert daily administrative control over a swath of Iraqi soil 
touched a raw nerve among Iraqis. There was a deep fear among Iraqis that if the United 
States attacked Iraq, it would go on to impose long-term military control. The prospect 
of hosting an occupation force for an indefinite period triggered angry emotions among 
Iraqis as they resented being ruled for a long time by foreigners.  
Predictably, the occupation of Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition in 2003 did not succeed in 
reversing anti-U.S. attitudes among the Iraqi people. From an Iraqi perspective, the 
2003 US-led invasion could be viewed as a costly example of America’s neo-colonialist 
tendencies. The war was seen as an act of extraordinary colonialism, which used 
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slogans of bringing democracy and removing Saddam simply in order to implement a 
grand plan to advance American geopolitical and economic interests. In the aftermath of 
the 2003 war, there was the widespread perception among Iraqis that Western 
occupation of their country aimed at securing oil supplies, and effectively taking over 
control of Iraq’s proven oil reserves. The immediate manifestation of this belief could 
be seen in the days and weeks that followed the toppling of Saddam from power. In 
addition, Iraqi sentiment reflected anxiety over the power that a foreign country had 
over Iraq. The U.S. - led occupation of Iraq fed into a sense of humiliation felt by many 
Iraqis who became worried about the extent of U.S. control. This in effect caused the 
rampant looting and lawlessness in the early days of the U.S.’s presence and also 
consequently fuelled the insurgency in Iraq. To some extent, it also retarded post-war 
Iraq’s political development.  
In Lebanon, the adverse commentary which emanated from amongst the ranks of 
important sections of the Lebanese media, intelligentsia, and individual political, 
religious, and community leaders and was directed towards the Bush administration’s 
flagship democracy initiatives in the form of the MEPI and GMEI also underlines the 
point being made about the widespread distrust of U.S. motives to promote democracy 
in this country. U.S. credibility as a bastion of democratic standards had already been 
undermined in Lebanon following the U.S.’s actions in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib scandal 
and as well as the Bush’s administration’s positions towards Hamas and the Israel-Arab 
conflict. Lebanese commentators sought to identify various themes that characterise the 
negative image of the United States within their society, and also across the Arab world. 
By vehemently denouncing the U.S., and articulating vociferous criticisms of U.S. 
initiatives, Lebanese commentators contributed to delegitimizing U.S. efforts aimed at 
promoting democratic change in their country.  
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It would seem however that although the power of nationalistic feelings, distrust and 
suspicion of U.S. motives was clearly evident amongst the populations of Iraq and 
Lebanon, the Bush Administration resisted the conclusion that U.S. policy or behaviour 
was implicated in these feelings. The underlying reason for the U.S.’s failure to 
confront squarely the harsh reality of local resistance on the ground in both countries 
was the belief that the goal of U.S. democracy promotion efforts was humanitarian and 
benign. U.S. policy-makers found it difficult to accept that their much publicized ‘good-
will’ and ‘well-intentioned’ initiatives towards Iraq and Lebanon could attract so much 
suspicion and rebuke. They erroneously assumed that their pro-democratic efforts 
would bring about pro-American attitudes – regardless of U.S. policies in the region. 
The deep resentment harboured by the Iraqis and Lebanese towards the United States 
was an outcome the Bush Administration had been less prepared for. The fact that Bush 
and his team struggled to comprehend the main contours of Iraqi and Lebanese anti-
U.S. sentiment regarding U.S. policy imperilled U.S. democracy promotion efforts in 
both countries.  
While this study has made a number of important contributions which are representative 
of the Iraq and Lebanese case studies, it also raises a variety of larger questions which 
require further research. The questions raised explain the reasoning behind the choice of 
the two factors which the thesis hypothesises as being responsible for derailing Bush’s 
democracy enterprise in Iraq and Lebanon.  
The first question is what tangible advancements can be made to improve, expand and 
possibly institutionalize collaboration between the U.S. State Department, the Defense 
Department and other U.S. agencies tasked with implementing the United States’ 
foreign policy?  
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In considering this enquiry, it is worthwhile as a start, to summarise the constitutional 
roles assigned to the State Department and Pentagon in particular. The U.S. Secretary of 
State is vested with constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and is 
the U.S. President’s principal foreign policy advisor. The mission of the Department of 
Defense is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and preserve the security 
of the United States. The Secretary of Defense is the principal defence policy adviser to 
the President of the United States. Under the direction of the U.S. President, the 
Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of 
Defense. With this in mind, the expanding role of the U.S. military in support of non-
combat activities and humanitarian programmes has given rise to concerns about the 
Pentagon’s foreign policy role. There are concerns about the creeping ‘militarization of 
U.S. foreign policy’ and of the Pentagon’s leadership role in implementing U.S. foreign 
policy which is constitutionally perceived to be the exclusive province of the State 
Department, civilian agencies and organisations. Whilst this is not a new development - 
as the literature on U.S. foreign policy raises similar questions in respect of Vietnam 
and Afghanistan - there is a perception that the U.S. military sometimes overstepped 
and created, rather than solved, problems in the civilian reconstruction effort.  
 
With regards to Iraq, the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA, worked at 
cross purposes with each other and produced various plans in readiness to deal with the 
situation on the ground in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. But as late as December 
2002, President Bush eventually authorised the Pentagon to take the lead regarding 
post-war planning in Iraq. Bush’s decision set the scene for bureaucratic infighting and 
it prompted the formation of bureaucratic politics. The fact that President Bush chose 
the Defence Department to head the U.S.’s reconstruction effort in Iraq renders 
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questionable the level of priority his Administration really placed in promoting 
democracy in this country. By directing the Pentagon to work on an invasion plan and 
engineer Iraq’s post-war reconstruction, Bush elevated the pro-war faction in his 
administration to a position of official superiority. This effectively meant that the State 
Department’s influence in the foreign policy-making process was instantly 
marginalized. As a consequence, the Defense Department disregarded the authority of 
the State Department and pursued its own agenda on the ground in Iraq. First, it tried to 
undemocratically install Ahmed Chalabi in power only to encounter strong opposition 
from Iraq’s domestic political leaders. Next, it undemocratically appointed Bremer as 
Iraq’s chief administrator. The result was a U.S. directed rather than a U.S. – facilitated 
reconstruction process which was untenable as it led to an advisory council being 
appointed. The State Department was unable to assert control over the Pentagon on 
political grounds partly because in assessing the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, the 
Bush administration decided that within the U.S. government, no organization except 
the military could deploy and sustain qualified people in large numbers to undertake 
reconstruction projects. As a result the State Department’s concept of nation-building in 
Iraq turned largely on encouragement of American democratic reforms which proved 
difficult to apply to the treacherous conditions existent on the ground in Iraq. 
 
The Pentagon assumed control of humanitarian aid, public diplomacy, information 
dissemination, civil reconstruction, and state building – tasks not normally undertaken 
by the military. Administrative experience and knowledge of Iraq, it would seem, were 
less important than ideological correctness. The Pentagon arguably moved away from 
previous U.S.-led nation – building experiences by ignoring and vetoing projects such 
as the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project which brought in Iraqi exiles – lawyers, 
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business people, engineers, educators, and civil administrators, for example – to draw 
up plans for post-Saddam projects to reconstitute civil society and reconstruct the 
country. Instead, the Pentagon favoured strong post-war controls, disbanding the Iraqi 
military and security forces and banning Ba’ath party members from government, civil 
service, and teaching posts. It relied on known quantities – Iraqis, mostly political exiles 
many of whom represented extreme sectarian or ethnic positions, but ‘faithfully’ 
professed loyalty to the U.S.’s aims and objectives. The complete militarization of the 
post-war situation in Iraq did very little to foster effective interagency coordination and 
cooperation. Important actors in Washington and on the ground in Iraq found it 
extremely difficult to coordinate their efforts and execute their specific roles. U.S. 
agencies needed to work together to achieve Bush’s objectives in Iraq but they found it 
difficult to do so. As a result, U.S. post-war efforts to reconstruct Iraq and implant a 
model of ‘Western style’ liberal democracy in this country suffered a huge blow.  
The difficulties that arose from the State versus Defense turf war in Iraq should be 
placed into proper context. Overall, it must be appreciated that inter U.S. interagency 
coordination is of great importance because the United States conducts not only a global 
foreign policy but also a global military posture. The partnership between the two 
pillars of the U.S.’s national security strategy - Department of Defense (military) and 
U.S. State Department (diplomacy) - canvasses the entirety of regional and functional 
diplomacy. Counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counter proliferation, energy security, 
and counter trafficking are just some of the areas in which the work carried out by the 
two departments overlap and coincide (Shapiro 2012). Indeed, the interaction between 
the two departments occurs almost daily and crosses the broad spectrum of activities as 
they are increasingly thrust together in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and 
humanitarian missions – as they were in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia – to develop and 
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implement agreements or programmes for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. In the 
broad area of foreign policy in the security sector, it is almost unthinkable not to find an 
instance where State-Defense dialogue is not occurring (Shapiro 2012).  
The second question requiring further research is the serious impact the lack of 
credibility will have on the U.S. in the Arab world as it continues to present itself as a 
pro-democratic actor. The U.S.’s lack of credibility as a pro-democratic actor highlights 
a problem of fundamental importance. If left unaddressed, this credibility gap, as most 
commentators speculate, will undermine even the most well-intentioned efforts by the 
U.S. to promote positive political change in the region. Suffice to say, the United States 
can no longer afford to talk about democracy while downplaying its negative image in 
the majority of the Arab world. Given the conditions of U.S. presence in the Arab 
world, the U.S.’s aim to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Arab citizens must 
address and mitigate the root causes of anti-Americanism. Indeed, what is conclusive 
about the two factors focused on in this study as being responsible for the failure of 
Bush’s plans to democratize Iraq and Lebanon post-9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war, is that 
they are inextricably linked as it is U.S. policy-making or decision-making in the Arab 
world that has given rise to the rampant prevalence of anti-Americanism in this region. 
Iraq in particular created a real headache for democracy promoters and analysts of 
democracy promotion. The intervention in this country (justified in the first instance by 
security rationales but later strongly linked to the notion of advancing freedom and 
democracy) was responsible for creating an immediate and long-lasting suspicion of 
U.S. motives to promote democracy in the Middle East region. The promotion of war in 
defence of democracy, many democracy promoters have argued, is actually perverse 
and a difficult foreign policy position to maintain. It is also a policy, which in the long 
term can only serve to undermine the credibility of U.S. foreign policy 
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